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One: Introduction

1.1 An Overview
Over the past decades, the ROC criminal justice system has long been criticized
for its insufficient human rights protection, especially for the alleged criminal
offenders.
siege.

From 1947 to 1987, the ROC enforced martial law and was in a state of

In this era of martial law rule, ordinary citizens in the ROC jurisdiction lived

for four decades with little anticipation of any recognition of their inherent human
rights, not to mention the rights of the accused.

To some extent, it was considered a

privilege for an ordinary citizen to claim any right to an impartial trial.

The

guarantee of due process in the criminal justice system, which is today widely
perceived as essential to civil rights in any modem democracy, was virtually
non-existent in any ordinary criminal proceeding in Taiwan.
Following the development of democratic institutions which began in 1987, with
numerous interpretative pronouncements of the ROC Grand Justice Council 1 as well

1

Article 77 ofthe Constitution ofRepublic of China provides: The Judicial Yuan shall be the highest
judicial organ of the State and shall have charge of civil, criminal, and administrative cases, and over
cases concerning disciplinary measures against public functionaries. Article 78 of the Constitution of
Republic of China provides: The Judicial Yuan shall interpret the Constitution and shall have the power
to unify the interpretation of laws and orders. Article 79 of the Constitution ofRepublic of China
provides: The Judicial Yuan shall have a President and a Vice President, who shall be nominated and,
with the consent of the Control Yuan, appointed by the President of the Republic. The Judicial Yuan
shall have a number of Grand Justices to take charge of matters specified in Article 78 of this
Constitution, who shall be nominated and, with the consent of the Control Yuan, appointed by the
President of the Republic. Therefore, Grand Justice Council in Taiwan is the equivalent of the
Supreme Court in U.S., which mainly focuses on resolving constitutional arguments. Within the
framework of the Constitution of the Republic of China, the Grand Justices en masse ensure the
Constitution's effectiveness by actively guarding it from violations, and resolving disputes rising from
its application. The stature of the Grand Justices can therefore be construed as ''the Protectors of the
Constitution." Over half of a century has passed since the inception of the Grand Justices Council in
1948 as a functional arm ofthe Constitution itself. Transforming along with the Constitution through

' I
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2

as extensive knowledge accumulated from the introduction and comparison of various
modem foreign criminal justice systems (such as the United States, Japan and
Germany) , the people of Taiwan started to review their legal system. They gave
particular focus to its criminal justice system which influenced the daily life of the
people most.

They gradually reached the conclusion that the 1967 ROC Criminal

Procedure Code, based mainly on the continental German system, was clearly out of
date.
To prevent the miscarriage of justice, the design of criminal procedures must
focus on the protection of the rights of the alleged offenders.

In fact, the degree to

which the rights of the alleged offenders are protected during criminal proceedings

has been regarded as one of the indexes of a nation's civil developments.

In order to

I

t"

improve human rights protection of the citizens and of the alleged offenders in Taiwan,
the ROC government decided to amend its Criminal Procedure Code.

The ROC

"Legislative Yuan" 2 then passed critical drafts of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code

those years, the Grand Justices' authority as well as its operational protocol have repeatedly evolved,
and the confidence vested in the Grand Justices' interpretation of the Constitution as well as its unifonn
interpretation of the statutes and regulations have profoundly enhanced our constitutional democracy
and the democratic rule of law. In recent decades, Republic of China bas been highly regarded for its
rapid development of constitutional democracy. However, it seems that only few have taken note of
the strenuous efforts and outstanding contributions made by the Grand Justices to advance this
democratic struggle. Thus upon the publication of the first English volume of the Interpretations
Rendered by the Grand Justices, it would serve a useful purpose for the readers who are not quite
familiar with our constitutional system to herein provide an analysis in depth of the Grand Justices and
acknowledgment of their laudable role in this so-called ''tranquil revolution" for democracy and
protection of human rights. For more infonnation about Taiwan's Judicial Yuan and its Grand Justice
Council, see the ROC Judicial Yuan Website, available at: hm>://www.judicial.gov.tw (last visited, Feb.
24th, 2005) .
2

I

I

According to the ideas of Dr. Sun, Yet-sen's Five-Power Constitution, enacted and promulgated in
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in 1990, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004,
corresponding to the demand for human right protection.

3

From the viewpoint of comparative legal study, the recent ROC legislation which
might reshape its criminal procedure has given rise to a controversy regarding
whether the new ROC criminal justice system retains its "Inquisitorial Tradition" or
has it become "Accusatorial."4

The ROC Judicial Yuan and the Judicial

1947, the Legislative Yuan shall be the supreme legislative organization ofthe State, to be constituted
of members elected by the people, and it shall exercise legislative power on behalf of the people. The
Constitution of Republic of China provides that: (Article 62) The Legislative Yuan shall be the highest
legislative organ of the State, to be constituted of members elected by the people. It shall exercise
legislative power on behalf of the people. (Article 63)The Legislative Yuan shall have the power to
decide by resolution upon statutory or budgetary bills or bills concerning material law, amnesty,
declaration of war, conclusion of peace or treaties, and other important affairs of the State. In tenns of
its competence, power, and function, Taiwan's Legislative Yuan is equivalent to a parliament in other
democracies (such as the Congress in U.S.). For more detailed introduction to the Legislative Yuan of
ROC, see the ROC Legislative Yuan Website, available at: hty~://www.ly.gov.tw (last visited, Feb. 24th,
2005) .
3

As to the 2003 amendments, the report said, "To better safeguard human rights, the Legislative Yuan
on January 14th, 2003, passed revisions to the Law of Criminal Procedure, including important
revisions to rules of evidence. The changes include incorporating ''the principle of presumed
innocence" into the articles and setting more stringent conditions on the evidentiary force of a
defendant's confession. According to the implementation act passed along with the revisions to
criminal procedure, some articles will go into effect immediately upon promulgation, while other
important articles, including the incorporation of the principle of presumed innocence, will be
implemented as of September 1. The revisions to criminal procedure laid down several important
rules regarding defendants' confessions, which were much debated as a result of the retrial ofSu
Chien-ho. These include that confessions made during an interrogation in which the subject is
exhausted may not be taken into evidence and that the confession of an accomplice cannot serve as the
only evidence for a conviction. If a defendant states that his or her confession was extracted in an
improper manner, the court must undertake a priority investigation. If the confession was provided by
the prosecutor, the court shall order the prosecutor to prove that the defendant's confession was given
of his or her own free will. For example, if a defendant claims that a confession was extracted by
means of torture, the prosecutor must prove that there was no torture, or the court will not admit the
confession. The revisions also add provisions stating that when the officials handling a case are
investigating a crime and gathering evidence, to prevent evidence that contravenes a suspect's claims
from disappearing, it shall be photographed or measured. In urgent situations, investigators must take
the suspect's fingerprints, footprints, a hair sample, a saliva sample, a urine sample, a breath sample, or
a voice sample to facilitate investigation of the crime." See Rights of accused strengthened by
Legislature, United Daily News, January, 15, 2003, available at:
htm://th.gio.gov.tw/show.cfm?news id=l6534 (last visited, Feb. 21 51, 2005) .
4

This is because the fonner Criminal Procedure Code was promulgated based upon continental
inquisitorial models and those current effective amendments are derived mainly from the U.S.
accusatorial model.
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Subcommittee of the ROC Legislative Yuan both declared in the 2003 Advisory Note
that these newly enacted articles of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code are based on
the so-called "Improved-Accusatorial Principle" that is similar to Italy. 5

However,

what this "Improved-Accusatorial Principle" actually contains remains unclear and
needs to be disclosed, identified and defined in the near future.

1.2 Inquisitorial and Accusatorial
As Professor Craig M. Bradley mentioned in the Overview of his famous work,
"Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study," the inquisitorial system and the
accusatorial system are two main approaches to criminal procedure in most legal
systems of the world. 6

In a sense "the accusatorial approach often has been

contrasted with the inquisitorial model because of an emotional attitude which makes

s Italy is a traditional civil law country which adopted a Code of Criminal Procedure in 1989
dramatically moving away from its historically inquisitorial system of criminal justice to a system
infused with accusatorial elements, and therefore resulted in a mixed system. As mentioned, "these
changes may be organized broadly into three categories. First, are changes, which reconstructed the
nature of criminal investigations. The 1989 Code implemented checks on the previously discretionary
power of the police conducting investigations, abolished the inquisitorial investigative judge and
allocated primary investigatory responsibility to the public prosecutor, with the newly created judge for
preliminary investigations responsible for overseeing the course of the investigations. Second are
reforms designed to make criminal trials more orality, immediacy and publicity. Thus, trials in Italy
are open to the public, persons testifying do so live, in open court and in a direct and cross-examination
format conducted by the prosecutor, defense attorney and attorney for the private party. Somewhat
ironically, the democratic reforms to the trial have made the trial more complicated and
time-consuming requiring the less democratic reform which implemented a form of plea-bargaining,
historically unheard of in inquisitorial systems. Thus, the third category of reforms include devices
created to dispose of cases with greater efficiency by either moving a case to trial quickly, bypassing
the preliminary hearing phase, or allowing cases to be resolved at the preliminary hearing phase,
eliminating the need for a trial." See Rachel VanCleave, Italy, in Craig M. Bradley eds., Criminal
Procedure: A Worldwide Study, Chapter 8, 245 ( 1999) .
6

See Craig M. Bradley, Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study, Overview, xv ( 1999 ) .

5
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the former the haven of guaranteed civil right, and the latter the symbol of an
investigatory and judicial technique that sacrifices those same civil liberties on the
altar of law enforcement."7

Although the ROC Criminal Procedure Code was drawn

basically from the inquisitorial traditions, some scholars still consider the Republic of
China on Taiwan currently "employs an 'adversarial' legal system with a prosecutor
representing the plaintiff and a defense attorney representing the defendant, " 8
emphasizing the word "adversarial" merely on the appearance of the court structure,
which might confuse the distinction between inquisitorial and accusatorial systems.
Thus, this study prefers to using the word "accusatorial"rather than "adversarial" to
prevent the latter from implying that it is only within this type of system that there are
opposing prosecution and defense. 9

In fact, both modem accusatorial and

inquisitional systems have opposing parties.

The powers of the state are separated

between a prosecutor and the judge, allowing the defendant the right to counsel. 10

7

See Ennio Amodio and Eugenio Selvaggi, An accusatorial system in a civil law country: the 1988
Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, 62 Temple Law Review 1211, 1213 ( 1989) .

8

See Chuen-Jim Sheu and Shu-Lung Yang, Taiwan, in WORLD FACTBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEMS, available at: htn>://www.ojp.usdoLgovlbjs/pub/ascii/wfbcjtai.txt( last visited, Feb.
20th, 2005) . This country report is one of many prepared for the World Factbook of Criminal Justice
System under Grant No. 90-BJ-CX-0002 from the Bureau of Justice Statistics to the State University of
New York at Albany. The project director for the World Factbook of Criminal Justice was Graeme R
Newman, but responsibility for the accuracy of the information contained in each report is that of the
individual author.
9

Of course, when the word "adversarial" or "adversary" does not cause the misunderstanding, or the
cited authority uses the word "adyersarial" or "adversary," this study will use the word "adversarial" or
"adversary."
10

Indeed, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Article 6 requires
these features in the legal systems of its signatory states. See: Wikipedia Encyclopedia, Adversary
System, available at: htn>://en2. wikipedia.org/wiki/Adversruy system
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In general, the inquisitorial legal system, usually found on the continent of
Europe among civil law systems (those deriving from the Roman or Napoleonic
codes), allows a theoretically neutral judge or a panel of judges to investigate the case
ex officio and determine the guilt or innocence.

An accused is usually questioned as

a non-witness by judges who have full access to the case from reading the relevant
dossiers before any further investigation. 11

Not all witnesses are cross-examined

during the trial that might last more than a year.

Both the behavior of the police and

I
~

the conduct of judicial proceedings are governed by the detailed Criminal Procedure

I,
I

Code. 12
On the contrary, the accusatorial system is generally adopted in common law
countries, relying on the skills of the different advocates representing their party's
positions and not on some neutral party, the judge, trying to ascertain the truth of a
case. 13

An accusatorial trial is held before a neutral decision maker, a judge or jury,

without prior knowledge of the case apart from reading the dossiers. 14

Judges in an

accusatorial system tend to be more interested in ensuring a fair play of due process

11

See Myron Moskovitz, The O.J. Inquisition: A United States Encounter with Continental Criminal
Justice, 28 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 1121, 1124 ( 1995) .
12

See Craig M. Bradley, supra note 6.

13

See Wikipedia Encyclopedia, supra note 10.

14

See Craig M. Bradley, supra note, 6.
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and decide, often when called upon by counsel rather than of their own motion, what
evidence is to be admitted when there is a dispute. 15
has a right to a jury.

The accused or the defendant

The attorneys conduct the trial, with each side attempting to

convince the decision maker of the rectitude of his position.

16

The trial is

continuously heard and all relavant evidence against the defendant must be presented
by live witnesses in court who are subject to cross-examination.

17

One can fairly state that the continental criminal procedure carries the imprint of
the inquisitorial pattern, and the criminal process in common law countries is
fashioned after the accusatorial tradition.

In summary, "the parties' initiativ.e in

collecting and producing evidence" and "the corresponding role the judge has to play
as the referee in a dispute in which the public prosecutor is fully responsible for the
burden of defending society by suppressing criminal behavior" are distinct
characteristics of an accusatorial system. 18

The inquisitorial procedure is, however,

a procedure where "the judge is expected to take the fact-finding initiative both before
and during trial; the state, rather than the parties, is responsible for eliciting the facts

15

However, in some common law jurisdictions, judges play more of a role in deciding what evidence
to admit into the record or reject. See Wikipedia Encyclopedia, supra note 10.
16

See Craig M. Bradley, supra note 6.

17

Id.

18

See Ennio Amodio, supra note 7.
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of the criminal case." 19
In reality, there is no jury trial in the ROC criminal justice system, professional
judges there were generally required to investigate all kinds of evidence ex o:fficio
and to determine the guilt or innocence.

20

The defendant was required to stand trial

and to be questioned by both prosecutors and judges. 21

Undoubtedly, the pre-2003

ROC criminal justice syatem could be categorized under the pure inquisitorial
approach.

In the following section, before introducing the whole framework of the

ROC criminal justice system in Chapter Two, this study will present a flagrant and
controversial murder case 22 from which readers will learn more than a first
impression of the extremely inquisitorial practice in the pre-2003 ROC criminal
justice system.

19

Id.

20

No matter before or after its amendments in 2003, the ROC Criminal Procedure Code allows judges
to investigate, see Article 94, 95, 96, 97 ... etc. of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
21

l

In 2003, for the first time, Paragraph 4 of Article 156 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code grants
the defendant the right to remain silent Thus, an accused is allowed to refuse to answer questions
during investigation and at trial.
22

According to the report of Amnesty International, this case is a miscarriage of justice, which has
exposed many flaws in the ROC criminal justice system. The case against the three defendants is
based almost entirely on their confessions that were allegedly extracted through torture. Amnesty
International asserts that a full and impartial investigation of these allegations must take place before
any criminal trial can proceed. The ROC criminal justice system has seen many improvements since
the early 1990s, when the investigative irregularities and alleged torture of this case took place. New
legislation, with stronger safeguards against the use of evidence illegally obtained through torture, has
been put in place. Amnesty International believes that this case demonstrates the flaws in the ROC
criminal justice system.
More detailed descriptions and analyses ofthis murder case are available at:
http://www.amnesty.org (last visited, Feb. 25th, 2005) , and
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/EA25Ad03.html (last visited, Feb. 25th, 2005) , from which the
following section is adapted.
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1.3 A Controversial Murder Case Prompting Calls for Criminal Justice Reform
On the night of23 March 1991, Ms. In-lan Yeh and her husband Mr. Ming-han
Wu were both stabbed to death at their home in the town of Hsichih County in the
northern part of Taiwan.

Five months later, on 13 August 1991, police traced a

fingerprint left at the scene of the crime to a marine soldier named Mr. Wen-hsiao
Wang.

He was taken into custody on 13 August 1991, and confessed to the police

immediately.

More than 36 hours after he had been taken into custody, Mr.

Wen-hsiao Wang added new information to his confession, and implicated his brother,

Mr. Wen-chung Wang, and his brother's three classmates, whom he could not name,
as accomplices.
warrant.

Police hereupon detained Mr. Wen-chung Wang without an arrest

He therefore named his three classmates, Mr. Bing-lang Liu, Mr. Chien-ho

Su and Mr. Lin-hsun Chuang, as his accomplices in the murder.
Since Mr. Wen-hsiao Wang was tried speedily by a military court, found guilty
and executed in January 1992, it is unknown whether he was ill-treated during
interrogation by the military prosecutor and the police because the military court
proceedings of his trial were later reported by the authorities to have been lost.

His

brother, Mr. Wen-chung Wang, was also tried by a military court and sentenced to two
years and eight months' imprisonment, which he has already served. 23

23

Mr. Wen-chung Wang served two years in prison for his alleged role as an accomplice in the crime.
After his release he retracted his oral evidence and stated publicly that the police had forced him to

IO
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In August 1991, the police arrested those three persons then aged 18 on 15
August 1991 in Hsichih.

The police did not have any arrest warrant, did not inform

these men's families about the arrests and searched Mr. Chuang's home without a
search warrant.

During interrogation by the Hsichih police, each of the three

suspects was told that the others had already confessed.

It is worth noting that none

of the confessions they made were consistent with each other and all three later denied
committing the murder.

Although a large amount of physical evidence, including

blood and fingerprints, was found at the scene of the crime, none of it has ever been
linked to these three suspects.

Their confessions differ on key points such as the

timing of the offense, the kind of murder weapons used, and the motive for the crime.
They were all charged with offenses under the Act for the Control and Punishment of
Banditry with robbery, murder and rape, a combination of offenses, which carries a
mandatory death sentence on 4 October 1991.

Their trial opened before Shilin

District Court on 11 October 1991 and they were tried before a panel of three·judges.
During the trial, the three young men asserted to have been tortured and coerced to
make false confessions and that there had been no direct or physical evidence to
convict them other than their confessions.l4

implicate his classmates.
on II January I992.
24

In addition, Mr. Wen-hsiao Wang was executed for his part in the murders

Three of them all described being beaten and having water or urine forced into their mouths. Mr.
Su and Mr. Chuang also claimed to have been subjected to electric shocks to their genitals, and in Mr.

11
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Even though the ROC Criminal Procedure Code has not allowed conviction
solely on the basis of confession, confessions frequently constitute the major item of
evidence in criminal cases in Taiwan, especially before its amendment in 2003.

In

this case, the court based its verdict almost exclusively on those "alleged coerced"
confessions.

Corroborative evidence was almost completely non-existent.

There

were no corroborating eye witnesses and no direct physical evidence linking the
co-defendants to those crimes.

The allegations of torture and obvious lack of

material evidence, coupled with extensive irregularities in the investigative process,
including unlawful detentions and illegal searches, give grave cause for concern that
there has been a miscarriage of justice in this case.

Moreover, while the defendants

were not allowed to challenge the admissibility of the out-of-court statements at that
time, during the district court proceedings the panel of judges reportedly refused to
call some of the defense witnesses. 25

The coroner's testimony appeared to rule out

any possibility that the female victim had been raped and forensic evidence from the
scene of those crimes was obviously not presented to the court.

In spite of this, the

men were all found guilty of all charges and on 18 February 1992 were sentenced to

Su's case, police allegedly smeared a concentrated chemical on the wounds on his genitals caused by
the electric shocks. Mr. Liu also asserted that police put a thick yellow book against his chest and
hammered him on the chest and then hung him upside down and started pouring water and urine into
his mouth.
25

The defendants tried to call their fellow prisoners who might have corroborated the men's allegation
of torture and several other people who claimed to have seen the three men elsewhere on the night of
the murder.
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death.

12

After a lengthy and convoluted series of appeals to both the High Court and

the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court on 13 February 1995 confirmed the original
verdicts and the final sentence was rendered. 26
Although each judicial instance in Taiwan sentenced them to death, they were
not executed since the case was considered an obvious miscarriage of justice·for years.
None of the five Ministers of the Department of Justice in office since 1995 was
willing to sign the warrant for the execution.27 In addition, the "ROC General Public
Prosecutor" has filed special appeals28 for them based on their defenses of torture and
coerced confession, which were all denied by the Supreme Court.

After the granting

of retrial for them on November 2000, 29 the Taiwan Taipei High Court for the first
time acquitted these three defendants on 13 January 2003 because of insufficient
evidence 30 but in August 2003 the ROC Supreme Court overturned that verdict and

26

While the evidence for conviction was sufficient pursuant to then effective criminal procedure law,
the ROC Supreme Court affirmed the convicts.
27

Article 461 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code provides: "A death penalty shall be subject to the
approval of the highest judicial administrative organ by issuance an order and shall be executed within
three days after receipt of the said order; Provided, that where the public prosecutor in charge of the
execution has found that merits of the case actually present some grounds for a retrial or an
extraordinary appeal (special appeal) , he may, within three days, request the highest judicial
administrative organ to reexamine the case."
28

Article 441 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code provides: "If it is discovered after a final judgment
that the trial was conducted contrary to law, the public Prosecutor-General may file an extraordinary
appeal (special appeal) with the Supreme Court."
29

l

~
I

The verdict is not uncontroversial because prior to this judgment, more than 40 judges have heard
this murder case in its various stages.
30

Mr. Kuo-tsai Tsai, spokesman for the Taiwan High Court, said that weakness in the evidence against
the three were the main reason for the acquittal. For example, the fingerprints and hair collected at
the crime scene did not match theirs. Their individual testimonies did not match one another either.
The kitchen knife believed to have been the murder weapon was "lost'' during military trial. See
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ordered the case to be remanded to the Taiwan Taipei High Court.

13

31

The three men

had already spent more than seven years on death row before their acquittal on 13
January 2003.

If they are found guilty in the new trial, they will face the death

penalty once more.

Even though after twelve years of investigation and nine trials in

the District Court and the High Court, the Supreme Court's judgment in August 2003
then remained debatable on many issues relating to the murder case, such as the
applicability of the exclusionary rule to police misconduct and the admissibility of the
out-of-court statements and the credibility of scientific evidence, etc.

This murder

case is pending trial even as of now.
What had been an almost forgotten case suddenly leaped into the public eye as
the nation's top prosecutor basically admitted to having made a mistake.

The case

has been at the forefront of human rights concerns in Taiwan ever since.

What this

suggests is that the ROC Criminal Procedure Code needs a thorough review.

The

case has sparked an emotional debate concerning the ROC criminal justice system
between the courts, legislators, attorneys, and human rights groups.

Even the

Taiwan Headline, January 14, 2003, available at: http://th.gio.gov.tw/show.cfm?news id=I6526
visited, Feb. 19th, 2005 ) .
31

(last

The Supreme Court's August 2003 judgment commented that ''there is much room for debate" on
many issues related to the case. For example, a large amount of physical evidence, including blood
and fingerprints, was found at the scene of the crime, but none of it has ever been linked to those three,
and the confessions of the three differ on key points such as the timing of the offence, the kind of
murder weapons used, and the motive for the crime. The allegations of torture and apparent lack of
material evidence, coupled with extensive irregularities in the investigative process, including unlawful
detentions and an illegal search, give grave cause for concern that there has been a miscarriage of
justice in this case. See 92 Tai Sun 43 87 (Aug. 8th, 2003 ) .
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President of the ROC was asked to pardon. 32

Whatever that decision may be, the

murder case has served to force the ROC criminal justice system out of the shadow of
its authoritarian political past and turn it into the semblance of something so that a
modern liberal democracy does not have to be ashamed of.

1.4 The Motive and Purpose of this Study
This controversial murder case not only attracts international attentions

33

but

also is a good symbol exemplifying the infamous inquisitorial practical reality of the
previous ROC criminal justice system over the past decades.

Mr. Brian Kennedy, a

board member of Amnesty International Taiwan and a former public defender in
California in U.S.A., even once criticized: "It was the worst example of judicial
incompetence I have ever seen."34

Of course, judicial incompetence and miscarriage

of justice might result from the corruption, laziness, or stupidity of those running the

32

While the author of this study was a staff member in the ROC President Office (the equivalent to the
White House of the United States) in 2000, in charge of nationwide pardon affairs, the President once
considered to give amnesty to the three in fact However, before the official documents of pardon
being issued, the ROC Supreme Court accepted the appeal and ordered the Taiwan Taipei High Court
to prepare rehearing and to have a retrial again on 23 September 2000, which made the case
inconsistent with the ROC Pardon Act.

'

'I

33

Amnesty International Organization and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of U.S.
Department of State both reported this murder case in their annual reports. More information about
their reports is available at: http://www.aronesty.org (last visited, Feb. 23nl, 2005) and
htql://www.nationbynation.com!faiwan!Human.html (last visited, Feb. 23nl, 2005) . See also
Laurence Eyton, Taiwan Justice: The ghost of authoritarianism, in Asian Times, available at:
htt.p://www.atimes.com/atimes/china/EA25Ad03.html (last visited, Feb. 23nl, 2005 ) .

I

I~
'

'

~ I f 'I

34

See Anthony Spaeth, Facing the Firing Squad, Time Asia, l 54 Vol. 17 (Nov. 1999 ) .
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system, however, the nature and the legal framework of a respective criminal justice
system should be a more important source from which injustice might derive. 35
Since this case resulted in examinations of the ROC criminal justice system over the
"Confession Law," the "Procedures of Search, Seizure and Arrest," the "Exclusionary
Rule," the "Hearsay Rule," and the "Due Process" as well as "the probative value of
the forensic evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the seventy-nine wounds
on the victims had been inflicted by only one instrument," legislative concerns are
intentionally focused on how to improve the rights of the accused, suspects and
defendants both in police custody and in the courtroom itself at a later stage.
For instance, there emerges a requirement that the accused upon arrest must be
notified of their legal rights. 36

In addition, interrogations must be taped in order to

assure the voluntariness and reality of confessions. 37

In the courtroom, confessions

by the accused will no longer be enough to secure convictions like those in the
Hsichih Case, and accusations by victims and lay witnesses are subject to

35

For example, the records and materials collected by prosecutors and the police were the basis of the
trial in the past, and the accused had no right to challenge what might not be admissible under the U.S.
Hearsay Rule. This practice was also against the civil law principles of orality and immediacy which
are designed to find the real truth under the continental idea. Although the injustice might also come
from the corruption, laziness, or stupidity of the people running the system, If the law provides the
accused with the right to challenge or prove what he believed to be true, the trial would be more fair,
and injustice will be going down.
36

See Article 95 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code. It is similar to the Miranda rights in the
United States. See Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 ( 1966) .
37

See Article 100-1 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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cross-examination under the accusatorial process as a matter of princi pie. 38

Thus,

records and materials collected by public prosecutors during the investigative phase
will no longer become the basis of the verdict unless the accused confesses the guilt
and the alleged facts of the offense.

Furthermore, there should be "sufficient

evidence" independent of confessions. 39

In order to deter police's misconduct, a

discretionary exclusionary rule is also adopted. 40

Those tremendous changes are

intentionally designed to both carry out the civil law principles of"orality and
immediacy,"41 and to preempt any potential misconduct similar to those in the
"Hsichih Murder Case" from recurring, the all-too-common police practice of beating
a suspect into confessing and securing a conviction based on that confession.
there are some drafts pending.

Still,

Relying upon those legal perspectives, this study

plans to explore how the ROC inquisitorial criminal justice traditions accommodate
the pertinent American legal concepts.
Besides, this study also intends to deal with the problem regarding expert
evidence in the ROC criminal justice system since behaviors involving medical
38

See Articles 159, 159-1, 159-2, 159-3, 159-4, and 159-5 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

39

See Article 156 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

40

See Article 15 8-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

41

As Professor William T. Pizzi and Judge Luca Marafioti explained, "orality and immediacy are
terms of art in civil law systems. 'Orality' connotes the practice of presenting evidence orally in open
court, rather than relying on written statements. 'Immediacy' refers to the fact that no intermediary
separates the trier of fact and law from the parties and witness." See William T. Pizzi and Luca
Marafioti, The New Italian Code ofCrimina1 Procedure: the Difficulties of an Adversarial Trial System
on A Civil Law Foundation, 17 Yale J. lnt' 1 L. 1, at 4 ( 1992) .
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malpractice or Intellectual Property Right infringements in Taiwan are criminal
offenses.

In practice, for instance, the court's judgment in a medical malpractice

lawsuit heavily depends on the report of an expert.

Yet, it is unclear how the court

should apply the expert's report as no relevant law exists.

When conflicting expert

reports or opinions come out, this defect becomes more evident.

In addition, there is

also an interesting phenomenon that each party at trial, no matter in a civil or a
criminal case, does not seriously try to cross-examine the expert who offers decisive
opinions.

Each party merely insists that the opinion of which he is in favor is correct.

In a word, expert evidence is an undeveloped area in the ROC criminal justice system.
Comparing to the ROC expert evidence system, situations in the United States
are much different.

Each trial lawyer who seeks to furnish scientific evidence or to

adduce expert testimony is working with substantive information involving "scientific,
technical and other specialized knowledge. " 42

The use of expert knowledge in the

resolution of legal disputes, as well as other kinds of disputes, is ubiquitous. 43

42

43

While

See Rule 702 of the Federal Rule of Evidence ( FRE 702) .

Concerning application of scientific evidence in a lawsuit in the United States, the Frye standard was
the controlling standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence in federal courts until Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, was decided in 1993. This case laid down a standard for
admissibility that made it more difficult for a party to admit novel scientific evidence than if that
evidence were not scientific evidence. Prior to 1975, the common law had governed the evolution of
evidence law in federal courts. In 1975, the Congress adopted the Federal Rules ofEvidence that
appeared, effectively, to codify and replace common law evidence. The question arose to whether
FRE 702, which addressed the admissibility of expert opinion testimony, superseded the Frye standard
that was a creation of the common law. IfFRE 702 did supersede the Frye standard, then a different
standard of admissibility would apply. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the U.S. Supreme
Court resolved the dilemma. The Daubert laid out a number of non-exclusive criteria with which a
court could assess the reliability of a scientific technique. But the court did not address how those
criteria apply to a case. This study will examine those related developments in Chapter 4 in more

18
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the development in the United States focuses on how to qualify an expert as "a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,

,.

may testify," the ROC Criminal Procedure Code seems not to care about whether the
scientific opinion comes from a "qualified expert."

L'

As a result, the parties can

present any thing possible in evidence whatever the court permits.

The following

case illustrates how this happened in the ROC criminal justice system.

In an interesting and famous fraud offense case,44 for example, the defendant,
Ms. Ying Zhang, 45 asked to show the court her ability of"getting the medicine out of
nothing" in front of a panel of judges of the Taipei High Court.

The court fmally

allowed her to "perform her show'' during the trial, but she did not get anything.
Even though allowing the defendant to perform her magic power did not fall within
the scope of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, it has "never" been criticized,
even from the United States point of view, in Taiwan.

It is worth mentioning that

nobody in Taiwan doubts if the court should examine whether the defendant is
capable of "making something out of nothing."

It is also "surprising" that the public

prosecutor in charge of the case, in order to make sure if Ms. Zhang really had the

detail.
44

45

See 90 Sun E 2963 (a Taipei High Court's decision, 2001) .

Ms. Zhang claimed to be endowed with an extraordinary power to produce medicinal powder or pill
in her palm out of air.
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ability to get something out of nothing, did inquire into a well-known scholar who has
been doing researches in the field of"extraordinary power," Professor Si-Chen Li.

46

Before the public prosecutor, Professor Li testified that he did witness the defendant
obtaining kinds of powder and pills out of air once yet he was not sure if it was false.
According to his own study and research, however, he said it might be true in a sense.
The Taipei High Court therefore discharged the fraud offense, reasoning there existed
reasonable doubt if the defendant was capable of getting medicine out of air, mainly
based on Professor Li 's testimony, but convicted the defendant of practicing medicine
without license.

The defendant, Ms. Ymg Zhang, as a result, was sentenced to 13

months in prison and five years of probation in violation of the former Medical
Doctor Act, Article 28 by Taipei High Court on 25 April 2002. 47

It is very interesting while the Anglo-American system only allows the court to

46

Professor Si-Chen Li, a Ph. D. in Electronic Engineering from Stanford University ( C.A., U.S.A.) ,
teaches Electronic Engineering and Parapsychology (including Chinese Chi and Extraordinary power)
at National Taiwan University ( NTU) . He has studied in Parapsychology from 1989 and published
numbers of papers about it. Generally speaking, Professor Li is a well-known scholar with authority
in parapsychology in Taiwan. The author of this study took his parapsychology class at NTU. More
detailed information about Professor Li is available at: htt,p://sclee.ee.ntu.edu.tw (last visited, Feb. 24th,

2005) .
47

It is worth noting that the district court judge convicted the defendant on the fraud offence, which
means the judge did not believe the defendant had ability to get something out of nothing so she did
deceive, after considering Professor Li's testimony in the dossier. Different from U.S.A., Article 55
of the ROC Criminal Code provides: "If one act constitutes several unlike offenses or the means
employed or the results of the commission of one offense constitute another unlike offense, only the
most severe of the prescribed punishments shall be imposed." Since the fraud offence is a more
serious offence than practicing medicine without license, only when the more serious offence is
discharged does the less serious offence become an issue. While the district court convicted on the
fraud offence, it was then unnecessary to impose on the less serious offence. This is why the Taipei
High Court only addressing the offence of practicing medicine without license after discharging the
fraud offence.

Ir
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decide whether evidence is admissible under FRE 702 but the ROC legal tradition
does not prohibit the court from addressing substantial 'scientific' issues.

It is also

impressive and worthy of studying that people in Taiwan seem to accept this practice.
Furthermore, while "Hypnosis" is provided as an element of offenses in the ROC
Criminal Law, 48 it is unavoidable for the court to evaluate whether the state of
hypnosis exists in any relevant case.

In addition to Ms. Zhang's fraud case, issues in

medical malpractice, accountant's liability in auditing, traffic accidents ... etc. also
arise within the scope of expert evidence.

Although the ROC Criminal Procedure

Code adopted some articles addressing this in 2003, it is still unclear for the ROC
criminal justice system to see how expert evidence system should be, particularly
when judges in Taiwan are all vocational with rare scientific background and
expenence.
As a researcher from Taiwan, it is particularly meaningful to explore these topics
on the basis of those criminal cases while Taiwan is now trying to adapt its criminal
justice system by modeling after its American analogue.

48

As Professor William T.

For example, Paragraph 1 of Article 221 of the ROC Criminal Law provides: A male who renders
resistance of a female impossible by threats or violence, by administering drugs, by inducing
"hypnosis" or other means and who has sexual intercourse with her is considered to have committed
rape. Article 224 of the ROC Criminal Law provides: Anyone who renders resistance of another
person impossible by threats or violence, by administering drugs, by inducing "hypnosis" or other
means and who commits a indecent act to a male or female shall be punished with imprisonment for
not more than seven years. Paragraph 1 of Article 328 of the ROC Criminal Law provides: Anyone
who by threats, violence, by administering drugs, by inducing "hypnosis" or by other means rendering
resistance impossible takes away a thing belonging to another or causes him or her to deliver it over
with intent illegally to appropriate it for herself or for a third party commits robbery.
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Pizzi and Judge Luca Marafioti pointed out:
"Because the civil law system places singular importance on ascertaining the truth
at trial, it erects few evidentiary barriers that restrict the information the judge can
consider in determining guilt.

Continental systems of criminal justice have no

equivalent of the Federal Rules of Evidence, since fixed evidentiary rules might
lead to the exclusion of important probative evidence.

Constitutional

exclusionary rules, such as those that have been read into the Fourth Amendment,
similarly are anathema.

In contrast, the U.S. system of criminal justice

frequently subordinates the finding of truth to the protection of constitutional
rights.

Exclusion is used to deter improper police conduct and protect the rights

of citizens, despite the potential effect on the outcome of certain trials." 49
It seems unavoidable to examine and compare all related procedural principles
between both "Inquisitorial" and "Accusatorial" systems in order to make sure if
adopting a respective legal institution in the Anglo-American system is actually
necessary and meaningful.

Only after becoming fully informed can the ROC make a

better choice of what it really needs and what really works.

Moreover, only when

law reformers in Taiwan have a better understanding of the legal culture behind the
new system can they take some measures to solve the possible conflict of different

49

See William T. Pizzi, supra note 41, 7.
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cultures.

/I'

Only after making sure of adoption of a new legal institution can meet its

',I,,
'I

needs will the proposed drafts not constitute just another thoughtless and senseless
•I
'I

"westernization," devoid of any practical usefulness.

' '·
I

The 1967 ROC Criminal Procedure Code was stemming from Germany and
Japan at the very beginning.

But the recent and potential amendments derive from

the Anglo-American criminal justice system.

'•

It is an interesting but serious issue

about how to attune those American style amendments in the civil-law-based ROC
legal framework.

Accordingly, as the supreme judicial authority, the ROC Grand

Justices Council will unavoidably face some forthcoming "constitutional
challenges" 50 resulting from discrepancies between those two different criminal
justice systems.

This study intends to provide with the systematic rationales behind

the newly adopted provisions of the exclusionary rule and the hearsay rule in the ROC
Criminal Procedure Code.

1.5 The Method Employed in this Study
This study has been carried out on the basis of a systematic documentary

50

I

,l

See Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the "LAW OF INTERPRETATION PROCEDURE FOR GRAND
JUSTICES." It provides: "The grounds on which the petitions for interpretation of the Constitution
may be made are as follows: ... 2. When an individual, a legal entity, or a political party, whose
constitutional right was infringed upon and remedies provided by law for such infringement had been
exhausted, has questions on the constitutionality of the statute or regulation relied thereupon by the
court of last resort in its final judgment. .. "
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research and a comparative study using in depth information of both the ROC and the
United States criminal procedure laws and evidence rules from both English and
Chinese language sources. A comparative analysis is therefore an important
approach adopted by this study.

The data has been systematically organized,

analyzed, and compared before and in the process of the comparative approach.51 It
is not infrequent that a case analysis is performed in order to identify the potential
result of future Taiwanese court's decisions relating to its recently adopted articles.

1.6 The Scope and Contents of this Study
This study focuses on the recently enacted "Pro-Accusatorial" provisions in the
ROC Criminal Procedure Code, the exclusionary rule and the hearsay rule, and their
Anglo-American counterparts.

Since these recently adopted articles are part of the

current ROC Criminal Procedure Code, it is desirable to introduce the current legal
framework of the ROC criminal justice system and the related practices, including
their former counterparts.

This study will present briefly the legal history of Taiwan,

the past inquisitorial practices of the ROC criminal justice system, and some
important enactments in the ROC Criminal Procedure Code Chapter Two.

See Watchara Neitivanich, SECURING ONLINE COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS BY
DIGITAL SIGNATURES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. E-SIGN ACT AND THAI
E-TRANSACTIONS ACT, 23 (an unpublished S.J.D. Dissertation of the Golden Gate University
School ofLaw, 2003, 12) .
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In order to compare the criminal justice systems between the United States and
I

i

I

,,

the ROC, Chapter Three will present the historical developments of the

I

Anglo-American accusatorial criminal procedure.

I (

Chapter Four then focuses on the

I,

I

historical developments of the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment to the
:i

llI

United States Constitution and the evidential rules of hearsay.

I
II

After reviewing the

pertinent inquisitorial and accusatorial criminal procedural issues in both the ROC

i\

I '
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and the United States, this study will go on with its comparative analyses in Chapter

I
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"
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Five.

Each part of comparative analysis in Chapter Five will be based on the major

ij
It

difference between inquisitorial and accusatorial legacies in these two legal systems. 52
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According to Professor William T. Pizzi and Judge Luca Marafioti's observation, for example, the
major difference between inquisitorial and accusatorial legacies obtaining in these two legal systems
can be illustrated by the following statements: "To appreciate the effect of switching from a civil law
trial system to a more adversarial trial system, it is important to understand some of the fundamental
differences between the two paradigmatic systems. As an initial matter, the central issue in a civil law
trial is very different from the central issue in an adversarial trial. In an adversarial trial, the central
determination is whether the prosecution can prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
If the prosecutor fails to meet this burden, whether because of negligence or simply a lack of evidence,
the rules of the adversarial system dictate that the prosecution loses. The judge in the adversarial
system is kept largely unfamiliar with the pretrial file in an effort to preserve neutrality. Once at trial,
the judge plays only a passive role in the development of evidence. Judges are far more active trial
participants in civil law systems. The judge, rather than the parties, is responsible for developing the
evidence at trial, calling and questioning witnesses himself. To aid in his investigation, the judge has
access to the pretrial file prior to the trial's commencement The involvement of the public prosecutor
and defense attorney is generally limited to asking occasional follow-up questions or suggesting other
lines of inquiry. As the name implies, the inquisitorial system places primary responsibility for
developing the facts in the hands of the judge. Because the civil law system places singular
importance on ascertaining the truth at trial, it erects few evidentiary barriers that restrict the
information the judge can consider in determining guilt Continental systems of criminal justice have
no equivalent of the Federal Rules of Evidence, since fixed evidentiary rules might lead to the
exclusion of important probative evidence. Constitutional exclusionary rules, such as those that have
been read into the Fourth Amendment, similarly are anathema. In contrast, the U.S. system of
criminal justice frequently subordinates the finding of truth to the protection of constitutional rights.
Exclusion is used to deter improper police conduct and protect the rights of citizens, despite the
potential effect on the outcome of certain trials. Defendant participation also differs greatly under the
two systems. The trial in a civil law system usually begins with an examination of the defendant by
the judge, exploring the defendant's background as well as his knowledge of, or participation in, the
alleged crime. Questions are frequently directed to the defendant throughout the remainder of the trial.
While the defendant has the right to refuse to answer any questions, such refusals are exceptional; the
presumption in civil law systems is that the defendant should cooperate with the trial judge and answer
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While the ROC new criminal justice system includes some Anglo-American
characteristics, it is interesting to examine to what extent the ROC new criminal
justice system remains inquisitorial.

Similarly, to what extent the ROC new criminal

justice system has become accusatorial also deserves serious attention.

In Chapter

Five, therefore, this study will review and compare the above-mentioned aspects and
identify which parts in the Anglo-American practices might not be applicable in the
ROC criminal justice system.

In addition to pointing out those inapplicable aspects, this study will also tender
its tentative recommendations regarding the ROC expert evidence system.

While

such as some IP infringements and medical malpractices will continue to be criminal
offenses in Taiwan, this study will introduce the "expert jury" institution and
recommend substituting it for the currently pending draft of empanelling the court
with the participating non-professional expert judges and professional judges.

This

study will also explain why it is better than the pending draft when dealing with the
highly complicated scientific or technical issues in Chapter Five.

Finally, Chapter

Six of this study concludes this dissertation with its recommendations for the better

questions completely. The defendant's cooperation is also encouraged by the fact that his sentence, as
well as his guilt, is determined at a single trial. A defendant who wishes to offer evidence of
mitigating circumstances thus must speak at trial in order to place such evidence before the court.
Since pretrial investigations usually are quite thorough, and since most defendants also cooperate with
the pretrial investigation, the inquisitorial system presents less potential for evidentiary surprises than a
criminal trial in the United States. A complete file, which includes statements from all potential
witnesses, is assembled in advance of trial and made available to the defense." See William T. Pizzi,
supra note 41, 7-9.
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expert evidence system and what the ROC exclusionary rule and hearsay rule may
mean.
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Two: The ROC Criminal Justice System

2.1 Historical Background of Inquisitorial Tradition
Before discussing the current ROC criminal justice system, it is desirable to
understand the special "colonial background"53 of Taiwan from which inquisitorial
tradition derived.

2.1.1 Colonial History
Taiwan had been a neglected island before the seventeenth century.

Before

1662, Taiwan was partly colonized by the Dutch from 1624 and the Spainish from
1628 to 1642. 54

After Mr. Cheng-gong Jheng defeated the Dutch in 1662 and set up

the Ming Dynasty Government, Taiwan was governed by the Chinese for the first
time, and there were about 40,000 Chinese people living in Taiwan. 55
Twenty-one years later, while the then ruler, Jheng's grandson, surrendered
control of the island to the Ching Dynasty in 1683, the Ching Dynasty began to rule
Taiwan for two hundred and twelve years until1895. 56

After Japan won the

53

To some extent, Taiwan was "colonized" in turn by the Dutch, the Spanish, the Chinese, and the
Japanese.

54

See Taiwan Yearbook 2003, available at:
htlJl://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbooklchpt03.htm

55

Id.

56

ld.

(last visited, Feb. 22nd, 2005) .
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Sino-Japanese war, Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895 pursuant to the Treaty of
Shimonoseki. 57

From 1895 to 1945, as a result, Taiwan was controlled by the

Japanese Government.

Following the defeat of Japan and the surrender in August

' I"

1945 at the end of World War II, Taiwan was retroceded to the Chinese, then the
'I
Jl

?

Republic of China government, on October 25th and again placed under Chinese

ll

governance.

il
J:

I~
'!!

II

2.1 .2 Inquisitorial Legacy

l
'I

There is no argument Chinese culture has been existing for more than 5000 years.

!I
!
I
I'

Confucius, one of the greatest philosiphers in Chinese history, introduced the concept

,,

of the importance of society over the individual which has survived in Chinese culture

~I

and has influenced the evolution of the traditional Chinese legal system. 58

il

addition, Confucius also introduced another legacy requiring people to defer to

1

I,

In

:I
III.,,
,,

I
.I

I;

1'

ancestors, leaders, and members of elite class encouraging class differences, a

J

1

f

pervasive theme throughout the Chinese imperial culture. 59

It is fair to say that

11

II
I
I

Confucianism has greatly formed the thought of Chinese society, including its ethics,

:

S7

Id.

sa See Derk Bodde, China's Cultural Tradition, 1-2 (N.Y. Rinehart, 1957) .
See Pamella A. Seay, Law, Crime, and Punishm~nt in the People's Republic of China: A
Comparative Introduction to the Criminal Justice and Legal System of the People's Republic of China,
9 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 143, 143 ( 1998) .
59
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its political theory, 60 and the ways in which disputes were resolved in traditional
China.

61

According to Taiwan's history, Taiwan was ruled by the Chinese for most of its
recorded history.

Chinese legal traditions therefore influenced Taiwan's legal

developments much more than others.

Traditional feudal Chinese government was

under a centralized system which accorded the then ruler judicial power as well as
executive power. 62

Usually the mayor was in charge of criminal investigati~n as

well as conviction and sentence.

Where there was a crime, the mayor had to

investigate evidence ex officio or upon request of the people.

After the alleged

offender was located, the officer would interrogate, sometimes torture, to obtain
confession.

If the alleged offender confessed during interrogation, it was by itself

sufficient to secure a conviction.
sentence.

The mayor also had the right to execute his

In short, from the beginning to the end, the mayor was in charge of all

criminal proceedings with all kinds of judicial powers in any given case.

This

discretionary approach became a "rule of the person," meaning that each person of
authority could make a decision based on the prevailing beliefs, the most expedient

60

See W. Scott Morton, China, Its History and Culture, 33 (McGraw-Hill, 1995) .

61

See Bobby K. Y. Wong, Dispute Resolution by Officials in Traditional Chinese Legal Culture, 10 E
Law 2, *1, available at: http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v10n2/wong102 text.html (last visited,
Feb. 12th, 2005) .

62

It was the emperor nationally, the mayor locally.
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choice, or the status of the person to be punished. 63

'·L

Nonetheless, accompanying with the Japanese governance on Taiwan, Western
!I
!'

\

legal concepts and ideas began to be imported into Taiwan since Japan had almost
finished its legal westernization while acquiring title to Taiwan. 64

It is fair to say

that modem Western law entered Taiwan for the first time together with the incoming
westernized Japanese authority.

I

~

While Japan adopted its legal framework mainly

from Imperial Germany, the Japanese criminal justice system was inquisitorial in
I

!,

nature at that time.

From 1895 to 1945, in short, Taiwan underwent a different type

of westernized inquisitorial criminal justice system under Japanese authority.
Before resuming sovereignty over Taiwan in 1945, the ROC government, under

I,

!

I

the administration of the Chinese Nationalist Party ( KMT) , established its legal
system following the example of Japan by enacting Western style, especially
German-style, codes from the late 1920s to mid-1930. 65

In 1935, the KMT

government enacted the ROC Criminal Procedure Code for the first time.

Although

the ROC legal system was based mostly on civil law system obtained in Germany and
was influenced by and modeled on the old Japanese and German codes, those

63

See Pamella A. Seay, supra note 59.

64

See Dan F. Henderson, Law and Political Modernization in Japan, in Political development in
modem Japan, in Robert E. Ward eds., 419-36 ( 1968) .
6

s See Wikipedia Encyclopedia, Chinese Law, available at: htq>://en. wikipedia.org/wik.i/Chinese law
(last modified, Feb. lOth, 2005) .
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individualism and liberal legal norms had not been practically enforced in China due
to the chaos of contiriuous hostilities during the period after their promulgation.
Even though most Japanese laws were repealed after October 25, 1946, and all ROC
laws mainly governed all public and private matters, it is interesting to note that the
old German-based Japanese codes were substantially preserved in Taiwan. 66

Under

both Japanese and Chinese inquisitorial traditions, the use of torture during criminal
investigation was officially sanctioned or condoned in order to obtain the relied upon
confessions from either defendants or witnesses. 67

As an independent jurisdiction,

g
Taiwan started its legal development under both Chinese and Japanese legal legacies,

6m

which at that time were principally civil-law-based, especially after the KMT-led

~c:

z

z

<
m
lD

ROC central government retreated to Taiwan in December of 1949.

68

Ill

~

.-

l

!:

2.1.3 An Overview of the ROC Legal System
Generally speaking, the Republic of China on Taiwan has a codified system of
law, of which the contents are mainly transplanted from abroad, and borrowed heavily

66

See Tay-sheng Wang, The legal development of Taiwan in the 20th century: toward a liberal and
democratic country, 5-6, available at: httj:>://www.law.ntu.edu.tw/faculty/prof/tswang!Wang%203.0.doc
(last visited, Feb. 21 5', 2005) .

67

See Jaw-Pemg Wang, Taiwan's Proposed Adoption of the Right to Silence, 5 (an unpublished S.J.D.
Dissertation of University of Chicago School of Law, 1995, 12) .
68

The ROC has remained to be an independent jurisdiction even after the establishment of the
People's Republic of China ( PRC) on October 15', 1949.

.
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from the laws of other countries with similar codified systems 69 as well as traditional

..

r••,
l

I

f

.

I~

The ROC Court system follows the continental civil law model.

Procedures are inquisitorial rather than accusatorial while the judges are active
participants at trial.

The supreme law of Taiwan is the ROC Constitution.

The

I

1.

I

Chinese laws.

judicial system is composed of three tiers: the Supreme Court, High Court, and

I
II

J

'
;I

District Court.

Judges decide all cases, including facts and legal issues.

There is

l1

no provision for jury trials.

:iI,

Appeals to the High Court are as a matter of right in

l

il

j

Taiwan.

I

1\

I

Appeals to the Supreme Court are limited and specified by statute, but are

generally available for all except for the smallest or most localized of cases.

I.

Supreme Court reviews only issues of law.
lt

il

The

An appeal may be made to the Supreme

1

Court only on the ground that the original judgment is in violation of a law or an order.

:\

\!

.,
Since the Supreme Court does not determine issues of fact, documentary proceedings

\I

'I

are the rule while oral proceedings are the exception.

As the legal system in the

i!
\I

'I
:i
I

I I

'\II

ROC is based on the civil-law-based legal traditions, legal matters are decided by

I

I'

reference to the Codes and to the writings of scholars and judges who interpret the

:I
Codes.

There is comparatively little judge-made law in Taiwan.

Similar to the

II
German criminal justice system, the ROC Criminal Procedure Code is the main

69

See Kenneth Robert Redden, Modem Legal Systems Cyclopedia, Volume 2A, 40.12 (William S.

Hein & Co., 1989) .
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authority of its criminal justice system. 70

While some of the individual rights

guaranteed by the ROC Constitution have special relevance in the context of the
criminal process, the jurisprudence of the Grand Justice Council has great judicial
powers for the interpretation of criminal procedure law although the interpretation of
the Criminal Procedure Code is the task of ordinary courts.

71

Taiwan has adopted some provisions of the United States style criminal
procedure from 1995, such as the Miranda right, the exclusionary rule, the hearsay
rules ... etc., under which the parties are now assuming responsibilities for producing
evidence and arguing its admissibility.

The ROC criminal justice system has become

more "Pro-Accusatorial" than its original German counterpart in a sense.

In

summary, the 2003 legislation have been incorporating significant Americanized
procedures into what had previously been a purely inquisitorial system.
Nevertheless, the pervasive ethos of the civil-law-based inquisitorial system, which
was either discarded or neutralized so as to fit within the civil law tradition, provided
a climate hostile to accusatorial reforms. 72

As a consequence, whether the current

70

Unlike the Anglo-American style of highly constitutionalized criminal justice system, most issues of
criminal procedure in the continental tradition are governed by the ROC Criminal Procedure Code in
Taiwan.
71

See Thomas Weigend, Chapter 6, Germany, in Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study, Craig M.
Bradley eds., 187 (1999) .

72

Similar situation happened in Italy. As described, "So radical are the changes embodied in the new
Code that the Italian reforms have no modem precedent. Rather, one must look back two hundred
years to the period following the French revolution, when France gazed across the Channel and tried to
build a justice system based on the English common law model. History teaches us that the English
transplant did not long survive in France. The pervasive ethos of the inquisitorial system provided a

I

~
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ROC criminal justice system constitutes an "accusatorial" one in part remains to be

)!•

analyzed by further study.

The possible combination of these two models within the

ROC criminal justice system deserves continuous observation.
I

2.2 Inquisitorial Practices Under the 1967 ROC Criminal Procedure Code
As mentioned supra, the ROC criminal justice system has its roots in European
Civil law.

Although its structure is not much different from the Anglo-American

,,
I

system of justice in that it comprises of police, the prosecutions, the courts and the
correctional facilities, its previous practices had rendered the western structure merely
nominal and criminal procedural protection of human rights was no more than a
It

symbol.

Before introducing the 2003 legislation in the ROC Criminal Procedure

'I

Code, in this section, this study is reviewing some important aspects of the ROC
criminal justice system from 1949; especially tinder the 1967 re-enacted Criminal
I

I

~, I

.

I 1

II

'

This study will

also survey some related developments and amendments of the ROC Criminal

I

I

J
t

Procedure Code and other related statutes concerning police power.

I~

Procedure Code adopted and revised between 1949 and 2003.

climate hostile to adversarial reforms, which were either discarded or neutralized so as to fit within the
civil law tradition. Italy now faces the same problem that post-revolutionary France confronted: the
new Code of Criminal Procedure attempts to build an adversarial trial system on institutions that
remain strongly rooted in the tradition and ideology of civil law. The result is a system caught
between two traditions. Unless the Italian legal system comes to grips with this philosophical tension,
the procedural reforms that Italy desperately needs in order to cope with its judicial backlog will never
be effective." See William T. Pizzi, supra note 41, 1.
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2.2.1 The Prosecution System
Originating from German sources, the ROC Criminal Procedure Code recognizes
a private prosecution system as well as a public prosecution system.

In general, a

private prosecution allows the victim of a crime to assume the responsibility of
instituting prosecution against the suspect without interference from the government
while the victim believes that he would play a more effective role to prosecute than
the public prosecutors, especially when the victim intends to prevent the suspect from
being "non-prosecuted" because he has collected enough evidence for conviction.

A

victim has to pay for investigating the crime without financial assistance from the
government even though it is free to institute a private prosecution.

It is worth

mentioning that a merely vexatious and malicious private prosecution is basically
prohibited since the private prosecutor is required to prove it is not a case for civil
action and the private prosecution is not being used to threaten the alleged offender. 73

2.2.1.1 Public Prosecution
A public prosecutor takes the responsibility for investigating crimes on behalf of
the state and screens the innocent from the guilty.

73

In order to discover the facts, a

See Paragraph 2 of Article 326 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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public prosecutor may use necessary means to investigate and collect evidence.
Investigation begins when a public prosecutor knows there is suspicion of an offense
I

'•'

having been committed because of a complaint, report or voluntary surrender, or other
reasons. 74

The ROC Criminal Procedure Code provides a public prosecutor with the

power to summon, arrest, interrogate and detain75 the suspects as well as the power to
search, attach and inspect them or property involved with a committed crime.

:j.,

I,,
Accordingly, a public prosecutor is authorized to issue an indictment, a written
II·I
II

I

I

disposition of non-prosecution, a written appeal.

In the investigation, a public

\i

I

prosecutor has to be neutral and give equal attention to circumstances favorable and

:\
II
I

I

unfavorable to the defendant. 76
:\

Similar to Germany, "this neutral role extends to the

trial and post-trial phases: the public prosecutor can ask the court, at the end of trial,

,.

I
I
lI,i

i!

to acquit the defendant for lack of sufficient evidence, and the public prosecutor's
I

:i

'I
I'
,I

I

I'I

office can bring an appeal against a conviction in favor of the defendant." 77

1:

Pursuant to Article 60 of the "Law Governing the Organization of the Court," the

lj

I,

\I

public prosecutors are responsible for investigation, prosecution, non-prosecution,
I

·''

74

See Paragraph I of Article 228 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

75

A public prosecutor's power to detain the alleged offender was abolished in 1997.

76

See Paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

1\
1\

Also, a public prosecutor has

to put everything deriving from his investigation, whether favorable or unfavorable to the accused, in

the dossier which will be turned over to the court later on if the suspect is indicted.
77

In fact, after a public prosecutor has made up his mind to tile formal charges he will usually attempt
to obtain a conviction. Especially when the defendant is represented by counsel, the public prosecutor
usually defines his role as an advocate, not as a neutral arbiter. See Thomas Weigend, supra note 71,
209.
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enforcing prosecution, assisting in private prosecution, and taking charge of private
prosecution.

With regard to the public prosecutors' investigation, while the

professional services of the public prosecutors are subordinate to the Executive
branch, the public prosecution system operates under the "Principle of Single
Prosecutorial Body" according to Article 63 and Article 64 of the Law Governing the
Organization of the Court, which allows the General Public Prosecutor (like the
Attorney General in the United States) or the chief prosecutor to personally
undertake the business assigned to a subordinate prosecutor and may re-assign the
business of one subordinate prosecutor to another prosecutor.

78

Under Article 61

and Article 62 of the Law Governing the Organization of the Court, a public
prosecutor functions independently of the trial court, the appellate court and the
Supreme Court.

The "Principle of Single Prosecutorial Body" has been adopted to

maintain the solidarity and the integrity of the public prosecutorial power, from the
General Public Prosecutor down to the public prosecutors of both the appellate and
district levels.

In other words, all the public prosecutors' offices are vertically

connected and constitute a single body.
78

Although they may act with certain

For example, in dealing with a complainant who files an application in writing for reconsideration of
the disposition of non-prosecution with reasons for dissatisfaction, according to Paragraph IV of former
Article 257ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code, if the chief prosecutor considers necessary, he/she
may, before delivery is made in accordance with the provision of Paragraph II, (i.e., delivery of files to
the superior chief prosecutor when the application is found to be groundless) personally investigate or
order another prosecutor to investigate to determine whether the original disposition should be set aside
or upheld. See Ministry of Justice, A Brieflntroduction to the Prosecutorial System of the Republic
of China, available at: htlJl://www.klc.moLgov.tw/html/e/e 8 index.htm (last visited, Feb. 21 '', 2005 ).
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discretion in the litigation according to Article 61 of the Law of the Court
Organization, in principle, the public prosecutors should follow the orders and

I

~

directions of their superior prosecutors or the General Public Prosecutor.

79

Unlike

the judges who conduct trials independently, in general, the public prosecutors
performing their duties in accordance with the ROC Criminal Procedure Code shall be
put under the command and supervision of their superiors.

80

While the police acquires any information about a criminal offense or a
suspected person before the public prosecutors do, they are empowered directly to
I'

investigate and collect evidence before reporting to a public prosecutor. 81

However,

they are required to submit the result to a public prosecutor82 who has to decide the

79

,,,

I
I

See the reasoning oflnterpretation No. 392 of the Grand Justice Council ( 1995) , available at:
htm://www.judicial.gov. tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03 Ol,asp?expno=392 (last visited, Feb. 23nl,
2005) . As it explained: "This is quite a separate matter from the independence they enjoyed outward
- to be free from interference of any other state organ when carrying out their duties, and the
independence they enjoyed inward- to act only according to laws in a trial. The prosecutor's office is
a government organ where the prosecutors carry out their duties. Although it is physically attached to
the courthouse (Law of the Court Organization, Article 58), yet it acts independently outside the court
system and is not subordinated to the court that exercises adjudicative power. Therefore, it is beyond
doubt that it is not a court of a restrictive definition, and that its member prosecutors are not judges.
However, the protection for job security of a prosecutor, except for matters of job transfer, is the same
as that of an active judge in all respects." Id.
80

In addition, as for the administrative supervision of prosecutors' office in the courts of all _levels
because Article 111, Subparagraph 1 of the Law of the Court Organization prescribes that Minister of
Justice shall have the supervisory power over prosecutors' offices in the courts of all levels, Minister of
Justice may lawfully issue orders concerning administrative and supervisory matters of prosecution in
order to facilitate criminal policies and expedite the execution of prosecutorial matters. See
Interpretation No. 530 of the Grand Justice Council (2001) , available at:
htm://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03 0 l.asp?expno=530 (last visited, Feb. 23nl,
2005) .

t

I'

I

81

I.

82

See Paragraph 2 of Article 230 and Paragraph 2 of Article 231 of the ROC Criminal Procedure
Code.

i

\

I. '

See Article 71-1 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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further direction for investigation and whether to indict

In other words, the public

prosecutor must be notified without delay of every offense known to the police.

If it

is considered necessary to place under detention a person suspected of an offense that
was arrested with or without a warrant, the alleged offender must be sent to the public
prosecutor office within twenty· four hours. 83
must be sent immediately. 84

If a public prosecutor so orders, he

In short, most of the police work is subject to the direct

supervision of the public prosecutors who have general authority to order and instruct
the police in criminal investigation.
Q

0

If a public prosecutor decides not to indict the suspect,

85

a written document

G
m
z

~
setting forth the reasoning must be served on the victim who may challenge a public

"'cz

~

prosecutor's refusal by asking for reconsideration of the case. 86

~

If either the initial

public prosecutor and his chief public prosecutor, or a public prosecutor in superior
prosecutor office finds the reconsideration to be well grounded, the case will be
reconsidered by further investigation. 87

83
84

If neither the initial public prosecutor or his

See Paragraph 2 of Article 92 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
See former Paragraph 2 of Article 228 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

85

See Article 253 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code. Similar to Germany, a public prosecution is
in fact discretionary with regard to less serious offenses. The Department of Justice sometimes makes
a policy instructing a public prosecutor not to indict a specific offense either when the alleged
offender's guilt appears insignificant or when there is no public interest in prosecution. See Thomas
Weigend, supra note 71, 206.
86

See Paragraph 2 of Article 255 and Paragraph 1 of Article 256 of the ROC Criminal Procedure
Code.
87

See Paragraph 1 of Article 257 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

40

I

1

I'
'I

I

I'

chief public prosecutor nor a public prosecutor in the superior public prosecutor office
finds the reconsideration to be well grounded, the case will be dismissed. 88

When

the decision not to indict becomes final and no prosecution of the same case will be
initiated thereafter under the equivalent of the double jeopardy clause, unless new
facts or evidence is discovered89 it is fair to stress the concentrated roles the public
prosecutor has to play in that the entire inquisitorial setting was one in which the
public prosecutor was responsible for inquiring into criminal cases, charging the
accused with offenses, and determining whether there was enough evidence to bind
the defendant to appear before the court for trial. 90

In order to avoid arbitrary prosecutorial policy favorable to the suspect, besides
I

I

initiating a private prosecution, from 2002 the victim may ask the district court to
review the non-indict decision and to grant a trial within ten days after receiving the
I I

reasoning.

91

If the court finds the case to be well grounded, then the trial procedure

applies to the case without formally being indicted by a public prosecutor. 92

Both

"asking for reconsideration( internal control)" and "asking for trial( external control )"

88

89

90

See Paragraph of Article 258 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
See Article 260 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
See Ennio Amodio, supra note 7, 1213.

91

See Paragraph I of Article 258-1 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code. Note that Articles 258-1,
258-2, 258-3, and 258-4 pfthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code were passed in 2002.
I
'

~

92

See Paragraph 4 of Article 258-3 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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are legislated to provide the victim with a judicial review of a non-indict ruling.

In

summary, like Germany, the public prosecutor's investigation and the trial procedure
are unbroken links in the same chain of activity, and the stage before the adjudication
proceeding might somehow be deemed merely a form oftrial.

93

2.2.1.2 Private Prosecution
Even though there is no grand jury system in Taiwan, the public prosecutors do
not have the exclusive authority to initiate prosecution since there is a parallel
"private prosecution" system in the ROC criminal justice system.

In general, a

private prosecution is designed to prevent arbitrary prosecutorial policy.

A private

prosecution emerges especially when the victim considers it impossible for a public
prosecutor to decide to indict, but believes the suspect will be convicted.

Before the

establishment of "asking for trial" in 2002, private prosecution was the only choice
available while facing unfavorable prosecutorial policy.

The victim of a crime may

file a private prosecution except that he or she is without, or limited, legal capacity, or
is dead. 94

It is noteworthy that there exist limitations of private prosecution where

"the unpleaded part under Article 55 of the Criminal Code"95 constitutes a niore

93
94
95

See Ennio Amodio,supra note 7, 1216.
See Paragraph 1 of Article 319 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
It provides: If one act constitutes several unlike offenses or the means employed or the results of the
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serious offenses or "its first instance is under the jurisdiction of a higher court."

96

t'

Moreover, the law prohibits a private prosecution from being initiated against a lineal

I

ascendant or spouse. 97

In a case chargeable ~mly upon complaint or request, a

private prosecution may not be initiated if such complaint or request is no longer
permitted. 98

When a public prosecutor has already started his investigation, a private

prosecution will no longer be allowed unless the case is chargeable upon complaint.
Without delegating to a lawyer, the court will dismiss a private prosecution.

99

100

Similar to a public prosecution, a private prosecution is required to provide the
full name, sex, age, native place, occupation, domicile or residence of the accused, or
other special identifying features, as well as facts and evidence of the offense. 101
Since the private prosecutor attorney is assumed to play the public prosecutor's role,

commission of one offense constitute another unlike offense, only the most severe of the prescribed
punishments shall be imposed. Therefore, the "unpleaded part" means there exists a more serious
offense than the "pleaded part'' filed by the private prosecutor under Paragraph 1 of Article 319 of the
ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

I .,

I

96

See Paragraph 3 of Article 319 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

97

See Article 321 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

98

See Article 322 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

I

,,
I

99

See Paragraph lof Article 323 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code. Before 2000, a private
prosecution was allowed before a public prosecutor concludes his investigation in the same case.
Besides, if a public prosecutor knows prior to the conclusion of his investigation that a private
prosecution has been initiated, he/she shall immediately stop such investigation and refer the case to
the court.
100

See Paragraph 2 of Article 319 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code. Before 2000, the private
prosecution did not require an attorney to be delegated by a private prosecutor.
101

See Paragraph 1 of Article 320 (private prosecution)
prosecution) of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

and Paragraph 2 of Article 264 (public
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any procedural act that may be performed by a public prosecutor may be performed
by a private prosecutor attorney. 102

A private prosecution has to prove the offense

beyond reasonable doubt while the court is still entitled to investigate the evidence ex
officio. 103

Interestingly, the law treats the private prosecution different from the

public prosecution.

The private prosecutor attorney is not allowed to interrogate the

accused or the witness or to request assistance from the police before the trial.

The

court should question the private prosecutor attorney before the accused in order to

clarify and determine if this is a case for civil action or that the private prosecution
procedure is being used to put pressure on the accused. 104

In practice, the court

distrusts the private prosecution to some extent because there is much commercial
consideration before an attorney accepts delegation to flle a private prosecution while
a public prosecutor decides a case mainly based on legal opinion.

Even though a

private prosecution does not provide the victim with public assistance in regard with
investigation, it is an opportunity for the victim to carry out justice by himself if he
believes himself to be more capable of convicting the accused.

2.2.2 Police Power
102
103

104

See Paragraph I of Article 329 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
See Paragraph 2 of Article 163 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
See Paragraph 2 of Article 326 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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The ROC has had a National Police Force.

According to Paragraph 1,

Subparagraph 17, Article 108 of the ROC Constitution,
'I'

105

Taiwan has a unified or

centralized police system that is very different from the United State's localized or
decentralized police system.

In addition, under Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 10,

Article 109 and Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 9, Article 110 of the ROC Constitution,

106

the police force could be divided into the national and local levels, whlch are both
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior through the National Police

I ,1
Administration.

Under thls structure, Professor Howard A. Kurtz considers each

Taiwan's police administration and police training program to be among the best in
the world. 107

The police functions in Taiwan are clearly defined in the Police Act,

including maintaining public order, protecting social security, preventing all dangers,
I I

and promoting the welfare of all people.

108

The police are not only responsible for

I

I

enforcing the law and maintaining public order but also for crime prevention and the
protection of the lives and property of others.

They are also assigned particular

I

I

105

I

I

Paragraph I of Article I08 of the ROC Constitution provides: "In the following matters, the Central
Government shall have the power of legislation and administration, but the Central Governn:ient may
delegate the power of Administration to the provincial and hsien governments ... I7. Police system .. ."
106

Paragraph 1 of Article 109 ofthe ROC Constitution provides: 'In the following matters, the
provinces shall have the power of legislation and administration, but the provinces may delegate the
power of administration to the hsien ... 10. Provincial police administration ..." And Paragraph 1 of
Article II 0 of the ROC Constitution provides: "In the following matters, the hsien shall have the power
oflegislation and administration ... 9. Admistration ofhsien police and defense .. ."
107

See Howard A. Kurtz, Criminal Justice Centralization Versus Decentralization in the Republic of
China, available at: htn>://www.llcc.cc.il.us/gtruitt/SCJ290spring2002/china%20cjs%20central.htm
( last visited, Feb. 21 •t, 2005 ) .
108

\1

r

0

I

See Article I of the Police Act
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duties that are not practiced in many countries, which include: management of exit
from and entry into Taiwan since the police handle immigration affairs, civil defense
and disaster rescue, order maintenance and riot control, and assistance for other

. whenever necessary. 109
government affimrs

2.2.2.1 Public Order Maintaining Power
In addition to these functions, the police in Taiwan are empowered to deal with
certain criminal matters. 110

It is noteworthy that "the Law Governing Offenses

Punished by the Police," enacted in the 1950s, permitted the police to impose
sanctions of administrative detention and compulsory labor upon the police offenders
(minor misdemeanors )

without judicial surveillance.

Besides, "the Law

Governing Offenses Punished by the Police" also permitted the police office to
subject a person to reformatory education, which is the learning of living skills or
correctional training, or to detain a person or to subject him to hard labor. 111
109

Under

See Chuen-Jim Sheu, supra note 8.

110

This might result from the Summary Judgment Law under Japanese colonial rule. The Summary
Judgment Law allowed the police to summarily decide both police offenses (after 1896) as well as
certain misdemeanors (after 1904), few of which were submitted to the courts for review. Meanwhile,
under the Taiwan Vagrant Discipline Regulation of 1906, vagrants could be warned to have fixed
residences or jobs and failing that, could be sent to work in the vagrant camp for one to three years.
The decision to send a person to the vagrant camp was nominally a "disposition for maintaining public
order," but, in fact, was equivalent to a criminal penalty. The decision was made by the police, with
the approval of the governor-general, with no means of judicial appeal. However, it should be noted
that at the end of the wartime period, almost no one was imprisoned in vagrant camps. See Tay-sheng
Wang, Chapter 4: Taiwan, in Poh-Ling Tan eds., ASIAN LEGAL SYSTEMS: LAW, SOCIETY AND
PLURALISM IN EAST ASIA, 99 ( LexisNexis, 1997).
111

See the former Article 28 of the Law Governing Offenses Punished by the Police( abolished on July

I·

...
I

1'1
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'•I

1
•I

'"

'I

this police law, there were one hundred and thirty-six unclear offenses punishable,

'I

rendering people vulnerable to unwarranted arrests, detention for up to two weeks,
forced labor up to sixteen hours and refonnatory education. 112

In practice, the police

usually charged the suspect with a misdemeanor under this police law whenever it
was unable to investigate the crime within twenty-four hours as required by the ROC
Constitution113 and the ROC Criminal Procedure Code. 114
police could easily detain the suspect for seven days. 115

With this maneuver, the

This Law became a

powerful instrument and excuse in which the police might utilize to initial or extend
the period of detention for their investigation of a serious crime, without probable
cause or reasonable suspicion to arrest or detain under the ROC Criminal Procedure
Code, by first arresting and detaining the suspect for mere police offenses. 116
II

Moreover, supervision under the public prosecutors also became impossible.

l st, 1991 ) . It provided: "Those who are loitering with intent or lazy and habitually commit offenses
punished by the police would be imposed severer punishments than others. They may be sent to
reformatory education or to learning living skills in a specific place after releasing from a prison."
112

See Tay-sheng Wang, supra note 110, 100.

113

Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the ROC Constitution provides: "When a person is arrested or detained
on suspicion of having committed a crime, the organ making the arrest or detention shall in writing
inform the said person, and his designated relative or friend, of the grounds for his arrest or detention,
and shall, within 24 hours, turn him over to a competent court for trial. The said person, or any other
person, may petition the competent court that a writ be served within 24 hours on the organ making the
arrest for the surrender of the said person for trial."
114

See Paragraph 2 of Article 93 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

115

See Tsung-fu Chen, THE RULE OF LAW IN TAIWAN, in L. Gordon Flake eds., THE RULE OF
LAW: Perspectives from the Pacific Rim, 114 ( 2000), at: htij:!://www.idlo.int/texts/idlilmis6094.pdf
(last visited, Feb. 21 ''. 2005 ) .
116

...

Id .
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This situation did not change until the 1990s.

Although the Grand Justice

Council first held in 1980 that: "The police sanctions of administrative detention and
compulsory labor stipulated by the Law Governing Offenses Punished by the Police
Offenses are sanctions on personal freedom.

In order to comply with the

requirements of Article 8, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, courts based on legal
process shall promptly administer these sanctions." 117
power still remained in effect till1990.

Nonetheless, this police

Therefore the Grand Justice Council again

declared it unconstitutional in 1990, stating that:
"The detention and forced work (hard labor) commanded by the police office
under the Law Governing Offenses Punished by the Police are punishment
relating to individual's physical freedom.

It would be desirable to expeditiously

revise the law, whereby these punishments shall only be decided by the courts in
accordance with legal procedure, so as to conform to Article 8, Section 1 of the
Constitution." 118
This police power was finally replaced in 1991 by "the Law for Maintaining Social
Order."

Since 1991, the court is the only authority responsible for deciding both

117

See Interpretation No. 166 of the Grand Justice Council ( 1980) , available at:
htt,p://www.judicial. gov. tw/constitutiona1court/EN/p03 0 l.asp?expno= 166 (last visited, Feb. 23 nl,
2005) .
118

See Interpretation No. 251 of the Grand Justice Council ( 1990) , available at:
httn://www. judicial.gov. tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03 0 l.asp?expno=251 (last visited, Feb. 23nl,
2005) .
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police offenses and criminal defenses.

2.2.2.2 Gangster Preventive Power
o I

I'

In addition to the "Public Order Maintaining Power," under the "Statute for
Prevention of Gangster" of 1985, designed to incarcerate violent hoodlums, the police
were authorized to arbitrarily classify a person as a gangster, to force him to appear
before the police or arrest him, to adopt a secret witness system, and to impose a
rehabilitative program upon him119 without any participation or surveillance of the
prosecutor. 120

Article 6 and Article 7 of the Statute for Prevention of Gangster

allowed the police to arrest the person who was subpoenaed but failed to appear.

For

those who are committing the offenses, the police may arrest them without prior
subpoenas. 121

'\

I

These articles authorized the police to arrest people without prior

notice or warrants.

The police then had the full discretion to decide whether to

'I

charge an individual as a hoodlum because the suspect was deprived of the right to

119

It means to send a person to the vagrant camp where he would be deprived of nearly all civil rights.

120

To some extent, the police played the public prosecutors' roles under this Statute. See the former
Articles 5, 6, 7, 12, and 21 of the Statute for Prevention of Gangster.
121

The former Articles 6 of the Statute for Prevention of Gangster provided: "After a person is listed
as a gangster and its circumstance is serious, the police bureaus may subpoena him to appear without
any warnings. The police may arrest the person who was subpoenaed but failed to appear." The
former Article 7 of the Statute for Prevention of Gangster provided: "Within a year after a person is
listed as a gangster and has been given such warning, the police bureaus may subpoena him to appear if
he still meets any condition as prescribed in any section of Article 2."

49

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

cross-examine the witness under the secret witness system,

122

which offered the

police an opportunity to produce fake witnesses in order to detain or incarcerate the
suspect.

123

With this uncontrolled power, the police might also easily detain suspects, in
practice, avoiding procedural requirements prescribed in Criminal Procedure Code, by
arbitrarily classifying those who were targeted as gangsters or hoodlums.

As a result,

many "gangsters or hoodlums" were "created" instead of being "discovered" under
this police administrative maneuver.

Moreover, this Statute became a technique by
Q

0

which the police start the period of detention for investigation of a serious crime by

G
1'11
z

Q

first charging the suspect as a gangster or hoodlum, especially after 1991 when the

~
rn

c.

z

<
m
;xJ

(/1

Law Governing Offenses Punished by the Police was abolished and replaced by the
Law for Maintaining Social Order.
This situation continued until1995.

After the Legislative Yuan modified those

122

Paragraph I of Article 12 of the former Statute for Prevention of Gangster provided: "In handling
the case of gangsters, the Police or the Court shall examine a witness separately in secret if the accuser,
victims, or witnesses ask their names and identities to be confidential. In any notices or minutes, their
names or identities shall be replaced by code numbers. Names or identities of secret witnesses shall
not be revealed." Its Paragraph 2 provided: "The accused and his retained lawyer may not request to
confront or cross examine secret witnesses."
123

See the reasoning oflnterpretation No. 384 ofthe Grand Justice Council ( 1995) , available at:
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03 0 l.asp?expno=384 (last visited, Feb. 23nl,
2005 ) . The Grand Justice Council declared: "Without considering the circumstances of the case, the
SPG demands that courts examine a witness separately in secret as a secret witness, as well as prevents
the accused and his lawyer from confronting or cross examining secret witnesses, simply because the
accuser, victims, or witnesses request their names and identities to be confidential. It abridges the
accused of the right to defense, hampers the court's truth finding function, possibly forces the accused
to accept the correction and training programs without sufficient evidence, and is of course not
permitted by the Constitution." Id.

~
r
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unconstitutional provisions declared by the Grand Justice Council in 1995,

124

the

judges in the gangster proceedings are therefore supervisors of the police power
1',

regarding gangsters and hoodlums.

The procedural protection in this field became

similar to that of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

The police are no longer

allowed to arrest a suspect without a warrant, to present secret witness without
cross-examination, or to impose reformatory education and imprisonment while the
suspect was convicted of a criminal offense.

2.2.2.3 Inquisitorial Legal Framework
While the court is actually in charge of reviewing these police decisions to
maintain public order and to prevent gangster relations in those reviewing
proceedings, however, a public prosecutor is not entitled to participate in.
Consequently, the court is required to investigate the case ex officio.

In practice, the

court requires the police to report any necessary information and evidence not
included in the dossier.
124

Neither accusatorial nor adversarial should be the system

Id. ("In no case except that of flagrante delicto, which shall be separately prescribed by law, shall
any person be arrested or detained other than by a judicial or police organ in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law. No person shall be tried or punished other than by a court in accordance
with the procedure prescribed by law. Any arrest, detention, trial or punishment not carried out in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law may be resisted. The phrase that 'in accordance
with the procedure prescribed by law' in the above sentence means that the procedure a governmental
organ based upon to impose any measures restraining people's liberty, no matter whether their status is
a criminal defendant or not, must be prescribed by statutes. The contents of the statutes must be
proper in substance, and comply with the relevant conditions set up in Article 23 of the Constitution.
Articles 6 and 7 of the Statute for Prevention of Gangster authorize the police to force people to appear
before the police station without following any necessary judicial procedure.")
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under either "the Statute for Prevention of Gangster" or "the Law for Maintaining
Social Order."

Until today, practices of those police powers are still in inquisitorial

pattern.

2.2.3 Police Procedures and Practices
2.2.3 .1 Stop, Frisk, Search and Seizure
In addition to these police powers above mentioned, the police are subordinate to
the public prosecutors while investigating criminal offenses.

125

In the ROC, stops

and frisks are regulated by "the Police Duty Enforcing Act" instead of the ROC
Criminal Procedure Code.

Since criminal procedural issues did not attract legal

attention in the past, rarely did any ROC court address the issue whether search and
seizure violated human rights protection, not to mention stop and frisk. 126
The authorities generally do not make warrantless searches, which were common
before the lifting of the martiallaw. 127

Before 2001, although a search warrant is

125

Because the police are responsible for search, seizure and arrest under the ROC Criminal Procedure
Code as the interrogation is only supervised by the judge in a private prosecution, this study does not
discuss police procedures together with interrogation.
126

For instance, the police search cars routinely at roadblocks under the authority of Police Duty
Enforcing Act. In addition, in the past allegations were made that police and security agencies
interfere with the right to privacy through such means as surveillance and interception of
correspondence and telephone calls.
127

According to the National Police Administration, warrantless searches are allowed only in
specialized circumstances, such as to arrest an escapee or if facts indicate a person is in the process of
committing a crime and the circumstances are urgent. In any case, however, the police must file a
report with the public prosecutor or court within 24 hours.

.,
,I
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required to effectuate a search, a public prosecutor was entitled to issue a search
I

IJI

warrant during the stage of investigation. 128

In addition, a public prosecutor or judge

I

o

might personally conduct a search without a search warrant.

129

A warrant, issued by

a prosecutor or a judge, must be obtained before a search, except when incidental to
arrest in principle.

In a sense the "incidental to arrest" provision was deemed

unconstitutional because it was often interpreted broadly by the police to justify
searches of locations other than the actual sites of arrests.

In addition, anything that

can be used as evidence or is subject to confiscation may be seized whether or not it is
discovered during the process of search or ordered to surrender or deliver it. 130
Evidence collected without a warrant, according to regulations, is not excluded from

,.

introduction during a trial.

I'

search can be sued for illegal entry and sentenced up to one year of imprisonment. 131

,,

Nonetheless, a policeman who carries out an illegal

\

\~

Not until2001 did the Legislative Yuan revise the search and seizure clause of the

I

,I

ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

It was seen as an invasion of privacy when an

undetached public prosecutor accompanied by the police could search anywhere
without reviewing the necessity of the search.

Thus, the former Article 129 was

121

See the former Paragraph 3 of Article 128 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

129

See the former Article 129 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

130

See Article 133 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

131

See Paragraph 1 of Article 306 of the ROC Criminal Law.
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abolished in 2001 and only a judge is allowed to issue a search warrant.

132

Except in

an emergency, the police must obtain warrants from a judge in order to search or seize
property or persons. 133

Furthermore, Interpretation No. 535 of the Grand Justice

Council have decided on constitutional parameters for reasonable stop, frisk and
search by the police, which reasserts the constitutional principle of due process of law
and prescribes clearly the limits of unwarranted search by the police in order to strike
a balance between the protection of citizens from unwarranted search and the police's
safety in enforcing laws. 134

2.2.3.2 Arrest
Since a legally-summoned suspect should appear before the summoning official
at the scheduled time, a suspect who fails to appear without good reason may be
arrested with a warrant. 135
warrant. 136

A public prosecutor is empowered to issue an arrest

In some instances, an accused may be arrested with a warrant without

being served with summon in advance while strongly being suspected of having
132
133

See Paragraph 3 of Article 128 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
See Article 131 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

134

See Interpretation No. 53 5 of the Grand Justice Council ( 2001 ) , available at:
htm://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03 0 1.asp?expno=535 (last visited, Feb. 23nl,
2005) .
135
136

See Article 75 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
See Paragraph 3 of Article 77 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

committed an offense.

~·
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137

I
0 I

Anyone in flagrante delicto, a person who is discovered in the act of committing

,,
an offense or immediately thereafter, may be arrested without a warrant by any person,
including the police. 138

An emergency arrest without a warrant by the police is also

allowed under the following circumstances: the person who is implicated to be a
co-offender by the one in flagrante delicto and there are facts sufficient to warrant the
strong implication; the person who has escaped from the execution of punishment or
from detention; when the officer strongly suspects by facts the person has committed
the crime and he refuses to be interrogated by the police and runs away; and when
arresting a strong suspect who has committed a crime which carries a possible death
sentence or at least five years in prison and there are facts sufficient to justify an
apprehension that he may abscond. 139

If a suspect is arrested with or without a

warrant, he shall be sent to the prosecutor's office and a public prosecutor has to

•'I,.

decide whether to release or detain him. 140

·~
137

Such instances include: a suspect has no fixed domicile or residence, or he either has absconded or
if there are facts sufficient to justify an apprehension that he may abscond, or there are facts sufficient
to justify an apprehension that the suspect may destroy, forge, or alter evidence, or conspire with a
co-defendant or witness, or he has committed an offence punishable with death penalty or life
imprisonment, or with a minimum punishment of imprisonment for not less than five years. See
Article 76 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
138

·'

In addition, a person is considered to be in flagrante delicto if he is pursued with cries that he is an
offender; or he is found in possession of a weapon, stolen property, or other item sufficient to warrant a
suspicion that he is an offender or his person, closes and the like show traces of the commission of an
offence sufficient to warrant such suspicion. See Article 88 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
139

See Paragraph 1 of Article 88-1 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

140

See Paragraph 2 of Article 93 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

~
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2.2.4 Detention
After interrogation and examination by a public prosecutor, a suspect might be
detained if the public prosecution deemed necessary.

141

Before 1997, either a public

prosecutor or a judge was entitled to issue a writ of detention during the period of
investigation. 142

Yet there existed a limitation that detention of an accused might not

. the stage of.mvestigation.
. . 143
exceed two months dunng

In practice, detention

usually became an instrument for a public prosecutor's convenience to "coerce" the
suspect to "confess." 144

Provisions in the articles concerning a public prosecutor

with the right to detain gave rise to the criticism concerning "Due Process" and the
suspect's human rights protection.

Although there has been no "investigating

141

In Taiwan, to be a public prosecutor or a judge, a person has to pass the Judicial Examination.
After passing the exam( the passing rate is only around 3% ), the winners are all trained by the Ministry
of Justice, Judicial Training Institute and assigned to district courts and local prosecutor's office to
observe the practice. After finishing the training, becoming a public prosecutor or a judge depends on
his performance during the training and will. Even after being assigned as a public prosecutor ( or a
judge) , he may request to be a judge (or a public prosecutor) five years later since they all have the
same background and qualification. Thus, a public prosecutor generally thinks of himself as no
difference from a judge except that they play different roles at criminal proceedings. This background
may justify why the legislators provided a public prosecutor with the right to issue search warrants and
a writ of detention at the very beginning. See Jaw-Pemg Wang, supra note 67, 13.
142
143

144

See the former Paragraph 3 of Article 102 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
See the former Paragraph 1 of Article 108 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

While the author of this study was a court clerk, from 1995 to 1997, not only a public prosecutor
but also a judge usually detained the suspect or the accused for a short term (such as one week or half
month) with instructing the accused an opportunity of "retrospect," particularly when the accused was
strongly considered lying. Under this circumstance, detention became a notorious instrument to give
the suspect or the accused both psychological and physical pressures although it was an effective one to
some extent.
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magistrate" in the ROC criminal justice system, in a sense a public prosecutor also
I

II

',•

played his role as an investigating magistrate with the power to search and detain in
the past.
Not until 1997 did the situation change.

The public procurator's power to

detain a suspect was finally held unconstitutional, based on Article 8 of the ROC
Constitution, by the Grand Justice Council in its Interpretation No. 392 in 1995.
was later abolished by the ROC Legislative Yuan in late 1997.

145

It

In 1997 an

amendment to the ROC Criminal Procedure Code shifted the power of investigative
detention from the public prosecutors to the courts.

Under the 1997law, the public

prosecutors must apply to the courts within twenty-four hours after an arrest for
permission to continue detaining an arrestee. 146

The duration of this pretrial

detention is limited to two months, and the courts may approve a single extension of
two months. 147

Limits may also be set for detention during trial.

If a crime is

~.

145

See Interpretation No. 392 of the Grand Justice Council ( 1995) , supra note 79. As noted, The
term "trial" defined in Article 8, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Constitution means trial by court. He who
has no authority to try a case cannot conduct this proceeding. The "Court" defined in Article 8,
Paragraphs 1 and 2 means a tribunal composed of a judge or a panel of judges empowered to try cases.
By Article 8, Paragraph 2 of the Constitutional, any organ other than a court arrested or detained a
person shall surrender the detainee to a competent court for trial within 24 hours of said action.
Therefore, Code of the Criminal Procedure, Article 101, and Article 102, Paragraph 3 applies mutatis
mutandis of Article 71, Paragraph 4, and Article 120, which empowers a prosecutor other than a judge
to detain suspects; Article 105, Paragraph 3 of the same Code which empowers a prosecutor to grant
request for detention submitted by chief officer ofthe detention house; Article 120, Paragraph 1 and
Article 259, Paragraph 1 of the same Code which empowers a prosecutor to withdraw, suspend, resume,
continue detention, or to take any other measures in conjunction with a detention, these provisions are
incongruous with the spirit of aforementioned Article 8, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution. Id.
146

See Paragraph 1 of Article 93 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

147

See Paragraph 5 of Article 108 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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punishable by less than ten years of imprisonment, then no more than three extensions
of two months each may be granted during the trial and appellate proceedings.

148

The authorities generally observe these procedures, and the judicial proceedings
usually take place within two months after indictment.
After this 1997 legislation, only a judge is empowered to issue a writ of
detention. 149
necessary.

A public prosecutor hereupon has to apply for a writ of detention if
Thus, a suspect enjoys better protection during a public prosecutor's

investigation because a detached judge is required to review it if it is necessary to
detain under the given circumstance.

Nontheless, according to Articles 101 and

101-1 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code, a judge can issue a writ of detention
after interrogating the defendant without the public prosecutor's application.
Whether a judge should still be entitled to issue the writ of detention or extend the
period of detention ex officio during the stage of trial remains to be seen in Taiwan.

2.2.5 Unitary Trial
Professor Mhjan Damaska once pointed out: "the idea that criminal proceedings
could justifiably be used for purposes other than those of establishing the truth and

148

And during the second appeal, only one extension may be granted.
of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
149

See Paragraph 1 of Article 108

See Paragraph 3 of Article 102 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

58

enforcing the substantive criminal law is simply not part of the continental legal
tradition." 150

Unlike the United States, "the trial in a civil law system usually begins

with an examination of the defendant by the judge, exploring the defendant's.
background as well as his knowledge of, or participation in, the alleged crime.
Questions are frequently directed to the defendant throughout the remainder of the
trial." 151

While trials are only about guilt in the United States, 152 trials in Taiwan are

unitary because both the accused's guilt and sentence are determined in a single
process. 153

For instance, the newly enacted Paragraph 3 of Article 289 of the ROC

Criminal Procedure Code provides the defendant an independent opportunity to give
his opinions regarding sentencing.
While the court is obliged to make a judgment in writing, which shall separately
set forth a syllabus of the decision and reasons and the facts of guilty, 154 the syllabus
of a written judgment of guilty shall contain: the offense committed; a pronouncement
of the principal punishment, accessory punishment, or remission of punishment; the

!so See Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure,

121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 506, 526 ( 1973) .
lSI While the defendant has the right to refuse to answer any questions, such refusals are exceptional.
See William T. Pizzi, supra note 41, 8.

!Sl

See Myron Moskovitz, supra note 11, 1135.

ISJ As noted, "The presumption in civil law systems is that the defendant should cooperate with the
trial judge and answer questions completely. The defendant's cooperation is also encouraged by the
fact that his sentence, as well as his guilt, is determined at a single trial." See William T. Pizzi, supra
note 41, 8.

14

s See Article 308 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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rate of commutation if a sentence of not more than six months imprisonment or
detention is pronounced and if commutation to a fme may be ordered; the rate of
commutation if a fine is pronounced and if commutation to labor may be ordered; the
pronouncement if a sentence is commutation to a warning; the period of probation if a
sentence of probation is pronounced; and the measure and its duration if a measure for

. ts
. pronounced.155
rehab1'l'ttation
In order to reduce the sentence by showing remorse and mitigating
circumstances to the court, the defendant usually has only one opportunity during the
trial phase to do so before the written judgment is made since there exists no
proceeding like a sentencing hearing in the United States. 156

However, whenever the

defendant confesses the guilt as well as the alleged facts at trial, the trial thereafter
will become nominal without real factual disputes indeed.

It seems unnecessary and

meaningless to go on such proceedings of the newly promulgated pro-accusatorial
135
136

See Article 309 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

For example, "A defendant who wishes to offer evidence of mitigating circumstances thus must
speak at trial in order to place such evidence before the court. Since pretrial investigations usually are
quite thorough, and since most defendants also cooperate with the pretrial investigation, the
inquisitorial system presents less potential for evidentiary surprises than a criminal trial in the United
States. A complete file, which includes statements from all potential witnesses, is assembled in
advance of trial and made available to the defense. The system creates a danger that the judge who
has already studied the case file will come to the trial convinced of the defendant's guilt or innocence.
The civil law system tries to protect against prejudiced judges in two ways. First, in all but-the most
minor cases only one member of the panel of judges who tries a case will have examined the file.
This collegial approach to decision-making counterbalances at least some of the inherent dangers of the
inquisitorial system. Second, in contrast to the U.S. system, the trial does not result in a simple
verdict of guilty or not guilty. Instead, the court prepares a written judgment that summarizes the
evidence developed at trial, the conclusions drawn from the evidence, and any legal issues that arose
during the trial. Because a civil law trial determines both guilt and sentencing, if the defendant is
found guilty the judgment will also state the sentence and why the court considered this sentence
appropriate." See William T. Pizzi, supra note 41, 7.
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process which is designed to achieve more accurate findings of historical facts out of
disputes.

The 2003 legislation therefore creates a new mechanism, the "simple

trial," allowing the court to decide cases, except those where the potential punishment
is a death penalty or life imprisonment, where the minimum punishment is not less
than three years or where a high court takes jurisdiction over the first instance,

I•

without rigidly applying the hearsay rule and the exclusionary rule when the
defendant confesses the guilt and the alleged facts. 157

Since the prosecutor does not

have to argue with the defense side at trial, the only concern of the trial becomes the
sentencing.

In a sense the newly created simple trial looks like the sentencing

hearing in the United States.

·'

To some extent, Articles 273-1 and 273-2 of the ROC

Criminal Procedure Code preserve the traditional inquisitorial practice in the new
ROC criminal justice system where those newly adopted pro-accusatorial articles do
not apply.

And, a real trial takes place if there is no confess and the defendant denies

guilt.

2.3 Pro-Accusatorial Reforms on the ROC Criminal Procedure Code
2.3 .1 Interrogation and Confession
In the past, under the principle of"finding the material truth," how to interrogate
the defendant was often neglected, even ignored, by the police, public prosecutors and
157

See Articles 273-1 and 273-2 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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the court.

Although the law provided that a suspect or an accused, being

interrogated or examined by officers, be informed that he is suspected of committing
an offense as well as the offense charged, and new charge if the original charge was
changed after being informed158 it was sometimes intentionally neglected or ignored
by the police since there was no instrument applicable to enforce the rule then, and
confessions resulting from police misconducts were still good evidence at trial,
shown in the controversial murder case in Chapter One.

159

as

While interrogation or

examination should be held in an honest manner without any violence, threat,
inducement, fraud and any other improper means, 160 and any confession extracted by
violence, threat, inducement, fraud, unlawful detention or other improper devices
should not be admitted in evidence, 161 the court usually admitted it in evidence in a
given case because it was difficult for the defendant to prove that the confession was
unlawfully extracted.
Even though a violation of the former Article 95, Article 98 or Article 156 was
found, confessions deriving from illegal means were automatically admissible unless

158

See former Article 95 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

159

In practice, records of police interrogation were the most important evidence at trial because there
was a dominant belief in Taiwan that the accused's first statement is closest to the truth, and later
statements are less trustworthy because of the outside influence. With the belief that the truth can be
revealed from the accused's first statement, judges and public prosecutors tended to give great weight
to the police records in evaluating a case. See Jaw-Pemg Wang, supra note 67, 10.
160
161

See the former Article 98 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
See the former Paragraph 1 of Article 156 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

. :I
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there was causation between illegal detention and confession. 162

As a public

prosecutor described, for instance, "It used to be a failed attempt for me to warn the
police not to violate due process in investigating criminal cases." 163

This practice

made the defendant almost impossible to secure legal interrogation without any
violation of law.

Thus, there were draft amendments and revisions proposed to

better protections of defendants under interrogation or examination.

Accompanying

these drafts, the ROC Supreme Court announced that: "Since violation of the
procedure rule ( Article 95 )

would possibly result in inadmissible confession, it

should not be presumed admissible without further investigation." 164

In this

subsection, this study will review recent developments of the right to remain silent
and the right to counsel in the ROC criminal justice system.

2.3 .1.1 The Right to Remain Silent
The 1967 ROC Criminal Procedure Code did not provide the defendant with the
1

,1

162

See 72 Tai Sun 1332 ( 1983) .

163

It was said by Mr. Jui-jen Chen, a public prosecutor at the Shihlin district prosecutors' office. Mr.
Chen also said that "when the executive branch of the government gradually released its control over
judicial affairs, Taiwan's court system became more independent in determining whether investigative
agencies had undermined the civil rights of crime suspects in the process of criminal investigations."
"Now, I have to say 'no more'," Chen said, laughing, "because the police themselves would phone me
up from time to time and inquire about the legality of the things they planned to do." See Taipei
Times, 'Big Brother' makes way for due process of law, November 18, 1999, available at:
http://th.gio.gov.tw/show.cfm?news id=3358 (last visited, Feb. 21 1\ 2005) .
164

See 88 Tai Sun 5762 ( 1999) .
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right to remain silent nor does the ROC Constitution.

In practice, rarely did the

defendant remain silent during interrogation from which the court would be drawing
inference against the accused.

Pressures on the accused from either the police's

question or public prosecutor's interrogation deserve careful consideration because
the accused was usually coerced under unfamiliar environment and procedure.
Moreover, the police often told or implied to the suspect and arrestee that if they
would confess to the public prosecutor, it would be more likely to obtain release on
lower bail and not to be detained. 165
Aside from a decisive change that handed authority for detention back to the
court system, a proposal of the Miranda Warning to protect the alleged offender from
coercion during interrogation was passed in 1997, which requires all interrogating
officers, including police, public prosecutor, and judge, to inform the alleged offender
of the right to remain silent, the right to request an attorney when being questioned,
the right to ask to investigate evidence favorable to the suspect, and if the charges are
amended subsequently, the officers must inform ·the suspect. 166

Without "reading a

suspect his rights," the statute says, a suspect's answers may not be used as evidence

in a trial. 167 At the same time, the 1997 legislation also prohibited interrogations that

I6S

166
167

See Jaw-Pemg Wang, supranote 67, 14.

see Arti cle 95 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
•

See Article 158-2 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

See Taipei Times, supra note 163.
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were overly exhaustive or went on through the night. 168

'I
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The ROC Supreme Court

hereupon overruled its former decisions and declared that the court should investigate
'I

if any violation of procedural rules exists and if there is causation between violation

II

and confession. 169

Furthermore, if the accused asserted confession is derived from

violation of the right to remain silent, the court has to investigate whether it is true
before any further investigation can proceed. 170 Nonetheless, this right to remain
silent is different from that under Miranda since violation of it does not necessarily

I

1

and automatically result in exclusion of the alleged confession, and the law does not
'I

prohibit the police from continuously interrogating even if the right to remain silent is
invoked. 171

I

I

2.3 .1.2 The Right to Counsel
While old Chinese people had a deeply entrenched mistrust oflawyers 172 smce

<
I

1

168

See Paragraph 1 of Article 100-3 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

169

See 89 Tai Sun 1133 ( 2000) .

170

See Paragraph 3 of Article 156 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

171

Under the American concept of Miranda Rights, when suspects are arrested, the police will have to
advise them of their rights, including the right to remain silent during police interrogation and the right
to retain a lawyer. Otherwise the statements of the parties involved cannot be used as evidence. See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 ( 1966) .
172

It is worth mentioning that: "The concept of a lawyer in China is quite different from that found in
the United States. A lawyer in the United States will generally have a four-year baccalaureate degree,
a three-year law degree, and will have passed a bar exam. In China, no comparable preparation is
required. A typical lawyer must at least be a high school graduate and may have taken some college
law courses, or may have even earned a baccalaureate degree. The one prerequisite to the practice of
law is to pass a civil service exam for the law. There are no mandated educational requirements for
I

~1
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ancient times, Chinese society was averse to those who made a living on vexation
litigation. 173

In fact, the Chinese word "lawyer" did not exist until the late Ching

Dynasty. 174

The first proposal to create criminal procedure did shock the Chinese

because the title and the substance of "attorney" were unknown at that time.

175

Although both the 1935 and 1967 Criminal Procedure Code provided the
accused with the right to retain a lawyer, it was not until 1982 that a counsel was
allowed to be present while the police or a public procurator examined the suspect.

176

While an accused has the right to retain a lawyer, that does not require the police or a

g
public prosecutor to advise the accused of the right without Article 95 of the ROC
Criminal Procedure Code.

In practice, before 1997, rarely could one find an

bm
z

~m

c::.

z

<

ordinary occurrence that the police should warn the accused of the right to retain a
lawyer under 72 Tai Sun 1332 even though Paragraph 5 of Article 88-1 has required
the police to inform the arrestee of the right to retain a lawyer to be present since
1982.
In December 1997, significant amendments to the ROC Criminal Procedure

the practice oflaw."

See Pamella A. Seay, supra note 59, 152.

173

See Todd D. Epp, The New Code of Criminal Procedure in the People's Republic of China:
Protection, Problems, and Predictions, 8 Int'l J. Comp. & Applied Crim. Just. 43, 50 ( 1984) .
174

175

176

See Jaw-Pemg Wang, supra note 67, 6.
See Yi-Pemg Chang, History of Judicial Refonn in China, 1 The China L. Rev. 18, 19 ( 1924) .
See Articles 27 and 88-1 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

~
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Code passed the legislature, as a further guarantee for civil rights through due process
of criminal justice. 177

The ROC Supreme Court thereafter overruled 72 Tai Sun

1332 by declaring that: "In order to secure a fair trial, the accused is entitled to retain
a defense attorney, which equates the defendant with a public prosecutor throughout
the whole proceeding.

If the right to retain a defense lawyer is ignored, especially

when failure to notify the defense attorney of the date of trial, it is impossible to
secure a fair trial. " 178

Thus, whenever an accused has retained a lawyer, the·

law-enforcement-officers should inform the attorney when to interrogate.

Without

observing this ruling, any proceeding will be treated as unfair and illegal because of
violation of due process. 179

Nevertheless, it is still difficult to predict if the evidence

will be subsequently excluded.
Despite that the ROC criminal justice system is equipped with the public defense
system, unlike the United States, a public defender will not be assigned by the court
unless the minimum punishment is more than three years or a high court takes
jurisdiction over the first instance. 180

There is no legal requirement that indigent

persons be provided a counsel during police interrogation, although such counsel is

177

See Taipei Times, supra note 163.

178

See 87 Tai Sun 644 ( 1998) .

179

See 88 Tai Sun 2282 ( 1999) .

180

See Paragraph 1 of Article 31 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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provided during trials.

In other words, a defense attorney is not required during

police and public.prosecutor's investigation if the accused can not afford one.

The

law allows the police, public prosecutors and the court to continue questioning or
examining the accused even if he retains no lawyer after being informed of and
invoking this right.

Even when a public defender is retained, he does not provide

effective defense because of spending little time on a given case. 181
Nothing in the ROC Criminal Procedure Code addresses the "Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel" on appeal.

It is reasonable under the traditional inquisitorial

framework because the court is presumed to discover the truth even if assistance of
counsel is really ineffective.

Nevertheless, since the new legislation increases the

role of the defense counsel at trial, whether this situation will change in the future is
worth being observed especially since the court still has the power to investigate on its
own initiative according to Paragraph 2 of Article 163 of the ROC Criminal
Procedure Code.

2.3 .2 Roles of the Court, Prosecutors, and Defense Attorney
Generally speaking, judges are far more active trial participants in civil law

181

Before 2003, in practice, public defense counsels typically do not appear until the fmal hearing of
the trial. However, this situation has changed since the newly enacted law requires the defense
attorney, if retained, to be present at trial all the time. For more detailed description about defense
attorney's new role, see the following subsection.
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systems because the judge, rather than the parties, is responsible for developing the
evidence at trial and calling and questioning witnesses himself182 although the 1967
Criminal Procedure Code required both the public and private prosecutors, while
filing a prosecution, to produce evidence before a judge or a panel of judges, who
later would question the accused about it.

In this subsection, this study will present

how the court, the public or private prosecutor, the accused, and defense attorney
operated the ROC criminal justice system in the past as well as changes of their roles
derived from the 2003 legislation.

2.3.2.1 The Changes of the Judge's Role
Under the inquisitorial tradition, an accused is examined by the court before any

~·

'

other witness. 183

An accused is usually required to make statements in court without

taking an oath, which means an accused is not regarded as a witness at trial.

Besides,

an accused has the right to make statements relevant to the charges at trial, especially
right after each evidence is argued by the prosecutor. 184

Even if an accused lies at

trial, since he is not sworn to tell the truth, no perjury will be imposed upon him.

182

In

As the name implies, the inquisitorial system places primary responsibility for developing the facts
in the hands of the judge. See William T. Pizzi, supra note 41, 7.
183

See Myron Moskovitz, supra note 11, 1124.

184

See Article 288-1 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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addition, like Germany, the defendant's statements are part of the trial evidence and
can form the basis of the judgment.

185

In theory, a public trial develops all relevant evidence on which the defendant
might be convicted.

However, in practice, the examination phase grew in

importance at the expense of the trial.

Under this practice, in the past, the ROC trial

merely confirmed what had taken place during the pretrial phase.

Records and

materials collected during the investigative phase thus became the basis of the verdict
and sentence without complying with the traditional continental principles of orality
and immediacy. 186

It is worth mentioning if an accused denied the guilt before the

court, in the past, the judges' examining usually became more inquisitorial as if
playing an "adversarial" role against the accused.
One significant change under the 2003 legislation is the nature of the trial.

In

order to mitigate this inquisitorial practice, after 2003, the court is prohibited from
examining the accused on the facts charged 187 right after the public prosecutor's
statements of the essential points of the prosecution.

Nevertheless, the judge still

retains the authority to investigate ex officio when an absolute need arises to get

185
186
187

See Thomas Weigend, supra note 71, 210.
See William T. Pizzi, supra note 41, 4.
See the former Article 287 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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additional ev!dence after the parties have closed their cases. 188

70

Like changes in Italy,

"the parties are given a greater role while the role of the court is dramatically
reduced." 189

Accordingly, the court again has to inform the accused of the right to

remain silent, the right to retain an attorney, the right to ask for investigating evidence
favorable to the alleged offender, and if the original charges are amended
subsequently, the newly amended charge. 190
After this procedural notice, the public or private prosecutor is required to
produce evidence with which the accused argues during the process of investigating
evidence. 191

Although it is still unclear when it is necessary or where there exists

evidence from which an accused can benefit greatly, in principle, the court is no
longer regarded to "continue" or "assume" an unfinished job of the prosecutors'
investigation.

This new role of the court makes the trial somewhat pro-accusatorial

although the court remains to be the trier of fact, who makes an almost unlimited use
of a dossier,

192

the investigatory work products of the police and the public

prosecutor or the private prosecutor, in reaching his decision in any given case.

188

See Paragraph 2 of Article 163 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

189

See Rachel VanCleave, supra note 5, 276.

190

See Articles 95 and 287 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

191

See Article 288 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

192

This dossier provides the umbilical cord that joins the investigatory and adjudicative phases into
one body to the point that the adjudication exercise is a trial of the dossier, rather than of the accused.
See Ennio Amodio, supra note 7, 1216.
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Different from the United States and some continental countries, there is no lay
involvement in criminal proceedings in Taiwan.
entitled to decide the truth. 193

Only professional judges are

In a sense professional judges in Taiwan are more

powerful than those with lay participation in other legal systems.

It is worth noting

that rarely do commentators in Taiwan criticize or doubt if it is proper to have such
powerful judges in criminal proceeding during all revising symposia.
judges' role in the past was unclear compared to the United States.
they were supposed to decide a case.

However, the
On the one hand,

On the other hand, they were supposed to pick

up holes in the prosecution's evidence, assuming the role of a defense counsel.

In

fact, "how zealously a judge pursues this second role is up to the judge, who might be
lazy, overworked, fed up with the job, or bribed." 194

While the 2003 legislation

adopts some accusatorial elements into the ROC criminal justice system, the judges
are now supposed to be passive according to Articles 159, 159-1 to 159-5 of the ROC
Criminal Procedure Code.
Unlike the judges in the United States who hear only one trial over the course of
two or more consecutive days, the judges in Taiwan usually hear several trials in a
single day.

Besides, many trials end up being broken up into three or more hearings

193

According to Article 2 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code, all trial judges are required to be
neutral while finding the truth by themselves and applying laws.
194

See Laurence Eyton, supra note 33.
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over the course of months to years probably because judges seem concerned that their
dockets will become overcrowded if they hear only one trial over the course of two or
more consecutive days. 195

This practice makes professional judges resort to the

written record since they are unlikely to remember the testimony from months
earlier. 196

While the trial is broken up in this way, it is ironic that one important goal

of the new pro-accusatorial legislation is to further the principle of "orality."

2.3 .2.2 The Past Functionless Character of the Prosecutor at Trial
Since the earlier enactment of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code in 1935, the
criminal trial had been merely nominally "adversarial," particularly in its practice.
While the court was generally required to discover the truth ex officio, 197 it was the
court's duty to determine the scope, order, and method of proof even when the parties
either admitted or did not contest the material facts.

In short, the presiding judge,

who determined the sequence in which proof was taken, is responsible for the
completeness of evidence, and for interrogating the defendant, witnesses and expert
witnesses while primarily conducting the trial.

195

t96

197

This practice is similar to the Italian experience.

Although the public prosecutor bears

See Rachel VanCleave, supra note 5, 277.

Id.
See the former Paragraph 1 of Article 163 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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the burden of proof as to the facts of the crime charged of an accused,

198

the trial

judge was required by the ROC Supreme Court's decision, declaring that: "the trial
court should investigate all related evidence not limited to those mentioned by the
parties of the crime in order to find the truth ex officio,"

199

to prove the defendant's

guilt or innocence with full responsibility to investigate all related evidence?00

Thus,

under the trial court's absolute control, either a public prosecutor or a defense lawyer
was considered merely as an "unimportant assistant" at trial.

In short, as the judge

has full access to the pretrial file prior to the trial's commencement in order to aid in
his investigation, the involvement of the public prosecutor and defense attorney is
generally limited to asking occasional follow-up questions or suggesting other lines of
inquiry.20l
Furthermore, although a public prosecutor is obliged to institution a prosecution,
he usually decided to indict just based upon "reasonable suspicion"202 since he

191

199

200
201
202

See Paragraph 1 of Article 161 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
See 61 Tai Sun 2477 (1972) ; 64 Tai Sun 2962 (1975) , and 25 Sun 3706 ( 1936) .
See Jaw-Perng Wang, supra note 67, 19.
See William T. Pizzi, supra note 41, 7.

See Paragraph 1 of Article 251 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code. It provides: "If evidence
obtained by a public prosecutor in the course of investigation is sufficient to show that an accused is
suspected of having committed an offense, a public prosecution shall be initiated." Scholars
interpreted this paragraph as that a public prosecutor has fulfilled his responsibility to indict if facts and
evidence indicated in indictment raise reasonable suspicion. See Pu-Shen Chen, Criminal Evidence
Rule, 160 (Taipei, 1995) (in Chinese) . It is noteworthy that the late Professor Chen was a former
Grand Justice and Professor of Law at National Taiwan University and National Chen Chi University,
the leading two Law Schools in Taiwan. He had been a leading scholar in Criminal Procedure since
the 1950s.
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believed that the court would continue his unfinished investigation if any.

The

standard of reasonableness applied in Paragraph 1 of Article 251 is the likelihood that
the alleged offender would be convicted after trial.

While a non-conviction in

Taiwan is not regarded as a personal defeat as it in the United States, a public
prosecutor preferred to institute a prosecution.

A private prosecution was often

initiated without sufficient investigation and evidence due to this inquisitorial practice.
In such a private prosecution, the trial court always investigated the case as if it was
playing a public prosecutor's role although a private prosecutor would be examined
by the court more deliberately in order to determine if this is a case for civil action or
that the private prosecution procedure was being used to threaten the accused from the
very beginning. 203
Unlike the United States, a trial started with the court's investigation.

A court

usually might have about ten to twenty cases to be tried on the same date in the past.
When the court considered it was time to close a case, the court would retain a public
prosecutor to be present.

The retained public prosecutor was scheduled to take his

turns to appear at different trials and would merely read the indictment204 because

203
204

See the former Paragraph 1 of Article 326 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

Usually the in court public prosecutor would mere state: "the facts are recorded in the indictment"
instead ofread it word by word, according to the author's clerk experience.
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this case was usually not prepared and filed by his own decision. 205
did not have the related dossiers at hand.

Moreover, he

This meaningless process existed because

the court believed that nominally complying with Articles 271 and 289 of the ROC
Criminal Procedure Code was enough.

Although a public prosecutor is required to

make an argument at trial, 206 in the past, he usually merely stated: "please decide the
case in accordance with laws," which would make the practice even more nominal
"adversary."

Generally speaking, a public prosecutor being present at trial in each

case would last no longer than five minutes, which made him only a symbol and to be
functionless at trial. 207
little to do at trial.

Similar to a public prosecutor, a private prosecutor also had

After the court clarified the purpose of the private prosecution

and confirmed it a real criminal offense, 208 a private prosecutor could expect the court
to fulfill the responsibility for investigation from which a private prosecutor would
definitely benefit.

A private prosecutor did even less than a public prosecutor

because he was not required to produce a dossier for the court.
In summary, while the 2003 legislation has made the prosecutor a real "party"

los A public prosecutor often received the indictment when he was present at trial.
no knowledge about the case before the trial.
206

No wonder he had

See Paragraph 1 of Article 289 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

207

This description of the pre-2003 practice results mainly from the author's personal practical
experiences as a court clerk in charge of criminal cases.
208

See the former Paragraph 1 of Article 326 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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with an increasing role at trial, 209 both public and private prosecutors in Taiwan are
no more functionless than before.

Nonetheless, while both public prosecutors and

judges are still considered members on the judiciary,210 there come up "the tensions
inherent in having an accusatorial trial system where one party is also considered a
member of the neutral judiciary yet to be resolved. " 211

2.3.2.3 New Pro-Accusatorial Status of the Defense Attorney
Contrary to the United States, a defense attorney in the past had little to do.
Due to its role set up to assist the court to discover the material truth, a defense
attorney was hired merely to remind the court of what else to investigate or to suggest
which witness to subpoena.

Under the inquisitorial tradition, while the case belongs

to the court, 212 all witnesses do not belong to either side of litigants either.2 13
Defense counsel could not object the court's question, nor did they have the right to
cross-examine the witness unless approved by the court.

In fact, a defense amounted

209

Even a public prosecutor is regarded as a party at trial, according to Article 2 of the ROC Criminal
Procedure Code, a public prosecutor has to be neutral and give equal attention to circumstances
favorable and unfavorable to the defendant Thus, a public prosecutor still has the duty to investigate
facts and circumstances which might exculpate or otherwise favor the defendant after instituting a
prosecution.
210

It is because both take the same entrance examination, accept the same training, have the same
salary, and may move from one branch to the other.

•l

211

There is a similar argument in Italy.

212

See Myron Moskovitz, supra note 11, 1128.

213

See Jaw-Pemg Wang, supra note 67, 21.

See Rachel VanCleave, supra note 5, 279.
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to little more than a written submission to the judge, which he was supposed to use in
questioning the prosecutors on the case they presented.

214

In addition, a defense

attorney's closing argument would generally last less than five minutes because all
competent and well-experienced attorneys knew that trial judges were very averse to
. nal arguments. 215
long and emotio
This practice did not change until 2002.

As mentioned above, the former

legislation provided that the court "should" ex officio collect and investigate evidence
for the sake of discovering the material truth.

This resulted in the court to assume

most of the responsibility to collect and investigate evidence and decide the case, as
shown in the Hsichih murder case. 216

Dissatisfying with then inquisitorial criminal

justice system, scholars and litigants asked for judicial reform, which included
adopting some accusatorial elements in the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

The

most critical and essential development is that the current Paragraph 2 of Article 163
of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code becomes "The court 'may' ex officio
investigate evidence for the sake of discovering the truth.

But if it is necessary for

justice or there exists evidence from which an accused can benefit greatly, the court

214

Only under the court's approval could the defense attorney examine the witness. See the former
Paragraph 1 of Article 166 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
215

216

See Jaw-Pemg Wang, supra note 67, 21.
See the former Paragraph 1 of Article 163 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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'should' ex officio investigate."
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Afterwards, the court does not necessarily ex

officio investigate evidence in principle.

While the newly adopted provision gives

the parties, rather than a judge, primary control over investigation at trial, a public or
private prosecutor is no longer an assistant or a vase to the court and has to prove his
case beyond reasonable doubt because those ROC Supreme Court decisions are no
longer in effect after this amendment.

Accordingly, a defense attorney becomes

more active.
In addition to reminding the court what else to investigate, a defense attorney, if
retained, is required to be present at pre-trial preparatory hearing.

A defense

attorney discusses the case, including deciding what the issue is and whether to
exclude evidence, the scope, order, and method to investigate evidence, with a public
prosecutor. 217

At trial, a defense attorney argues after a public prosecutor presents

evidence or legal opinions,218 and tries to persuade the court.

Furthermore, a

defense attorney is allowed to examine or cross-examine witness directly without
interference from the court.2 19

In short, although the court is still playing the role as

a fact fmder, it becomes rather inactive than active in the past regarding evidence
investigation.
217

See Paragraph 1 of Article 273 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

218

See Paragraph 1 of Article 289 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

219

See Paragraph 1 of Article 166 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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2.3 .2.4 Party Presentation of Evidence
At this point, an attempt should be made to elucidate the feature through which
the 2003 legislation in Taiwan reveal its accusatorial soul. 220

It is fair to say that the

drafters developed these new laws on "the basic principle of presentation of evidence
by the parties."

Unlike the 1967 inquisitorial system that required the trial structure

to be framed around an official inquiry mainly conducted by the judge, the 2003
legislation acknowledges the parties' right to produce evidence, 221 to call witness and
to examine them on his own initiative. 222

The best illustration of this adversary

approach is the provision providing that: "The scope, order and method of
investigating evidence should be admitted on request from a party." 223
party initiative in evidentiary matters obviously operates only at trial.

Nonetheless,

In the

investigating phase, while the accused is entitled to file a request to a public
prosecutor for investigation, the process remains inquisitorial in nature.

Only the

trial structure possibly exhibits the most peculiar features of the accusatorial

220

Articles l6I and I63 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code were passed in 2002. Articles I6I-I,
I6I-2, I63-I, and I63-2 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code were enacted in 2003.

221
222
223

See Paragraph I of Article I6I, and I6I-I ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
See Paragraph I of Article I63 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
See Paragraph I of Article I6I-2 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

I.
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pattem. 224
It is worth mentioning that the accusatorial structure of the trial phase in the new
ROC criminal justice system does not force the judge to play an entirely passive role
like that in the United States.

For example, the 2003 legislation grants the court the

power to question the witness after the parties have completed their own
examinations?25

Moreover, the judge retains the authority to call witnesses or to

investigate on his motion should an absolute need arise to get additional evidence
after the prosecution and the defense have closed their cases. 226

However, these

judicial powers are designed to operate only if the parties fail to produce adequate
evidence in presenting their cases so that the narrow scope of the fact-finder's active
role surviving in the new provisions by no means impairs the full operation of the
burden of evidence placed on the prosecutor. 227

To some extent, the newly

promulgated Paragraph 2 of Article 163 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code
• 1

providing with the court the inquisitorial power to investigate under the
pro-accusatorial legislative trend seems to mean this pro-accusatorial legislation in

224

Similar to the Italian accusatorial approach, following the opening speech, both the prosecutor and
the counsel for the defendant ( or the accused himself if retaining no attorney ) produce the evidence
for their cases through direct and cross-examination of witnesses, experts, and the defendant himself.
The burden of introducing evidence as well as the burden of persuasion has become the cornerstones of
the new ROC system of criminal justice. See Ennio Amodio, supra note 7, 1220.
225

See Paragraph 4 of Article 166ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

226

See Paragraph 2 of Article 163 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

227

See Ennio Amodio, supra note 7, 1121.
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2003 does not change the goal of the trial to the ascertainment of a formal or
procedural truth.

Rather, as the Italian Constitutional Court's ruling mentioned, "the

goal remains that of determining the actual or material truth, and that it is the
responsibility of the impartial judge to ensure that such truth comes out."

228

2.3.3 Presumption of Innocence
2.3.3.1 Inquisitorial Practice
One striking difference between the ROC and the United States in criminal trial
procedure was how the defendant is presumed in the judicial process.

Under the

Anglo-American trial system, the defendant is presumed innocent unless proven
guilty.

229

In the past, on the contrary, the overall impression of the ROC criminal

justice system was that once the public prosecutors' office decided to charge a suspect,
guilt was almost taken for granted. 230

This impression would easily be learned from

the ROC Supreme Court decisions. 231

In practice, since the trial court should

investigate all related evidence not limited. to those mentioned by the parties of the
crime in order to flnd the truth ex officio and to prove the defendant's guilt or
228

See Rachel VanCleave, supra note 5, 277.

229

See Gerald D. Robin and Richard H. Anson, Criminal Justice System, 312 (Harper Collins, 4th ed.,
1990) .

230

231

See Laurence Eyton, supra note 33.
For those decisions, see supra note, 199.
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innocence with full responsibility, 232 it should not acquit the accused unless all
possible approach of investigation to secure conviction is exhausted. 233
the defendant wo has to prove his innocence.

Usually it is

Under this inquisitorial practice,

ironically, "innocence should be proven beyond reasonable doubt," which was
unreasonably unfavorable to the accused.

2.3.3.2 Adoption of Presumption of Innocence
Generally speaking, the principle of innocent until proven guilty has become one
of the basic tenets of human rights protection throughout history.

234

To embody the

principle of innocence, first of all, Paragraph 1 of Article 154 ofthe ROC Criminal
Procedure Code has been added, which states that the accused is presumed innocent
until proven guilty.

Secondly, the revision of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code has

been focused to reinforce the burden of proof to be shouldered on prosecutors, rather
.,

than on defendants, as the latter would have suffered immensely should they have
been sued without reasonable causes.

Thus, Paragraph 1 of Article 161 of the ROC

Criminal Procedure Code has been revised to prescribe that the burden of proof rests
232

See 61 Tai Sun 2477 (1972) .

233

See 25 Sun 3706 ( 1936) .

234

This principle can be located in the United States Declaration of Independence, the Declaration of
Human Rights during the French Revolution, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, and European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
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on both public and private prosecutors, who must present to the court a convincing
plan for proving the defendant's guilt.

Meanwhile, even though the accused may be

still found innocent in a weak prosecution by the end of trial, wrongful indictments
and arduous criminal proceedings have significant impacts on the reputation, life and
the family of the accused.

Paragraph 2 of Article 161 of the ROC Criminal

Procedure Code has thus been revised to state that should the prosecutor fails to
present to the court with an adequate plan for proving the defendant's guilt at trial, the
court may request prosecutors to reinstate such a plan before a certain deadline or
dismiss the trial should the request be unmet.
of proof to the prosecution.

This amendment is to shift the burden

It is one of a few truly revolutionary changes in the

administration of justice in Taiwan.

In short, when a suspect is presumed innocent,

it is the police and public prosecutors that must discover convincing evidence to
establish culpability. 235

2.3 .4 The Confrontation Right
2.3.4.1 The Pre-1995 Practice
Neither the ROC Constitution nor the 1967 Criminal Procedure Code provided

235

In order to assert justice in criminal proceedings, these new amendments have been added recently
to the ROC Criminal Procedure Code and were designed to prevent both public and private prosecutors
from making wrongful indictments without substantial evidence.

I.
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the accused the absolute right of confrontation.

Even the ROC Grand Justices

Council once considered it not necessary to recognize the confrontation right as a
fundamental constitutional protected human right under the continental tradition. 236
In other words, the ROC Grand Justice Council seemed to claim it better to provide
with the court the discretionary power to determine if it is necessary for the defendant
to confront with the witness against him.

In practice, the defendant had no right to

face his accuser if the court or the public prosecutor considered such a confrontation
between the accused and the witness was unnecessary or improper. 237

Usually, a

witness legally examined by a public prosecutor during the stage of investigation
should not be called to testify again.238

Even the out-of-court statement made by the

law-enforcement-officers during investigation was admissible as evidence at trial.239
It is noteworthy that, unlike the United States, a co-defendant is not considered a
witness in the other co-defendant's case.

An accused also had no right to confront

with the co-defendants since the ROC Supreme Court declared "the co-defendant's
statement against the other co-defendant is admissible in evidence at trial to secure

236

See the concurring opinion in Interpretation No. 384, written by Justice Mr. Yun-Mo Lin and
Justice Mr. Son-Yen Sun.
237

See Paragraph 3 of Article 97 and Paragraph 2 of Article 184 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

238

See the former Article 196 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

239

See 72 Tai Sun 1203 ( 1983) .

85

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

conviction for the other co-defendant. " 240

As shown in the controversial murder

case, merely confession derived from a co-defendant was sufficient to secure
conviction.

While a co-defendant is prone to shirk and shift responsibility to the

other co-defender falsely, the past practice was especially unfair to the so-called
"other co-defendant" who he had no opportunity to prove the lies if possible.

2.3.4.21mproved Protection of the Accused
This situation did not change until 1995 when the ROC Grand Justice Council
recognized in its Interpretation No. 384 that "requiring the courts to examine a
witness separately as a secret witness and to prevent the accused and his retained
lawyer from confronting or cross-examining secret witness would definitely abridge
the accused the right to defense." 241

Thus, in 2003, the ROC Legislative Yuan

passed a new provision providing that: "The confession of either an accused or a
co-defendant shall not be used as the sole basis of conviction; and the other necessary
evidence shall still be investigated to see if the confession coincides with the facts." 242
Under this statute, confession derived from a co-defendant is no more itself sufficient
to secure conviction and a co-defendant should be confronted by the accused although
240

See 46 Tai Sun 419

241

See the reasoning of Interpretation No. 384 of the Grand Justice Council ( 1995) .

242

See Paragraph 2 of Article 156 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

(1957) .
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not being treated as a witness.

In addition, in order to make the trial more accusatorial, the 2003-passed
Paragraph 1 of Article 166 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code provides with the
defendant and the defense attorney the right to cross-examine witness and expert
witness presented by the prosecutor.

While the defendant is indigent and retains no

counsel, the court should know the defendant's right to cross-examine and ask the
defendant whether to cross-examine or not.

Regarding statements or confessions

from a co-defendant, although the new law does not change the declarant's status into
the witness, Paragraph 1 of Article 159 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code,
providing that: "Unless otherwise provided by law, the out-of-court verbal and written
statements derived from anyone other than the defendant are inadmissible;" provides
the defendant with the right of confrontation.

Thus, in principle, confession or

statement resulting from a co-defendant itself is no more sufficient to secure
conviction without confrontation.

The 2003 legislation provides the accused with a

right to examine co-defendants and lay witnesses against him.

2.3.5 The Exclusionary Rule
2.3.5.1 An Overview
Like Germany, there was no general statutory exclusionary rule which would
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make illegally obtained evidence inadmissible under the 1967 ROC Criminal
Procedure Code.

Nonetheless, Paragraph 1 of the Article 156 does provide for the

I

I .

inadmissibility of statements elicited by certain forbidden means, like violence, threat,
inducement, fraud, unlawful detention and other improper devices.

Despite this

provision, since the ROC Supreme Court did not care about how evidence was
obtained, any evidence related to proving the truth of the matter at issue was
admissible in the past. 243

As presented in the Hsichih case, the police usually

.!
\

,..

I

neglected warrant requirement to search and seize, let alone coercing the suspect to
confess with torture.

2.3.5.2 Practical Developments Before the 2003 Legislation
Influenced by the United States, an exclusionary rule emerged in the ROC
criminal practice for the first time in 1998.

The ROC Supreme Court in 1998 for the

first time, based on judicial integrity and fairness, recognized that an exclusionary rule
is applicable in the ROC criminal justice system so that any evidence obtained
through illegal wiretaps could not be allowed in a criminal trial? 44

243

244

Nonetheless,

See 72 Tai Sun 1332 ( 1983) .

See 87 Tai Sun 4025 ( 1998) . It held that illegally wiretapped communication by police should be
excluded or it would prejudice the judicial integrity and fairness according to Article 8 and 16 of the
ROC Constitution and Interpretation No. 384, 396, and 418 of the Grand Justice Council. Therefore it
is necessary to investigate if there existed illegal wiretapping.

,I

I

'\I
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I

under what circumstances evidence should be excluded remains to be developed by
trial courts.

What follows are the Taipei High Court cases addressing the

exclusionary rule in practice since 1998. 245
In a fornication case, 246 a victim wife hired someone to wiretap telephone
conversations between her husband and his new lover and recorded it.

After

wiretapping their conversation regarding their sexual intercourse, the victim wife
accused both of them and a public prosecution was later filed.

While the district

court convicted two of them, the Taipei High Court acquitted them and declared that:
"Since wiretapping other's telephone conversation is a criminal offense, it violates
the defendants' privacy protection if the tape is admitted as evidence at trial.

In

addition, admitting the tape in evidence at trial would prejudice judicial integrity
and fairness and encourage others to do the same.

Therefore, the wiretapped

245

l

'I

It is worth mentioning that before 1998, there existed some district court rulings addressing
exclusionary rule. A decision by the Taipei district court over the inadmissibility of illegally-obtained
evidence was being perceived as a critical ruling that embodied the due process of law. In compliance
with the so-called exclusionary rule, under which the use of any illegally-obtained evidence is
disallowed, the district court acquitted a suspected robber on the grounds that the suspect's confession
was extracted during a nighttime interrogation, which is now against the law. In fact, the Taipei
District Court ruling is not the only one in the island's criminal system that complies with the
exclusionary rule. Over the last few years, there have been a series of court rulings that manifest the
inadmissibility of illegally obtained evidence. In 1996, during deliberations over the trial of a
suspected drug addict, the Hualien district court dismissed both the prosecution's physical evidence and
the defendant's confessions, on the grounds that they were obtained through illegal search and arrest.
The court then decided to acquit the defendant and, most importantly, the police officer then
investigating the case became th,e subject of a criminal investigation himself. However, in
comparison to the results of court rulings, due process is often given less emphasis in Taiwan society.
This is due in part to the result of public doubt, namely, whether ensuring defendants get their due
process in criminal procedures actually gives too much protection to the presumed "bad guys." See
Taipei Times, supra note 163.
246

It is a criminal offense in Taiwan. Article 239 of Criminal Code provides: a married person who
commits adultery with another shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than 1 year; the other
party to the adultery shall be subject to the same punishment.
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1..
. ma
. dmi ss1'ble. ,247
tape 1s
In short, any evidence secured in violation of the criminal law is not admissible even
if it is carried out by ordinary people instead of police officers.

This is dramatically

different from the U.S. exclusionary rule practice which provides no exclusion
remedy for evidence obtained unlawfully by private persons. 248
In another case involving the investigation of corruption, the police wiretapped a
telephone conversation of the suspect and recorded it.
over the phone.

The defendant was bribed

Although the defendant was convicted by the district court, the

Taipei High Court again acquitted the defendant by declaring:
"The court would become a conspirator to invade privacy, the right of
correspondence guaranteed by Article 12 of Constitution if it admitted the
wiretapped tape in evidence at trial.

In addition, in this case, wiretapping did not

coincide with the requirements in the recently adopted 'Correspondence
Protection Act,' which regulates wiretapping, even though it was conducted
before its legislation. " 249
Under this ruling, it is fair to say any wiretapping obtained in violation of any
statutory privacy protection would be inadmissible.
247

248

249

See 88 Sun E 1953 ( 1999) .
See Burdeau v. McDowell. 256 U.S. 465 ( 1921) .
See 90 Sun E 1085 ( 2002) .
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While those cases mentioned above excluded wiretapping because of privacy
violations and concerns of judicial integrity, the Taipei High Court presented a
different viewpoint in a drug producing case.

In that case it held that:

"Wiretapping conducted before the enactment of the Correspondence Protection
Act in July, 14, 1988 is admissible in that requirement of wiretapping according to
that Act could not be violated before its promulgation.

Since laws in effect when

police conducting wiretapping did not expressively prohibit wiretapping, it is not
fair to say wiretapping is in admissible under no law."250
In this ruling, the court did not address the issue whether privacy protection would be
violated or if evidence derivative from wiretapping would prejudice the judicial
integrity and fairness.
wiretapping.

It merely declared when there was no law regulating

No law would be violated from which no "fruit of poison tree" would

result.
In addition to wiretapping, in a fraud case, the police interrogated the defendant
in violation of a procedure rule which prohibits the police from interrogation during
night time.

The Taipei High Court then declared:

"Whether the resulting confession should be excluded depends on a balancing test
requiring the court to weigh the seriousness of the violation against the public

250

See 90 Sun Gum Two 1112 ( 2002) .
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interest.

Since this illegal interrogation stopped at nine o'clock p.m. which did

!.

not constituted serious violation, and the police did not intend to coerce the
defendant to confess by conducting weariful methods, confession resulting from
procedure violation should not be excluded in this case." 251

In other words, exclusion depends on the seriousness of the violation, the relevance of
the piece of evidence for the resolution of the case, and the seriousness of the offense.
Violation of procedure rule does not necessarily lead to exclusion of evidence.

Thus,

for the first time the High Court in Taiwan indicated that application of Taiwan's
exclusionary rule should be a discretionary matter in which the court balanced the
factors listed above.

This stands in contrast to the American exclusionary rule which

requires mandatory exclusion if any police activity was found to be unlawful. 252
Concerning search in a handgun possession case, the police intentionally
conducted a search with knowing that the address to be searched was incorrectly
recorded which made it an invalid warrant.

The Taipei High Court did not exclude

evidence derived from the search and announced:
"Although the police would eventually secure another valid search warrant with a
correctly written address in advance in this case, while it is necessary and

251

252

See 90 Sun E 2046 ( 2002) .
See Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) .
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important to seize those handguns as soon as possible lest the defendant should
pass them to the others which might break societal order, it is improper to exclude
those handguns as evidence for the offense is serious."253
Again, the court applied the balancing test in determining whether to exclude
evidence.

Given the exigency of the situation, such as when the defendant possesses

,.
I

L

handguns or weapons, which might seriously prejudice the societal peaceful order;
even though the police conduct is unlawful, the balancing test should result in no
suppression.

However, if the illegal search resulted in financial records or

commercial statements which might not prejudice the societal peaceful order, the
balancing test would favor the defendant and therefore evidence derived from illegal
search should be excluded.254

2.3.5.3 Concerns of the Newly Legislated Exclusionary Rule
Under those practical developments recognizing exclusionary rule, the
Legislative Yuan for the first time promulgated an exclusionary rule in 2003.

Article

158-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code provides: "Unless otherwise provided by
law, whether evidence derivative from violation of procedure rule conducted by

253

See 90 Sun Su 2229 ( 2002) .

254

See 91 Sun Gum One 197 ( 2003 ) .
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government officers should be excluded in a criminal case depends on the result of
balancing human right protection of the defendant against the public interest."
law provides the court with discretionary power to exclude evidence.

This

The

Exclusionary Rule is not mandatory whenever a violation of procedure rule occurs.
The Advisory Committee suggested seven standards to be considered in deciding
whether to exclude evidence: 1) the seriousness of the violation of procedure rule, 2)
the subjective intent of the violation, 3) the infringement of human right protection, 4)
the seriousness of the offense, 5) the potential deterrence to government officers, 6)
the possibility to discover the evidence without this violation, and 7) prejudice to
defense. 255
After this legislation, the Taipei High Court applied this exclusionary rule newly
declared in Article 158-4 to a case involving the leaking of national secrets.

The

defendant was accused of revealing national secret affairs by faxing them to Mr.
Wang in Shanghai, China.

While the defendant asserted that the fax was obtained

without a search warrant and should be excluded, the court ruled that:

"In that the faxing record was not obtained by the government officer in charge of
criminal investigation, allowing it as evidence at trial would not coincide with the
principle behind Article 158-4 which intends to deter government misconduct.
255

Generally speaking, these suggested standards are consistent with the former practical
developments.
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Thus, judicial integrity would not be tainted even though this faxing record be
admitted."256
This High Court decision is much different from its earlier one made in the .
fornication case ( 88 Sun E 1953 ) which applied the exclusionary rule against private
persons.257

Under this ruling, the newly adopted exclusionary rule applies merely to

governmental misconduct derived from law-enforcement-officers in charge of
criminal investigation.

For evidence resulted from governmental misconducts

carried out by other officers not in charge of criminal investigation, like
non-law-enforcement-officers, the exclusionary rule does not apply.

,,

In short, this

High Court decision limits the exclusionary rule merely applicable to governmental
misconducts made by those so-called law-enforcement-officers.

However, there has

not been any Supreme Court decision addressing on the exclusionary rule yet.
Whether the ROC Supreme Court will uphold this new ruling requires further
observation.

2.3 .6 The Hearsay Rule
2.3.6.1 The Pre-2003 Practice Without Hearsay Rule: Under Direct Inquisition

256

257

See 92 Sun E 1812 (2003) .

It is worth mentioning that this new decision is also different from its American analogue which
applies the exclusionary rule to governmental misconduct by any officer oflaw.
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Under continental inquisitorial tradition, almost all scholars and judges did not
.
1 hearsay rul em
. ~1ru.wan.
.
258
. there was an Amencan
recogmze
stye

Since the former

Article 159 of ROC Criminal Procedure Code provided "statements made by a
witness outside the court shall be inadmissible unless otherwise provided by law,"
which looked like the definition of hearsay of the United States Federal Rules of

EV1'dence. 259

In addition, Articles 157, 158, and 206 of the ROC Criminal Procedure

Code260 might be treated as exceptions to hearsay, it was questionable whether the
1967 ROC Criminal Procedure Code adopted the American style hearsay rule while
the minority opinion claimed those provisions constituted hearsay rule. 261
In practice, based on the 1967 Advisory Committee Note, Article 159 of the
ROC Criminal Procedure Code had long been considered to be derived from the
continental principles of "Direct Inquisition" and "Verbal Inquisition" instead of

258

It is noteworthy that late Professor Pu-Shen Chen, a former Grand Justice and leading Professor of
Law at National Taiwan University and National Chen Chi University, asserted that there was no
hearsay rule in the ROC Criminal Procedure Code. And an out-of-court statement shall be admitted
in evidence according to Article 165 and 166. See Pu-Shen Chen, supra note 202, 413.
259

Rule 801 (c) of the Federal Rule of Evidence provides: "Hearsay is a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial of hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted."

260

Article 157 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code provides: "No evidence need be adduced to prove
facts commonly known to the public." Article 158 provides: "No evidence need be adduced to prove
such facts as are obvious to the court or have become known to it in performing its function." And
Paragraph 1 of Article 206 provides: "An expert shall be ordered to make a report of his or her findings
and results verbally or in writing."
261

Only Professor Tung-Sheung Huang, Professor of Law and a former President of National
Chun-Shin University, asserted there existed hearsay rule in the ROC Criminal Procedure Code before.
See Tung-Sheung Huang, Discussing Hearsay Rule, Military Law Journal, Vol. 35-1, 16 (Taipei, 1989)
( in Chinese ) .

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

common law hearsay rule.

96

Hence, courts in Taiwan were bound by very few legal

restrictions on the nature of evidence they received as explained by the ROC Supreme
Court.262

Generally speaking, any out-of-court verbal statement made by a witness

other than an accused is inadmissible.263
by a witness is inadmissible.264

An out-of-court 'written' document made

Interestingly, even though an out-of-court verbal

statements should be inadmissible under former Article 159 of the ROC Criminal
Procedure Code, if it was 'made by a co-defendant or a victim' and 'recorded by
law-enforcement-officers' and the court performed its duty to read related notes and
other documents in the dossier which might be used as evidence against an accused at
trial under the former Paragraph 1 of Article 165 of the ROC Criminal Procedure
Code, without direct inquisitioning the declarant, any out-of-court verbal statement

l,

made by a co-defendant or a victim during law-enforcement-officer interrogation was
not only admissible but also sufficient to secure conviction.265

For example, in 72

Tai Sun 1203 ( 1983) , the ROC Supreme Court held: "Under the 'Doctrine of
'I

'

Discretional Evaluation of Evidence,' there is no limitation regarding the

262

See the following ROC Supreme Court decisions: 70 Tai Sun 3864( 1981 ), 72 Tai Sun 1203( 1983 ),
77 Tai Sun 848 ( 1988), 79 Tai Sun 5140 ( 1990), 81 Tai Sun 4352 ( 1992), 82 Tai Sun 622 ( 1993),
83 Tai Sun 2785 (1994) , 84 Tai Sun 2819 ( 1995) , and 91 Tai Sun 2363 ( 2002) etc.
263

See 79 Tai Sun 5140 ( 1990) .

264

See 77 Tai Sun 848 (1988) .

26

s See the following ROC Supreme Court decisions: 71 Tai Sun 5946( 1982 ), 72 Tai Sun 1203( 1983 ),
77 Tai Sun 4249 (1988) , 86 Tai Sun 4242 (1997) , and 90 Tai Sun 6517 ( 2001 ) .. ., etc.
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admissibility of the stereotype of evidence in the ROC criminal justice system.
Victim's deposition made during police interrogation is not prohibited from being in
evidence by Article 159 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

The court has the

discretionary power to decide whether the 'victim's deposition' would prove guilt or
innocence of the accused."

In other words, according to this decision, the victim's

deposition was not excluded by the former Article 159 of the ROC Criminal
Procedure Code.

While the former Article 159 of the ROC Criminal Procedure

Code mentioned "witness statements" only, it did not apply to out-of-court statements
made by co-defendants or victims since they were not considered as witnesses.
Even though the former Article 159 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code
excluded an out-of-court verbal statement made by a witness, in 91 Tai Sun 2363
( 2002) , the Supreme Court ruled "the stat~ment recorded in private-made tape or
video should be admissible if the defendant merely intended to prove what the witness
had told before the court or a public prosecutor previously was not true."

As a result,

an out-of-court verbal statement was admissible for the purpose of impeaching the
witness.

In general, out-of-court verbal statements made by non-victim and

non-co-defendant witnesses were inadmissible in the pre-2003 practice.

Nonetheless,

if an out-of-court verbal statement was made by a victim or a co-defendant and
recorded by a government officer, only when the court fulfilled its obligation to

I
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investigate these statements under the former Paragraph 1 of Article 165 of the ROC
Criminal Procedure Code would they be admissible as evidence.

Under this practice,

an out-of-court statement made by a co-defendant or a victim before any government
officer was itself enough to secure conviction.

This practice resulted in unfairness

especially when a defendant had no opportunity to respond an out-of-court statement
with full preparation because not until trial would he learn this kind of information.
While commentators began to sense that this kind of injustice mainly came from the
lacking of hearsay rule, of meaningful protection of the right to confront, and of other
procedural protection in Taiwan, claims to reform the ROC criminal justice system
hereupon emerged, which eventually resulted in adoption of the American style
hearsay rule.

2.3.6.2 The 2003 Hearsay Rule
2.3.6.2.1 Definition

In 2003, in order to better the defendant's protection at trial, after years of
arguments whether to adopt the hearsay rule, the ROC Legislative Yuan finally
revised its Criminal Procedure Code by adding the hearsay rule into it.

Unlike the

former Article 159 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code, the current Paragraph 1 of
Article 159, providing that: "Unless otherwise provided by law, any out-of-court
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verbal statement derivative from anyone other than the defendant himself shall be
inadmissible," clearly delimits inadmissible hearsay in principle.

Under this new

provision, out-of-court statements made by co-defendants or victims are inadmissible
hearsay.

Only out-of-court statements made by the defendant himself are not hearsay.

In addition, comparing to the former Article 159 of the ROC Criminal Procedure
Code which did not provide any hearsay exception, not all out-of-court statements
made by witnesses are absolutely inadmissible onwards because some hearsay
exceptions are enacted in 2003.

In short, as a civil-law-based jurisdiction, Taiwan

currently adopts the common-law-derived-from hearsay rule.

2.3 .6.2.2 Exceptions to Hearsay

In addition to adoption of hearsay rule, exceptions to P.aragraph 1 of Article 159
of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code are also adopted.

For instance, if an

out-of-court verbal statement derived from anyone other than the defendant is made
before a judge, it is admissible because of its reliable voluntariness. 266

Without

obvious unbelievable circumstances, out-of-court verbal statements derived from
anyone other than the defendant made before a public prosecutor is also admissible?67

266

See Paragraph 1 of Article 159-1 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code and the Advisory
Committee Note.
267

See Paragraph 2 of Article 159-1 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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In addition, while an out-of-court verbal statement derived from anyone other than the
defendant made before any law-enforcement-officer is inconsistent with the same
declarant's statement at trial, the former inconsistent statement is admissible if the
court finds the previous statement is more reliable and it is necessary to use the
previous statement to prove the truth of the asserted matters.268

If the declarant is

unavailable to stand trial in that he is dead, has a mental disorder, loses his memory, is
incapable of talking, is living abroad, lost, or refuses to make a statement without
justification, the former out-of-court verbal statement derived from anyone other than
the defendant made before any law-enforcement-officer is admissible too when the
court finds the out-of-court statement is more reliable and it is necessary to use the
out-of-court statement prove the truth of the asserted matters. 269
Besides the out-of-court verbal statements, either public records and reports or
business records of regular activity are admissible in evidence unless obviously
unbelievable circumstances exist. 270

Accordingly, a residual clause admitting any

other document made in reliable circumstance is also adopted. 271

Within the scope

of inadmissible hearsay, while both parties accept out-of-court statement in evidence

268

See Article 159-2 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

269

See Article 159-3 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

270

See Subparagraphs 1 and 2 of Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

271

See Subparagraph 3 of Article 159-4 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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at trial, hearsay is admissible only if the court finds it proper after considering the
given situation where it was made. 272

In other words, the newly passed Article

159-5 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code allows both parties to dispose hearsay
statements.

Whether to object his opponent's hearsay evidence depends on the

party's own discretion.

Nonetheless, the court still is entitled to make a final

decision about the admissibility of parties-accepted hearsay.

As a consequence,

some pre-2003 admissible out-of-court statements273 become inadmissible hearsay
because of Paragraph 1 of Article 159 and Article 159-2 of the current ROC Criminal
Procedure Code; some pre-2003 inadmissible out-of-court statements 274 are
admissible at trial according to Articles 159-3, 159-4 and 159-5 of the ROC Criminal
Procedure Code today.
c:;3 •

.:1:1

I .~
2.3.6.3 Problems Derived From the 2003 Legislation
Although the American style hearsay rule is initially adopted to improve human
rights protection, the 2003 legislation itself also results in new legal problems. For
example, while there are more than twenty exceptions to hearsay in the United States

272

See Paragraph 1 of Article 159-5 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

273

Such as: out-of-court statements were made by co-defendants or victims before government
officers.
274

Such as: the out-of-court declarant (witness) is dead, has a mental disorder, loses his memory, is
incapable of talking, is living abroad, lost, or refuses to make a statement without justification.
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Federal Rules of Evidence, only five articles in the 2003 legislation provide
exceptions to hearsay in the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

Why the ROC

Criminal Procedure Code merely provides five hearsay exceptions and whether these
provisions provide enough hearsay exceptions become important issues.

Do Articles

159-1 to 159-5 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code cover all hearsay exceptions
under the Federal Rules of Evidence of the United States?

If not, why not?

In

addition, without any limitation, Article 159-1 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code
admits out-of-court statements made before a judge or a public prosecutor.
the rationale behind this article?

What is

Since the current hearsay rule excludes some

previously admissible out-of-court statements, why does it accordingly admit some
former inadmissible out-of-court statements made by private persons at trial?
Comparing to Articles 159-2, 159-3, and 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code
requiring the court to find the necessity and the reliability to admit previous
out-of-court statements, it is questionable and unclear why merely "stating" instead of
"testifying" before a judge or a public prosecutor without requiring the necessity and
the reliability would itself result in the admissibility.

While the Advisory Committee

Note in 2003 declared the purpose to adopt the American style hearsay rule was to
protect the right to confront with any witness against the defendant, whether Article
159-1 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code admitting out-of-court statements
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violates the right to confront appears confusing.

What should the standard for

deciding the admissibility of out-of-court statements be thus emerges as a core legal
problem regarding the hearsay rule in Taiwan.
Moreover, since 91 Tai Sun 2363 admitted an out-of-court statement to be
admissible for the purpose of impeaching the witness, whether the 2003 legislation
recognized this practice is unclear.

It is also ambiguous about the scope of the

exclusionary hearsay adopted in Taiwan.

Before borrowing some experience from

the United States, if any, in resolving these problems, it is desirable to introduce the
development of the exclusionary hearsay in the United States.

2.3. 7 Expert Evidence
2.3. 7.1 Inquisitorial Legacy
Similar to the German Criminal Procedure Code, 275 the ROC Criminal
Procedure Code provides the court as well as a public prosecutor with the power to
select an expert witness in order to assist the court in finding the truth. 276
Nonetheless, different from the role as a supporter of one party in the United States,

275

See Section 73 of Paragraph 1 of the Gennan Criminal Procedure Code, which provides: "The
judge shall select the experts to be consulted, and shall detennine their number. He shall agree with
them on a time limit within which their opinions may be rendered." More infonnation of Gennan
Criminal Procedure Code is available at: htttJ://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StPO.htm (last visited,
Feb. 24!1\ 2005) .
276

See Article 198 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

I
I.
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an expert witness in either the German or ROC criminal justice system is presumed to
be a neutral assistant to the court.

Under this premise, the court or a public

prosecutor is entitled to select an expert witness ex officio with discretionary powers
I

I

even without request by each party if it is considered proper and necessary, as shown

in Ms. Zhang's fraud case? 77

In practice, a public prosecutor often appoints experts

during the investigation stage of the process, and the court retains the same expert for
reasons of expediency.

The defense can try to introduce additional experts in the

same way as they can nominate witnesses, but its chance of success is often limited
because of financial considerations. 278

It is noteworthy that an expert witness is

allowed to make a report of his findings and results in writing. 279

An accused

usually retains no opportunity to confront and cross-examine this reporting expert
witness in this situation.

For instance, in medical malpractice cases, the court

usually makes a decision based merely upon reviewing the expert report submitted by
a hospital, medical school, National Investigation Bureau, Medical Malpractice
Reviewing Committee, etc. 280

The court in fact does not exactly know what and

how to examine medical doctors even if a reporting expert stands trial .

277

See Section 4 of Chapter One of this study.

278

See Thomas Weigend, supra note 71, 210.

279

See Paragraph l of Article 206 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

280

Furthermore,

See ROC Medicine and Law Association, Case Analysis of Medical Malpractice, 5, 16, 24, 36 ... etc.
(Taipei, 1998 ) ( in Chinese ) .
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the court would hardly understand what the report actually means without its final
suggestion281 since rarely do professional judges have relevant and sufficient medical
knowledge.

Although the defendant and the defense counsel are allowed to

. a court-appomte
. d expert Witness
.
. 282 ne1'ther an accused
cross-examme
or exanuner,
nor a defense attorney is capable of doing it in most circumstances because of the
same reason.

Thus, it was considered unnecessary and improper for the court to

summon the reporting expert witness in the past.
The most inquisitorial aspect in the relevant ROC proceedings of expert witness
is the active role of the court in examining expert witness.

Since the court is

designed to be the trier of fact, when professional judges feel unconfident or
dissatisfied with the expert witness's explanation, the court will find out what it means
verbally or in written283 by re-asking the inspecting expert witness or requesting
another expert witness to inspect it again. 284

Usually the court will not make a

decision unless it is satisfied with the expert witness's explanation.

It is interesting

how the court will be satisfied with expert's opinions expecially when professional
judges are without proper scientific or technical knowledge.
281
282

For example, the defendant is with or without negligence, with or without intent.
See the former Articles 166, 167 and 248 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

283

It depends on if the expert witness stands trial since Article 199 of the ROC Criminal Procedure
Code provides that an expert witness shall not be arrested with a warrant.
·
284

See Paragraph 1 of Article 208 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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In summary, as Professor Thomas Weigend mentioned, "Theoretically, the
German system of court-appointed expert witnesses should make for a neutral,
detached role of experts, in contrast to the "hired gun" syndrome in adversarial
system." 285

Under this tradition, expert witnesses in Taiwan are not presumed to

play an advocate role in favor of one party as those in an accusatorial system, Of
course, communication between expert witnesses and the trier of fact is basically
different between these two criminal procedural approaches.

2.3.7.2 An Exception to the Direct Inquisition Principle
Since an accused has no right to "face" an expert witness at trial even when this

I~
'

expert's scientific report was not in favor of the accused, the expert usually does not
stand trial in practice.

In the past practice, almost all the expert's opinions were in

writing and were submitted to a public prosecutor or the court.
know who made this report and why the result came out.

An accused did not

This practice was

interpreted lawful in that Article 206 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code should be
an exception to "the Direct Inquisition Principle" derived from Article 159 of the
ROC Criminal Procedure Code by the ROC Supreme Court. 286

285

See Thomas Weigend, supra note 71, 211.

286

See 92 Tai Sun 2282 ( 2003 ) .

While the court has

I!
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discretionary powers at trial 287 to determine when an expert witness or expert
witnesses are required and who is a qualified expert witness and to select whom to be
an expert witness, whether to proceed this process has long been inquisitorial rather

than accusatorial.

Even after the ROC Legislative Yuan adopted the hearsay rules in

2003, the above-mentioned ROC Supreme Court ruling concerning Article 206 of the
ROC Criminal Procedure Code still justifies the court's discretionary power.

In a

sense Articles 206 and 208 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code constitute an
exception to the hearsay rule under Article 159 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
This exception derives from the inquisitorial tradition indeed.

In addition, Paragraph 1 of Article 208 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code
clearly provides: "A court or public prosecutor may request a hospital, school, or
other suitable establishment to make an expert examination or to review the
examination of another expert witness, and the provisions of Articles 203 to 206-1 of
the ROC Criminal Procedure Code shall apply mutatis mutandis to the circumstances
specified in this paragraph; an expert witness or examiner may be required to explain
it verbally if necessary."

According to this provision, under what circumstances will

it be necessary to require a expert witness or examiner to explain its report verbally at
trial becomes an important issue because the defendant and the defense counsel are

287

Note that a public prosecutor also has this discretionary power during his investigation.
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entitled to cross-examine the expert witness or examiner in this situation.2 88

In

addition to this question, since a court or public prosecutor may make an inspection in
order to investigate the evidence or circumstances of an offense, 289 under what
circumstances should a court or public prosecutor be allowed to do it instead of
requesting an expert witness is also an unsolved issue.

2.3.7.3 Problems of Expert Evidence: Defects of Lay Participation
Generally speaking, it is up to the court or a public prosecutor to request a expert
witness to inspect or examine another expert witness's inspection in principle.

In

practice, only issues of fingerprint290 and mental disorder291 secure mandatory expert
witness under the ROC Supreme Court's rulings.

For example, in car accident cases,

while the majority of judges request the "Car Accident Inspection Committee" to
inspect if the defendant is criminally responsible for the accident, sometimes
professional judges conduct this inspection by themselves292 and hence make their
decisions.

If the truth of handwriting becomes a matter of fact argued, sometimes

288

See Paragraph 2 of Article 208 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

289

See Article 212 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

290

See 32 Sun 2136 ( 1943) .

291

See 47 Tai Sun 1253 ( 1958) . But there are exceptions to this mandatory ruling. For example, a
court is capable of determining if the defendant was not under mental disorder after having only one
cup ofbeer. See 88 Tai Sun 930 ( 1999) .
292

See Article 212 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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professional judges are allowed to inspect it by themselves293 but sometimes they are
required to request the "National Investigation Bureau" or the "Criminal Police
Bureau" to do it. 294

It is unclear when a judge is allowed to make a decision merely

according to his own personal experience under the past practices.

In other words,

"what kind of dispute requires expert witness to present or produce expert evidence"
and "what kind of standard or requirement should be reached or passed in order to be
'good' science on which conviction could base" are still arguable.

If the court still

has discretionary power to determine those questions, the practice of expert evidence
remains inquisitorial as in the past, however, if the defendant is empowered to
influence the court's decisions, it becomes somehow pro-accusatorial.
Nonetheless, if the court is no more playing the role as a fact-finder regarding
highly complicated scientific or technical disputes, the practice of expert evidence
will be much different.

It is generally accepted that lay persons are not capable of

deciding highly complex scientific or technical disputed issues because they are
insufficiently knowledgeable and intelligent about the disputed issues.

As a result,

experts are introduced to be fact-finders to deal with highly complex scientific or
technical disputed issues.

293

294

In Section Four of Chapter Five, in addition to discussing

See 31 Sun 2200 ( 1942) .
See 18 Sun 373 ( 1929) and 91 Tai Sun 5591 (2003) .
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the defects of lay participation in dealing with highly complex scientific or technical
disputed issues, this study will introduce the proposed draft in the ROC dealing with
expert evidence when scientific and technical disputes are at stake.

Moreover, this

study will suggest another institution avoiding the defects of lay participation in
dealing with highly complex scientific or technical disputed issues.

1'

Ill

f!om Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

~hapter Tbree:

Historical Develonments of the Accusatorial Criminal Procedure of

lhe United States
3.1 Introduction
Criminal procedure begins with the police investigating a crime and includes
searches of houses, cars, and other places where evidence may be discovered.

295

It

continues further with police lineups of potential suspects, or with other identification
methods, and proceeds through arrest, interrogation, arraignment and a preliminary
hearing. 296

Other characteristics of "procedure" may include grand jury indictment,

trial, sentencing, appeal, and collateral challenges to conviction.297
Procedure has been an important aspect in American history.

Criminal

Justice Felix

Frankfurter once proclaimed: "The history of American freedom is, in no small
measure, the history ofprocedure." 298

After Christopher Columbus voyage to the

"New World" 1492, European countries such as: The United Kingdom, Spain, France
and others started establishing colonies upon the continents that had been previously
unknown to them.

The Europeans intent was to create economic benefits for

29

s As Professor Craig M. Bradley defines: "Criminal procedure means the entire range of activities
associated with bringing a criminal defendant to trial." See Craig M. Bradley, The Failure of the
Criminal Procedure Revolution, 1 (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993 ) .
296

Id.

297

ld.

298

See Malinskv v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 ( 1945) .
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themselves.

Based upon different geographical and social conditions, settlers and

immigrants gradually developed legal principles that were based upon those of their
native countries.

These principles had to be adjusted or modified to accommodate

the needs of the new settlements.

This special historical background coincidentally

resulted in the criminal justice system of the United States being much different than
those from which it originally derived.

As to differences between the legal systems

of European countries and the U.S.A., Professor Gordon Van Kessel once pointed out:
"The American style adversarial system---with its emphasis on the contest
between the lawyers for the individual and for the state, rules designed to shield
the accused from the process, and extensive use of the lay jury---has its roots in
the individualism, populism, and pluralism that are natural ingredients of our
character and that strongly influence our view of the proper structure and role of
social and political institutions.

A fundamental aspect of our individualism that

stands in the way of reforms embracing nonadversary approaches is our antipathy
toward authority: in particular, our fear and distrust of governmental power.
These attitudes lead us to establish mechanisms--such as strong lawyers and the
lay jury--that shield the individual from the authority of state institutions."299
It would be meaningful to explore the roots of the American Criminal Justice
299

See Gordon Van Kessel, Adversarial Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 403,505 ( 1992) .
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System after briefly introducing its counterpart in the Republic of China on Taiwan so
that further comparisons between these two distinct approaches to criminal procedure
rules might be comprehensively examined.

r

While the 1935 and the 1967 ROC

Criminal Procedure Codes stemmed mainly from the continental civil law tradition,
concepts such as the Exclusionary rule and the Hearsay rule, for instance, were
unknown to the ROC criminal justice system.

However, reforms to this

civil-law-based criminal procedure law in 2003 adopted some accusatorial features
and elements from the U.S. criminal justice system.

Before starting the comparative

analysis, we shall examine the criminal procedure in the United States, especially
those features adopted by the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

In this chapter, this

study will examine some related developments in the United States corresponding to
the ROC's recently adopted pro-accusatorial elements in its Criminal Procedure Code
after giving a rather brief overview of the American experience and characteristics of
i

!.

its criminal justice development.

3.2 British Legacy
3.2.1 Introduction
Most people in the United States are somewhat familiar with the workings of the
adversarial, or accusatorial system.

Movies and television shows usually contain the
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following scenario: the prosecutor and defense counsel are seen engaged in a battle of
wits, trying to persuade the court in its favor; the judge sits above the fray, responding
only to a specific request or objection from one of the attomeys. 300
jury of six, nine, or sometimes twelve, sits mutely to one side. 301

Meanwhile a
However, for those

from continental countries, it is difficult to understand this American practice without
appreciating some underlying principles, stemming mainly from the British Legacy. 302
While all American courts share a basic approach to the resolution of cases;
understanding criminal court process in the United States requires understanding a
common heritage and overarching philosophy of justice.303

300

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury and Nancy Frank, Criminal Court Process, 42 (West, 1996) .

3ot

Id.

302

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland consists of four countries forming three
distinct jurisdictions each having its own court system and legal profession: England & Wales,
Scotland, and Northern Ireland. The United Kingdom was established in 1801 with the union of
Great Britain and Ireland, but only achieved its present form in 1922 with the partition oflreland and
the establishment ,of the independent Irish Free State (later the Republic of Ireland). See A Guide to
the UK Legal System, available at htm://www.llrx.com/features/uk2.htm (last visited, Nov. 1, 2004) .
Scots Law and the Scottish Legal system has a long history, dating back to the medieval era. Its
integrity and independence were acknowledged in the 1707 Act of Union which abolished the Scottish
Parliament and created a new UK Parliament at Westminster. Scots Law shares many statutory
provisions with the law of England and Wales, but Scots civil law remains substantially based on Scots
common law rather than statute, and Scots civil law contains elements that have origins in Roman
Dutch Law rather that English Common Law traditions. In the criminal justice system, the role of the
public prosecutor is critical. The position of the Lord Advocate, as head of criminal prosecution in
Scotland, is protected by the 1998 Scotland Act which led to the establishment of the new Scottish
Parliament in 1999. See Scots Law, available at:
htm://www.scotland.&ov.uk/Resource/Doc/925/0000078.pdf (last visited, Nov. 1, 2004) . Some
authors wrongly state that the Scottish legal system is also based on civil law, because of its origin in
civil law. But it has been developing since 1707 into a mixed system combining elements of civil law
and of common law as the House of Lords in England being the court of last resort for Scotland has
interpreted Scots Law through the lens of English jurisprudence. See Civil law, available at:
htm://www.fact-index.com/c/ci/civil law.html (last visited, Nov. 1, 2004) . Since the Scottish legal
system stems from civil law, the term "British Legacy" here refers only to the legal traditions and
developments of England and Wales. For more information about Scottish legal system, see Scottish
Court Service, available at: htm://www.scotcourt.gov.uk (last visited, Nov. 1'', 2004)
303

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 42.
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In Tudor and Stuart England, criminal trials were nasty, brutish, and essentially
of short duration. 304
constrained inquiry. 305

Counsel seldom participated at trial; few evidence rules
Judges routinely examined witnesses and defendants in the

most vigorous manner. 306
testimonial oaths. 307
courtroom. 308

I

Only prosecution witnesses were allowed to swear

Jurors were free to utilize private knowledge gained outside the

Judges frequently introduced their political views into proceedings.

Finally, there was virtually no appellate procedure. 309

While criminal procedure

during the Middle Ages was a combination of informally collecting evidence and
formalized rituals for determining the verdict, 310 the practice from this period to the
Eighteenth Century was predominantly inquisitorial and non-adversarial,311 although
a jury system had been adopted. 312

The two primary means for arriving at a verdict
~·

~I
·_ ~

304

See Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth
Century England, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 497, 499 ( 1990) .
3os Id.
306

ld.

307

Id.

3oa Id.
309

Id.

310

see Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 68.

311

See John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder
Sources, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. I, 123 ( 1983) .

312

It is agreed that trial by jury is the mainstay of the accusatorial system of criminal justice. See
Leonard W. Levy, The Palladium of Justice: Origins of Trial by Jury, back cover page (Chicago
Publisher Ivan R. Dee, 1999) .
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were compurgation and ordeal.
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In general, when evidence of guilt was sparse or

vague, compurgation, a complex and highly legalistic form of adjudication based
upon the practice of oath taking wherein both sides to a contest had to produce a
certain number of oaths to prove their case. 313

Ordeal was reserved for felonies and

for the difficult cases in which compurgation was unsatisfactory for one reason or
another. 314

Influenced by the competitive oath-taking process and in order to replace

this old inquisitorial traditional, non-contentious approach of criminal procedural
system with a better one, the English gradually developed the adversarial or
Ill!

i!

.

accusatorial mode1. 315

This model was characterized by the presence of litigants in a

high structured forensic setting arguing and presenting evidence to a neutral and
passive decision ma.ker. 316

The hoped for outcome was that the decision maker

could weigh the evidence and derived a satisfying resolution of the legal dispute. 317

313

See Robert F. Taylor, A Comparative Study of Expert Testimony in France and the United States:
Philosophical Underpinnings, History, Practice, and Procedure, 31 Texas Int' 1L. J. 182, 187 ( 1996 ) .

314

Trial by compurgation is considered the origin of the adversarial or accusatorial process.
Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 68.

315

See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304,500.

316

Id.

317

See

In addition, an adversarial system fundamentally includes three elements: "The first is that the
decision maker remain neutral and passive during the trial of the case. If the adjudicator becomes an
active enquirer, adversary theory holds that the litigants are likely to be relegated to a subordinate role
in the case and the fact finder's neutrality likely to be jeopardized. One further postulate of this first
tenet of adversary theory is that the system is likely to favor the use of lay juries because jurors are far
less likely than judges to be drawn into the courtroom contest The second element of adversarial
justice, and an obvious concomitant of the first, is litigant responsibility for the production and quality
of the proof upon which the case is to be decided. An adversary system cannot function unless the
parties produce the evidence to be considered by the neutral and passive fact-finder. Implicit in such a
division of responsibility is the likelihood that a class of skilled advocates will develop. The
difficulties inherent in finding, organizing, and presenting persuasive proofs make it likely that
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These elements have become permanently fixed in modem adversarial and
accusatorial judicial systems.

3.2.2 The Jury
Using a jury to settle legal disputes is also a characteristic of the British
legacy. 318

Although modem day juries are hybrids of Egyptian, Greek, Roman, and

European jury customs, English juries have been a leading influence in shaping the
American jury system. 319

Both the grand jury and the petty jury were initially

created to resolve issues in relation to property and land disputes. 320

The grand jury

inexperienced litigants will seek assistance. Over time, this is likely to result in the growth of a
professional bar. The final major element of an adversary system is an elaborate set of rules to govern
the trial and the behavior of the advocates. These are needed to guard the integrity ofthe process as
well as to ensure that cases brought to court are resolved in an expeditious manner. One of the most
important consequences of this aspect of adversarial structure is that it creates a demand for some sort
of process of review to guarantee that the participants have honored the rules regulating the contest"
Id.
318

See Morris Ploscowe, The Development of Present-Day Criminal Procedures in Europe and
America, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 445 ( 1935) .

319

See TEACHERS' RESOURCE GUIDE for LAW & IDSTICE, available at:
http://www.l9thcircuitcourt.state.il.us/bkshelf/resource/origin.htm (last visited, Nov. 24th, 2004) .
("England, under Alfred (871-901 A.D.) had a rough system of juries. Representatives oftithings
were brought together to decide the questions put before them. This system disintegrated on the death
of Alfred, although testimony of witnesses did begin to appear. The Normans left partially intact
much of the Saxon court system, which included appeals to the King, legal witnesses and ordeals.
They did separate temporal and spiritual courts and appointed circuit judges to represent the King
across the country. They introduced trial by combat as well. Norman England established the
foundations of the modem jury system. It slowly developed for those cases in which trial by combat
was inapplicable, usually in less important cases. Local citizens were brought to court to rule on
matters they had witnessed. During the reign ofHenry II, in the 12th Century, the use of juries
increased and defendants were commonly offered the choice of trial by jury or combat. About the
year 1350, when Edward III was King, the definition of jurors began to shift. And, by the end ofthe
15th century, a jury was not a body of witnesses but a body that heard the testimony of witnesses and
unanimity became necessary to convict a criminal in a criminal trial.")
320

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 71.
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as a means of charging persons with crimes can be traced back to an 1166 A.D. law
called the "Assize of Clarendon," which provided the grand jury with the power of
presenting criminal accusations. 321

Initially, however, the purpose of the grand jury

was merely to name those individuals suspected of crime so that they might be
brought to justice. 322

The purpose later expanded in 1215 to allow grand jurors to

determine whether the basis of the suspicion was credible, and was further modified
in 1360 to let the jury review private prosecution referred by a justice of the peace.

323

Today, stemming from this history, the grand jury has become an institution protecting
persons from prosecution when evidence is improper or insufficient.
As mentioned supra, criminal accusations were usually subjected to
compurgation or ordeal. Even the celebrated chapter thirty nine of the Magna Carta
(1215) did not guarantee trial by jury;324 however, an exception involving the use of a
jury to resolve some kinds of criminal accusations emerged in 1180 providing that the

321

A provision of the Magna Carta ensured that no one could be put to an ordeal unless formally
accused by the grand jury of presentment before the royal judges on circuit. See Leonard W. Levy,
Origins of the Bill of Rights, 212 (Yale University Press, 1999) .
322

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 72. ("The Assize of Clarendon required that in each
county twelve men from each hundred and four men from each township be summoned to court where
there summoned men were under oath to name everyone in the county reputed to be guilty of murder,
larceny, or harbouring criminals." )
323

324

Id.

See Leonard W. Levy, supra note 321,212. Chapter thirty nine of the Magna Carta provides: "No
freemen shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go
upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land."
See Wikipedia, Magna Carta, at htq>://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/magna carta (last modified, Sep. 16,
2004) .

119

.from Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

accused might challenge the accusation, which was not made by the grand jury, by
pleading that it had been made out of hate and/or spite. 325

In cases where the

accused challenged the accusation, the accused had to buy a royal writ asking a jury to
decide whether the accusation had some basis other than simple maliciousness, not
the ultimate question of the defendant's guilt. 326

Since the Fourth Lateran Council of

the Roman Catholic Church and Pope Innocent Ill

( 1198-1216)

327

forbade the

priests and banned the clergy from participating in the administration of ordeals328
without providing appropriate judicial solutions replacing the ordeal, justices in
England faced a great number ofprisoners. 329

Many of these people were being held

in dungeons after being imprisoned without a trial. 330

Worse, even though the ordeal

had been abolished, many had no prospect for a trial because no appropriate judicial
institution replacing the ordeal was available. 331

In order to reduce the number of prisoners, justices would allow the accused the

32S

326

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 72.
Id.

327

The Pope transformed cannon or church law into an inquisitorial system in order to protect the faith
from heretics. See David J. Bodenhamer, Fair Trial: Rights of the Accused in American History, 12
(Oxford Uni. Press, 1992) .
328
329

See Leonard W. Levy, supra note 321,212.
See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 72.

33o

Id.

331

ld.

I
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option to accept a trial by jury. 332
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A great number of prisoners found this amenable

because to do otherwise would mean indefinite imprisonment. 333

A royal statute

enacted in 1276 further provided that the accused submit to jury trial, and subjected
those who refused stiffpenalties.334

This practice created new problems for the

operation of the jury trial because previously, jurors living in the jurisdiction where
the offense occurred were expected to have the knowledge they needed to determine
the defendant's guilt. 335

However, jurors alien to the vicinity could not be expected

to have this knowledge.

This resulted in the necessity of taking the testimony of

in-court witnesses to bring the facts to light for the jury.336

Near the end of the

fifteenth century, the jury had ceased being primarily a body of men who knew the
criminal facts and became a body examining criminal evidence presented to it. 337

332

See George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 Yale L. J. 575, 588 ( 1997) .

333

Id.

334

It is worth mentioning that jury trial in this period bore little resemblance to the jury trials of today:
no evidence was formally presented to either the grand jury or the trial jury; the jurors were expected to
know the facts and give their opinions about whether the defendant had committed a crime; the
reputation of the accused and common knowledge about the events of the neighborhood were critical in
the jury's determination of guilt; the same jurors would frequently serve on the charging grand jury as
on the trial jury. Responding to the criticism that such a method could bring in biased jurois,
additional jurors who did not serve on the grand jury could be obtained. See Ellen Hochstedler Steury,
supra note 300, 74. See also Bryce Lyon, A Constitutional and Legal History of Medieval England,
451 (New York W. W. Norton, 1980) .
335

However, Barbara J. Shapiro challenged this viewpoint by arguing: "verdicts were probably made
on the basis of what was deemed to be personal knowledge of facts, but that knowledge might be based
on firsthand knowledge or derived from persons the jury believed." See Barbara J. Shapiro, Beyond
Reasonable Doubt and Prabable Cause: Historical Perspectives on the Anglo-American Law of
Evidence, 4 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991 ) .
336

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 74.

337

See Bryce Lyon, supra note 334, 637.
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Additionally, the trial jury's power to determine the defendant's fate was virtually
absolute,338 and juries continued to act independently, and even unpredictably in
many cases, despite the frequent attempt of judges to limited jury power by refusing
to accept not guilty verdicts and threatening to imprison jurors339 who voted to acquit
obviously guilty defendants. 340

As a consequence, this independence from judicial

pressure became the source of the jury's power and the key to its trusted and
cherished position as the bulwark of English liberty.

341

By the middle of the

fifteenth century, and after the Fourth Lateran Council of the Roman Catholic Church
abolished trial by ordeal, 342 trial by jury was firmly established in the common law
courts.
Today, while having a historical appreciation for the role of juries contributes to
willingness and ability of citizens to serve impartially when called to judge their peers,
jury duty, along with voting, is one of the primary means by which the average citizen
participates in democratic government.

Nonetheless, use of juries is just one thread

338

See Thomas Andrew Green, Verdict According to Conscience: Perspectives on the English
Criminal Jury Trial, 1200-1800, 19 (University of Chicago Press, 1985 ) .

).

339

See Joseph B. Sanborn, A Historical Sketch of Plea Bargaining, 3 Justice Quarterly 111, 120
( 1986) .

340

It should also be noted that: "In a variety of circumstances the jury could use this absolute power to
bring verdicts that were contrary to the evidence. Whether such verdicts resulted from mercy, fear, or
outright corruption, they evidenced the trial jury's domination of the system of justice." See Ellen
Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 75.
341
342

ld.
See Robert Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water, 137 (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1986) .
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running through the historical development of the American judicial system. 343

3.2.3 The Magna Carta: 1215
The concepts of "Due Process" and "Limited Government Power" can be traced
back to an ancient document, the Magna Carta, which was signed by King John in
1215, traditionally has been cited as the origin of the most fundamental civil rights we
enjoy today. 344
England.

ii•.

The Magna Carta also established the principle of the rule of law in

Soon after the Norman Conquest of 1066, the English King had become

the most powerful monarch in the European history. 345

Nonetheless, the Magna

343

See TEACHERS' RESOURCE GUIDE for LAW & JUSTICE, supra note 319. ("Common law is
court-made law, and differs from statutory law which is made by legislative bodies. Court-made law
develops and is passed on to future courts through the decisions and opinions of judges hearing cases.
Common law derives its authority from the uses and customs of time, or from the judgment or decrees
of courts recognizing and enforcing such uses and customs. Common Law is especially recognized as
the ancient unwritten law of England. In the 11th and 12th Centuries' the English King resolved
disputes with the aid of advisors at his court. Formal judicial courts began to develop during the 16th
and 17th Centuries, and the judges of these courts studied earlier decisions for guidance. Established
decisions came to be called the common law. This form of judicial lawmaking is still used in the
England, and the United States, who adopted this policy from the English... Juries serve several
important purposes: ( 1) they serve as an arbiter regarding the conflict of facts and evidence as
presented at criminal and civil trials; (2) they provide a means by which community values and
sentiments are injected into the judicial process; and (3) they help to increase the public's acceptance of
legal decisions.")
344

Initially, the Magna Carta was a reactionary document forced upon King John, a despotic and
power-hungry ruler, by feudal nobles who felt that their traditional rights were being taken away by a
selfish and arbitrary king. See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 75.

34

s See Woopedia, supra note 324. ("After King John took power in the early 13th century a series of
stunning failures on his part led the barons of England to revolt and place checks on the king's
unlimited power. The failures of King John were threefold. First, there was a general lack of respect
for King John because of the way he took power. When the previous king Richard Lionheart died in
1199 there were two candidates to take his place, John and his nephew Arthur of Brittany in Normandy.
John captured Arthur and imprisoned him and he was never heard from again. Although Arthur's
murder was never proven it was assumed, and many saw it as a black mark against John that he would
murder his own family to be king. After Philip Augustus, the king of France, seized most of the
English holdings in France, the English barons demanded of their king that he retake the land, and
while he attempted to do so 8 years later, the effort came to failure at the Battle ofBouvines in 1214.
Because King John is blamed for the loss of a large part of English land he would be known as John
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Carta placed certain checks on the absolute power of the English monarch.
According to this document, the King agreed to forfeit his land and possessions if he
dared to break his promise to comply with its provisions.

346

In effect the Magna Carta required the King to accept the basic principle that no
man, even the king, was above the law,347 as well as the precedent that royal power
was limited; however, it itself was not a document of liberty for the average person
living in 1215.348

In addition, the Magna Carta was not considered a particularly

important document during the Medieval Age.

This view is supported by the fact

that William Shakespeare did not mention the Magna Carta in his historical play
"King John;" nonetheless, it became increasingly important in the 17th century as it
was repeatedly revised and other documents created such as the "Provisions of
Oxford," which guaranteed greater rights to greater numbers of people, thus setting
the stage for the British Constitutional monarchy. 349

'Lackland.' The third failure of John was when he became embroiled in a dispute with the Church
over the appointment of the office of Archbishop of Canterbury. John wanted to appoint his own
Archbishop and the Church wanted to appoint Stephen Langton, this struggle went on for several years
during which England was placed under a sentence of interdict and finally John was forced to submit to
the will of the Church in 1213. By this time the barons of England had enough, and in 1215 they
banded together and took London by force, forcing King John to sign Magna Carta in the meadow at
Runnymede on June 15, 1215.")
346

347

See Alan Harding, A Social History of English Law, 55 (London Penguin, 1966) .

However, its provisions might disappoint anyone who sought a detailed listing of rights.
David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 17.

See

348

The notion that rulers are limited in their power and must follow lawful procedures was
revolutionary in its influence on English legal and political thought See Ellen Hochstedler Steury,
supra note 300, 75.
349

Besides, King John had no intention of honouring Magna Carta as it was signed under extortion by
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Since the notion that rulers are limited in their power and must follow lawful
procedures was revolutionary in its influence on English legal and political thought,
rule of law as a concept would become particularly important during the conflicts of
the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries in both England and her American
colonies. 350

While the colonists resorted to arms in 1775, the Magna Carta had come

to mean indictment by grand jury, trial by jury, and a cluster of related rights adhering
to the criminally accused.351

Although it was once a feudal document protecting

only the nobility, it had become a constitutional guarantee of due process of law and

li
~:

fair procedure for everyone. 352

!i

"'!I'

H

3 .2.4 The Rise and Fall of the Court of Star Chamber
Although not adopted by the modem American legal system, the Court of Star
Chamber (the "Court"), first emerged in the fifteenth century. 353

Its initial subject

force, and as soon as the barons left London he renounced it. However he died within a year in 1216
and the next king, King Henry III was more willing to accept it. Henry III ruled for 56 years until
1272 by which time Magna Carta had become a settled part of English law. See Wikipedia, supra
note 324.
350

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 76.

351

See Leonard W. Levy, supra note 321, 50.

352

Id.

353

,,I

The Court of Star Chamber, so named because the court chamber had a large star painted on its
ceiling, and evolving from meetings of the king's royal council, was initially well regarded because of
its speed and flexibility. See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 76.
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matter jurisdiction included political crimes and religious dissent. 354

This Court

should be considered important to the development of Anglo-American legal· system
not because its innovations survive, but because it became so despised that its actions
reaffirmed the necessity of many protections traditionally provided under the common
law. 355

In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, English government

suffered nearly one-hundred and fifty years of unrest and revolt because of religious
conflict and uncertain succession. 356

During this period, the ordinary courts were

used as tools of political and religious persecution.357

As judicial power became a means of persecution, judges sought to set aside
verdicts that were contrary to the courts' wishes; this judicial action challenged the
power of the jury.

Lay jurors sometimes did not recognize the legitimacy of the laws

and sought to lessen their effect on defendants. 358

Often, jurors feared being

intimidated by defendants of high position who could retaliate against them. 359

3S4

Jd.

3SS

Id.

3S6

Id., at 75.

357

Id. ("During the mid-sixteenth century King Henry III broke with the Church of Rome in order to
marry a new wife who he hoped would produce a male heir to the throne. Although a male heir was
finally born, conflict over the legality of Henry's marriage created political strife, especially after
Henry's son died soon after succeeding to the throne. The struggle between those loyal to the Church
in Rome and those who upheld Henry's new Church of England led to more than a century of conflict
and religious intolerance.")
lSI

359

See Thomas Andrew Green, supra note 338,21.
See Alan Harding, supra note 346, 153.
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Unfortunately, jury trial was now considered a mockery and an injustice because no
juror dared hand down a verdict of guilty in the latter circumstances. 360

Thus, it

became necessary for the King to create the Court, an untraditional judicial institution,
to execute his political purposes and deal with the judicial injustice that had derived
'·

from the jury's improperness.
Tudor and Stuart monarchs employed this institution to handle exclusively
troublesome crimes, including riots, unlawful assembly, conspiracy, criminal libel and
perjury, in addition to its initial jurisdiction over misdemeanors, political crimes and
religious dissent. 361
common law. 362

The Court also had new powers to act outside the restrains of

Moreover, a judge could seek to have jurors tried by the Court on

perjury charges if he thought they had violated their oath to convict the guilty. 363
Even though the court was initially a court of appeal, Henry VIII and his councilors
Wolsey and Cranmer encouraged plaintiffs to bring their cases directly to the Court,
bypassing the lower courts entirely so that the Court finally became a political
weapon for bringing actions against opponents under the decrees and edicts of Henry

360

See Bryce Lyon, supra note 334, 615.

361

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 76.

362

See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 13.

363

See J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 591 (Boston Butterworths Press, 1990) .
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VIII? 64

In a sense this institution was designed to serve the king's interest by

policing the behavior of jurors and witnesses in common law cases, and by providing
an alternative forum for the punishment of a range of acts deemed particularly hostile
to the monarch.

365

With the Court expanding its criminal jurisdiction to difficult or troublesome
cases, its power grew considerably since it adopted methods more commonly used on
the Continent stemming from the reforms of Pope Innocent III.

366

There

interrogation of the suspect, sometimes in secret and accompanied by torture, was a
common fact-finding tool. On the Continent criminal procedures were swift and
informal, a case was initiated merely by information, there was no grand jury
indictment, there was no right to trial by jury, the accused was forced to incriminate
himself, and torture was used extensively to extract confessions. 367

Further,

accusations could be brought without evidence, and the accused was not informed of

364

See Wikipedia, Star Chamber, at htm://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/star chamber (last modified, Sep. 6,
2004) . ("It was made up of privy counselors as well as common-law judges and supplemented the
activities of the common-law and equity courts in both civil and criminal matters. In a sense the court
was a supervisory body, overseeing the operations oflower courts, though its members could hear
cases by direct appeal as well. The court was set up to ensure the fair enforcement oflaws against
prominent people, those so powerful that ordinary courts could never convict them of their crimes.
Under the Tudors, the mandate of the court expanded to include instances of public disorder and rioting.
Judges would receive petitions involving property rights, public corruption, trade and government
administration, and disputes arising from land enclosures. Although the court could order torture,
prison, and fines, it did not have the power to impose the death sentence. Under the Tudors, Star
Chamber sessions were public.")
365

See Stephan Landsman, supra nnote 304, 507.

366

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 77.

367

Id.
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the identity of the person making the accusation. 368

King Charles I made even more

extensive use of the Court to persecute dissenters, including the Puritans who fled to
New England. 369

As a consequence, the Court became notorious and infamous for

the use of inquisitorial tactics against opponents of the crown, applying procedures
unknown in the common law. 370

The following words written by Edgar Lee Masters

in the early 1990s reflected the practice of the Court:
"In the Star Chamber the council could inflict any punishment short of death, and

-

frequently sentenced objects of its wrath to the pillory, to whipping and to the
cutting off of ears. ...

With each embarrassment to arbitrary power the Star

Chamber became emboldened to undertake further usurpation. .. .

The Star

Chamber finally summoned juries before it for verdicts disagreeable to the
government, and fined and imprisoned them.
who were called to do constitutional acts.

It spread terrorism among those

It imposed ruinous fines.

It became

the chief defense of Charles against assaults upon those usurpations which cost

368

Id.

369

In addition to incarcerating dissenters, Charles I used the Court of Star Chamber as a sort of
Parliamentary substitute during the years 1628-1640, when he refused to call Parliament. On October
17, 1632, the Court of Star Chamber banned all 'news books' over complaints from the ambassadors
from Spain and Austria that coverage of the Thirty Years' War in English newspapers was unfair.
Newspapers had to be printed in Amsterdam and then smuggled into the country until the ban was
lifted six years later. See Wikipedia, supra note 364.
370

In short, secret proceedings and torture were mainstays of this court. As an extraordinary power
to be imposed only when state security was at issue, the efficiency of torture in securing convictions
soon prompted its use in less serious cases. See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 13. To some
extent, this practice depriving citizens of liberties under color of"state security" is still similar to what
happens to date, no matter how, what, why, where and when it happens.
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Even though the Court Chamber denied the rights that had developed as part of
the common law to the defendants, rather than transform the entire judicial structure
to suppress revolt and dissent, it preserved the common law system for the vast
majority of ordinary offenders. 372

While the abuse of the Court high lighted to many

legal professionals of the day the importance of the judicial procedures of the
common law courts in preserving liberties,373 the abuse finally led to the abolishment
of this institution in 1641 A.D. 374

The common law courts retained jurisdiction to

all difficult and political cases with jury trial afterwards.

Nonetheless, although both

the political prosecutions of the English Civil War and the abuses of the Court had
created impulses toward protecting the rights of defendants, the English in the
eighteenth century had just begun to recognize these rights and the unique
environment of colonial and Revolutionary America made the New World their new
incubator. 375

\.
I.
371

372

373
374

375

See Wikipedia, supra note 364.
See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 77.

Id.
See Herbert A. Johnson, History of Criminal Justice, 83 (Cincinnati Anderson Publishing, 1988) .
See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 81.
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3.2.5 Magistrates' Courts and the Preliminary Examination
Since the thirteenth century, justices of the peace, also called "magistrates," were
appointed by the English King to dispense justice in local communities. 376

This was

thought to undermine the power of the local sheriff who was appointed by the
nobility;377 however, the justices of the peace were merely allowed to play a
preliminary fact-finding role in felonies. 378

During the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries, the magistrates were required to take depositions from the victims and
witnesses and to examine the accused and to put the accused's statement in writing. 379
The magistrates, however, were still not supposed to make a judgment regarding the
likely guilt or innocent of the accused. 380

However, this had changed by the end of

the eighteenth century to allow the magistrates the power to dismiss cases after a
preliminary examination if they believed the accusation to be groundless. 381

This

practice became the forerunner of the late-nineteenth-century innovation of the
376

See John A. Conley, Doing It by the Book: Justice of the Peace Manuals in English Law in
Eighteenth-Century America, 6 Journal of Legal History 257, 258 ( 1985) .

mId.
378

See John M. Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel in the English Criminal Trial in the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 9 Law and History Review 221, 268 ( 1986) .

379

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 79.

380

In fact, the justices of the peace served several functions. One was to mediate minor crimes
arising from such disputes as trespass and assults. If mediation was inappropriate or failed in the
particular case, the second function of the justices of the peace was to summarily dispose of
misdemeanors. This practice allowed the magistrate to convict without a jury trial. After 1670,
defendants convicted in a summary trial by a magistrate were typically given the opportunity to appeal
the conviction in the county court, which could correct any mistakes. Id.
381

See Barbara J. Shapiro, supra note 335, 178.
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"preliminary hearing" in the United States. 382

Nonetheless, in Eighteen Century

England the preliminary examination itself was less a hearing than an interrogation. 383

3.2.6 Origins of Accusatorial and Adversarial Structure and Legal Assistance
Generally speaking, the system of criminal procedure in the United States is both
accusatorial and adversarial.

Although accusatorial principles, generally requiring

the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the burden ofproof,384
are not identical to adversarial principles, which require the prosecutor to present the
case against the defer,.dant, they complement each other. 385

The development and

maturation of the adversary and accusatory system as it exists in American courts
today can be traced to the rising importance of the jury in medieval England.

While

jury replaced trial by combat, it also transformed from a body of witnesses to an
impartial body of fact-finders.

After the jury became a neutral entity, the parties to a

case adopted the role of adversaries. 386

382

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 80.

383

In addition, magistrates were also responsible for setting bail for the accused or ordering the
accused in jail before trial. The magistrate also had to assure the appearance ofthe prosecutor and
witnesses at trial by ordering monetary guarantees. Id., at 81.

384

See Murphy v. Waterfront Commission. 378 U.S. 52, 55 ( 1964) .

385

See William Burnham, Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States, 259 (West
Group, 1999 ) .
386

See TEACHERS' RESOURCE GUIDE for LAW & JUSTICE, supra note 319. ("Under this
approach, in all Courts, each side is bound by many rules as to how the case may be conducted.
These rules are meant to ensure fair and consistent treatment for all parties, in all cases, across all

I
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I

I

I

In fact, no one set out to build this accusatorial and adversarial approach to

I

criminal procedure.

While it was neither part of a grand governmental design nor

the scheme of an ingenious legal philosopher, the judges, lawyers, and litigants of
eighteenth-century England went about their business unaware that they were the
instruments of any historical purpose or that the product of their labors would
eventually become a new system of adjudication. 387

From the medieval era on,

judges were vigorous questioners and jurors were also involved in questioning.388
This non-accusatorial and non-adversarial practice lasted for centuries until the
middle of the eighteenth-century when the initial movement toward adversarialism
began. 389

One important factor contributing to the development of the adversarial

method was associated with the historical and intellectual changes that swept English

situations. This adherence to rules and procedures is a hallmark of the adversary system, unlike the
inquisitorial system, for example, in which few technical rules of evidence exist. On the contrary, the
inquisitorial approach is less sensitive to claims concerning individual rights. An inquisitorial style is
Jess likely to serve as a check on government powers, the role American Courts play in our system of
checks and balances.")
387

See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304, 502. The term "adversary'' implies two conflicting
parties. In American courts those two parties are the plaintiff and defendant. These parties present
to the Court all the evidence and testimony they can find, in the most persuasive manner allowable, in
order to achieve a decision favorable to their interests. The attorneys serve as advocates, and the
judge sits as a neutral referee. See TEACHERS' RESOURCE GUIDE for LAW & JUSTICE, supra
note 319.
388

389

See G. W. Keeton, Lord Chancellor Jeffreys and the Stuart Cause, 21, 22 ( 1965) .

See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304, 502. ("This movement was a response to the abusive
activities of professional thief catchers who became active at the Old Bailey in the early decades of the
eighteenth century. In their efforts to collect the substantial rewards made available by Parliament and
others, these men adopted a host of adversarial tactics. They organized and elicited proofs in a
manner strikingly similar to that used by counsel. Their participation in litigation moved j~dges to
permit and, at times even encourage, a more robust defense." )
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society in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

390

In 1692, the English Parliament enacted perhaps the first criminal statute that
permanently established a reward for the apprehension of a specified class of felons.
This law focused on highway robbers and offered the very considerable sum of £40
for their capture and conviction.

391

The establishment of such bounties and the

promise of other rewards by government bodies and private individuals somehow
created substantial incentives for the development of a cadre of professional thief
catchers. 392
pay. 393

These men made it their business to capture and prosecute criminals for

Under this reward institution coupled with skillful courtroom performances,

for the sole purpose of making money, thief-catchers usually framed innocent
people. 394

390

In order to prevent the thief catchers from abusively employing their

Id., at 572.

391

This piece of legislation was followed over the next half century by a series of similar measures
concerning burglars, horsethieves, coiners and a host of others. Id., at 573.
392

ld.

393

See Gerald Howson, It takes a Thief: The Life and Times of Johnathan Wild, 3-7 (London The
Cresset Library, 1987) .

394

See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304, 573-5. ("What the OBSP demonstrates about them is that
they were wise not only in the ways of the street, but of the courtroom as well. From the earliest days
of the sample, thief catchers could be seen at work. Perhaps the best introduction to their efforts is a
brief examination of the activities of one of the most notorious of their number, Jonathan Wild.
Although he would be executed three years later, and was involved in a variety of criminal schemes
including the framing of innocent men, in 1722 Wild appeared the preeminent thief catcher. Four
cases that typified his approach to criminal prosecution were the two trials of Butler Fox and those of
James Wright and John James. In the first of two highway robbery prosecutions, Fox was accused of
accosting Sir Edward Lawrence. Sir Edward opened the testimony with a brief description of the
robbery, which he said was committed by two disguised highwaymen whom he could not identify.
The victim was followed to the stand by William Hawkins, who claimed to have been Fox's
accomplice in the holdup. Hawkins had been arrested when he tried to sell some of the things taken
in the robbery and, apparently in return for immunity, had agreed to testify against his alleged
companion. The next witness for the prosecution was Edward Carter, who claimed that the defendant

I.
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discretionary powers to frame innocent defendants,395 reforms were introduced.
These measures were aimed at curbing the thief catcher practice of "trumping up"

II

and Hawkins had come to his house with items taken during the robbery. Then a man named Norris
testified that the defendant had hired a horse from him and returned it under suspicious circumstances.
Finally, it was Jonathan Wild's turn. He deposed, that on Hawkin's information, going to the
Prisoners House he found him there. That the Prisoner's Wife then said to her Husband. Ay you
Rogue! this is your Friend Hawkin's doing. The defendant denied the charge and said that his only
association with Hawkins was the acceptance of certain goods in payment for a debt. He offered a
great number of character witnesses and was acquitted. He was, however, remanded to custody
pending resolution of another charge. Fox's second trial was held in January of 1722. He was
accused of the highway robbery of John Gunn. Again the victim opened the testimony by describing
the robbery but not the robbers. Again the victim's testimony was followed by that of the alleged
accomplice, Hawkins. After Hawkins's accusations a man named Porringer testified that he saw Fox
and Hawkins together on the day of the robbery. Norris appeared for a second time to repeat his story
about the hiring and return of a horse. Once again Wild was the final prosecution witness. He
reitered what he had said in the earlier trial about Fox's wife's incriminating words. Again the
defendant put on witnesses to his good character. He also attacked Hawkins as having a grudge
against him. The jury found Fox not guilty for a second time. James Wright was tried for highway
robbery in December, 1721. The first witness against him was the victim Samuel Towers, who said
three disguised men had robbed him. Once again the informer, William Hawkins, was the second
witness. He said that he, Wrlght, and a third man had all participated in the robbery of Towers. The
now familiar Norris testified that the defendant along with Hawkins had hired horses from him.
Arthur Turner supported Norris's claims by testifying that the defendant and his associate had put up
their Horses in his Stables. Jonathan Wild then appeared and repeated an incriminating conversation
he had allegedly had with the defendant and Hawkins concerning a pair of pistols. The final
prosecution witness was T. Askew who said that when Wright was arrested he declared: That Rogue
Hawkins!-- I expect no other than to be ty'd up. Wright denied the charges and said Hawkins was
lying to save his own life. He apparently had no witnesses to offer and was found guilty. The last of
this quartet of prosecutions involved John James and two others who were accused of the highway
robbery of Elizabeth Knowles. The victim testified that she was assaulted on the street by a group of
unknown assailants and her possessions stolen. She said that she went to Jonathan Wild for help and
that he had captured the defendants. Thomas Eades then testified that he along with the three
defendants had robbed Knowles. Jonathan Wild then described the arrest of the defendants and their
admissions of guilt Two of the defendants offered token opposition at trial. The third, Henry Avery,
however, presented a strong case with respect to his character. He was acquitted while the others were
condemned. As may be glimpsed in the foregoing descriptions, Wild's work often followed a rather
precise pattern. He concentrated his efforts on defendants charged with highway robbery, an offense
with a clear statutory authorization for rewards. In all the cases, the testimony fell into a
well-organized and predictable pattern. The pattern was to present a bona fide victim, couple his or
her charges with the testimony of an accomplice, and corroborate the accomplicehs tale, insqfar as
possible, with evidence from Wild and his associates. The cases are striking in their reluctance to rely
on externally verifiable facts. Instead they emphasized confessions, admissions, and hearsay.
Always at the center of these proceedings stood Wild himself. His testimony in each of the four cases
was the final link in the chain of proof, the evidence that brought the charge home to the defendant
Although he was a witness, Wild seemed, in each of these cases, to serve an extra function. He was
the advocate wise in the ways of the underworld, whose remarks were supposed to persuade the jury.
When compared with run-of-the-mill prosecutions from 1722, Wild's seem more tightly organized and
offer a larger number of witnesses.")
395

See John H. Langbein, supra note 311, 113-4.
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charges against innocent individuals for the mere profit ofit. 396
This benefit-incentive thief catcher practice eventually resulted in judges and
jurors at that time to become more sensitive to the risks of corruption posed by the
thief catcher system.397

To prevent injustice found in cases like that of Charles

Patrick and William Meeds,398 courtroom changes of the "OBSP" starting with the

396

See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304, 576-7. ("Wild's special brand of advocacy may be seen
even more clearly in a pair of 1722 cases in which he appeared on the defendant's behalf. The first of
these involved John Duvall and Mary Bright, who were accused of the theft of a number of items from
Dorothy Molony's house. The defendants claimed that the charges arose out of a family dispute about
the ownership of certain land. They offered three witnesses to prove that the case had been instigated
by Mr. Molony, whose out-of-court statements were frequently quoted by the witnesses. At the
conclusion of this evidence, Wild appeared as the fourth, and final, defense witness. He declared that
Molony was a prisoner last Sessions, on suspicion of putting off Counterfeit Money. The defendants
were acquitted. The organization of this case, with its corroboration of the defendants' claims by
witnesses quoting Molony's out-of-court admissions and its carefully orchestrated attack on his
character, replicates the focused and forceful advocacy of Wild's efforts on behalf of prosecutors.
Perhaps even more revealing was Wild's role in the case of Charles Johns and James Bradshaw, who
were accused of theft. The prosecution hinged on the testimony of the victim, Elizabeth Howard, and
her lodger, Mary Floyd. The defendants presented a strong alibi and proof that the victim had accused
someone else of the crime. This led the court to carefully examine Elizabeth Howard's background.
It appeared that she ran a bawdy house and that Mary Floyd was a prostitute. At the moment these
facts were revealed Jonathan Wild took Mary Floyd by the Arm, and looking wishfully in her Face;
said, he had an Information against her, for picking a Gentlemans Pocket of a Watch; then the
Gentleman was sent for, but happening not to be at home, she was set at liberty again. Wild appeared
in these cases, as well as the prosecutions, as both witness and advocate, watching proceedings and
jumping in with crucial information at the most opportune moment He advanced his courtroom goals
by providing useful testimony and by stage managing the proceedings. Such a combination was open
to serious abuse. It allowed an entirely self-interested individual to run litigation for profit, while free
of the constraints imposed on counsel. Wlld had at his disposal a variety of sources of evidence to
frame his cases including hearsay materials and the corroborative contributions of his assistants. It
should come as no surprise that in these circumstances false accusations were fabricated to convict
innocent men." )
397

Id., at 509. (During his testimony, Sutton, the alleged accomplice, said he had been seized by three
thief catchers who, without consulting a justice of the peace, took his 'Information in Writing.' Thus,
the court held: "Those People ought not to take upon them to prepare and draw up Informations, and
to settle among themselves whatever they design the lnformist shall swear before a Justice, or in this
Court. Informations are to be taken before a proper Magistrate that the Publick may be satisfied, that
no unfair Practices have been made use of.")
391

Charles Patrick and William Meeds were tried for the offense of highway robbery highly.
objectionable. However, the key prosecution witness was their alleged accomplice. Eentually, they
insisted on formal and impartial procedure that described the direction in which court reform was to
move. This theme was reiterated in a substantial number of later cases as the courts began to insist on
procedural integrity. Id., at 577.
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last quarter of the seventeenth century emerged to echo concerns about corrupt thief
catchers. 399

Although formal and impartial procedure was the theme of reforming

the thief catcher system, however, defendants and prisoners were required to argue
that their captors had behaved improperly which resulted in an adversarial issue. 400
Even though the absence of counsel was considered to facilitate active judicial
inquiry, 401 it was not until the 1730's that counsel began to appear regularly on either
side in non-political felony trials. 402

From their first appearance, they pursued the

issue of thief catcher behavior with particular energy. 403

The first formal step taken

399

I

\

~I

I
t

Id., at 509. ("The acronym 'OBSP' is an abbreviation of''the Old Bailey Session Papers." It
should be noted that measuring change in the level of adversariness of court proceedings is not an easy
task. What one is really looking for is evidence that the things said and done in the courtroom are
more adversarial than they were before. This requires a comparison over time of the way courtroom
participants handled matters fundamentally affecting the adversariness of the proceedings, including:
the judge's involvement in interrogation; the parties' and their representatives' participation in the
presentation of evidence; and the development of forensic rules to govern the offering of proof. The
best method to measure change in these areas would be to examine a substantial body of verbatim
transcripts of court proceedings over an extended period of time. Unfortunately, no such body of
records is known to exist In the absence of such material it is necessary to rely on other data
concerning court proceedings. A source that offers a significant volume of useful information is the
Old Bailey Session Papers. These reports, of which we have copies dating from at least as early as
1674, were published regularly for almost 250 years and were, during the time relevant to this Article,
addressed to lay readers interested in prosecutions in the Old Bailey. The early reports are
fragmentary and tend to focus on a few sensational cases. They fail to provide the sort of systematic
picture of prosecutions needed for this study. By about 1715, however, the reports display an
expanded coverage that provides useful information about a significant body of cases.")
400

I

1:

Id., at 578. (This is what William Fleming did in his 1732 prosecution for highway robbery. "He
went one step further and coupled his claim with the offer of evidence tending to show that 'Jo.
Williams the Thief-Catcher' had tried to frame him. The evidence, however, was based on hearsay,
and the court excluded it. Flemming was convicted. Moreover, defendant's complaints often
succeeded when there was solid evidence to support them. Such was the situation in the case of
James Page. There the defendant provided witnesses to show that suggestive tactics had been used to
secure his identification. This testimony, coupled with a number of witnesses to his good character,
led to Page's acquittal.")
401

See G. W. Keeton, supra note 388,22.

402

See John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 314( 1978 ).

403

See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304, 578.
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to lift this prohibition carne in 1696 when Parliament authorized defendants to employ
counsel in treason trials. 404

Until the end of the eighteenth century, the participation

of defense counsel was often limited because legal commentators of the day viewed
defense counsel as an impediment to uncovering the truth.

405

This view held that

defense lawyers would obstruct defendants' honest efforts to explain his or her
conduct. 406

Meanwhile, the judge would ask questions can clarify related to the

elements of the offense, while ensuring defendants had a fair opportunity to clear
themselves. 407

Nonetheless, all restrictions on the employment of defense counsel

were finally lifted in 1836. 408

Although late eighteenth-century courts were inclined

to allow defendants to be represented by counsel, as a consequence, the assistance of

404

With the passage of the Treason Act in 1696 Parliament had acknowledged, at least tacitly, the
value of counsel to those faced with serious charges and carefully orchestrated prosecutions. It was
only natural in light of that legislation for the courts to allow defendants not only to press their cases
with increased vigor, but to employ counsel to do it for them. Id., at 578-9.

405

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 81.

406

Id.

407

Id.

408

See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304, 578-9. ("It came to serve as one of the central themes of
cross-examination. This was typified by the sharp interrogation of John Clark, a member of the Bow
Street thief catchers' organization, in the case of John Morgan. Counsel for the defense took pains to
point out Clark's association with Bow Street and his interest in a reward. Despite Clark's protest, the
court found such examination to be entirely proper. Similarly, in the case of Peter Verrier and William
Harding, counsel repeatedly emphasized improprieties in the identification and witness preparation
procedures utilized by the professional thief catchers who organized the case. These matters, and an
apparent excess of prosecutorial zeal, led the jury to acquit In fact, some of the most dramatic
clashes between counsel and witnesses came in the context of the examination of thief catchers.
When Garrow and Julius Lyon squared off during Robert Horseley's trial for burglary it was clear that
two professionals, thief catcher and barrister, were working their way over familiar ground. The same
was true in the burglary prosecution of Richard Notely and the highway robbery trial of John Wheeler.
In the latter, Garrow decried the manipulations of a thief catcher who behaved like a cunning 'lawyer'
in framing an exaggerated indictment The defendant was acquitted.")

I
1.

,.
I
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counsel was not recognized as a right and counsel was actually barred from
participating in certain kinds of cases. 409
From the civil and judicial wrongs brought on by the thief-catchers' abusive and
malicious conduct in framing the innocent, a series of procedural protections for
safeguarding defendants' rights were created.

These safeguards managed to cover

all the attacks on thief-catchers and the reward system that seemingly encourage their
behavior.

An adversarial and accusatorial structure of fact-finding process seemed to

be necessary since it allowed defendants the latitude to decide whether to challenge
dubious activities and practices of professional prosecutors.

The development

toward adversarial inquiry became a means of safeguarding the accused's rights.

In

other words, the thief-catchers problem was, in all likelihood, one of the most
important origins and reasons for the expansion of the role of counsel as well as the
adoption of an accusatorial and adversarial fact-finding process which began in the

~

I

rj,

Old Bailey court house during the early part of the eighteenth-century. 410

409

410

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 81.

See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304, 602-3. ("Besides encouraging adversarial enquiry as a
means of safeguarding defendants' rights, the courts took a number of other steps as well. These
included a willingness to place perjurious prosecutors in jail for their lies, an insistence on the
avoidance of suggestive behavior at identifications, a willingness to check on the reputations of those
pressing claims that might garner rewards, and a keen interest in the production of witnesses who could
corroborate important facets of the prosecutor's story. While the activities of thief catchers were far
from the only spur to reform, they were a very potent one. The need for methods to counterbalance
the risks created by the reward system and unchecked bounty hunters must have been clear to Old
Bailey judges and jurors alike. It was to be expected that in response to this danger defendants would
be granted greater adversariallatitude in pressing their claims or in using counsel to do so on their
behalf. It should be noted, however, that the number of cases involving thief catchers was probably
not large. The procedural and evidentiary activity manifest in Wild's cases in the 1720s was distinctly
atypical. While the employment of procedural protections and counsel might have seemed useful in a
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3.3 Unfederalized Criminal Procedure
3.3 .1 Colonial Experience
Beginning with the first permanent settlement in Virginia in 1607, the English
established colonies in New England, Maryland, Vrrginia, and the Carolinas.

While

sharp status differences among the colonists created complex social relations, early
colonial rulers appeared to have actually increased the severity of the law in order to
.
.
. 411
cope WI'ththe uruque
crrcumstances
ofthe co1omes.

This action resulted in the

l
t

legal systems in the colonies becoming totally different from their counterparts in
England; for example, judges in England began to mitigate the harshness of
seventeenth century laws and were becoming concerned with protecting the rights of
the defendant. 412

This disparity between the two systems that seemed to favor

number of cases, it does not appear that thief catchers, on their own, forced courts to embrace
thoroughgoing adversarialism in anything like a majority of the cases tried. Moreover, the fears
generated by thief catcher misconduct seemed to fade over the course of the century. The last great
thief catcher scandal occurred in the 1750s, when Stephen M'Daniel and his gang were proven to have
procured the improper conviction of a number of innocent defendants. Thereafter, 'blood money
conspiracies' do not seem to have been a particular worry until the second decade of the nineteenth
century. To understand the second surge in contentious procedure, beginning in the 1770s, factors
besides thief catching must be explored.")
411
412

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 82.

Id. ("Regarding the complex social relations in the colonies beginning with the seventeenth century,
the northern colonies, including Massachusetts, New York after its acquisition from the Dutch in 1664,
and Pennsylvania, were founded largely by religious dissenters, though many settlers in these areas
came for the more mundane purpose of making a better life for themselves than possible in the Old
World; the southern colonies, including Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas, were founded by the
English gentry who attempted to maintain dictatorial control over the colonial settlers many of who
were indentured servants obtaining ship's passage to the colonies by promising to work for a master for
a specific number of years; other settlers were prisoners who had been offered transportation to the
New World as a means of escaping a death sentence; and finally, almost as soon as the colonies were
established, Africans were forcibly brought to the colonies to work the large tobacco and rice

I

I
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British subjects living in Great Britain, caused the colonists to feel they were not
being treated fairly.

For this reason, in part, they fmally decided to declare

independence from their mother country.
Even though the Declaration of Independence was announced in 1776, it is fair
to say that the United States of America, as a nation, began in 1781 with the surrender
of Lord Cornwallis to George Washington at Yorktown.

However, the social, legal

and cultural habits of the new nation were primarily analogs of those in Great Britain
,,

and were brought to America with each succeeding boatload of colonist.

There, the

newly found courts of the United States started to take their own path, developing and
changing to suit the needs and social conscience of the new nation. 413

Nothing

suggests that practices followed in England, and those of colonists from other
continental countries such as France and Holland, strongly influenced court
procedures and practices in the colonies ofNorth Am.erica. 414

The unique conditions

of colonial life in the "New World" created an environment in which innovations in
I

I

plantations in the Southern colonies and to serve as domestic servants in the Northern colonies.")
413
414

See TEACHERS' RESOURCE GUIDE for LAW & WSTICE, supra note 319.

For example, the New England colonists who were religious refugees sought to reform the law to
accommodate their religious beliefs; this is clear as a judge mentioned in 1813: "Every country has its
Common Law. Ours is composed partly of the Common Law of England and partly of our own
usages. When our ancestors emigrated from England, they took with them such of the England
principles as were convenient for the situation in which they were about to place themselves... By
degrees, as circumstances demanded, we adopted the English usages, or substantial others better suited
to our wants, till at lengh before the time of the revolution we had formed a system of our own." See
Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 82.

I'
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criminal procedure were tolerated and even welcomed. 415
In the colonial era, criminal cases could be initiated by private citizens, by
justices, or by grand jury indictment.

Nevertheless, while prosecuting cases

privately was expensive and difficult, given the lack of familiarity with judicial
procedure and the shortage of lawyers, public prosecution which might be introduced
by colonists from Scotland, Holland, and France416 would serve the public interest
most. 417

Attorneys general for the colonies thus began to serve as public prosecutors

early in the eighteenth century. 418

During the earliest period of settlement, the

governor of the colony acted as judge in both civil and criminal cases, 419 however,
this practice changed as the population grew and cases became more numerous. 420
At this point regular courts were organized and regular procedures were followed to a
degree. 421

Similar to the English judicial process, Justice of the Peace Courts, or

magistrates' courts, were established in the counties to try misdemeanors because
415

See Lawrence M. Friedman, History of American Law, 39 (New York Simon & Schuster Press,
1973) .

416

See Barbara J. Shapiro, supra note 335, 180.

417

Public prosecution may be introduced by colonists from Scotland, Holland, and France.
Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 82.

See Ellen

418

See Herman Goldstein, History of Public Prosecution, in Sanford Kadish, ed., Encyclopedia of
Criminal Justice, Vol. 3, 1286 (New York Free Press, 1983) .
419

See Edwin C. Surrency, The Courts in the American Colonies, 11 American Journal of Legal
History, 253, 258 ( 1967) .
420

421

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 82.
Id.
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these courts were close to the people, offered ready access, and adopted informal
summary procedures like those of magistrates' courts in England. 422

The magistrate

courts also conducted preliminary examinations of felony defendants but were not
authorized to hear cases involving capital offenses.

423

Prior to 1750, serious crimes

I•
I

were adjudicated before a central colonial court that held sessions only once or twice
each year and felony defendants would be held in jail while they awaited the next
session of the court according the then effective laws.
•'' .'

Generally speaking, English

common law practices of indictment by grand jury and the right to trial by jury were
adopted by colonial America with few changes;424 however, defendants were neither
informed of the nature of the evidence against them until trial nor were they entitled
to defense counsel.

' '

425

Nevertheless, in order to control smuggling and tax evasion as well as to
suppress seditious printings,426 the British colonial governors had instituted different
measures that were both effective in apprehending suspects and repugnant to the idea

422

See Allen Steinberg, The Transformation of Criminal Justice: Philadelphia, 1800-1880, 6,7
(University of North Carlina Press, 1989) .

423

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 83.

424

Id.

425

See Warren M. Billings, Pleading, Procedure, and Practice: The Meaning of Due Process of Law in
Seventeenth Century Vrrginia, 40 Journal of Southern History 573,580 ( 1981) .

426

See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327,34.
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of due process of law. 427

Under such measures the government was allowed to

ransack houses, to search for untaxed items and to take away notes and manuscripts
merely with a "general warrant." 428

The common law protections of indictment by

grand jury and trial by jury were almost denied by the Courts of Vice-Admiralty
which were finally used to deal with cases of smuggling and tax evasion. 429

With a

belief that the decision to issue a warrant was a judicial instead of an executive act, by
the eve of the American Revolution the Earl of Chatham, Sir William Pitt, gave
eloquent voice to what had become the opinion of Englishmen by asserting:
"The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the Crown.
It may be frail --- its roof may shake --- the wind may blow through it --- the

storm may enter --- the rain may enter --- but the King of England cannot enter;
all his forces dare not cross the threshold of that ruined tenement. " 430
Under this generally accepted viewpoint, general warrants declined rapidly as a tool
against seditious libel; however, the power to issue writs of assistance, which was

427

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 86.

428

Id. See also David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 34. ("General warrants are also called writs of
assistance, which customs officials used to search colonial property for contraband or smuggled goods.
As with many of the complaints against the mother country, this issue already had a long history when
resistance surfaced in 1761 to the unlimited power of search and seizure granted under cover of the
writs.")
429
430

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 86.

See Jacob W. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court: A Study in Constitutional
Interpretation, 28 ( Baltimore Press, 1966 ) .

I
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previously authorized by Parliament as part of the customs laws remained unimpaired
without any significant objection in England perhaps because the writs were used
infrequently to search for smuggled goods. 431

.I

different from its counterpart in the colonies. 432

This practice was dramatically
Opposition to this colonial practice

finally resulted in adopting the Fourth Amendment even though it was a right not
previously included in colonial charters, enactments, or declarations. 433
In addition to ordinary criminal procedure, the colonists created another criminal
j ;
1

I

justice system for

sl~ves

designed especially for that institution.

The institution of

slavery had become an integral part of southern society by the end of the seventeenth
century. 434

Each colony had evolved its own set of laws for regulating the slave

trade and for absolutely controlling the slave population. 435

Slave owners were

allowed to severely and autocratically punish slave offenses that occurred on the

431

I

I

d

See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327,36. ("In Massachusetts, as elsewhere, customs officials
at one time could enter and search buildings simply on the authority of their royal commissions. After
the passage of the Stamp Act Boston mobs thwarted efforts of officials to search and seize suspicious
goods. Elsewhere provincial courts refused to grant the writ. Two claims justified their opposition:
the common-law requirement of equal treatment forbade the application of a policy in the colonies that
was not permitted in England; and the writs were subject to local law, which recognized only specific
warrants. The controversy continued untill the outbreak of war, even though writs of assistance were
of no practical effect after the mid-17 60s. As the period of constitution-making would demonstrate,
Americans had found in this issue one of the fundamental rights of the accused that was essential to
liberty.")
432

Id.

See William Cuddihy and B. Carmon Hardy, A Man's House Was Not His Castle: Origi~s of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 William and Mary Quarterly, 371, 398( 1980 ).

433

434

See Michael Hindus, Black Justice Under White Law: Criminal Prosecutions of Blacks in
Antebellum South Carolina, 48 Journal of American History, 575, 579 ( 1976) .
43S

Id.
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plantation; 436 however, only serious offenses or offenses involving people or property
off the plantation were taken to the courts for resolution. In the earlier years of the
seventeenth century, local magistrates' courts were adapted for the felony trials of
slaves. 437

In these courts, the burden of proof was lower than that in common law

courts, and there was usually no opportunity for a jury trial or an appeal of the court's
verdict. 438

Even in cases where there was a jury, the hysterical atmosphere that

pervaded the communities in the wake of a particular serious crime could make it
almost impossible for a slave to secure an unbiased jury. 439

A primary complaint of

the colonists was that England denied them the rights granted to all other Englishmen,
one of which was the right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the Magna Carta of 1215. 440
Ironically many of those same persons built a legal system which deprived slaves of
almost every single civil right and legal protection.

In short, these criminal justice

practices, which continued through the Civil War with few changes, merely put a
gloss of legitimacy on whatever punishment the white community wanted. 441

As a

436

In other words, slave owners were authorized to beat, whip, and even castrate slaves according to
the then effective laws. ld.
437
438

ld.
See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 84.

439

See Daniel Flanigan, Criminal Procedure in Slave Trials in the Antebellum South, 40 Journal of
Southern History, 537, 551 ( 1974) .

440

441

See TEACHERS' RESOURCE GUIDE for LAW & JUSTICE, supra note 319.
See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 84.
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whole, development of criminal justice systems in the colonial era were separate and
local in that social conditions were not all the same in each colony.

3.3.2 Legacies oflndependence Revolution
A late Harvard President, Josiah Quincy, once asserted that ''the only
consequence of the American Revolution was to put the people's name in place of that
of the King, and fqr the rest one could find nothing changed among us. " 442

This

phenomenon is one of the paradoxes of the revolution in that such an assertion cannot
il

be dismissed easily because the western world remained largely what it had been for
centuries, except that Americans were no longer part of the British Empire;443 .on the
other hand, something had to change.

At the very least the colonists thought they

I

'I
I

should be able to determine what kind of government they were going to build and

:

I

I

how to improve_ their lives as independent political entities. 444

As the movement

toward independence gained momentum, and it became clear that declaring their
independence was inevitable, the colonies began to organize new state governments
where the Enlightenment concept of a social contract led the colonists to write

442

See George Lawrence, Journey to America, 38 (New York Press, 1971 ) .

443

See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 30.

444

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 87.
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constitutions defining the structure and criminal processes of the new governinents. 445
It was a whole new era for the colonists as soon as they began to seek independence.
With bad experiences derived from the political philosophy that had embraced
and supported centralized power exercised by the King-in-Parliament, and a deep
distrust of the English government's arbitrary power, gave way in the thirteen
rebellious colonies to a new constitutional scheme of separation of powers and
federalism. 446

Another consequence of the colonist's previous experience of

political and religious persecution and their fresh memories of the Court of Star
Chamber was their strong preference to jury trial and procedure rights to protect other
liberties. 447

They might have jury trial would preclude secret trials and was, thus,

the best method available of assuring justice and protecting liberty. 448

After more

and more colonists recognizing the importance of protections against unreasonable
search and seizure and tortured confessions, many proposed documents that would
define and affirm those rights for themselves.

445

ld.

446

See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 30.

449

Additionally, their ire was ignited

447

It needs to be mentioned that most Enlightenment philosophers aimed their criticisms ofcriminal
procedures at the harsh practices in France, instead of that in England. See Ellen Hochstedler Steury,
supra note 300, 84.

448

449

See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 32.

For instance, beginning in 1648 the Massachusetts Bay colony drafted a comprehensive piece of
legislation called "the Body of Liberty," which spelled out precise definitions of criminal acts and
stated the rights and privileges to which accused persons were entitled. Other colonies passed similar
legislation. See Herbert A. Johnson, supra note 374, 104. See also Lawrence M. Friedman, supra
note 415, 61. (These declarations of rights covered religious freedom, freedom of speech, and a variety

I
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because they believed the practices of the Courts of Vice Admiralty denied them the
common law protections of Grand Jury indictment and jury trial. 450

They further

believed this denial was in direct contravention of provisions set out in the Magna
Carta, which contained references to trial and juries.

The colonists thought this

quasi-military criminal practice made them feel they were being denied the rights
other Englishmen enjoyed. 451

On the other hand, experiencing the harsh judicial

practices of the British in suppressing revolt renewed colonists' fears of unrestrained

,' I
of rights for accused persons, including the right to trial by jury, protection against cruel and.unusual
punishment, and a limited right to counsel for the accused. It is important to remember, however, that
how the colonists interpreted these rights often differed dramatically from how these rights have come
to be interpretd since. For example, the Massachusetts Body of Liberties in 1672 prohibited the use of
torture after conviction in order to obtain information about conspirators or confederates, so long as the
torture was not "barbarous and inhumane." )
4

so See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 32-3. (The Courts of Vice Admiralty was a civil-law
tribunal established seventy-five years earlier to enforce imperial trade regulation. Next to taxation
without representation, Boston voters proclaimed, ''the Jurisdiction of the Admiralty, are our greatest
grievance." What troubled the colonists was that vice-admiralty courts operated withoutjuiies. In
these courts a judge appointed by the crown determined all issues of law and fact: local custom no
longer defined the bounds of justice; local communities forfeited much of their ability to blunt
parliamentary encroachments on the rights of Englishmen; and local citizens lost the prized assurance
of fair trial under common law. The people ofNewburyport also complained, "We are obliged to
submit to a jurisdiction ... where the Laws of Justinian are the Measure of Right, and the Common Law,
the collected wisdom of the British Nation for Ages, is not admitted." Civil law, all Englishmen
knew, was the tool of arbitrary governments; common law, the protector of liberty. )
4 1

s See TEACHERS' RESOURCE GUIDE for LAW & JUSTICE, supra note 319. ("DuringAmerican
colonial times, the jury became one of the symbols of rebellion against the English King. That the
Common Pleas assemblies shall not follow the court (royal court), but be held "in some certain place,"
and that juries shall consist of "honest men of the neighborhood" were sample references in the Magna
Carta. Trial by jury was not completely denied to the colonists, however. Early charters, such as the
Virginia Company, which established Jamestown in 1607, included the mention of such rights. In
New York, the jury found John Peter Zenger not guilty of libel in 1735 on the grounds that what he had
written about the royal governor was true. Vrrginia jurors had great latitude in deciding verdicts.
They could even bring in verdicts for offenses other than the ones for which a defendant was charged.
It was the British Vice-Admiralty courts, sitting without juries, which ignited the ire of the colonists.")
In addition, the Massachusetts Administration ofJustice Act, one of the so-called Intolerable Acts
adopted in response to the Boston Tea Party and continued infringements of imperial regulations,
which allowed royal officials to seek a change of venue or location for prosecutions under the
navigation acts, did not deprive the accused of trial by jury. There was no denial of trial by jury, only
of trial by jury from the neighborhood. The act was clearly designed to aid prosecution by shifting the
trial to a site less hostile to the needs of empire. See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 34.
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governmental power and the potential of judicial procedures to crush dissent.

452

This fear made the colonists suspect that their rights as Englishmen were in grave
danger of extinguishment,453 and further strengthened their resolve to demand
individual rights. 454

As the Continental Congress had declared, the colonists

believed that they were entitled to all rights of Englishmen, including their legal
system, and their common law. 455

In response to those contentions of unfairness and

the abrogation of rights, for instance, the colonists included in their earliest documents
guarantees of the right to trial by jury; they strongly believed that only a jury from the
vicinage, or neighborhood, unfettered in its judgments could form an impregnable
shield against arbitrary government. 456

They believed that a faulty judgment would

form a precedent that may ultimately militate against them and without a competent
jury; all other rights would ultimately fail. 457

452
453
454
455

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 86.
See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327,31.
See Herbert A. Johnson, supra note 374, 104.
See Leonard W. Levy, supra note 321, 1.

456

See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327,32. See also TEACHERS' RESOURCE GUIDE for
LAW & JUSTICE, supra note 319. ("The First Congress of American Colonies in 1765 recommended
trials with juries. The First Continental Congress in 1774 declared that the respective colonies were
entitled to the common law of England and more especially to the great and inestimable privilege of
being tried by peers of the vicinage, according to the course of that law. In the Declaration of
Independence, Thomas Jefferson listed among the various complaints against King George, that he had
obstructed the administratipn of justice by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary
Powers, made judges dependent on his will for appointment for salary, depriving us in many cases if
the benefits of Trial by Jury, and transporting (defendants) beyond seas for trial. All these, along with
other complaints, led to the United States Constitution in 1787, and in 1897 the first ten amendments.")
457

The colonists also believed: The general verdict, a simple reply of guilt or innocence to an
accusation of wrongdoing, was the people's most effective weapon against tyranny. The presence of
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Before the Declaration of Independence was signed, Virginia had already enacted
its Declaration of Rights.

This document included the right against

self-incrimination, the right to be informed of the criminal charges, the right to a
speedy trial and trial by jury, the right against excessive bail and cruel and unusual
punishment, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and the assertion of equality
and majority rule. 458

Nonetheless, Professor Leonard W. Levy, a leading scholar in

the field of American Constitution History, thought the Virginia Declaration of
Rights:
" ... omitted the freedom of speech, assembly, and petition; the right to the writ of
habeas corpus; the right to grand jury proceedings; the right to counsel; separation
of church and state; and freedom from double jeopardy and from ex post facto
laws.

The rights omitted were as numerous and important as those

included .... " 459
Although other states followed Virginia's example, many of them using parts of it to

jurors precluded secret trials, secured the citizenry from venal judges, purchased testiminy, or
threatening officials, and protected them from other abuses by governments unconcerned with the
liberties of its people. It was the best method available of assuring justice and protecting liberty.
See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327,37.
458

See Robert Allen Rutland, The Birth of the Bill of Rights, 1776-1791, 22 (University of North
Carolina Press, 195 5 ) . ("The new England colonies adopted these declarations of the rights of
individuals as legal codes. In the south, where the colonies were typically royal charters to private
entrepreneurs, the charter provisions usually included some ststement that colonists were entitled to the
same rights as other English subjects.")
459

See Leonard W. Levy, Constitutional Opinions: Aspects of the Bill of Rights, 305 (Oxford
University Press, 1988) .
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roughly model their own statements of citizens' rights, it is unclear whether those
omissions were a matter of oversight or whether there were serious disagreements
about which rights ought to be preserved in a bill ofrights.

460

None of these state

documents offered what might in retrospect be considered a complete Bill of
Rights. 461

While localism was also considered an important American attachment to

the meaning of trial by jury, colonial isolation from England and the new world's
pattern of scattered settlements inevitably strengthening the conviction that justice
rested upon community norms.

462

After the Revolution, whether a bill of rights should be included in the United
States Constitution became an intensely debated issue in that some argued that a bill
of rights was unnecessary because state constitutions had already secured those

~

i
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@
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rights. 463

460

Others argued that a bill of rights was necessary to restrain the federal

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 87.

461

However, many state constitutional conventions concluded that some ststement of the rights of the
individual against government power was a necessary prerequisite to establishing any government.
Id.
462

See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327,32-3. ("This notion oflocalism was not new to English
law because most trials had been held in the area where the dispute arose or crime occurred beginning
with the thirteenth century. Besides, evidence from Massachusetts reveals why colonists were so
insistent on this view. The Bay Colony freely received the common law of England as the basis of its
legal system and with it the doctrine that precedent provided a sure guide to the law. But local
communities also reserved the right for juries to determine both the law and facts of any case. This
expansive conception of the jury's role restrained judicial authority by removing from judge the right to
decide which precedent applied to the issue at hand. Simultaneously, it permitted local juries to reject
by means of an acquittal whatever parts of the law were inconsistent with the community's view of
justice and morality. Parliamentary innovations of the 1760s and 1770s challenged this role for the
local jury and made revolutionaries place an even higher value on its preservation.")
463

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 87.
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government from encroaching on the rights of citizens. 464
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It was surprising that the

effort to identify rights of the accused was muted during the first constitution-making
period in 1776 and 1777 while various states had already included some basic
individual rights in their own Independence Declarations. 465

The Constitutional

Convention of 1787 enacted the United States Constitution in that year, and sent it to
the states for ratification without a bill of rights; however, most states refused to ratify
the new constitution without assurances that amendments could eventually be added,
as needed, that would guarantee the rights of individuals, particularly with regard to
criminal due process. 466
The Anti-federalists recognized that an all-powerful legislature might claim
authority over the bill of rights in the state constitutions. 467

They argued that the

lo

464

Id.

465

See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 43. ("The Framers generally gave two reasons for the
omission, although neither was without dispute. The first concerned the nature of the problem
confronting the nation and the theories designed to solve it since delegates to the Constitutional
Convention focused primarily on the authority the new government would require to function
effectively. After Americans then viewing ultimate power as the sole prerogative of the people, the
notion of a sovereign people allowed specific powers to be entrusted to government and permitted
these powers to be be subdivided among governmental agencies for their more certain control. Thus,
government could exercise only those powers delegated to it explicitly in a written constitution.
Without express power to legislate, and Congress had no such authority over individual liberties, there
could be no threat to the rights of the people. The second addressed the question of which
government, state or national, had responsibility for protecting the rights of citizens since civil rights
were considered privileges of citizenship. Governments had an obligation to extend rights equally to
all citizens and safeguard them against private interference which would be best suited to the state
governments because they were closer to the people." )
466

It needs to be noted that the debate over a bill of rights also became a rallying point in the struggle
between the Anti-federalists who sought to preserve states' rights and powers and the Federalists who
sought a strong central government See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 87.
467

See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 32, 45.
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new national government with its consolidated power must necessarily annihilate and
absorb the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the several states, and produce
from their ruins an iron handed despotism. 468

They further disputed the contention

that the Constitution protected rights by limiting to the centralized government only
those powers which the states had surrendered, called the "enumerated powers. "469
Not surprisingly, the Anti-federalists concluded that the traditional reliance on the
states as guarantors of liberty no longer rested on a firm foundation. 47° Consequently,
they judged the Constitution's greatest single omission to be a bill of rights
ascertaining and fundamentally establishing those unalienable and personal rights of
men; rights without which there could be no true liberty, and over which it was not
necessary for a central government to have contro1. 471
Although the Anti-federalists' conclusion and judgment concerning the rights of
the accused were not accepted as parts of the Constitution, the Federalists, in order to
pass their proposed draft of the Constitution, agreed to submit an amendatory bill of
the rights.

Based on state's bill of rights and proposals that had been made by state

ratifying conventions, James Madison, a congressman from Vrrginia and the

468

Id.

469

Id.

47o

Id.

471

Id.

154

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

intellectual force behind the Constitution, believing that the bill of rights in the states
were very defective, came up with a proposal for amendments that could create a
federal bill ofrights. 472

Madison proposed to the House of Representatives a series

of amendments that eventually became the Bill of Rights. 473

Nonetheless, Madison's

original proposal seeking an amendment that would have extended to the states the
protections of freedom of conscience, freedom of the press, and the right to jury trial
in all criminal cases which he viewed as the most valuable in the whole list was not
incorporated into the final version of the Bill ofRights. 474

In general, words in the

Bill of Rights employed by the Framers were indeed statements pregnant with
meaning but without fixed boundaries.

This was perhaps partly because common

law provided an incomplete guide that could not anticipate the federal system's "dual
'G
I~

I

power"475 to accuse and try offenders.

472

One other reason might be the fact ~at the

See Leonard W. Levy, supra note 459, 305.

473

See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 45. ("Opponents of the measures, convinced that such
amendments were unnecessary and perhaps even harmful, engaged the House in a tiresome debate.
The major controversy concerned whether they achieved any good purpose without changing the nature
of the Constitution. Finally, the House sent seventeen amendments to the Senate, which returned
twelve for further consideration. On September 25, 1788, a joint conference reported twelve
amendments for approval by the states. Two failed to gain ratification; the remaining ten became the
Bill of Rights." )
474
475

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 88.

American courts are organized into a dual, or two-part structure. There is both a Federal and State
Courts system, each state having its own, unique system. The historical basis for this structure was
the concern shown by the original colonies as to relinquishing sovereignty to a central government, and
the strong thread of state rights which runs through United States history. A practical basis for a dual
system exists as well, a two-tiered structure allows for jurisdictional distinctions. See TEACHERS'
RESOURCE GUIDE for LAW & JUSTICE, supra note 319. It should also be noted that duel
federalism was the new phrase that described an older notion that state and central government
occupied separate spheres of authority which neither could overstep in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century. See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 74.
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Framers who, were practical politicians, merely constructed the Bill of Rights from
experience instead of abstract political theories; hence, they lack the knowledge to
foresee that these amendments would undergo both challenges and shifts in
interpretation. 476

Even though the Framers initially did not expect the Bill of Rights

t
I

I
to prevent all injustice, its adoption would definitely impress upon the world that
national independence was merely an empty prize without personal liberty.

477

As

Madison had argued, at least the written guarantee of rights would serve as good
ground for an appeal to the common sense of the community when these written
rights should be threatened by arbitrary governments or oppressive majorities.

478

Though at frrst they were extepding only to defendants in federal prosecutions,479
four of these new amendments mainly emphasized the rights of those accused of
crimes and matters of criminal process.
and the Eighth Amendments.

They were the Fourth, the Fifth, the Sixth

Each is meant to ensure that the accused can properly

defend himself or herself against the charges brought against him or her, and that guilt
should be reached upon the collective mind of his or her peers.

Given this colonial

and revolutionary history as mentioned above, it is fair to say that the procedures the

476
477
478
479

See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 47.
See Robert Allen Rutland, supra note 458, 218.
See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 47.
See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 88.
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colonists adopted as part of the United States Constitution were in part a reaffirmation
of both traditional common law protections and later innovations influenced by
Enlightenment philosophy. 480

The traditions that gave shape and substance to the

Bill of Rights had their English roots, however, a unique American experience
colored that shape and substance. 481

This federal-state dual system and its

decentralized design of the criminal justice system maintained and continued.the
then-existing local and separate developments of criminal procedure.

3 .3 .3 Separated Criminal Due Process
Even though jury trial was one of the main concerns during colonial and .
revolutionary American history, the rights of the accused had progressed much further
than those in Great Britain. 482

For example, other institutions were developed and

480

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 86. The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." The Fifth Amendment states: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself: nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." The Sixth Amendment says: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense." And the Eighth Amendment rules: "Excessive bail should not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
481

See Leonard W. Levy, supra note 321, 1.

482

See Rights of the Accused, in Rights of the People, available at:
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employed to limit governmental powers under the concept of due process, which is
mentioned in the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. 483

In order to prevent judges from becoming extensions of the

executive, for instance, a number of states decided to elect judges for office. The

I

I.

rationale underlying election was to lessen a judge's potential to fall prey to the
seduction of power. 484

While the theory of common law crime was denied not only

because it left people uncertain of prohibited acts, but also because it vested in judges
to much power in creating new styles of crimes at will, states began to pass penal
codes; if the behavior was not prohibited by the penal code beforehand, it should not
be punished under the color of a crime. 485

Under this approach, only people in the

I

.I!

American colonies were allowed to decide what act constitutes a crime, and if so,
what type of crime?

Moreover, only such were deemed capable of determining

whether the accused had committed the charged crime after a fair and public trial.

http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/rightsof/accused.htm (last visited, Oct. 7,2004) . ("At the time of
the American Revolution, the concept of the rights of the accused had progressed much further than in
Great Britain. If we look at the first state laws passed after the American Revolution of 1776, we find
a surprisingly modem list of rights, which included a right to reasonable bail, the exclusion of
confessions made out of court, the right to know the charges, grand jury indictments in capital cases,
trial by jury, and others, many of which would eventually be included in the Bill of Rights ( 1791 ). " )
483

The reference in the 5th Amendment applies only to the federal government and its courts and
agencies. The reference in the 14th Amendment extends protection of due process to all state
governments, agencies, and courts. See Constitutional Topic: Due Process, at
http://www.usconstitution.net/constamnotes.html (last visited, Sep. 22, 2004) .
484

48

See Gordon Van Kessel, supra note 299,428.

s See Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History, 65 (New York Basic
Books, 1996 ) .

l·

r
r
tj
•
~ .,1

'·
i

I

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

158

To some degree, this demand of justice and fairness in criminal proceedings and
procedural fairness, is traceable to Chapter Thirty Nine of the Magna Carta, which
provides the following: "No freemen shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or
exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except
by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. "

486

In addition to trial by jury and by the lawful judgment of his peers, according to
the Magna Carta, the guarantees of due process of law by the law of the land, has long
been considered one of the firmest bulwarks of liberty.

Arguably, since Colonial

times, criminal due process has been a main concern in limiting the government's
power and protecting the accused from the government's arbitrary invasions. . Since
the 18th Century, the core historical meaning of the due process clause is that the
government cannot deprive anyone of life, liberty or property, if the law of the land
forbids it. 487

In a sense due process is a difficult concept to define, and the Supreme

Court has not been much help over the years.

With Daniel Webster's definition of

due process as "a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds on inquiry, and
renders judgment only after a trial," the concept of due process, which at least means
fundamental fairness, is a course of legal proceedings according to the rules and

486

487

See WJ.kipedia, supra note 324.

See Wikipedia, Due Process, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/due ,l?rocess
2004) .

(last modified, Aug. 25,
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principles established by custom and constitution for the enforcement and protection
of the rights of private citizens. 488

In general, due process includes two essential

elements: "Notice shall be given to a person that matters concerning him are before
the court; and that person shall be given an opportunity to be heard and defend
himself in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case."

489

Nonetheless, since the vast majority of criminal offenses have long been defined
and governed state law under state constitutions, the antebellum criminal
jurisprudence, with strict separation of state and central power, reflected little concern
for the rights of the accused that had characterized American political thought since
the drafting of the Bill ofRights. 490

While in 1833 the United States Supreme Court

I
I
I

l

ruled in Barron v. Baltimore,491 that the Bill of Rights applied only to the national

488

See TEACHERS' RESOURCE GUIDE for LAW & JUSTICE, supra note 319.

489

Id. ( "These mean that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, property or any right granted him
by statute unless the matter involved shall first be adjudicated in a trial or hearing conducted according
to the rules for judicial proceedings, and no matter shall be adjudicated without the opportunity for a
hearing. This is important for a judicial system that purports to function with integrity and honor.
Accordingly, to give this established course of legal proceedings a valid and competent tribunal is
considered the duty of the courts. To some extent, due process has been a concern of men determined
to establish justice in governments for at least seven and one-half centuries. The Magna Carta, signed
by King John of England in 1215, is one of the first historical documents of men demanding rights of
their government." )
490

See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327,68, 70.

491

See 7 Peters 243 ( 1833) . See also Constitutional Rights Foundation, Bill of Rights in Action, at
btn>://www.crf-usa.org/briafbria7 4.htm (last visited, Oct 7, 2004) . ("In 1815, John Barron, a
successful businessman, owned a wharf located at the deepest part of Baltimore's harbor. That year,
several city street improvement projects diverted streams, which caused soil to build up in front of
Barron's wharf. By 1822, no ships could tie up at the wharf and John Barron was out of business.
Barron went to a state court and sued the city of Baltimore for destroying his wharf business.
According to the Fifth Amendment of the Bill of Rights, Barron argued, private property could not be
taken or reduced in value for public use without just compensation. The case fmally ended up before
the U.S. Supreme Court. Writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Marshall
dismissed Barron's lawsuit on the grounds that the Fifth Amendment, as well as all the amendments of
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government but not to the states, before 1861 each state had virtually gone its own
way on criminal procedure, administering criminal justice with the degree of
punctiliousness or muscle that suited the style of its people, and with little regard for
the Constitution and courts of the United States; 492 moreover, states still retained
almost exclusive control in matters of criminal process even after the Civil War. 493
In other words, interpretations of the constitution of the state where the accused was
tried determined the nature of the due process considered. Predictably, elements of
•

I

criminal practice considered constitutional in one state might be thought
unconstitutional in another on account of that state's particular approach to criminal
procedure.

There existed no national standards in deciding due process and the

Supreme Court had nothing to say about how each state jurisdiction should conduct
its criminal procedure.
Although the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment has long been

the Bill of Rights, applied only to the national government and not to the states. The Barron decision
established the principle that the rights listed in the original Bill of Rights did not control state laws or
actions. A state could abolish freedom of speech, establish a tax-supported church, or do away with
jury trials in state courts without violating the Bill of Rights.")
492

See Fred P. Graham, The Due Process Revolution: The Warren Court's Impact on Criminal Law,
Preface viii (New Jersey Hayden Book, 1970) .
493

See Loren P. Beth, The Development of the American Constitution, 1877-1917,203 (New York
Press, 1971 ) . Since national civil rights had been relatively few compared to the limitless privileges
conferred by state citizenship prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights merely protected
individuals against actions of the federal government, but not against state or private acts; however, the
war and Reconstruction had proven that southern state governments especially, either by legislation
such as the Black Code or non-enforcement of criminal laws, posed the biggest threat to civil rights of
ex-slaves. See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 73.
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considered an important guarantee of civil rights, providing:
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws."
When members of Congress debated the Fourteenth Amendment after the Civil War,
they hardly discussed whether the amendment made the entire Bill of Rights apply to
all the states.494

In the late nineteenth century, this amendment merely maintained a

tenuous connection with the events and ideas that gave it birth as interpreted by the
Supreme Court so that federal guarantees proved hollow in the area of criminal justice

in that only few people believed that the amendment modified the state's almost
exclusive control of criminal process. 495
Cases

496

In 1873, for instance, the Slaughterhouse

denied the petitioner's argument that a Louisiana law creating a monopoly in

the slaughtering trade violated the due process clause under the Fourteenth
Amendment, where Justice Samuel F. Miller, avoided ruling on the meaning of the

494

However, Raoul Berger, a scholar who wrote extensively on the Fourteenth Amendment, argued
that the elusive due process clause was simply intended to protect the civil rights of the ex-slaves in the
South following the Civil War. See Constitutional Rights Foundation, supra note 492.

495

496

See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 73.
See 16 Wallace 36 ( 1873) .

•
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From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

162

,'

due process clause. 497

Instead he asserted that only a very limited number of

privileges were inherent to federal citizenship,498 and opined that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not change the traditional nature of federalism, that state and federal
citizenship were essentially separate, and that most rights belonging to Americans
were attributes of state citizenship and were, thus, not subject to national regulation or
control. 499

In Hurtado v. California. the Supreme Court held that a grand jury

indictment in criminal cases applied only to federal prosecutions. 500

I

' J

These holdings

implied the unwillingness of the courts to depart from the traditional viewpoint that
criminal due process should be exclusively determined by state courts.

In a sense,

the approach the Court employed in determining whether the due process clause of

497

See Constitutional Rights Foundation, supra note 492.

498

See Wikipedia, supra note 487.

499

See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 74.

500

See 110 U.S. 516( 1884 ). See also David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 80-l.(In this case, after
a police court determined there was probable cause to detain Hurtado, the district court attorney filed
charges. "This procedure departed from the indictment required in federal and most state courts, but it
was permitted by the 1879 California Constitution. Writing for the majority, Justice Matthews
rejected the argument that due process required indictment by a grand jury. He concluded the
meaning of due process was the same in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Due process
under the latter amendment did not include indictment because the former amendment listed indictment
and due process as separate provisions. Under a rule of interpretation that required the court to
assume no part of the Constitution was unnecessary or superfluous, Matthews argued that the framers
at Philadelphia did not consider grand jury indictment to be part of due process of law or they would
not have it especially. In addition, the Court also considered the concept of due process was flexible
since it was made for an undefined and expanding future. The Constitution did not impose traditional
common law procedures on the states but left them free to recast their criminal process, as nine states
had chosen to do by modifying or abandoning grand jury indictments as the method of initiating
prosecutions. The Fourteenth Amendment did not profess to secure to all persons in the United States
the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies. Great diversities might exist in two states
separated only by an imaginary line. On one side there might be a right of trial by jury, and on the
other side no such right Each state should prescribe its own modes of judicial proceeding. . Thus,
the Court concluded that no state could interfere with fundamental principles of liberty and justice, but
states could determine what those principles were." )

.

~

I
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r.
the Fourteenth Amendment could incorporate guarantees of the federal Bill of Rights

~
I

and make them binding on the states 501 denied the so-called total incorporation of the
Bill of Rights into the fourteenth Amendment. 502

Justice John Marshall Harlan

criticized this approach. He asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment's clear intent
was "to impose upon the State the same restrictions, in respect of proceedings

I

involving life, liberty and property, which had been imposed upon the general
government. "

503
I

I

Nearly three decades after the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, the Court
eventually for the first time ruled in Chicago Burlington & Quincy Railroad v.
Chicago, what due process meant, by declaring that the phrase "just compensation" in
the Fifth Amendment was a right within the due process clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment. 504

However, in Twining v. New Jersey, the Court declared that the

right against self-incrimination was not an essential part of due process so that neither
the Fifth Amendment's express language concerning self-incrimination nor its
guarantee of due process secured the privilege from state action. sos

501

Even though the

See Richard C. Cortner, The Supreme Court and the Second Bill of Rights: The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Nationalization of Civil Liberties, 24 (University of Wisconsin Madison Press,
1981) .
502

See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 81.

503

See 110 U.S., at 541.

504

See 166 U.S. 226 ( 1897) .

505

See 211 U.S. 78, 105 ( 1908) .
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Fourteenth Amendment had been in effect since 1868, during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, the United States Supreme Court in case after case,
generally resisted the idea that the Bill of Rights applied to state criminal process. 506
The Court instead opted to go for traditional interpretations of defendant's rights, and
reaffirmed the era's understanding of the bright line between federal and state
authority, including the local practices and procedures oflaw enforcement and trial
proceedings. 507

3.4 Developments Toward Constitutional Criminal Procedure
3.4.1 Introduction
It is clear there had been no absolute agreement on the meaning of due process
by the end of the nineteenth century.
concept might include.

In fact there was one case addressing what this

However, the Court in Twining v. New Jersey had started to

I'

'

I

question "whether a particular state criminal justice system violated 'a fundamental
principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of a free government
and is the inalienable right of a citizen of such government"'508 could be based upon

506

See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 82-3.

507

ld.

508

See 211 U.S., at 78.
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in determining if the due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment had been
violated.

On the other hand, in Rochin v. California, the question arose "whether a

state's criminal justice system would 'offend those canons of decency and fairness
which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those
charged with the most heinous o:ffenses,'" 509 could also become a standard in
deciding the meaning of the due process clause.

Recently the Court stopped using

this abstract approach to determine if a procedural safeguard was necessary, and
without which due process could be found to be violated. 510

At this point, we will

consider what the past criminal justice system looked like and what constituted past
criminal practices that finally led the Court to establish the so-called Federalized
Constitutional Criminal Procedure.
While the Bill of Rights initially applied only to the federal government, and
criminal cases were for the most part tried in state courts under state law and state
constitutions, in the early twentieth century there existed two separate systems of

SM
510

See 342 U.S. 165, 169 ( 1952 ) .

Instead, the Court held, in Duncan v. Louisiana, that:"[t]he recent cases ... have proceeded upon
the valid assumption that state criminal processes are not imaginary and theoretical schemes but actual
systems bearing virtually every characteristic of the common-law system that has been developing
contemporaneously in England and in this country. The question thus is whether given this kind of
system a particular procedure is fundamental--whether, that is, a procedure is necessary to an
Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty.... [Therefore the limitations imposed by the Court on the
States are] not necessarily fundamental to fairness in every criminal system that might be imagined but
[are] fundamental in the context of the criminal processes maintained by the American States." 391
U.S 145, 149 ( 1968) . See FindLaw, Rights Guaranteed: Procedural Due Process-Criminal, at
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/amendmentl4/15.htm (last visited, Oct. 8, 2004) .
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criminal procedure in the United States.

166

On the one hand, there were a small

number of federal crimes, which would be investigated by the small force of federal
investigators, and tried in federal courts under the strict requirements of the Bill of
Rights; on the other hand, there were the state courts, in which state crimes were
investigated by local or state police, prosecuted by local or state district attorneys in
state courts, and in which only state provisions, not federal rights, applied.

In the

majority of criminal practice, the following phenomena resulted:
"There were few procedural rights, and even the ones that existed were not
stringently enforced; searches could often be carried out without a warrant;
persons arrested could be subjected to intimidating police interrogation without
the presence of a lawyer; if they did not have the money to hire an attorney, then
they could be tried without a lawyer; in many states defendants did not have the

.I

right to refuse to testify at their trials, and if they decided not to take the stand,

I
their silence could be used as proof of their guilt; and if found guilty, they often
did not have the right of an appeal. " 511

511

See Constitutional Rights Foundation, supra note 492. Moreover, because the United States is a
federal system, "laws do vary not only between the federal government and the states, but from state to
state. In those areas where the Constitution does not spell out a clear federal supremacy, the practice
has been to allow the states great leeway in how they conduct their business, including investigation
and prosecution for crime. Until the early twentieth century, federal courts operated on the
assumption that the Constitution did not give them any power to review either the procedures or the
results of state trials. One should note that in many states, procedural guidelines were as protective of
individual rights as that of the federal government. But a wide spectrum existed, ranging from trials
that would, under any circumstances, be considered fair to those that could only be described as
mockeries of justice. It was one of these latter that finally moved the federal courts to intervene, and
which over the next half-century led to a redefinition of criminal procedure in the United States.
While this sounds simple to accomplish, the history of criminal procedure in the United States and
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Given these circumstances, the Supreme Court's reluctance to extend the Bill of
Rights to the states was not because of lack of opportunity, nor lack of concern with
the traditional guarantees of due process; however, while unprecedented eco~omic
development just after the Civil War in areas tied to constitutionally delegated
powers 512 spurred a tremendous expansion of federal criminal law, the increasing
federal prosecutions began to oblige and force the Supreme Court to determine the
limits of the constitutional protections of defendants' rights afforded by the Fourth,
the Fifth, the Sixth, and the Eighth Amendments in those emerging federal trials.

513

elsewhere shows that it is not. Only in democratic societies confident of their rights can such a
system develop. However, military justice is different, out of necessity, this study treats of the vast
majority of cases referred to civil courts." See Rights ofthe Accused, supra note 482.
m Such as: taxation, interstate commerce, and the postal system.
513

In addition to the expansion of federal criminal law, reconstruction policies protecting the civil
rights of recently freed black people also required more federal involvement in criminal justice. See
David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 70-2. ("The first tests of criminal due process came during and
immediately after the outbreak of war, for instance. As early as April1861 pro-secession mobs in
nothern cities forcibly contested the passage of Union troops, and in border states southern sympathizer
recruited and trained armed volunteers for the Confederacy. The law of treason was too muddy to
permit confident prosecution of such activity, and state criminal statutes were irrelevant In response
to this crisis, President Lincoln, claiming extraordinary emergency powers, suspended the writ of
habeas corpus and order the arrest and detention of persons dangerous to the public safety. Often
without sufficient evidence to make a definite charge, military authorities, federal marshals, and secret
service agents detained hundreds of suspected subversives until the immediate emergency passed.
Civilian judges frequently sought the release of such prisoners, but military officers disregarded their
orders. Under this circumstance, the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court in 1861, Roger
B. Taney, a Maryland slaveowner who denied Negro citizenship in Dred Scott v. Sanford ( 1857) ,
challenged the President by ordering James B. Merryman's release on a writ of habeas corpus. In his
opinion, although politically motivated and misleading, Taney claimed that Congress alone had the
power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus so Lincoln's executive order deprived Americans of one of
the chief guarantees of their liberty, protection against arbitrary arrest. As a consequence, in 1863
Congress passed the Habeas Corpus Act, a recognition that preservationofthe Union justified Lincoln's
extreme measures, authorizing Lincoln's suspensions as provided in Article I, Section 9 of the
Constitution. The Habeas Corpus Act signaled a greatly expanded role for federal courts in criminal
process, an area previously left exclusively to state jurisdiction because criminal justice was
overwhelmingly local prior to the war, by requiring the release of political prisoners if grand juries
found no indictments against them, which resulted judicial procedures in the basis for detention of
prisoners. Although defendants could only gain relief on a writ of error to the U.S. Supreme Court
when alleging an infringement of a federal constitutional right and no federal court could intervene in
pretrial maneuvering or shift trial from state to federal jurisdiction, the Habeas Corpus Act established
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After the Supreme Court started to review issues regarding the accused's civil rights
in federal criminal trials, there existed the possibility of establishing national
standards ofjustices. 514

These standards were previously reserved exclusively to the

states, focusing on due process and the federal government's role in its enforcement,
the nationalization of civil rights under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 515

a new practice and rest it on an emerging conviction that rights could not be left solely to the protection
of state courts." )
I

i

j•

514

See Harold Hyman and William C. Wiecek, Equal Justice Under Law: Constitutional Development,
1835-1875,261 (NewYorkPress,1982).

m See Notes on the Amendments, at htm://www.usconstitution.net/constamnotes.html (last visited,
Sep. 22, 2004) . (In fact, ''the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified against the slavery. Slavery was an
institution in America in the 18th and 19th centuries. The Southern states, with their agricultural
economies, relied on the slavery system to ensure the cash crops (cotton, hemp, rice, indigo, and
tobacco, primarily) were tended and cultivated. Slaves were not unknown in the North, but"abolition
in the North was completed by the 1830's. In 1808, the Congress prohibited the slave trade, not a
year later than allowed in the Constitution. A series of compromises, laws, acts, and bills tried to
keep the balance between the slave states and the non-slave states. Novertheless, South Carolina
voted to secede from the United States as a result of Abraham Lincoln's election to the Presidency.
Lincoln had, over time, voiced strong objections to slavery, and his incoming administration was
viewed as a threat to the right of the states to keep their institutions, particularly that of slavery, the
business of the states. More states seceded, eleven in all, forming the Confederate States of America.
The secession movement led to the Civil War. In the waning days ofthe war, which ran from 1861 to
1865, the Congress approved an amendment to abolish slavery in all of the United States. Once the
CSA was defeated, approval of the 13th Amendment was a requirement for readmittance into the
United States. Proposed on January 31, 1865, it was ratified on December 6, 1865 (309 days). It
never was ratified by all of the CSA states, with Mississippi being the lone hold-out. The ratification
of the 13th Amendment was a major victory for the North, and it was hoped that with the Emancipation
Proclamation and the 13th Amendment, the effects of slavery in the United States would quickly
diminish. The original plan to readmit states after acceptance of the 13th was supported by President
Andrew Johnson, but the Radical Republicans, as they became known, wanted more than just a return
to normalcy. They wanted to keep the power they had attained during the war years. The South did
not make it easy for Johnson, however, and the so-called Black Codes started to be passed in Southern
states. Congressional inquiries into the Black Codes found them to be a new way of controlling
ex-slaves, fraught with violence and cruelty. The ensuing Reconstruction Acts placed the former CSA
states under military rule, and prohibited their congressmen's readmittance to Congress until after
several steps had been taken, including the approval of the 14th Amendment. The 14th was designed
to ensure that all former slaves were granted automatic United States citizenship, and that they would
have all the rights and privileges as any other citizen. The amendment passed Congress on June 13,
1866, and was ratified on July 9, 1868 (757 days).") In addition, according to the Civil Rights Act,
enacted to protect the liberty and rights of freed blacks in 1866 which opened federal federal tribunals
to individuals uncapable of enforcing their rights of citizenship in state courts, Congress seemed to
retain the power of regulating local police and criminal law. See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note
327,72.
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Generally speaking, however, based upon a unique federal system, America from the
very beginning has developed its rules of criminal procedure piecemeal, on a case by
case basis, rather than through a code of criminal procedure.

516

3.4.2 Establishments of Federal Standards in American Criminal Procedure
3.4.2.1 Trial Issues: Beginning with Federal Review in State Criminal Practices
As mentioned supra, there are historical reasons why the criminal justice system
had long been considered a state issue since the independence of the United States.
Even as early as 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, and during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the United States Supreme Court had
resisted the idea that the Bill of Rights merely applied to state criminal processes. 517
Nonetheless, in the late

ninete~nth

and early twentieth centuries, the belief emerged

that the federal government should step in to remedy the widespread abuses by state
and local police of the rights of criminal suspects, especially black criminal suspects,
although it was not clear whether the federal government had the authority to do so. 518
Starting with Strauder v. West Vrrginia, the United States Supreme Court for the first
time abandoned an 1873 West Virginia law, a state statute that excluded colored
516
517
518

See Craig M. Bradley, supra note 295, 2.
See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 82-3.
See Craig M. Bradley, supra note 295, 2.

I
I

I'.
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people from serving as jurors by declaring its unconstitutionality in violation of equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment although this decision did not rest on the

,·

Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. 519

More generally and open-endedly,

in Rogers v. Peck, the Court noted that: "Due process of law, guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment does not require the state to adopt a particular form of
procedure, so long as it appears that the accused has had sufficient notice of the
accusation and an adequate opportunity to defend himself in the prosecution."520
Similarly, in the case of Neal v. Delaware, the Court also reversed a conviction on
both due process and equal protection basis in that the blacks were excluded by statute
from grand jury service. 521

Based upon these Supreme Court decisions, it seems that

the Court had already recognized itself with the power to demand that criminal
procedure law at both the federal and state levels conform to certain standards, at least
insofar as the conduct of trials was concerned. 522

Afterwards, in Powell v. Alabama,

a capital case, the Supreme Court decided the Fourteenth Amendment right stemming
from the due process clause had been violated after the colored accused had been
519

See 100 U.S. 303 ( 1880) . However, "while the justices also decided that absence of the blacks
from juries did not necessarily deny black defendants the right of judgement by their peers, as a
practical matter, white officials could exclude blacks with impunity by exercising care in the selection
process so black voters would not appear on lists of potential jurors that county officials prepared for
the court." See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 75.

520

See 199 U.S. 425, 435 (1905) .

521

See 103 U.S. 370 ( 1880) .

522

See Craig M. Bradley, supra note 295, 7.
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denied assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, which was considered
fundamental and inherent to the due process requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

523

3.4.2.2 Investigatory Process: The Fourth Amendment
In addition to trial issues already discussed, the Court in Boyd v. United States,
started to employ its judicial power in reviewing local investigatory conduct by
implicitly applying a whole new exclusionary approach to regulate government
misconduct, especially that of police. 524

If federal subpoenas were too broad to

·.I

523

See 287 U.S. 45, 64 ( 1932) . See also Rights of the Accused, supra note 482. (In fact, Justice
Oliver Justice George Sutherland, in Powell v. Alabama, held: "The right to be heard would be, in
many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of the law. If charged
with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad.
He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be out on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue
or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense,
even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how
much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect" The case of Powell v.
Alabama is notable for two things. "First, it launched the federal courts on a new mission, that of
overseeing the criminal justice system in the states, and they did this under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which specifically applies to the states. It was not then, and never has
been, the mission of the federal courts to ensure that criminal procedure in every state is identical to
that in every other state. Rather, the courts have attempted to define the minimum protection of rights
that the Constitution demands to ensure due process. While some states, for example, have 12-person
juries, other states have lesser numbers for certain types of trial. These variations are permissible, the
courts have held, so long as the trial and the jury adhere to minimal standards of fairness. Second,
Powell established the rule that in capital cases, those in which the death penalty could be imposed,
effective assistance of counsel is constitutionally required. The lawyers in the Alabama case did no
more than show up; they did nothing to defend their clients, and for all practical purposes might as well
have been absent altogether. Not only must a defendant have a lawyer, the Court ruled, but that
lawyer must provide real assistance, or as the courts have put it, effective counsel. But the Court that
ruled in Powell still believed strongly in a federal system, and while it was willing to extend its
oversight function, it did so slowly, and only when confronted with a case that so offended it that the
justices could not ignore the breach of due process.")
524

I.

See 116 U.S. 616 ( 1886). In this case, federal prosecutors alleged that George and Edward Boyd,
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identify the scope of search and seizure, the Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable search and seizure might be violated, as ruled in Hale v. Henkel.

525

Moreover, eight years later, the Court in Weeks v. United States changed its ambiguity
and explicitly stated that any evidence federally obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment should be excluded from any federal criminal trial because if illegally
seized stuff could be "used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against searches
o

and seizures is of no value, and might as well be stricken from the Constitution."

I

. \

526

Nonetheless, since federal law enforcement was much more limited at that time than
what it is today, Weeks did have little impact on the development of the law to change
the popular conception among lawyers that criminal procedure law was not intended
to regulate local police practices. 527
The Fourth Amendment was mainly created to protect citizens from
'I
I

I'
I

New York City merchants, had imported thirty-five cases of glass duty-free in violation of customs
laws. At trial, the district court judge ordered the Boyds to produce the invoice for glass previously
imported so the government could prove the worth of the cargo in question. The defendants, under
protest, were compelled to produce evidence that convicted them. However, the trial was merely a
civil proceeding since the government sought only recovery of the duty, not criminal penalties. While
the Court had earlier ruled that the Fourth Amendment protection extended only to criminal matters in
Murra,y v. Hoboken Land Co .. ( 18 Howard 272, 1855 ) , and there was no physical search for evidence
of crime and no attempt to seize contraband, the Court had to change its traditional approach in
explaining the Fourth Amendment. See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 77; Craig M. Bradley,
supra note 295, 8.

l
)

.

.,

525

See201 U.S. 43 ( 1906).

526

See 232 U.S. 383,393 ( 1914) .

527

See Craig M. Bradley, supra note 295, 8.

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

unreasonable search and seizure.
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Thus, under what circumstances would the police

be allowed to conduct search and seizure inevitably became a significant issue during
investigatory process.

In Agnello v. United States, the Court ruled that, "the search

of a private dwelling without a warrant is in itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our

1aws.

,528

For the purpose of detennining the legality and validity of a search warrant,

the Court in Byars v. United States declared that only information of the affiant's
good-faith belief that contraband529 would be found at the place to be searched was
insufficient to sustain a federal search of defendant's house. 530
Even though the Court demanded search with a warrant as a principle, it also
I

recognized a few exceptions: in Amos v. United States, the Court implied that an
intentional waiver would justify a warrantless search. 531

.1

In Carroll v. United States,

the Court established the automobile exception as a justification for legally

528

The Court also held: "Congress has never passed an act purporting to authorize the search of a
house without a warrant. On the other hand, special limitations have been set about the obtaining of
search warrants for that purpose." See 269 U.S. 20, 32 ( 1925) .
529

It refers to intoxicating liquors and instruments and materials used in the manufacture of such
liquors in this case. Id.

530

The Court held: "The information upon which the search warrant was issued states only that affiant
'has good reason to believe and does believe the defendant has in his possession' such intoxicating
liquors, instruments and materials. The warrant clearly is bad if tested by the Fourth Amendment and
the laws of the United States." See 273 U.S. 28,29 ( 1927) . In fact, this decision required a rather
objective probable cause in which those warrants should be based on although this decision itself did
not mention the phrase, "probable cause." See Craig M. Bradley, supra note 295, 9.
531

The Court noted: "The contention that the constitutional rights of defendant were waived when his
wife admitted to his home the Government officers, who came, without warrant, demanding admission
to make search of it under Government authority, cannot be entertained. We need not consider
whether it is possible for a wife, in the absence of her husband, thus to waive his constitutional rights,
for it is perfectly clear that under the implied coercion here presented, no such waiver was intended or
effected." See255U.S.313,317 (1925).
~j
I
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conducting warantless searches by declaring that:

"If the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is,
upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer,
that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to
seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid.

The Fourth

Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable
search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve
public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens."532 '
Moreover, the Court also approved search incident to arrest as an exception to the
warrant requirement in Marron v. United States. 533

3.4.2.3 Police Interrogation and Other Topics
Similar to the spirit of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, the Court in

532

533

See 267 U.S. 132, 149 ( 1925) .

The Court ruled: "When arrested, Birdsall was actually engaged in a conspiracy to maintain, and
was actually in charge of, the premises where intoxicating liquors were being unlawfully sold. Every
such place is by the National Prohibition Act declared to be a common nuisance, the maintenance of
which is punishable by fine, imprisonment or both. The officers were authorized to arrest for crime
being committed in their presence, and they lawfully arrested Birdsall. They had a right without a
warrant contemporaneously to search the place in order to find and seize the things used to carry on the
criminal enterprise. The closet in which liquor and the ledger were found was used as a part of the
saloon. And, if the ledger was not as essential to the maintenance of the establishment as were bottles,
liquors and glasses, it was none the less a part of the outfit or equipment actually used to commit the
offense. And, while it was not on Birdsall's person at the time of his arrest, it was in his immediate
possession and control. The authority of officers to search and seize the things by which the nuisance
was being maintained, extended to all parts of the premises used for the unlawful purpose." See 275
u.s. 192, 198-9 ( 1927) .

I
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Bram v. United States declared that: "the general rule that the confession must be free
and voluntary, that is, not produced by inducements engendering either hope or fear, is
settled by the authorities referred to at the outset." 534

In deciding the legality and

validity of a confession, the Court in Wan v. United States further provided that:
"In the federal courts, the requisite of voluntariness is not satisfied by establishing
merely that the confession was not induced by a promise or a threat.

A

confession is voluntary in law if, and only if, it was, in fact, voluntarily made.

A

confession may have been given voluntarily, although it was made to police
officers, while in custody, and in answer to an examination conducted by them.
But a confession obtained by compulsion must be excluded whatever may have

I

I,
j .

.

[

been the character of the compulsion, and whether the compulsion was applied in
a judicial proceeding or otherwise." 535

~i

The Court, in other words, had long held that coerced confessions, including those
induced by threats, promises and brutality, were inadmissible in federal trials since
~ey

violated the Fifth Amendment prohibition against compulsory

534

The Court also noted: "The facts in the particular cases decided in this court, and which have been
referred to, manifested so clearly that the confessions were voluntary, that no useful purpose can be
subserved by analyzing them. In this court also it has been settled that the mere fact that the
confession is made to a police officer, while the accused was under arrest in or out of prison, or was
drawn out by his questions, does not necessarily render the confession involuntary, but, as one of the
circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether
or not the statements of the prisoner were voluntary." See 168 U.S. 532, 557-8 ( 1897) .
~s

)
266U.S.1,14-5 ( 1924.
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self-incrimination. 536
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The Court continued to rule in Snyder v. Massachusetts, for

instance, that state law should not offend some principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamenta1; 537 in Mooney v.
Holohan, the intentional use of perjured and false testimony by a state prosecutor for
the purpose of getting a guilt conviction constituted a denial of due process protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment; 538 in Brown v. Mississippi, that confessions
obtained by beating and hanging the suspect should not be admitted as evidence at
trial since someone who had been convicted on the basis of involuntary confessions
had been deprived of his or her liberty without due process of law. Even then the
Court emphasized that the privilege against self-incrimination did not apply to the
states. 539

536

See Craig M. Bradley, supra note 295, 9.

537

See 291 U.S. 97, 105 ( 1934) .

538

See 294 U.S. 103 ( 1935) .

539

I
1

I

~I

I

In addition, the Court in Chambers v. Florida. preserved "an accused's

The circumstances under which the confessions of the defendants were obtained by the police were
set out by the court: "The crime with which these defendants, all ignorant negroes, are charged, was
discovered about one o'clock p.m. on Friday, March 30, 1934. On that night one Dial, a deputy
sheriff, accompanied by others, came to the home of Ellington, one ofthe defendants, and requested
him to accompany them to the house ofthe·deceased, and there a number of white men were gathered,
who began to accuse the defendant of the crime. Upon his denial they seized him, and with the
participation ofthe deputy they hanged him by a rope to the limb of a tree, and having let him down,
they hung him again, and when he was let down the second time, and he still protested his innocence,
he was tied to a tree and whipped, and still declining to accede to the demands that he confess, he was
finally released and he returned with some difficulty to his home, suffering intense pain and agony.
The record of the testimony shows that the signs of the rope on his neck were plainly visible during the
so-called trial. A day or two thereafter the said deputy, accompanied by another, returned to the home
of the said defendant and arrested him, and departed with the prisoner towards the jail in an adjoining
county, but went by a route which led into the State of Alabama; and while on the way, in that State, the
deputy stopped and again severely whipped the defendant, declaring that he would continue the
whipping until he confessed, and the defendant then agreed to confess to such a statement as the deputy
would dictate, and he did so, after which he was delivered to jail. The other two defendants, Ed
Brown and Henry Shields, were also arrested and taken to the same jail. On Sunday night, April 1,
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right to procedural due process sprang in large part from knowledge of the historical

jl,

~I

I'
truth that the rights and liberties of people accused of a crime could not be safely
entrusted to secret inquisitorial processes." 540

I·

This decision acknowledged that the

federal government had a duty to guarantee fair trials in states as well as federal

.I
II

courts because the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to guarantee adequate and

l

t'
I,

appropriate procedural protection for people charged with or suspected of crime by

I
'j

~I

r•

)r•

1934, the same deputy, accompanied by a number of white men, one of whom was also an officer, and
by the jailer, came to the jail, and the two last named defendants were made to strip and they were laid
over chairs and their backs were cut to pieces with a leather strap with buckles on it, and they were
likewise made by the said deputy definitely to understand that the whipping would be continued unless
and until they confessed, and not only confessed, but confessed in every matter of detail as demanded
by those present; and in this manner the defendants confessed the crime, and as the whippings
progressed and were repeated, they changed or adjusted their confession in all particulars of detail so as
to conform to the demands of their tortw'ers. When the confessions had been obtained in the exact
form and contents as desired by the mob, they left with the parting admonition and warning that, if the
defendants changed their story at any time in any respect from that last stated, the perpetrators of the
outrage would administer the same or equally effective treatment Further details of the brutal
treatment to which these helpless prisoners were subjected need not be pursued. It is sufficient to say
that in pertinent respects the transcript reads more like pages tom from some medieval account, than a
record made within the confines of a modem civilization which aspires to an enlightened constitutional
government." See 297 U.S. 278 ( 1936) . See also Craig M. Bradley, supra note 295, 3, 10-1.
540

The Court mentioned: "The scope and operation of the Fourteenth Amendment have been fruitful
sources of controversy in our constitutional history. n8 However, in view of its historical setting and the
wrongs which called it into being, the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment- just as
that in the Fifth -- has led few to doubt that it was intended to guarantee procedural standards adequate
and appropriate, then and thereafter, to protect, at all times, people charged with or suspected of crime
by those holding positions of power and authority. Tyrannical governments had immemorially
utilized dictatorial criminal procedure and punishment to make scapegoats of the weak, or of helpless
political, religious, or racial minorities and those who differed, who would not conform and .who
resisted tyranny. The instruments of such governments were, in the main, two. Conduct, innocent
when engaged in, was subsequently made by fiat criminally punishable without legislation. And a
liberty loving people won the principle that criminal punishments could not be inflicted save for that
which proper legislative action had already by 'the law of the land' forbidden when done. But even
more was needed. From the popular hatred and abhorrence of illegal confinement, torture and
extortion of confessions of violations of the 'law of the land' evolved the fundamental idea that no
man's life, liberty or property be forfeited as criminal punishment for violation of that law until there
had been a charge fairly made and fairly tried in a public tribunal free of prejudice, passion, excitement,
and tyrannical power. Thus, as assurance against ancient evils, our country, in order to preserve 'the
blessings of liberty,' wrote into its basic law the requirement, among others, that the forfeiture of the
lives, liberties or property of people accused of crime can only follow if procedural safeguards of due
process have been obeyed. See 309 U.S. 227, 236-7 ( 1940) .

I
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those holding positions of power and authority. 541
While Court decisions before 1940 partly focused on the police interrogation
tactics which caused some to believe the reason the confessions were ordered
excluded was to deter the use of such tactics in the future, the Court began
emphasizing fair trial concerns in 1941. 542

In Lisenba v. California, the Court for its

first time set out that:
"The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false
evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether
true or false.

The criteria for decision of that question may differ from those

appertaining to the State's rule as to the admissibility of a confession.

As .

applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure to observe that
fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice.
'I

In order to declare

a denial of it we must find that the absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial;
the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.
Such unfairness exists when a coerced confession is used as a means of obtaining
a verdict of guilt. " 543

541

See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 101.

542

See Craig M. Bradley, supra note 295, 12.

543

See314U.S.219,236 (1941) .
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This decision is usually referred to as "the conscience shocking test."

544

Beyond

Lisenba. the Court in a series of cases also recognized that even police malpractice

II

I
could deprive the defendant of fundamental fairness, even if the trial was not thereby

It

I
. 545
rendere d ··-~
wuru.r.

For instance, an otherwise voluntary confession must be

excluded from a federal trial if obtained during a· prolonged delay between arrest and

r

1

If

I!

I
I'
I

544

See Craig M. Bradley, supra note 295, 12.

545

Id., at 13. For example, in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155 ( 1944) ,the Court noted that:
"The Constitution of the United States stands as a bar against the conviction of any individual in an
American court by means of a coerced confession. There have been, and are now, certain foreign
nations with governments dedicated to an opposite policy: governments which convict individuals with
testimony obtained by police organizations possessed of an unrestrained power to seize persons
suspected of crimes against the state, hold them in secret custody, and wring from them confessions by
physical or mental torture. So long as the Constitution remains the basic law of our Republic,
America will not have that kind of government" In Malinsk;y v. New York. 324 U.S. 401,404,405
( 1945 ) , the Court ruled that: "If all the attendant circumstances indicate that the confession was
coerced or compelled, it may not be used to convict a defendant And if it is introduced at the trial,
the judgment of conviction will be set aside even though the evidence apart from the confession might
have been sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict" Also in Haley y. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 607 ( 1948) ,
the Court held that: "In concluding that a statement is not voluntary which results from pressures such
as were exerted in this case to make a lad of fifteen talk when the Constitution gave him the right to
keep silent and when the situation was so contrived that appreciation of his rights and thereby the
means of asserting them were effectively withheld from him by the police, I do not believe I ·express a
merely personal bias against such a procedure. Such a finding, I believe, reflects those fundamental
notions of fairness and justice in the determination of guilt or innocence which lie embedded in the
feelings of the American people and are enshrined in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment To remove the inducement to resort to such methods this Court has repeatedly denied
use of the fruits of illicit methods." Moreover, in Watts y, Indiana. 338 U.S. 49, 53, 54 ( 1949) , the
Court stated that: "A confession by which life becomes forfeit must be the expression of free choice.
A statement to be voluntary of course need not be volunteered. But if it is the product of sustained
pressure by the police it does not issue from a free choice. When a suspect speaks because be is
overborne, it is immaterial whether he has been subjected to a physical or a mental ordeal. .Eventual
yielding to questioning under such circumstances is plainly the product of the suction process of
interrogation and therefore the reverse of voluntary. We would have to shut our minds to the plain
significance of what here transpired to deny that this was a calculated endeavor to secure a confession
through the pressure ofunrelenting interrogation. The very relentlessness of such interrogation
implies that it is better for the prisoner to answer than to persist in the refusal of disclosure which is his
constitutional right. To turn the detention of an accused into a process of wrenching from him
evidence which could not be extorted in open court with all its safeguards, is so grave an abuse of the
power of arrest as to offend the procedural standards of due process. This is so because it violates the
underlying principle in our enforcement of the criminal law. Ours is the accusatorial as opposed to the
inquisitorial system. Such bas been the characteristic of Anglo-American criminal justice since it
freed itself from practices borrowed by the Star Chamber from the Continent whereby an accused was
interrogated in secret for hours on end."
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arraignment, 546 as implied in McNabb v. United States. 547
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Instead of applying the

exclusionary rule to state trials, in Rochin v. California, the Court excluded coerced
confessions by invoking "the due process conscience shocking test" established by
Lisenba. 548
With regard to legal assistance, the Court in Johnson v. Zerbst declared that:
"Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to
546

Id., at 14.

547

The Court ruled that: "The circumstances in which the statements admitted in evidence against the
petitioners were secured reveal a plain disregard of the duty enjoined by Congress upon federal law
officers. Freeman and Raymond McNabb were arrested in the middle of the night at their home.
Instead of being brought before a United States commissioner or a judicial officer, as the law requires,
in order to determine the sufficiency of the justification for their detention, they were put in a barren
cell and kept there for fourteen hours. For two days they were subjected to unremitting questioning
by numerous officers. Benjamin's confession was secured by detaining him unlawfully and
questioning him continuously for five or six hours. The McNabbs had to submit to all this without the
aid of friends or the benefit of counsel. The record leaves no room for doubt that the questioning of
the petitioners took place while they were in the custody of the arresting officers and before any order
of commitment was made. Plainly, a conviction resting on evidence secured through such a flagrant
disregard of the procedure which Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to stand without making
the courts themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of law. Congress has not explicitly
forbidden the use of evidence so procured. But to permit such evidence to be made the basis of a
conviction in the federal courts would stultify the policy which Congress has enacted into law. Unlike
England, where the Judges of the King's Bench have prescribed rules for the interrogation of prisoners
while in the custody of police officers, we have no specific provisions of law governing federal law
enforcement officers in procuring evidence from persons held in custody. But the absence of specific
restraints going beyond the legislation to which we have referred does not imply that the circumstances
under which evidence was secured are irrelevant in ascertaining its admissibility. The mere fact that a
confession was made while in the custody of the police does not render it inadmissible. But where in
the course of a criminal trial in the federal courts it appears that evidence has been obtained in such
violation of legal rights as this case discloses, it is the duty of the trial court to entertain a motion for
the exclusion of such evidence and to hold a hearing, as was done here, to determine whether such
motion should be granted or denied." See 318 U.S. 332, 344-6 ( 1943) .
548

The Court noted that: "Due process of law, as a historic and generative principle, precludes defining,
and thereby confining, these standards of conduct more precisely than to say that convictions cannot be
brought about by methods that offend 'a sense of justice.' It would be a stultification of the
responsibility which the course of constitutional history has cast upon this Court to hold that in order to
convict a man the police cannot extract by force what is in his mind but can extract what is U1 his
stomach. Use of involuntary verbal confessions in State criminal trials is constitutionally obnoxious
not only because of their unreliability. They are inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even
though statements contained in them may be independently established as true. Coerced confessions
offend the community's sense of fair play and decency. So here, to sanction the brutal conduct which
naturally enough was condemned by the court whose judgment is before us, would be to afford
brutality the cloak of law. Nothing would be more calculated to discredit law and thereby to brutalize
thetemperofasociety." See342U.S.165, 173 (1952).
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the assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an
essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's authority to deprive an
accused of his life or liberty.

When this right is properly waived, the assistance

of counsel is no longer a necessary element of the court's jurisdiction to proceed
to conviction and sentence.

If the accused, however, is not represented by

counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right,
the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and
sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty."

549

Except for capital cases, in Betts v. Brady, the Court denied that the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause obligated the states to the states 550 becaus~ it
considered the right to counsel was in fact a matter of policy instead of being
"dictated by nature, inherent and fundamental principles offairness." 551

Thus, free

counsel for the accused was not mandatory; as noted in Griffin v. illinois, 552 states

549

The Court also mentioned that: "The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel
invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused -- whose life or liberty is at stake
-- is without counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the
trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused. While
an accused may waive the right to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should be clearly
determined by the trial court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear
upon the record." See 304 U.S. 458, 467-8 ( 1938) .
550

See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 102.

551

See 316 U.S. 455,471 (1942) .

552

The Court held that: "But when a State deems it wise and just that convictions be susceptible to
review by an appellate court, it cannot by force of its exactions draw a line which precludes convicted
indigent persons, forsooth erroneously convicted, from securing such a review merely by disabling
them from bringing to the notice of an appellate tribunal errors ofthe trial court which would upset the
conviction were practical opportunity for review not foreclosed." See 351 U.S. 12, 23 ( 1956) .
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were merely required to provide indigent defendants with a free trial transcript if
appeals were allowed. 553

Furthermore, as late as a 1959, in Burns v. Ohio, the Court

held that states were not allowed to require an indigent defendant in any criminal case
to pay a filing fee before permitting him to file a motion for leave to appeal in one of
its courts. 554
In a sense those decisions are based mainly upon a host of federal criminal cases,
created by the expansion of federal criminal law in the decades following the Civil
War, addressing the meaning of criminal due process and the constitutional
protections guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, especially the Fourth, the Fifth, the Sixth,
and the Eighth Amendments.

Perhaps arising from wartime experiences, the United

States Supreme Court seemed to gain a new understanding of the federal
government's role in protecting civil rights which had been considered only the

553

It should be noted that states were not required to afford convicted defendants an appeal.
Craig M. Bradley, supra note 295, 15.
554

See

The Court mentioned that: "Since Griffin proceeded upon the assumption that review in the Illinois
Supreme Court was a matter of right, Ohio seeks to distinguish .Qrif!in on the further ground that leave
to appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio is a matter of discretion. But this argument misses the crucial
significance of Griffin. In Ohio, a defendant who is not indigent may have the Supreme Court
consider on the merits his application for leave to appeal from a felony conviction. But as that court
has interpreted § 1512 and its rules of practice, an indigent defendant is denied that opportunity.
There is no rational basis for assuming that indigents' motions for leave to appeal will be less
meritorious than those of other defendants. Indigents must, therefore, have the same opportunities to
invoke the discretion of the Supreme Court of Ohio. The State's action in this case in some ways is
more final and disastrous from the defendant's point of view than was the .Qri1;lin situation. At least in
.Qriffin, the defendant might have raised in the Supreme Court any claims that he had that were
apparent on the bare record, though trial errors could not be raised. Here, the action of the State has
completely barred the petitioner from obtaining any review at all in the Supreme Court of Ohio. The
imposition by the State of financial barriers restricting the availability of appellate review for indigent
criminal defendants has no place in our heritage of Equal Justice Under Law." See 360 U.S. 252,
257-8 ( 1959) .
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privileges of citizenship in reality. 555

After those decisions, individual rights

guaranteed by the Bill of Rights no longer exclusively belonged to each state
jurisdiction; although in many cases, states were still free to regulate the procedure of
their courts in accordance with its own conceptions of policy unless such regulating
would offend some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of its
citizens to be ranked as fundamental.

556

3.4.2.4 Approaches of Incorporation of the Bill of Rights to Due Process Clause
When the Supreme Court began reviewing state civil rights issues and holding
that individual rights, that the Bill of Rights guaranteed defendants in federal criminal
prosecutions, also applied to state criminal defendants, the Court considered only
those rights that were implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and required the states
to apply them in state trials, as noted in Palko v. Connecticut. 557

This approach did

not necessarily give the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment an
independent function concerning the safeguarding of the federal Bill of Rights at the
state level since the due process clause itself had rarely been an independent and
single justification for supporting any Supreme Court's decision.
555
556

557

See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 73.
See 291 U.S., at 105 and 297 U.S., at 285.
See302U.S. 319,325 (1937) .

Nevertheless, in

r
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Gitlow v. New York, the Court started incorporating the specific right listed in the Bill
of Rights with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to limit state
power. 558

In Gitlow the Court held that "freedom of speech and of the press ---

which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress --- are
among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States."559
Furthermore, regardless of which individual right in the Bill of Rights sought to be
applied in state trials, 560 the Fourteenth Amendment would become a means of using
that specific right to limit state power.

In addition to what constituted due process

and what rights were fundamental to the Bill of Rights, and just how the Court should
incorporate those rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, become an important issue
during the development of the due process.

In fact, there are two schools of thought

i

f.

sprung up around this issue: total incorporation and selective incorporation.

•I
I

I
I

Justice Hugo Black, who represented the thought of total incorporation, claimed
that: except for the right to privacy, substantive due process which required that the

,,
I

States respect all of the enumerated rights set forth in the first ten amendments did not
wish to see the doctrine expanded to include other judicially determined fundamental
558

See 268 U.S. 652 ( 1925) .

559

Id., at 666.

560

In this case, it refers to the First Amendment
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rights and this formulation would eliminate any arbitrariness or caprice in deciding
what substantive due process ought to protect, by sticking to words already to be
found in the Constitution; however, Justice Felix Frankfurter who represented the
thought of selective incorporation asserted that: the incorporation process ought to be
incremental, and that the federal courts shoUld only apply those sections of the Bill of
Rights whose abridgement would shock the conscience of our society.

561

Regardless

of the method adopted to safeguard the Bill of Rights at the state level, the Fourteenth

I·
I

1
I

I

Amendment, by equating state and national citizenship, somehow created an endless
list of national civil rights by judicial interpretation and, more important, made the
central ·government responsible for protecting them. 562

While the Court in Adamson

v. California specifically refused to hold that the concept of due process necessarily
incorporated the entire body of the Bill ofRights, 563 and Justice Frankfurter's

s61 See Wikipedia, supra note 487.
62

s

63

See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 73.

s The Court held that: "A construction which gives to due process no independent function but turns
it into a summary of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights would, as has been noted, tear up by
the roots much of the fabric of law in the several States, and would deprive the States of opportunity
for reforms in legal process designed for extending the area of freedom. It would assume that no
other abuses would reveal themselves in the course of time than those which had become manifest in
1791. Such a view not only disregards the historic meaning of 'due process.' It leads inevitably to a
warped construction of specific provisions of the Bill of Rights to bring within their scope conduct
clearly condemned by due process but not easily fitting into the pigeon-holes of the specific provisions.
It seems pretty late in the day to suggest that a phrase so laden with historic meaning should be given
an improvised content consisting of some but not all of the provisions of the first eight Amendments,
selected on an undefined basis, with improvisation of content for the provisions so selected. And so,
when, as in a case like the present, a conviction in a State court is here for review under a claim that a
right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been denied, the issue is
not whether an infraction of one of the specific provisions of the first eight Amendments is disclosed
by the record. The relevant question is whether the criminal proceedings which resulted in conviction
deprived the accused of the due process of law to which the United States Constitution entitled him.
Judicial review of that guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment inescapably imposes upon this Court an

it

t
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incrementalist approach did carry the day, it is interesting that the result is nearly what
Justice Black had advocated, after the Court expanded its concept of what constituted
due process to include all important provisions of the Bill of Rights. 564

The only

exceptions included the Fifth Amendment right to an indictment by a grand jury, the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil lawsuits, which has been ruled to only

~1:

exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the proceedings in order to ascertain whether they
offend those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English·speaking
peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses. These standards of justice are not
authoritatively formulated anywhere as though they were prescriptions in a pharmacopoeia. But
neither does the application of the Due Process Clause imply that judges are wholly at large. The
judicial judgment in applying the Due Process Clause must move within the limits of accepted notions
of justice and is not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment. The fact that
judges among themselves may differ whether in a particular case a trial offends accepted notions of
justice is not disproof that general rather than idiosyncratic standards are applied. An important
safeguard against such merely individual judgment is an alert deference to the judgment of the State
court under review." See 332 U.S. 46, 67-8 ( 1947) ; see also Craig M Bradley, supra note 295, 18.
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564

See Wlkipedia, supra note 487.("Incorporation has applied most of the substantive rights ofthe Bill
of Rights to the States as well. The doctrine of Incorporation is the only legal reason why, for
example, States must recognize the First Amendment protections of freedom of speech or religion
regardless of whether their own State laws and constitutions offer comparable protections. The only
exceptions to Incorporation of the substantive rights in the Bill of Rights--the Second Amendment right
to bear arms, the Third Amendment right not to have soldiers quartered in one's home, and the Eighth
Amendment prohibition on excessive bail and fines-·are provisions that the Supreme Court has not
defmitively ruled on. Many lower federal appellate courts have ruled that these rights have been
Incorporated, however. Today, a new generation of conservative politicians takes issue with certain
effects of the incorporation doctrine, including and especially federal courts' long history of applying
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the actions of state officials. It remains unclear
whether these people are simply unaware of the reason that the First Amendment, which begins
'Congress shall make no law... ' has been and is now being interpreted to apply to state actions, or
whether they are actually attacking the legal underpinnings of this long-standing approach.
Regardless of which explanation is correct, incorporation seems to be on firm legal ground. Although
Justice Clarence Thomas advocated an end to incorporation of the Establishment Clause in Elk Grove
Unified School District v. Newdow (2004) (the Pledge of Allegiance case), he did not challenge other
applications of the doctrine. Thomas' reasoning was confined to the first provision of the First
Amendment, which he reasoned ought not to be applied through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause because it guarantees no individual rights. Due Process under the federal Constitution
has additionally been interpreted as a restraint on the ways that legislatures may alter the law, although
some judges over the years have objected to stretching the Due Process Clause beyond what was
intended by Magna Carta. As a limitation on Congress, the Due Process Clause has been interpreted
by the majority of the Supreme Court to have both procedural and substantive components, meaning
that it imposes restrictions on legal procedures--the ways in which laws may operate--and also on legal
substance·-what laws may attempt to do or prohibit The distinction between substance and procedure
is difficult in both theory and practice to establish. Moreover, the substantive component of due
process has proven to be very controversial, because it gives the U.S. Supreme Court considerable
power to strike down state and federal statutes in order to legalize crimes that a majority of the judges
do not think should have been criminalized in the first place.")
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apply in federal courts, and the Sixth Amendment's implicit command that all
565
. .
b e reach ed b y a twe1ve-memb er unanimous
.
.
crinu'nal convictions
Jury.

As Justice Robert H. Jackson once pointed out, whatever else due process might
mean, procedural fairness is what it most uncompromisingly requires.

566

To date,

due process, in the context of the United States Constitution, refers to "how'' and

~
I

"why" laws are enforced. It applies to all persons, citizen or alien, as well as to
•

corporations.

567

.

3.4.3 The Federalized American Criminal Procedure Revolution

~l
r

While the United Supreme Court had already announced its authority to govern
the conduct of federal law enforcement authorities and to enforce its dictates with the

J

S6S

Id.

s66 See Rights of the Accused, supra note 482.

s61 See Constitutional Topic: Due Process, supra note, 483. ("In a sense, the 'how' is procedural due
process. Is a law too vague? Is it applied fairly to all? Does a law presume guilt? A vagrancy
law might be declared too vague if the definition of a vagrant is not detailed enough. A law that
makes wife beating illegal but permits husband beating might be declared to be an unfair application.
A law must be clear, fair, and have a presumption of innocence to comply with procedural due process.
And the "why'' is substantive due process. Even if an unreasonable law is passed and signed into law
legally (procedural due process), substantive due process can make the law unconstitutional. The Roe
v. Wade abortion decision declared a Texas law in violation of due process and ruled that in the first
trimester, it is unreasonable for a state to interfere with a woman's right to an abortion; during the
second trimester, it is reasonable for a state to regulate abortion in the interest of the health of mothers;
and in the third, the state has a reasonable interest in protecting the fetus. Another application has
been to strike down legislation requiring certain non-dangerous mentally ill persons be confined against
their will. Generally, due process guarantees the following (this list is not exhaustive): Right to a fair
and public trial conducted in a competent manner; Right to be present at the trial; Right to an impartial
jury; Right to be heard in one's own defense; Laws must be written so that a reasonable person can
understand what is criminal behavior; Taxes may only be taken for public purposes; Property may be
taken by the government only for public purposes; Owners of taken property must be fairly
compensated." )

,~
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due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment before 1960, it was neither
regulating searches nor seizures conducted by state and local police, nor recognizing
the Fifth Amendment to be incorporated within the Fourteenth. 568

The Court had,

nonetheless, provided that the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures to be applicable to the states through the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and had declared the exclusionary remedy, not the
exclusionary rule itself, was also applicable to the states through "the so-called
conscience shocking test. " 569

This test had been established by Lisenba in certain

cases thought to so egregious as to shock the conscience.

The Court was making

extensive efforts to ensure that only voluntary confessions were used in state
courts.s?o
The most influential Chief Justice in the twentieth century, Mr. Earl Warren, a
former California district prosecutor, attorney general and governor, expressively and
stoutly applied a number of individual rights listed in the Bill of Rights to the state's
administration of criminal trials.

Chief Justice Warren almost single handedly

reshaped the American criminal justice system. 571

568

See Craig M. Bradley, supra note 295, 15.

569

Id.

Emerging from his brilliant

570

In addition, police identification procedures, such as lineup, had not been subjected to Supreme
Court scrutiny, either. ld.
571

See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 110-1.( "Chief Justice Earl Warren specifically dismissed
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political experiences, instead of formal academic study, Chief Justice Earl Warren,
recognized that the pursuit of justice should be an active search for a fundamental

),
morality to guide daily life. 572

The Chief Justice further thought this pursuit should

f
I

be led by an independent judiciary, and that the process implied continual revision of
the catalog of rights lest a document that would not have exactly the same meaning it
had when people received it from their fathers, but one that would be better because it
was burnished by growing use. 573

Warren's sentiments were counter to those held in

the conservative judicial mainstream, which was led by Justice Felix Frankfurter
before his resignation in 1962. 574

These views included deference to legislative

actions; respect for federalism and the diversity of state practice it implied, and
reliance upon neutral decision-making based on narrow case facts rather than broad
constitutional interpretations of the mid-twentieth century. 575
The U.S. Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Warren's leadership believed the
as fantasy the notion that justices should be impartial. Instead, he proposed that as the defender of the
Constitution, the Court could not be neutral. He sought a broad role and active stance for the high
bench since he thought: ''the Court sits to decide cases, not to avoid decision, and while it must
recognize the constitutional powers of the branches of Government involved, it must also decide every
issue properly placed before it." More important, Court decisions must reach the right result, a
condition defined by ethics, not legal procedures. Warren firmly believed the Constitution embodied
moral truths that were essential to enlightened government. It was the Court's duty to apply these
principles, even if doing so contravened the expressed wishes of the legislature.")
sn Warren's view was antagonistic to that of Justice Felix Frankfurter who urged the Court to protect

the integrity of democratic process and trust the people's representatives to promote liberty.

110.
S73

Id.

S74

Id.

S1S

Id., at 111.

Id., at

l·
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Bill of Rights codified the sense of justice inherent in human nature and provided the
basis for bringing American law into harmony with moral principles. 576

The Court

further thought the Bill of Rights protected the natural rights of people against
arbitrary actions of government and that no legal doctrine could curb the protection of
individual rights against the state nor could any institutional limitation encumber
''

judges in enforcing them. 577

This required the constant and creative application of

the Bill of Rights to new situations.

The United States Supreme Court, under the

leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren from 1961, accelerated the already existing
and proceeding judicial reforms focusing on protections of the accused in criminal
trials by beginning with the landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio. 578

Mapp ruled that

applying the Fourth Amendment to the states like that in Wolfv. Colorado was merely
an empty if it did not include the exclusionary remedy 579 in that: "Nothing can
'

.

.!

destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse,
its disregard of the charter of its own existence." 580

576

Id.

577

Id.

578

Id. (In fact, "Mr. Earl Warren was appointed as Chief Justice in 1953 by President Eisenhower.
However, not until 1960 when three justices, Black, Douglas, and Brennan, as well as a changing fifth
member, usually Clark, Goldberg, or Fortas, joined Warren which completed the majority did the
Supreme Court become liberal.")
579

The term "criminal procedure revolution" refers to a series of constitutional decisions by the United
States Supreme Court during the 1960s that revolutionized the criminal procedures of the states. See
Craig M. Bradley, supra note 295, 1, 19.
580

The Court declared that: "Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable
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Mapp distinguished itself from previous cases because applying the exclusionary

I1

rule to state criminal trials by incorporating a particular provision of the Bill of Rights
into the Fourteenth Amendment also incorporated the body oflaw that had attached to
. . over the years. 581
that proVISlOn

This process would eventually apply a sometimes

extensive body of Supreme Court case law as a ready-made body of law, derivative
mainly from each constitutional provision, to the states. 582

The subsequent holding

t

l
I

in Ker v. California that "[t]he States are not thereby precluded from developing

l

\

workable rules governing arrests, searches and seizures to meet 'the practical
demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement' in the States,

I

!
l
\

against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government Were it
otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and
seizures would be 'a form of words,' valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of
inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would
be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish
means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a freedom 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.' At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the Amendment was
applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court, as we have seen, had
steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the
evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf 'stoutly adhered' to that proposition. The
right to privacy, when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of
destruction by awls ion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been
deemed dependent under the ~ Weeks and Silverthorne cases. Therefore, in extending the
substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches -- state or federal it was logically and constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine -- an essential part of the
right to privacy-- be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the
Wolf case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional right by ,WQ!f could not consistently
tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence
which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to
grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment Only last year the Court itself
recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter -- to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way- by removing the incentive to disregard
it." See 367 U.S. 643, 655-6 ( 1961) .
581

For example, Irvine v. California which had given state officials more leeway than federal agents in
applying the exclusionary rule was implicitly overruled by Mapp y, Ohio which applied the same
constitutional standards prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures to the states as to the federal
government. See Craig M. Bradley, supra note 295, 20.
S82

Id.

I
I

l.
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!~
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provided that those rules do not violate the constitutional proscription of unreasonable
searches and seizures and the concomitant command that evidence so seized is
inadmissible against one who has standing to complain" 583 in reality resulted from
the fact that Mapp has not been capable of laying down a fixed formula for the
application in specific cases of the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures, which caused searches simply to be judged according to their
reasonableness, basically a question to be answered in the first instance by the trial
court. 584

Moreover, in Fay v. Noia, the Court expanded federal jurisdiction over

state convictions by approving federal authorities to issue writs of habeas corpus
pursuant to the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867. 585

Based upon the Warren Court's

513

The Court also held that: "This Court's long-established recognition that standards of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment are not susceptible of Procrustean application is carried
forward when that Amendmenfs proscriptions are enforced against the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment. And, although the standard of reasonableness is the same under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, the demands of our federal system compel us to distinguish between evidence held
inadmissible because of our supervisory powers over federal courts and that held inadmissible because
prohibited by the United States Constitution. We reiterate that the reasonableness of a search is in the
first instance a substantive determination to be made by the trial court from the facts and circumstances
of the case and in the light of the 'fundamental criteria' laid down by the Fourth Amendment and in
opinions of this Court applying that Amendment Findings of reasonableness, of course, are respected
only insofar as consistent with federal constitutional guarantees. As we have stated above and in
other cases involving federal constitutional rights, findings of state courts are by no means insulated
against examination here." See 374 U.S. 23, 33-4 ( 1963) .
ss 4 See Craig M. Bradley, supra note 295, 21.
sas The Court ruled that: "Federal courts have power under the federal habeas statute to grant relief
despite the applicant's failure to have pursued a state remedy not available to him at the time he applies;
the doctrine under which state procedural defaults are held to constitute an adequate and independent
state law ground barring direct Supreme Court review is not to be extended to limit the power granted
the federal courts under the federal habeas statute. . . . We have reviewed the development of habeas
corpus at some length because the question of the instant case has obvious importance to the proper
accommodation of a great constitutional privilege and the requirements of the federal system. Our
survey discloses nothing to suggest that the Federal District Court lacked the power to order Noia
discharged because of a procedural forfeiture he may have incurred under state law. On the contrary,
the nature of the writ at common law, the language and purpose of the Act of February 5, 1867, and the
course of decisions in this Court extending over nearly a century are wholly irreconcilable with such a

flI
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decisions, federal judges became more powerful with regard to reversing state
convictions if a federal court should discover any violation of a provision of the Bill
of Rights, as well as the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

While

the cases before the Warren Court differed from term to term, the overarching goal of
fundamental fairness remained constant because the justices sought to abolish
distinctions of class and wealth in American society and promoted modem liberal
values in which equality of condition joined equality of opportunity.

586

Afterwards,

criminal procedure has no longer been a state issue and anyone would look in vain in
an American law school criminal procedure casebook for any discussion of state
law. 587 · As a consequence, Warren Court decisions, 588 through employing the

limitation. At the time the privilege of the writ was written into the Federal Constitution it was settled
that the writ lay to test any restraint contrary to fundamental law, which in England stemmed ultimately
from Magna Charta but in this country was embodied in the written Constitution. Congress in 1867
sought to provide a federal forum for state prisoners having constitutional defenses by extending the
habeas corpus powers of the federal courts to their constitutional maximum. Obedient to this purpose,
we have consistently held that federal court jurisdiction is conferred by the allegation of an
unconstitutional restraint and is not defeated by anything that may occur in the state court proceedings.
State procedural rules plainly must yield to this overriding federal policy." In addition, this Act
mainly provided that the federal courts shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases
where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution or law of the
United States. See 372 U.S 391, 399,427 ( 1963) .
ss 6 See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 111.
sa? In addition, many states, shell-shocked by the Supreme Court's blast, have limited their

participation in this area to attempting to decipher and apply Supreme Court law and, in some of the
more liberal states, to using the state constitution to resist incursions by subsequent Courts on the rights
established by the Warren Court. Some states have, by contrast, attempted to develop rules in areas in
which the Supreme Court has been silent See Craig M. Bradley, supra note 295, 29.
sss Those decisions include: Mapp v. Ohio( 1961 ), Rogers v. Richmond( 1961 ), Robinson v. California
( 1962) , Gideon v. Wainwright ( 1963 ) , Aguilar y. Texas ( 1964) , Preston y. United States ( 1964) ,

Mallozy v. Hogan ( 1964) , Escobebedo v. Illinois ( 1964) , Stoner v. California ( 1964) , Clinton v.
Virginia ( 1964) , Beck v. Ohio ( 1965) , Pointer v. Texas ( 1965 ) , United States v. Ventresca ( 1965 ) ,
Miranda v. Arizona( 1966 ), Camara v. Municipal Court( 1967 ), Katz v. United States( 1967 ), Klopfer
y. North Carolina( 1967 ), Warden v. Hayden( 1967 ), Washington v. Texas( 1967 ), Duncan v. Louisiana
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Fourteenth Amendment, as a whole resulted in a nationalized Bill of Rights that
largely dimmed the local character of justice by applying the same restrains to all
criminal proceedings in the United States. 589

3.5 The Exclusionary Rule
3.5.1 An Overview
The "Exclusionary Rule" presents a controversial issue in the criminal justice
system.

Generally speaking, there are some who believe it is needed to deter police

from violating a person's constitutional right and to maintain judicial integrity. 590
While others think there should be no exclusionary rule in that it allows the guilty to
go free without carriage of justice. 591

In this section, this paper will review its

development in the United States criminal justice system.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution merely provides that

( 1968 ), Terzy v. Ohio( 1968 ), Benton v. Maryland( 1969 ), Chimel v. California( 1969 ), and Spinelli
v. United States (1969) ... e.tc.
589

See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 113.

°

59

For example, the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule "is to deter - to
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-- by removing the
incentive to disregard it in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 ( 1960) . See 367 U.S., at 656.
Mapp also held that: "But, as was said in Elkins, 'there is another consideration - the imperative of
judicial integrity.' The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing
can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard
of the charter of its own existence." Id., at 659.
591

As did Justice (then Judge) Cardozo mentioned that: "under our constitutional exclusionary
doctrine 'the criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.'" Id., at 659.
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"The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and

I
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be

t
seized."

According to this provision, protection of persons, houses, papers and

effects is at the core of this amendment, and a right free from unreasonable searches

f
t
~

and seizures is declared.

In other words, the Fourth Amendment charges police with

l
\

acting reasonably while engaging in search or seizure activities.

A lay person might

think it is easy to determine what constitutes search and seizure; however, it is not.
As Justice Felix Frankfurter once mentioned, "the course of true law pertaining to
searches and seizures ... has not run smoothly."592

Over the years, the United States

Supreme Court has struggled to decide whether, and where, limits should be imposed
on the government's search and seizure power. 593

In general, if it is determined that

a search or a seizure took has taken place, it must next be determined whether it was
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 594

592

Thus, whether the

See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 ( 1961) .

593

As one commentator has observed, "attempting to comprehend the Fourth Amendment cases is
rather like stepping through the Looking Glass with Alice. Precedents and analytical approaches
appear and disappear like the Cheshire Cat Words and phrases acquire new meanings in the context
of these analytical progressions." See Michele M Jochner, Recent U.S. Supreme Court Fourth
Amendment Rulings Expand Police Discretion, citing Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in Flux: The
Rise and Fall of Probable Cause, 1979 U Ill L F 763, at http://www.isba.org (last visited Sep. 18,
2004) .
594

See William Burnham, supra note 385, 275.
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Fourth Amendment applies depends upon the question whether one who is subjected
to being searched or seized has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a specific
situation. 595

If there exists a reasonable expectation of privacy, then the government

has to show probable cause or its conduct would be illegal in terms of
unreasonableness. 596

Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances

within knowledge, and of which they had reasonable trustworthy information,
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an
offense has been or is being committed." 597

To determine whether probable cause

exists, the Supreme Court currently adopts, instead of the old-fashion two-pronged
standard in Aguilar v. Texas598 and Spinelli v. United States,

599

the so-called ·

595

As Professor Joseph D. Grano pointed out, "In legal jargon, whether the police may lawfully arrest
or search usually depends on whether they have 'probable cause.' Unfortunately, at least for those
who relish bright-line mechanical rules, the Supreme Court has never precisely defined this elusive
concept The Court has said that probable cause to arrest exists when the police have reasonably
trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an
individual has committed a crime. This definition, however, fails to 'structure' analysis for the trained
legal mind." See Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of
Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 465, 465 ( 1984) .
596

Id.

597

See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S 160 ( 1949) .

598

It held: "Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct
personal observations of the affiant, the magistrate must be informed of some ofthe underlying
circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were,
and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose
identity need not be disclosed, was 'credible' or his information 'reliable. Otherwise, 'the inferences
from the facts which lead to the complaint' will be drawn not 'by a neutral and detached magistrate,' as
the Constitution requires, but instead, by a police officer 'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime,' or, as i~ this case, by an unidentified informant." See 378 U.S. 108, 114-5
(1964) .
599

It held: "While recognizing that the constitutional requirement of probable cause can be satisfied by
hearsay information, this Court held the affidavit inadequate for two reasons. First, the application
failed to set forth any of the 'underlying circumstances' necessary to enable the magistrate
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commonsense approach in Illinois v. Gates. 600

Utilizing this approach, the Court

balances the government's interest in investigating crime against the extent of the
intrusion into someone's privacy.
The United States Constitution as well as its amendments does not provide
remedies for any violation of the Fourth Amendment's restrictions on unreasonable
searches and seizures.

If there is no remedy, constitutional guaranty of the.right

against unreasonable searches and seizures would unavoidably and intentionally be
disregarded by law enforcement officers since some law epforcement officers really
think of the Forth Amendment as a mere technicality or impediment. 601

Thus, what

independently to judge of the validity of the informant's conclusion that the narcotics were where he
said they were. Second, the affiant-officers did not attempt to support their claim that their informant
was 'credible or his information 'reliable.' The Government is, however, quite right in saying that the
FBI affidavit in the present case is more ample than that in Aguilar. Not only does it contain a report
from an anonymous informant, but it also contains a report of an independent FBI investigation which
is said to corroborate the informant's tip. We are, then, required to delineate the manner in which
Aguilar's two-pronged test should be applied in these circumstances." See 393 US. 410, 412( 1969 ).
600

It held: "We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that an informant's 'veracity,' 'reliability,' and
'basis of knowledge' are all highly relevant in determining the value of his report. We do not agree,
however, that these elements should be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements
to be rigidly exacted in every case, which the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois would imply.
Rather, as detailed below, they should be understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may
usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question whether there is 'probable cause' to believe
that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place. This totality-of-the-circumstances
approach is far more consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause n6 than is any rigid demand
that specific 'tests' be satisfied by every informant's tip. Perhaps the central teaching of our decisions
bearing on the probable-cause standard is that it is a 'practical, nontechnical conception.' 'In dealing
with probable cause, ... as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical;
they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men,
not legal technicians, act' Our observation in United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981),
regarding 'particularized suspicion,' is also applicable to the probable-cause standard: 'The process
does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was
articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common-sense conclusions about human
behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same - and so are law enforcement officers.
Finally, the evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by
scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field oflaw enforcement."' See 462 U.S. 213,
230-2 ( 1983) .
601

See 364 U.S., at 217.
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should be the best remedy for a violation of the Fourth Amendment has long been
argued.

In order to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights, putting offending police

officers in jail might be one solution.

This would, however, not be fair to law

enforcement officers because the nature of their jobs makes them the most likely
offenders of the Fourth Amendment.

It is also against society's best interest to jail

its officers not only because they are needed on our streets but also because the jail
remedy might deter law enforcement officers to the extent that searches and seizures
are not conducted.

There is another way to prevent violations of the Fourth

Amendment, and that is by using the civil remedies available to those whose civil
rights are violated.

However, under this approach, "society's interest in safeguarding

its Fourth Amendment right would depend on the whim and ability of individuals in
bringing civil rights lawsuits.

Allowing the matter of illegal search and seizure to be

heard in a criminal case brought by the prosecution makes it much more likely to be
heard. ,602

602

See Stephen P. Haws, The Fourth Amendment: Just a Technicality?, at
httJ>://69 .I 0.163.11 0/sphaws/fourth.html (last visited Sep. 18, 2004). Concerning available remedies
for a violation of the Fourth Amendment, it should be noted that: "Theoretically, there are several
alternatives to the exclusionary rule. An illegal search and seizure may be criminally actionable and
officers undertaking one thus subject to prosecution, but the examples when officers are criminally
prosecuted for overzealous law enforcement are extremely rare. A policeman who makes an illegal
search and seizure is subject to internal departmental discipline which may be backed up in the few
jurisdictions which have adopted them by the oversight of and participation of police review boards,
but again the examples of disciplinary actions are exceedingly rare. Persons who have been illegally
arrested or who have had their privacy invaded will usually have a tort action available under state
statutory or common law. Moreover, police officers acting under color of state law who violate a
person's Fourth Amendment rights are subject to a suit for damages and other remedies under a civil
rights statute in federal courts. While federal officers and others acting under color of federal law are
not subject jurisdictionally to this statute, the Supreme Court has recently held that a right to damages
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As an effective remedy for a violation of the Fourth Amendment, "the rule that
reliable and probative physical evidence of guilt may not be introduced in the
prosecution's case-in-chiefifit was obtained in violation of the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights was unknown to the law in this country for almost 100 years after
the Fourth Amendment was adopted."603

Generally speaking, the practice of finding

evidence inadmissible and excluding it from trial is called the exclusionary rule. 604
Because this exclusionary rule itself is not found in the Constitution, it is desirable to
explore the Framers' original intentions before discussing the related developments of
the exclusionary rule.

for violation of Fourth Amendment rights arises by implication out of the guarantees secured and that
this right is enforceable in federal courts. While a damage remedy might be made more effectual, a
number of legal and practical problems stand in the way. Police officers have available to them the
usual common-law defenses, most important of which is the claim of good faith. Federal officers are
entitled to qualified immunity based on an objectively reasonable belief that a warrantless search later
determined to violate the Fourth Amendment was supported by probable cause or exigent
circumstances. And on the practical side, persons subjected to illegal arrests and searches and
seizures are often disreputable persons toward whom juries are unsympathetic, or they are indigent and
unable to bring suit The result, therefore, is that the Court has emphasized exclusion of
unconstitutionally seized evidence in subsequent criminal trials as the only effective enforcement
method." See FindLaw, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule, at
htW://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitutionlamendment04/06html (last visited Sep. 18, 2004) .
603

See Department of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, 'Truth in criminal justice' series office of legal
policy: the search and seizure exclusionary rule, 22 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 573, 575 ( 1989) . ("The fourth
amendment had its genesis in antipathy to Crown search and seizure abuses under the general writs of
the colonial period, and the warrant clause is clearly a response to the abuses of general writs. The
addition of the search and seizure clause may indicate a perception on the Framers' part that the
warrant clause alone would be insufficient to limit all abuses. The Framers did not consider the
problem of warrantless searches in the modem sense, as municipal police departments were a
development of the nineteenth century. Indeed, it was not until nearly a century after the ratification
of the fourth amendment that courts began to suppress evidence as a remedy for constitutional
violations.")
604

See Freda Adler, Criminal Justice, 113 ( McGRAW-IDLL, 1994) .
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3.5.2 Origins and Developments of the Exclusionary Ru1e
Writs and warrants were originally used by the Tudor monarchy as means of
restricting freedom of the press and suppressing dissenting publications. 605

The

Fourth Amendment was created to provide a general right against search and seizure
and also to provide a specific right against general warrants. 606

While the Framers

were greatly concerned about wrongful searches, the practice since the establishment
of the United States did not include the exclusion of evidence as a remedy for such
searches. 607

In fact it does not appear that the Framers or ratifiers of the Fourth

Amendment contemplated suppression as a remedy for its violation. 608

In Adams v. New York, the Supreme Court, based on the common law tradition,
held that the use of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights under the

605

I.
I

I'

See Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property. 367 U.S. 717, 724( 1961 ). It is worth mentioning that
each succeeding English regime expanded the use of these broad powers, ultimately using them to
enforce compliance with import duties and tax laws, and the English Parliament transported these
practices to the colonies, authorizing the use of general warrants and writs of assistance to enforce
British customs and revenue laws. See Michele M. Jochner, supra note 593.
606

See Department of Justice, supra note 603, 592. ("Unlike other provisions of the Bill of Rights,
which grew out of more ancient principles of English jurisprudence, the fourth amendment developed
particularly as a reaction against abuses leading to the American Revolution. During the 1760s,
widespread colonial opposition developed to the Crown's use of general warrants and writs of
assistance. General warrants were issued by royal officers and gave officials carte blanche to search
anywhere for anything. Writs of assistance were similar but were authorized by Parliament rather
than the Crown. In sum, in the American colonies, attempts to enforce general warrants were
sometimes met with violent resistance.")
607

Id., at 594. ("Scholars generally agree on the historical background ofthe origin ofthe fourth
amendment. In addition, the Framers do not seem to have considered suppression as a remedy for
unconstitutional searches. They were, however, aware of the remedies available in the law of their
time. It seems fair to infer that they believed these remedies adequate, at least for the problems of
their era." )
60s

•I

Id.
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Fourth Amendment was constitutional; however, exclusion of evidence as a remedy
for a constitutional violation was discussed in two earlier Supreme Court cases. 609

In

Boyd v. United States, which provides the first mention of an exclusionary remedy,
the Supreme Court excluded private papers as evidence because it required the owner
to be a witness against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 610

In addition,

the Court held that it constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 611
The case that formally and expressly created the exclusionary rule for Fourth
Amendment violations is Weeks v. United States. 612

In Weeks the Court held that

evidence derived from a warrantless seizure by United States Federal Marshals was
inadmissible in that:

I.
"If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment
declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value,
and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the

609

610

611

612

See 192 U.S. 585 ( 1904) .
See 116 U.S. 616 (1886) .
Id.
See 232 U.S. 383 ( 1914) .
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Constitution. " 613
Although the holding of Weeks v. United States was limited to the illegal search
conducted by federal agents and did not extend significantly beyond Boyd, the true
significance of Weeks lay in the Court's sole reliance on the Fourth Amendment.
After Weeks, two 1921 decisions, Gouled v. United States614 and Amos v. United
States, 615 firmly established the exclusionary rule in the federal courts. 616

This was

reaffirmed by Wolfv. ·colorado617 in 1949 which for the first time established that the
security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police is embodied in the
concept of due process contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. 618

613

Id., at 393.

614

See 255 U.S. 298 ( 1921) .

615

See 255 U.S. 313 ( 1921) .

616

Wolf held that:

In Gouled v. United States, the Court unanimously rejected the common law rule previously
affirmed in~ that prevented a criminal defendant from objecting at trial to the manner in which
the government had obtained its evidence. That rule, the Court reasoned, was merely procedural and,
therefore, should not prevail over a constitutional right And in Amos v. United States, decided the
same day as Gouled, the Court held that whiskey seized unlawfully from the defendant's home should
have been excluded from evidence. By making it clear that private papers are not the only things that
may be inadmissible on fourth amendment grounds, this decision began a trend of focusing on the
manner in which the government obtained its evidence rather than on the nature of the evidence.
Because the exclusionary rule that developed in~ and its progeny was based on the fourth
amendment, the Court limited its scope to persons acting under federal authority, and did not apply it to
searches by state officials. Under that approach, the so-called "silver platter doctrine," federal courts
could admit evidence that had been illegally seized by state officers. Similarly, the Court declined to
apply the rule to evidence obtained by means of illegal conduct that did not violate the fourth
amendment. Among the states, the number of jurisdictions adopting the exclusionary rule under state
constitutions increased steadily following Weeks. In People v. Marxhausen. Michigan became the
first state after Weeks to adopt an exclusionary rule for violations of search and seizure requirements.
By 1949, 47 states had passed on the Weeks doctrine. Ofthese, 16 had adopted it and the remaining
31, including Iowa -- which had been the only state to adopt an exclusionary rule prior to Weeks -- had
rejected it. See Department of Justice, supra note 603, 596.

,,
617

See 338 U.S. 25 (1949) .

618

See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 132 ( 1954) .

II
I
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I
I
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"In a prosecution in a State court for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does
not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and
seizure." 619

Thus, although Wolf extended the Fourth Amendment protections to the

states, it refused to apply the Weeks exclusionary rule to state trials under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment, which invited the states to ignore Supreme Court Fourth
Amendment decisions. 620
t.

The exclusionary rule as applied in the United States also includes the "Tainted"
or "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" doctrine, first established in Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States. 621

There the Court held that not only is evidence which is illegally

seized inadmissible, but also any evidence or testimony obtained later as a result of
the illegally seized evidence is inadmissible. 622 Under this doctrine, which
sometimes results in not enough evidence to go to trial, any secondary and
incriminating facts or leads discovered later in a case from an earlier, illegal seizure
are inadmissible because if the "tree" is tainted, its "fruits" are also tainted. 623

619

See 338 U.S., at 33.

620

See Craig M. Bradley, supra note 295, 14, 19.

621

See251 U.S385 (1920).

622

Id.

623

See The Exclusionary Rule, at http://faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/405/405lect04.htm (last visited
Sep. 18, 2004). ("There exist two exceptions to this tainted doctrine. One loophole is the purged taint
exception, which applies if the defendant broke the chain of evidence himself or herself, and came
forward with new evidence, like a spontaneous confession, about a related crime. Another loophole is
the inevitable discovery doctrine, designed as a built-in loophole to the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine. Based on Nix y. Williams (467 U.S. 431, 1984), the doctrine holds that if illegally obtained
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3.5.3 From Federal Level to State Level
It was not until 1960 that the Supreme Court, through decisions that substantially
expanded the scope of the exclusionary rule, made the rule applicable to the states.
In Elkins v. United States, the Court overruled the "Silver Platter Doctrine"
announced in Weeks by noting that the question whether evidence obtained by state

II

II

officers and used against a defendant in a federal trial was obtained by unreasonable
search and seizure is to be judged as if the search and seizure had been made by
federal officers. 624 Under this rational, therefore, federal courts could not use
evidence illegally seized by state officers. 625 As Justice Stewart stated, the .
exclusionary rule "is calculated to prevent, not to repair.

Its purpose is to deter -- to

compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available
way--by removing the incentive to disregard it."626

•I

\I

I

II
I

II

I

evidence would in all likelihood eventually have been discovered anyway, it is admissible. For
example, if police obtained an illegal confession and cooperation from a suspect in locating where
bodies were buried, and police were conducting their own independent search of an area for bodies but
had given up, the help of the suspect in locating the bodies would be a natural extension of proper
police methods as if the police had never terminated their search. Although the confession. is illegal,
the dead bodies are admissible evidence. The reasoning behind inevitable discovery (not to be
confused with inadvertent discovery in Plain View Doctrine) is to restore police to the same position
they would have been if no police error or misconduct had occurred." )
624

See 364 U.S. 206 ( 1960) .

625

ld.

626

ld., at217.

I

1
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One year later, in Ma1212 v. Ohio, 627 the Supreme Court eventually overruled
Wolf v. Colorado by completely breaking from the common law tradition that relevant
evidence was admissible regardless how it had been obtained. 628

Ma1212 held that:

"All evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is,
by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court... Since the Fourth
Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them
by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government.
Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against
unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be 'a form of words,' valueless
and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties,
so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so
ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from
all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a
freedom 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' ... In short, the admission of
the new constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently tolerate denial of its
most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence

627

628

See 367 U.S. 643 ( 1961) .
See Craig M. Bradley, SYMPOSIUM ON THE FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF MAPP V. OIDO:

MAPP GOES ABROAD, 52 Case W. Res. 375 ( 2001) .

j,
• 0

·i

•II
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I

which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure.

.,

To

hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and
enjoyment.

Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the

'I

exclusionary rule is to deter -- to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in
the only effectively available way-- by removing the incentive to disregard it."629
It is interesting that Mapp was not originally thought to be a Fourth Amendment case.
Since it was in fact a First Amendment case, the exclusionary rule was neither briefed
nor argued. 630

However, as mentioned in the Department of Justice's research paper,

in Mapp v. Ohio, Justice Clark pointed out four justifications for imposing the
exclusionary rule on the states:
"First, he said, the exclusionary rule is necessary to ensure the actual enjoyment

629

See 367 U.S., 655, 656 ( 1961). Moreover, the Court held that: "our holding that the exclusionary
rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments is not only the logical dictate of
prior cases, but it also makes very good sense. There is no war between the Constitution and common
sense. Presently, a federal prosecutor may make no use of evidence illegally seized, but a State's
attorney across the street may, although he supposedly is operating under the enforceable prohibitions
of the same Amendment. Thus the State, by admitting evidence unlawfully seized, serves to
encourage disobedience to the Federal Constitution which it is bound to upholdm .. .. Federal-state
cooperation in the solution of crime under constitutional standards will be promoted, if only by
recognition of their now mutual obligation to respect the same fundamental criteria in their approaches.
'However much in a particular case insistence upon such rules may appear as a technicality that inures
to the benefit of a guilty person, the history of the criminal law proves that tolerance of shortcut
methods in law enforcement impairs its enduring effectiveness.' Denying shortcuts to only one oftwo
cooperating law enforcement agencies tends naturally to breed legitimate suspicion of 'working
arrangements' whose results are equally tainted." Id., at 658.
630

At the trial no search warrant was produced by the prosecution, nor was the failure to produce one
explained or accounted for. At best, "There is, in the record, considerable doubt as to whether there
ever was any warrant for the search of defendant's home." The Ohio Supreme Court believed a
"reasonable argument'' could be made that the conviction should be reversed "because the 'methods'
employed to obtain the [evidence] ... were such as to 'offend' a sense of justice," but the court found
determinative the fact that the evidence had not been taken "from defendant's person by the use of
brutal or offensive physical force against defendant." See 367 U.S., at 645.

•
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I.

of Fourth Amendment rights by--- as explained in Elkins--- removing the
incentive to violate constitutional guarantees.

Second, he argued, the close

relationship between the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment's
I,

prohibition on coerced confessions requires exclusion of what is tantamount to
coerced testimony -- unconstitutionally seized goods, papers, effects, or
documents.

Third, Justice Clark claimed that application of the exclusionary

l

\.
\.

I
I.
c

f'

rule to the states would promote federal-state cooperation in solving crime in
accordance with constitutional standards.

Finally, he argued that the imperative

of judicial integrity required application of the rule to the states."631
Thereafter, all evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and any other
Constitutional right is inadmissible.

Although Justice (then Judge) Cardozo

complained in People v. Defore632 that "under our constitutional exclusionary
doctrine the criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered," 633 Justice
Clark responded this viewpoint in Mapp by stating that:
"There are those who say, as did Justice (then Judge) Cardozo, that under our
constitutional exclusionary doctrine 'the criminal is to go free because the
631

See Department of Justice, supra note 603, 598. However, after Leon, all but one of the four
theoretical pillars once used to justify the rule have been eroded, the validity of the sole remaining
justification has been cast in doubt, and serious efforts are underway in Congress to limit the rule
substantially, if not to abandon it entirely. Id., at 602.
632

See 242 N.Y. 13 (1920) .

633

ld., at 2 I.

\,
il
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In some cases this will undoubtedly be the result.

But, as was said in Elkins. there is another consideration -- the imperative of
judicial integrity.
him free.

The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets

Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to

observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own
existence. " 634

3.5.4 Expansions and Limitations on Mapp
After Mapp, the Supreme Court continued to extend the scope of the judge made
exclusionary rule.

In Wong Sun v. United States. the Court further applied the ·

exclusionary rule to "verbal statements" that were regarded as fruits of an unlawful
search. 635

In addition, in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, the Court also

634

See 367 U.S., 659. In addition, the Court also noted that: "As Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting,
said in Olmstead v. United States: 'Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good
or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example... . If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.' Nor
can it lightly be assumed that, as a practical matter, adoption of the exclusionary rule fetters law
enforcement. ... 'The federal courts themselves have operated under the exclusionary rule of Weeks for
almost half a century; yet it has not been suggested either that the Federal Bureau of Investigation n 10
has thereby been rendered ineffective, or that-the administration of criminal justice in the federal
courts has thereby been disrupted. Moreover, the experience of the states is impressive.. . . The
movement towards the rule of exclusion has been halting but seemingly inexorable."' Id., 660.

m It decided: "The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials
obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion. It follows from the holding of the
United States Supreme Court in Silverman y. United States that the U.S. Const. amend. IV may protect
against the overhearing of verbal statements as well as against the more traditional seizure of 'papers
and effects.' Similarly, testimony as to matters observed during an unlawful invasion has been
excluded in order to enforce the basic constitutional policies. Thus, verbal evidence which derives so
immediately from an unlawful entry and an unauthorized arrest is no less the 'fruit' of official illegality
than the more common tangible fruits ofthe unwarranted intrusion." See 371 U.S 471,485. ( 1963) .
II
I

I'I

'·
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applied the exclusionary rule to civil forfeiture proceedings because they should be
classified as quasi-criminal proceedings. 636 Thereafter, the Supreme Court started to
narrow its application of the exclusionary rule "by placing ever increasing emphasis
on the rule's deterrent purpose as opposed to other justifications that had been offered
for it, and by balancing its apparent costs against its presumed benefits." 637
For as long as the exclusionary rule has existed, critics have attacked it,
challenge its premises, and disputed its morality. 638 Instead of abolishing the
(

exclusionary rule, the current Supreme Court has chosen to preserve it, but to narrow
its application. 639

The Supreme Court has made a series of decisions with regard to

limitation on the application of the exclusionary rule.

Since Map_p was decided, the
;

exclusionary rule was found inapplicable in a variety of settings.

In almost every

case concerning the scope of the exclusionary rule since Linkletter, 640 the Court has
been guided by considerations of deterrence and has employed a balancing approach
in deciding whether to apply the exclusionary rule. 641
636

637
638

639

In United States v. Calandra,

See 380 U.S. 693 ( 1965) .
See Department of Justice, supra note 603, 599.
See FindLaw, supra note 602.
See William Burnham, supra note 385, 287.

640

In Linkletter v. Walker, the Court decided that Mapp should not be applied retroactively because
retroactivity would not serve the rule's deterrent purpose and would impose significant costs on the
administration ofjustice. See 381 U.S. 618 ( 1965) .
641

Thus, in Alderman v. United States, the Court stressed the deterrence rationale, but indicated that
"the fourth amendment does not mandate every measure that deters illegal searches. Adopting a
balancing approach, the Court concluded that the public interest in having all relevant and probative

I
'
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1

under the same approach, the Supreme Court refused to exclude unlawfully obtained
evidence from grand jury proceedings. 642

The Court held that the exclusionary rule

derives not from a personal constitutional right but comes from a judicial remedy
created principally to deter unlawful police conduct. 643

.,

I

Thus, the Court balanced the

potential injury to the function of the grand jury against the marginal deterrence to be
gained by applying the rule to grand jury proceedings and found that exclusion should
not apply. 644

Using a similar balancing test, in United States v. Havens, the Court

held it is lawful to use illegally obtained evidence to impeach testimony by a criminal
defendant on cross-examination;645 in Stone v. Powell, under this balancing
approach, 646 the Court determined that "the rule does not provide a basis for granting
federal habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner who had ample opportunity to litigate
his Fourth Amendment claim in the state courts."647

Most of these limitations have

evidence submitted to the fact finder outweighed whatever additional deterrence would result from
extending the protection of the exclusionary rule to defendants whose rights had not been violated by
the unlawful search." See Department of Justice, supra note 603, 599.

I

II

642

See 414 U.S. 338 ( 1974) .

643

Id.

644

It held: "The Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence
obtained in violation of its commands, and an examination of its origin and purposes makes clear that
the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure ' [works] no new Fourth Amendment wrong."'
Id., at 454.
645

See 446 U.S. 620 ( 1980) .

646

See 428 U.S. 465 ( 1976) .

647

As the author mentioned: The linchpin of the Leon decision is the Court's analysis of the costs and
benefits of applying the exclusionary rule under the circumstances presented. The "substantial social
costs" cited by the court was the rule's interference with the truth finding functions of judge and jury,
the consequent freeing or unduly lenient treatment of guilty defendants, and the resultant generation of
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been tied to the first reason given in the Map,p case, the deterrence of police
misconduct ignoring that court's concerns with the imperative of judicial integrity.
The result has been that, "unless the application of the rule to a particular kind of case
directly and substantially furthers the policy of deterrence, the rule will not be applied
to bar the evidence involved."

648

Another limitation on the sweep of the exclusionary rule was the Court's

1·.

determination that the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained by

~

private persons.

l,,

In Burdeau v. McDowell, the Court, using a

J

totality-of-the-circumstances test, decided evidence that a private person obtains

I
I

without governmental supervision or encouragement is not subject to the exclusionary
rule 649 because "the exclusionary rule was characterized as a restraint upon the
activities of the sovereign authority and not a limitation uppn other than gov~rnmental
agencies. " 650

disrespect for the law and the administration of justice. With respect to benefits, the Court rejected
the argument that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant would significantly deter errors by
issuing judges and magistrates, and said that, instead, if exclusion of such evidence is to have any
deterrent effect, "it must alter the behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the policies of
their departments." Turning then to situations in which officers have relied on a warrant obtained in
objective good faith, the Court noted "in most such cases, there is no police illegality and thus nothing
to deter... Penalizing the officer for the magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot logically
contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations." Thus, the Court concluded, "the
marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable
reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion."
See 428 U.S. 465 ( 1976) . See Department of Justice, supra note 603, 600.
648

649

650

See William Burnham, supra note 385, 287.
See 256 U.S. 465 ( 1921) .
See Yale Kamisar, Modem Criminal Procedure: cases-comments-questions, 135 (West Group,

•
I

I

I
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3.5.5 The Good Faith Exception
Despite this long pattern of cases contracting the sweep of the exclusionary rule,

'I

it was still true that illegally obtained evidence could not be introduced at trial as part

I

of the prosecutor's case-in-chief against the victim of a Fourth Amendment violation.
Then, in the 1984 case, United States v. Leon, the Burger Court adopted a completely

,,

different approach and created a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 651

I

I

Leon held that:
"Suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only
on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will
further the purposes of the exclusionary rule...

The deterrent purpose of the

exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or
at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some

,, I
I I
I

right.

By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the

courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their future
counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused.

Where the

official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence.

J
I

2002) .
651

See 428 U.S. 897 ( 1984) .
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rationale loses much of its force...

If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to

deter unlawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a search should be

I\

suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge,
or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional
under the Fourth Amendment."

652

Thus, according to this ruling, the exclusionary rule will no longer bar use in the
government's direct case of evidence seized by law enforcement officers who are

,.
I

~

objectively acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant, found to be unsupported
by probable cause, but issued by a detached and neutral magistrate.

653

While the

Court's holding in Leon was limited to searches conducted pursuant to warrants and,
therefore, was not as broad as this language would seem to permit, whether this
passage and other aspects of the Leon decision strongly suggest that the Court may be
inclined to extend the "reasonable good faith" doctrine to warrantless searches as well
is open to speculation.

However, the court's increasing willingness to uphold

warrantless searches as not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment may reduce
the frequency with which the good faith issue arises in the context of the exclusionary
rule.

652
653

654

654

Since the exclusionary rule was mainly developed and devised to deter

See 428 U.S. 897, 918

(

1984 ) .

See 428 U.S. 465 ( 1976) .
See FindLaw, supra note 638.

See also Department of Justice, supra note 603, 600.

.

I.
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police misconduct, as explained in Leon, it is unnecessary to apply the exclusionary
rule if it turns out to have no deterrent effect.

Thus, the so-called good faith

exception was extended to good faith reliance on Constitutionality of a statute655 and
good faith reliance on court maintained computer records. 656

In addition to Leon, on

the basis of the cost-benefit analysis, 657 the Supreme Court decided in INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza that the fruits derivative from illegal searches and seizures by INS
agents are admissible in civil deportation proceedings. 658

Since the exclusionary rule

is held not applicable in the proceedings such as, impeachment of a defendant's trial
testimony at the criminal trial, grand jury testimony, sentencing, parole hearings,
juvenile hearings, and deportation proceedings, a fair guess is that the rule, radically a
judicial mandate, is designed to help professionalize the police; however, it seems
merely a social experiment, and not a guarantee of constitutional safeguards. 659

II
'I

1

I

j~

3.5.6 The Standing to Claim the Exclusionary Rule

I

Although the Supreme Court established the exclusionary rule as a remedy for

6

ss See Illinois v. Krull. 480 U.S. 340 ( 1987) .

6 6

s See Arizona v. Evans. 514 U.S. I (1995) .

6 7

s See Department of Justice, supra note 603, 601.

6 8

s See 468 U.S. 1032 ( 1984) .

6 9

s See Peter Evangelista, The exclusionary rule: why the criminal goes free when the constable
blunders, at htt,p://members.aol.cornlrmhmcj 123/myhomepage/ (last visited, Mar. 18, 2004 ) .
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violation of Constitution, whether a party was the appropriate person to move to
suppress allegedly illegal evidence became another issue.

Long before the Supreme

Court authoritatively resolved this issue, "the lower courts had developed the doctrine
[

that a defendant lacked standing to challenge evidence seized in violation of a third
party's constitutional right." 660

I·

As decided in Jones v. United States, the Supreme

Court for a long term followed a rule of standing by which it determined this issue.

661

Similar to Section Two of Article Three of Constitution, the justiciability principles,
I

~·

which emphasize that one may ordinarily contest only those government actions that
harm him or her, the standing principle in Fourth Amendment cases required of
someone seeking to challenge the legality of a search as the basis for suppressing
relevant evidence that he or she alleges, and if the allegation be disputed that he or she
establishes, that he himself or she herself was the victim of an invasion of privacy. 662
The modem approach of the standing to claim the exclusionary rule is set forth in
the following Supreme Court cases: in Rak:as v. Illinois, the Court held that whether
the challenged search or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment rights of the criminal
defendant who seeks to exclude the evidence obtained during it should be asked in
660

See Yale Kamisar, supra note 650, 749.

661

It held: "the movement must show that he was a victim of search or seizure, one against whom the
search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the use of evidence
gathered as a consequence of search or seizure directed at someone else." See 362 U.S. 257, 261
(1960).
662

See FindLaw, supra note 638.

See also 394 U.S. 165 ( 1969) .

I

I.
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determining whether a party has "standing" 663 to object to a search or a seizure. 664
In Rawlings v. Kentucky, the Court rejected the idea that a claim of ownership of
property seized during a search confers upon the owner the automatic right to
challenge the search; therefore, whether the defendant has legitimate expectation of
privacy became the requirement to confer the so-called standing.

665

In Minnesota v.

Olson, the Court held that overnight guests have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the home of their host since that "staying overnight in another's home is a
long-standing social custom that serves functions recognized as valuable by
society .... We are at our most vulnerable when we are asleep because we cannot
monitor our own safety or the security of our belongings."666

In Minnesota v: Carter,

by a six-to-three vote, the Court decided that the mere presence at another's place
does not constitute sufficient contact with the place to confer Fourth Amendment
standing; one needs more than a casual day-guest status to challenge the illegality of a
search. 667

.

Thus, the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy now seems to displace

"the property-ownership concepts" which previously might have supported either

t

663

Although the Court in this case technically did away with the concept of "standing" as an issue
separate from the general Fourth Amendment inquiry; however, courts, litigants, and commentators
have continued to use this concept See Yale Kamisar, supra note 650, 756.
664

See 439 U.S. 128 ( 1978) .

665

See 448 U.S. 98 (1980) .

666

See 495 U.S. 91 ( 1990) .

667

See 525 U.S. 83 ( 1998) .

1~
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standing to suppress or the establishment of an interest that has been invaded. 668

It is

~
J
II
11

no longer sufficient to allege possession or ownership of seized goods to establish the

h

,,
interest, if a justifiable expectation of privacy of the defendant was not violated in the
•

seizure.

669

li

3.6 Rights of the Accused in American Criminal Process
3.6.1 An Overview
I.

Although the United States Supreme Court has adopted the selective

(

incorporation approach in applying the most important provisions of the Bill of Rights
into state trials, most criminal defendants have not gone to trial regardless of whether
in federal or state court since plea-bargaining as a method of adjudication670 has
existed in the American criminal justice system for a long time. 671

In a sense, trial

by jury has become the residue of a residue handling cases surviving a long filtering

l

,.

1

process. 672

While the prevalence of plea bargaining inevitably has resulted in the

whole collection of procedural rights in affording a only a minority of defendants,

668

See FindLaw, supra note 638.

669

Id.

670

See John H.Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 3, 9 ( 1978) .

671

672

See Gordon Van Kessel, supra note 299, 466.
See Lawrence M. Friedman, supra note 485, 39.
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while depriving the majority, of rights available to the accused in most civilized
countries, 673 it is necessary to examine what rights the accused may invoke or enjoy
during the criminal procedure process.

The necessity arises not only because those

rights declared by the United States Supreme Court come from the accusatorial and
adversarial traditions, but also because they represent a model of fairness as the
holding in Robinson v. California, provides:
"We cannot but consider the statute before us as of the same category.

In this

Court counsel for the State recognized that narcotic addiction is an illness.
Indeed, it is apparently an illness which may be contracted innocently or
involuntarily.

We hold that a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as

a criminal, even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the State or
been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

To be sure,

imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either
cruel or unusual.

But the question cannot be considered in the abstract.

Even

one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of
having a common cold. " 674

673

See Thomas Weigend, Continental Cures for American Ailments: European Criminat ·Procedure as
A Model for Law Reform, in Norval Morris et al., eds., Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of
Research, 421 (University of Chicago Press, 1980) .
674

See 370 U.S. 660, 667( 1962 ).

See also Rights of the Accused, supra note 482.( As noted, "Rights
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Unlike civil law countries, police officers in the United States are not required to
investigate crimes under direct supervision of a public prosecutor, although a local
prosecutor is often considered the chief law enforcement officer of the county.

675

r.

Police officers are allowed to investigate crimes by questioning or interrogating a
suspect, interviewing witnesses and examining physical evidence.

Nonetheless, the

most powerful and fruitful methods employed to investigate crimes are searches and
seizures.

Because most police officers are non-law-trained professionals, and not

criminal procedure experts, their investigatory methods are sometimes held to invade
a suspects' constitutional rights, though there may be no intent to do so.

In this

\.

section, corresponding to Taiwan's legal reforms in its Criminal Procedure Code
before 2003, this study will review what concerns are principally required and what
rights are currently recognized by the Supreme Court before the end of the first
instance during criminal procedure in the United States.

3.6.2 Pre-Arrest Investigation
Usually police officers are in charge of pre-arrest investigation, however, in some
in American history are not designed to free the individual from community norms; rather, they exist to
promote a responsible liberty, to allow each and every one to be free from arbitrary power. Regarding
the rights of the accused, the basic outlines of due process are spelled out in the Constitution, and their
specifics have been refined in local, state, and federal courtrooms for more than two centuries. Many
of these questions seem to deal with minute, some would even say mundane, details of procedure.")
675

In general, local prosecutors have no direct regulatory authority over the various police departments
operating within their jurisdiction. See Yale Kamisar, Modem Criminal Procedure, 11 ( West, 1994) .
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cases including public corruption, misuse of economic power, and widespread
distribution of illegal services and goods, public prosecutors are responsible for
conducting pre-arrest investigation via grand jury. 676

Regardless of who are in

charge of pre-arrest investigation, there are some United States Supreme Court
decisions concerning procedures police officers have to obey in order to avoid
violating constitutional protections.

3 .6.2.1 Questioning a Suspect
While on duty, and without any violation of the Fourth Amendment, police
officers are empowered to stop and question a person they suspect of having .
committed a crime.

This is the policy, even though it might constitute temporary

real detention of the suspect; however, as held in Florida v. Royer, suspects
questioned are not required to answer any question. 677

676

See John H. Israel, Criminal Procedure and the Constitution, 405 (West, 1994). ("The advantage of
the grand jury as an investigative body is its subpoena authority to compel the production of testimony
( ad testification) and physical evidence( duces tecum). While police officers are generally required
to show probable cause to obtain a warrant for getting physical evidence, the subpoena 'duces tecum'
can be issued by the grand jury without showing probable cause. In addition, the grand jury is also
allowed to issue a subpoena for the production oftestiminy without probable cause. Anyone who
appears in front of the grand jury is required to present evidence under oath." )
677

!

"

The Court noted that: "law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely
approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to
answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in
evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions. Nor would the fact that
the officer identifies himself as a police officer, without more, convert the encounter into a seizure
requiring some level of objective justification. The person approached, however, need not answer any
question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way.
He may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his
refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds. If there is no detention -- no
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment-- then no constitutional rights have been
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3.6.2.2 Frisk
In Terrv v. Ohio, the Court ruled that after stopping the suspect, to protect
themselves and the public, police officers may conduct a carefully limited search of
the suspect's outer clothing to search for weapons. 678

I

I

3 .6.2.3 Warrant Requirement for Search
f
As established in Agnello v. United States, the Court declared that, "the search of

infringed." See 460 U.S. 491, 497 ( 1983) .
678

The Court mentioned that: "Applying these principles to this case, we consider first the nature and
extent of the governmental interests involved. One general interest is of course that of effective crime
prevention and detection; it is this interest which underlies the recognition that a police officer may in
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of
investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. It
was this legitimate investigative function Officer McFadden was discharging when he decided to
approach petitioner and his companions. He had observed Terry, Chilton, and Katz go through a
series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but which taken together warranted further
investigation. There is nothing unusual in two men standing together on a street comer, perhaps
waiting for someone. Nor is there anything suspicious about people in such circumstances strolling
up and down the street, singly or in pairs. Store windows, moreover, are made to be looked in. But
the story is quite different where, as here, two men hover about a street comer for an extended period
of time, at the end of which it becomes apparent that they are not waiting for anyone or anything;
where these men pace alternately along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window
roughly 24 times; where each completion of this route is followed immediately by a conference
between the two men on the comer; where they are joined in one of these conferences by a third man
who leaves swiftly; and where the two men finally follow the third and rejoin him a couple of blocks
away. It would have been poor police work indeed for an officer of 30 years' experience in the
detection of thievery from stores in this same neighborhood to have failed to investigate this behavior
further. The crux of this case, however, is not the propriety of Officer McFadden's taking steps to
investigate petitioner's suspicious behavior, but rather, whether there was justification for McFadden's
invasion of Terry's personal security by searching him for weapons in the course of that investigation.
We are now concerned with more than the governmental interest in investigating crime; in addition,
there is the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against him. Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary
risks in the performance of their duties. American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence,
and every year in this country many law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and
thousands more are wounded. VIrtually all of these deaths and a substantial portion of the injuries are
inflicted with guns and knives." See 392 U.S. 1, 22-4 ( 1968) .

J
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a private dwelling without a warrant is in itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our
laws." 679

Police officers must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial

approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure; however, in most
instances failure to comply with the warrant requirement can only be excused by
exigent circumstances. 680

As noted in McDonald v. United States the exigencies of

the situation, in which the officers were in pursuit of a suspected armed felon hiding
in the house which he had entered only minutes before they arrived, permitted their
warrantless entry and search. 681 The Court ruled in Warden v. Hayden that "the
Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an
investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others."682
In Preston v. United States the Court held that:
"Unquestionably, when a person is lawfully arrested, the police have the right,
without a search warrant, to make a contemporaneous search of the person of the
accused for weapons or for the fruits of or implements used to commit the crime.
This right to search and seize without a search warrant extends to things under the
679

See 269 U.S. 20, 29 ( 1925); Katz y. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89
(1964); and Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
680

See 392 U.S., 20.

681

See 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948) .

682

The Cout also noted that: "Speed here was essential, and only a thorough search of the house for
persons and weapons could have insured that Hayden was the only man present and that the police had
control of all weapons which could be used against them or to effect an escape." See 3 87 U.S. 294,
298 ( 1967) .

1

I

I
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accused's immediate control, and, to an extent depending on the circumstances of
the case, to the place where he is arrested.

The rule allowing contemporaneous

searches is justified, for example, by the need to seize weapons and other things
which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the
need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime -- things which mi~t

rI

easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on the accused's person or under
his immediate control. " 683
Moreover, in United States v. Robinson, the Court recognizing that a search incident

I

to a lawful arrest has traditionally been an exception to the warrant requirement so
that a search warrant under these circumstances is generally not necessary. 684

In

Chimel v. California, the Court held it reasonable for an arresting officer to search
both the person arrested and the immediate area in which the arrest took place. 685

In

California v. Carney, the Court ruled that a search warrant is not required to search a
vehicle if the searching police have probable cause to do so. 686

In Maryland v. Buie,

the Court stated that police officers are allowed to make a protective sweep without a

\

'
I
I

683

In addition, these justifications are absent where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest.
Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant,
is simply not incident to the arrest. See 376 U.S. 364, 367 ( 1964) .
684

See 414 U.S. 218 ( 1963) .

685

See 395 U.S. 752 (1969) .

686

See 471 U.S. 386 ( 1985) .
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search warrant while they are lawfully inside premises for the purpose of making an
arrest. 687

As already being mentioned in last section, in Mapp v. Ohio, the Court

declared that any evidence obtained through searches and seizures in violation of the
Fourth Amendment would be excluded from both federal and state trials. 688

3.6.2.4 Electronic Surveillance
While an ordinary search includes physical entrance into the area occupied by
someone, whether attaching an electronic listening and recording device to the outside
of the telephone booth from which the calls were made constituted a search under the
Fourth Amendment became controversial since FBI agents had started using this
method to get information.

In Katz v. United States, the Court ruled that the Fourth

Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures should apply to
electronic surveillance since the Fourth Amendment protection extended to persons,
not places. 689

Therefore, warrants are required if law enforcement officers seek to

place the suspect under electronic surveillance.

687

See 494 U.S. 325 ( 1990) .

688

See 367 U.S. 643 ( 1961) .

689

The Court mentioned that: "For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected." See 389 U.S. 347,351 ( 1967) .
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3.6.3 Arrest
3.6.3.1 Warrant Arrest
Under some circumstances, police officers are required to obtain an arrest
warrant from the judicial branch before starting to arrest. 690

As held in United States

v. Ventresca, law enforcement officers may find it wise to seek arrest warrants where
practicable to do so, and their judgments about probable cause may be more readily
accepted where backed by a warrant issued by a magistrate. 691
to this principle are often seen in real practice.

However, exceptions

Thus, the circumstances under which

warrantless arrests are allowed have become more important than the requirements
needed for the issuance of the warrant.

3.6.3 .2 Warrantless Arrest
Generally, warrantless arrests are constitutional if a police officer has a

\
I

I

reasonable belief the arrestee has committed a felony.

692

In United States v. Watson,

~~·
I

,\ .
690

See Yale Kamisar, supra note 675, 21.

691

See 380 U.S. 102, 106 ( 1965) .

\\

692

In Rohan v. Sawin. a false arrest case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that given
probable cause to arrest, "the authority of a constable, to arrest without warrant, in cases of felony, is
most fully established by the elementary books, and adjudicated cases .... It has been sometimes
contended, that an arrest of this character, without a warrant, was a violation of the great fun~amental
principles of our national and state constitutions, forbidding unreasonable searches and arrests, except
by warrant founded upon a complaint made under oath. Those provisions doubtless had another and
different purpose, being in restraint of general warrants to make searches, and requiring warrants to
issue only upon a complaint made under oath. They do not conflict with the authority of constables or
other peace officers, or private persons under proper limitations, to arrest without warrant those who
have committed felonies. The public safety, and the due apprehension of criminals, charged with
heinous offences, imperiously require that such arrests should be made without warrant by officers of

~..l:

~~l (:

I
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the Court approved the post officers' warrantless arrest "because there was probable
cause in this case to believe that Watson had violated § 1708, the inspector and his
subordinates, in arresting Watson, were acting strictly in accordance with the
governing statute and regulations."693

"To implement the Fourth Amendment's

protection against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, as held in Gerstein v.
Riverside, the Court has required that the existence of probable cause be decided by a
neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible." 694

For instance, in County of

Riverside v. McLaughlin, the Court ruled that judicial determinations of probable
cause for warrantless arrests within forty-eight hours generally would not violate the
promptness requirement of Fourth Amendment as set in Gerstein. 695

3.6.4 Interrogation after Arrest

the law." See 59 Mass. 281, 284-5 (1850).
693

Thus, "the effect of the judgment of the Court of Appeals was to invalidate the statute as applied in
this case and as applied to all the situations where a court fails to find exigent circumstances justifying
a warrantless arrest The Court declined to transform this judicial preference into a constitutional rule
when the judgment of the Nation and Congress has for so long been to authorize warrantless public
arrests on probable cause rather than to encumber criminal prosecutions with endless litigation with
respect to the existence of exigent circumstances, whether it was practicable to get a warrant, whether
the suspect was about to flee, and the like." See 423 U.S. 411,415 ( 1976) .
694

695

See 420 U.S. 103, 112 (1975) .

The Court ruled that: "Although we hesitate to announce that the Constitution compels a specific
time limit, it is important to provide some degree of certainty so that States and counties may establish
procedures with confidence that they fall within constitutional bounds. Taking into account the
competing interests articulated in Gerstein. we believe that a jurisdiction that provides judicial
determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the
promptness requirement of Gerstein. For this reason, such jurisdictions will be immune from
systemic challenges." See 500 U.S. 44, 63 ( 1991) .

' I
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3.6.4.1 Right against Self-Incrimination
While the Court in Malloy v. Hogan ruled that the right against
self-incrimination should be an essential part of due process, 696 it reversed Twining v.
New Jersey.

By explicitly recognizing the theory of selective incorporation in

justification of its decision, Twining determined that the right against
self-incrimination should be only a valued rule of evidence bec~use #ghts embodied
in the due process clause were merely similar to the guarantees of the first eight
amendments; 697 recall that rights found to be incorporated in the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment were identical to corresponding guarantees

of~e

Bill

of Rights. 698

3 .6.4.2 Right to Retain Counsel

In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court answered the question left by Powell v.
Alabama of whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel would extend to
non-capital cases.

The Court held that everyone accused of a crime is entitled to a

696

The Court ruled that: "It would be incongruous to have different standards determine the validity of
a claim of privilege based on the same feared prosecution, depending on whether the claim was
asserted in a state or federal court. Therefore, the same standards must determine whether an
accused's silence in either a federal or state proceeding is justified." See 378 U.S. I, 11 (1964) .
697

698

See 211 U.S. 78 ( 1908) .
See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 118.
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lawyer at trial, regardless of whether federal or state jurisdiction was involved. 699

In

addition, Gideon abandoned the so-called fair trial approach employed by Betts v.
Brady in determining whether a particular provision of the Bill of Rights would apply
to state trials. 700

With confessions resulting from police questioning after ignoring

the suspect's request for an attorney, the Court in Escobedo v. Illinois declared:
"We hold that, therefore, where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the
suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of
interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the su5pect
has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the
police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to
remain silent, the accused has been denied 'the Assistance of Counsel' in
violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as 'made obligatory upon
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, and that no statement elicited by the
police during the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial ....
Nothing we have said today affects the powers of the police to investigate 'an

699

700

i

1

See 372 U.S. 335 ( 1963) .

The Court ruled that: "We accept Betts v. Brady's assumption, based as it was on our prior cases,
that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is 'fundamental and essential to a fair trial' is made
obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment We think the Court in Betts was wrong,
however, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not one of these
fundamental rights." Id., at 342.
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unsolved crime,' by gathering information from witnesses and by other 'proper
investigative efforts.'

We hold only that when the process shifts from

investigatory to accusatory -- when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is
to elicit a confession -- our adversary system begins to operate, and, under the
circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer." 701 .

In addition, in Coleman v. Alabama, the Court ruled that due process requires the

I

\

l

government to provide the defendant the right to an attorney at the preliminary
hearing and that an indigent defendant has a right to retain a free attomey702 because
what happens at the preliminary hearing would eventually affect the defendant's
rights at trial. 703
: I

~

I

i I

3.6.4.3 Miranda Rights

I~

If the suspect is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
I

action in any significant way by law enforcement officers, the Court in Miranda v.
Arizona held that:
"Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
701

702

703

See 378 U.S. 478,490-2 ( 1964) .
See 399 U.S. 1 (1970) .
See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 279.

IIt·
I
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that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.
The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.

If, however, he indicates in any

manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney
before speaking there can be no questioning.

Likewise, if the individual is alone

and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police
may not question him.

The mere fact that he may have answered some questions

or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to
refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an
attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned."704
According to this decision, if the person being interrogated at any time indicates that
he or she wants to remain silent, the interrogation must cease; if he or she expresses
that he or she wants the assistance of an attorney, the interrogation also has to cease
until an attorney is present.
Moreover, regarding whether the suspect has invoked his Miranda rights in
custodial interrogation, as the Court held in Davis v. United States, invocation of
Miranda rights must be as clear as unequivocal and unambiguous. 705

704

705

Any violation

See 384 U.S. 436, 444 ( 1966) .

The Court noted that: "Of course, when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal statement it
will often be good police practice for the interviewing officers to cllirify whether or not he actually
wants an attorney. That was the procedure followed by the NIS agents in this case. Clarifying
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of Miranda requirements will yield confessions inadmissible into evidence.

706

3.6.5 Booking and Line-up
In general, booking directed to the relative administrative procedure
accompanying the arrest includes fingerprinting, photographing, interrogating and
placing in a lineup for identification conducted by police officers. 707

After booking,

a higher ranking police officer will decide whether or not to charge the suspect who

has been arrested without an arrest warrant. 708

The Court in Gilbert v. California

held that "a post-indictment pretrial lineup at which the accused is exhibited to
identifying witnesses is a critical stage of the criminal prosecution and that police
conducting such a lineup without notice to, and in the absence of his counsel denies
the accused his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and calls into question the

questions help protect the rights of the suspect by ensuring that he gets an attorney if he wants one, and
will minimize the chance of a confession being suppressed due to subsequent judicial second-guessing
as to the meaning of the suspect's statement regarding counsel. But we decline to adopt a rule
requiring officers to ask clarifying questions. If the suspect's statement is not an unambiguous or
unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him. To
recapitulate: We held in Miranda that a suspect is entitled to the assistance of counsel during custodial
interrogation even though the Constitution does not provide for such assistance. We held in Edwards
that if the suspect invokes the right to counsel at any time, the police must immediately cease
questioning him until an attorney is present But we are unwilling to create a third layer of
prophylaxis to prevent police questioning when the suspect might want a lawyer. Unless the suspect
actually requests an attorney, questioning may continue." See 512 U.S. 452,461-2 ( 1994) .
706

See Burt Neuborne, An Overview of the Bill of Rights, in Alan B. Morrison eds., Fundamentals of
American Law, 108 (Oxford University Press, 1996) .
707

708

See George F. Cole, Criminal Justice in America, 39 (New York Wadsworth Publishing, 1996) .

The higher-ranked police officer may decide not to press charges against the suspect and release
him either there is insufficient evidence or because there exists some policy reasons. See Yale
Kamisar, supra note 675, 23.

~
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admissibility at trial of the in-court identifications of the accused by witnesses who
attended the lineup." 709

Whether this exclusionary approach set out by Gilbert

would apply to "identification testimony based upon a police station show up that
took place before the defendant had been indicted or otherwise formally charged with
any criminal offense" still requires to be resolved.

Based upon Simmons v. United

States, "an accused is entitled to counsel at any critical stage of the prosecution, and
that a post-indictment lineup is such a critical stage." 710

The Court in Kirby v.

lllinois declined to "import into a routine police investigation an absolute
constitutional guarantee historically and rationally applicable only after the onset of
formal prosecutorial proceedings." 711

As held in United States v. Ash. "the Sixth ·

Amendment does not grant the right to counsel at photographic displays conducted by
the Government for the purpose of allowing a witness to identify the offender." 712
Thus, the exclusionary rule declared by Simmons does not apply to any identification
taking place before the commencement of a prosecution.

In addition, since "a

lawyer could see any unfairness at a lineup, question the witnesses about it at trial,
and effectively reconstruct what had gone on for the benefit of the jury or trial

709

See 388 U.S. 263,272 ( 1967) .

710

See 390 U.S. 377, 382, 383 ( 1968) .

711

See 406 U.S. 682,690 (1972) .

712

See 413 U.S. 300, 321 ( 1973) .
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judge,"713 "counsel was required at a lineup, primarily as an observer, to ensure that
defense counsel could effectively confront the prosecution's evidence at trial." 714

f

In

other words, the Court extended the right to counsel to suspects in a police lineup
rather than at photographic displays.

3.6.6 Detention
When police officers arrest a suspect and hold him for trial on information,
whether he is entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause for his detention
becomes controversial.

In Gerstein v. Pugh, the Court concluded that the Fourth

Amendtnent protects people from unreasonable arrest and detention.

715

Though it

also recognized that the Constitution requires no adversary determination of probable
cause and that state systems of criminal procedure vary widely, the Court required
state governments to provide the suspect judicial review to determine whether there

713

Id., at 324.

714

The Court reasoned that: "A photographic identification is quite different from a lineup, for there
are substantially fewer possibilities of impermissible suggestion when photographs are used, and those
unfair influences can be readily reconstructed at trial. It is true that the defendant's photograph may
be markedly different from the others displayed, but this unfairness can be demonstrated at trial from
an actual comparison of the photographs used or from the witness' description of the display.
Similarly, it is possible that the photographs could be arranged in a suggestive manner, or that by
comment or gesture the prosecuting authorities might single out the defendant's picture. But these are
the kinds of overt influence that a witness can easily recount and that would serve to impeach the
identification testimony. In short, there are few possibilities for unfair suggestiveness - and those
rather blatant and easily reconstructed. Accordingly, an accused would not be foreclosed from an
effective cross-examination of an identification witness simply because his counsel was not present at
the photographic display. For this reason, a photographic display cannot fairly be considered a critical
stage of the prosecution." Id
715

See 420 U.S. 103 ( 1975) .

I.
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existed probable cause to detain the arrestee once he was in custody. 716

234

On the other

hand, if there was an arrest warrant, this process of deciding whether there existed
probable cause to arrest, as declared in Gerstein, becomes unnecessary. 717

I'

3 .6. 7 Arraignment and Preliminary Hearing
During the next step of arraignment on the complaint, the defendant for the first
time appears in court, at which time the court will inform him of his rights and the

716

717

Id., at 111-5.

The Court declared that: "Both the standards and procedures for arrest and detention have been
derived from the Fourth Amendment and its common-law antecedents. The standard for arrest is
probable cause, defined in terms of facts and circumstances 'sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.' ... Maximum protection of
individual rights could be assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual justification prior to
any arrest, but such a requirement would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate law
enforcement Thus, while the Court has expressed a preference for the use of arrest warrants when
feasible, it has never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the officers
failed to secure a warrant Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-the-scene assessment
of probable cause provides legal justification for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for a brief
period of detention to take the administrative steps incident to arrest Once the suspect is in custody,
however, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate. There
no longer is any danger that the suspect will escape or commit further crimes while the police submit
their evidence to a magistrate. And, while the State's reasons for taking summary action subside, the
suspect's need for a neutral determination of probable cause increases significantly. The
consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest.
Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his
family relationships. Even pretrial release may be accompanied by burdensome conditions that effect
a significant restraint of liberty. When the stakes are this high, the detached judgment of a neutral
magistrate is essential if the Fourth Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from unfounded
interference with liberty. Accordingly, we hold that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial
determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.
This result has historical support in the common law that has guided interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment At common law it was customary, if not obligatory, for an arrested person to be brought
before a justice ofthe peace shortly after arrest. The justice ofthe peace would 'examine' the
prisoner and the witnesses to determine whether there was reason to believe the prisoner had
committed a crime. If there was, the suspect would be committed to jail or bailed pending trial. If
not, he would be discharged from custody. The initial determination of probable cause also could be
reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus. This practice furnished the model for'criminal
procedure in America immediately following the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, and there are
indications that the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it as a model for a 'reasonable' seizure."
Id., at 123.
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At arraignment, the judge will set bail.

Setting bail means

the magistrate will have to determine the conditions the defendant will have to meet in
order to gain release from custody pending trial. 719

After reviewing the case, the

judge will schedule a date for trying a misdemeanor offense, or a date for the
preliminary hearing of a felony offense. 720

The Court in Coleman v. Alabama

reasoned that since important trial rights are at stake at the preliminary hearing, the
preliminary hearing is a critical stage in the prosecution of a criminal defendant. 721
However, since there is no federal constitutional right to a preliminary hearing,
whether a preliminary hearing will be held depends on the applicable federal law or
the conStitution of the state where the matter is being heard. 722

In a sense, the

,.
I'

718

Many jurisdictions impose a 24 hour limit on pre-appearance detention while the others permit it up
to 48 hours. See John H. Israel, supra note 676, 9.
719

See George F. Cole, supra note 707, 39.

Id. In setting bail, ~e magistrate is subject to the Eighth Amendment which provides that
excessive bail shall not be required. Most jurisdictions allow the defendant to obtain his release by
depositing with the court ten percent of the bond set by the magistrate. See James B. Jacobs, Criminal
Law, Criminal Procedure, and Criminal Justice, in Alan B. Morrison eds., Fundamentals of American
Law, 295, 311 (Oxford University Press, 1996) .
720

721

The Court ruled that: "Plainly the guiding hand of counsel at the preliminary hearing is essential to
protect the indigent accused against an erroneous or improper prosecution. First, the lawyer's skilled
examination of witnesses may expose fatal weakness in the State's case that may lead the magistrate to
refuse to bind the accused over. Second, in any event, the skilled interrogation of witnesses by an
experienced lawyer can fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examination of the State's
witnesses at trial. Third, trained counsel can more effectively discover the case the state has against
his client and make possible the preparation of a proper defense to meet that case at the trial. Fourth,
counsel can also be influential at the preliminary hearing in making effective arguments for the accused
on such matters as the necessity for an early psychiatric examination or bail." See 399 U.S. 1, 8
(1970) .
722

See Christopher Osakwe, The Bill of Rights for the Criminal Defendant in the American Law, in J.
A. Andrews eds., Human Rights in Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 270 (Hague Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 1982) .

!
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preliminary hearing and the grand jury are mainly employed to "prevent hasty and
malicious prosecutions, to protect persons from being humiliated in public, and to
discover whether substantial grounds exist for a prosecution."723
During the preliminary hearing, in addition to deciding whether the felony
'

II

charges are supported by sufficient evidence and probable cause, and true to the
adversarial nature of the common law court, 724 judge has to allow the defendant and
defense counsel to cross-examine the prosecutor's witnesses and to introduce defense
evidence. 725

If no probable cause is found, the case ends. 726

On the contr~, if

probable cause is found, the case goes to either the grand jury or the trial court; which
court depends on whether that jurisdiction requires grand jury review. 727

When-there

is no requirement of grand jury review, the case goes to the trial court, where the
defendant is then arraigned. 728

In addition to being informed of charges, the

defendant may answer the charges by pleading nolo contendere in the federal judicial
system, 729 and either guilty, not guilty, or nolo contendere in other jurisdictions. 730

723

See George F. Cole, supra note 707, 40.

724

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 279.

725

See Yale Kamisar, supra note 675, 29.

726

Id., at 28.

727

Id., at 29.

728

See John H. Israel, supra note 676, 11.

729

See Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (b) .

730

See Yale Kamisar, supra note 675, 30.
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With a plea of guilt, or nolo contendere accepted as knowingly and voluntarily
made,

731

the case will be set for sentencing.

732

I
On the other hand, with a not guilty

I

plea, the defendant will receive a jury trial or a bench trial, which depends upon if the
defendant waives his or her right to a jury trial. 733

Before trial, defendants ~d their

attorneys are entitled to "discover" the evidence relevant to guilt or sentencing the
prosecutor may possess per the rule declared in United States v. Bagley. 734
Moreover, either party may present pretrial challenges to bar evidence, being
submitted by the opposing party, that the objecting party believes violates the rules of

1. .,

''I

I

The admissibility of the

I

challertged evidence will be decided by the trial judge before the real trial starts. 736

.I

evidence, or infringes upon some constitutional right. 735

3.6.8 Grand Jury Indictment
The modem grand jury evolved from the English grand jury of the twelfth
century that had been originally designed to uncover crimes, but became a shield or

731

See Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (d) .

732

Usually the defendant will get a reduction of the charges from the prosecutor if be pleads guilty or
nolo contendere. See Yale Kamisar, supra note 675, 30.

733

ld.

734

See 473 U.S. 667 ( 1985) .

73

s See James B. Jacobs, supra note 720, 314.

736

See Yale Kamisar, supra note 675, 29.
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buffer between the government and citizens. 737 As held in Wood v. Georgi~
"historically, this body has been regarded as a primary security to the innocent against
hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in our
society of standing between the accuser and the accused, whether the latter be an
individual, minority group, or other, to determine whether a charge is founded upon
reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill wil1." 738
Although the grand jury has deep historical roots, by the middle of the nineteenth
century the prevailing opinion in the United States was that it was too awkward and
ineffective for routine use. 739 Hence, in 1859, Michigan became the first jurisdiction
to allow charges to be reviewed at a preliminary hearing as an alternative to grand
jury indictment. 740

The Michigan precedent resulted in more than half of the

American jurisdictions adopting this institution. 741

In Hurtado v. California, the

court held that a grand jury indictment in criminal cases applied only to federal
prosecutions 742 in that a defendant is treated no less fairly if the evidence is screened

737

Later this specialized jury became part of the Fifth Amendment
supra note 300, 271.
731

See 370 U.S. 375, 390 ( 1962) .

739

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 278.

740

Id.

741

Id.

742

See 110 U.S. 516 ( 1884).

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury,
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by a judge than by a group of laypersons. 743

The court further stated that the right to

indictment by grand jury had become one of the few rights, in the Bill of Rights, that
do not apply to state criminal procedures. 744

As a result, if a jurisdiction requires

grand jury review, after the preliminary hearing, the case goes to the Grand Jury,
I I
I

which hears the prosecutor's evidence in secret, without the defendant's presence. 745

3.6.9 Fair Trial
Although a defendant may waive the right to trial by jury and receive a bench
trial, in Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court rejected the right of a state to withhold jury
trial for defendants charged with serious offenses since the Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury is fundamenta1. 746

While the federal government is required to impanel

a twelve-member criminal jury to comply with the Sixth Amendment protection of

I.
I

trial by jury, 747 the Court in Williams v. Florida held that a state criminal jury of six
members does not violate the Sixth Amendment; 748

743

However, in Ballew v. Georgia

Today, many observers even believe that the preliminary hearing is more protective of the
defendant than the grand jury. See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 278.
744
74

See James B. Jacobs, supra note 720, 312.

s See Yale Kamisar, supra note 675, 29.

746

747

748

See 391 U.S 145 (1968) .
See James B. Jacobs, supra note 720, 317.
See 399 U.S. 78

(

1970 ) .

I
I

,l

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

240

II
the Court ruled a jury consisting of only five members would deprive the defendant of
his Sixth Amendment protection. 749

Moreover, in the case of Washington v.Texas,

the Court struck down a part of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure that prohibited

.I

criminal codefendants from testifying on behalf of one another but allowed the state

'

to call a codefendant as a prosecution witness. 750

In Klopfer v. North Carolina, the

Court determined that North Carolina's refusal to prosecute a criminal indictment
against a civil rights advocate kept the defendant in legal limbo and violated the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of speedy trial. 751
The Sixth Amendment provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."

Hence, .in

Pointer v. Texas, the Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment right of an accused to
confront the witness against him is also a fundamental right and is made obligatory on
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. 752

Under the confrontation clause, as well

as the adversarial and accusatorial trial structure, generally speaking, a party is
entitled to cross-examine witnesses and expert witnesses presented by the opposing
party.

Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible at trial unless it falls within the

749

See 435 U.S. 223 ( 1978) .

750

See 388 U.S. 14 ( 1967) .

751

See386U.S.213 (1967).

752

See 380 U.S. 400 ( 1965) .
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scope of hearsay exceptions.
the confrontation clause?

However, just what will justify a hearsay exception to

To what extent does the confrontation clause protect?

In

I
I

I

the next chapter, this study will examine this evidential issue so that a comparative
analysis on the hearsay rules of Taiwan and the United States will be more grounded.

I~
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!;:hapter Four: Evidence Law Under the Confrontation Clause
4.1 Introduction
Through the ages, man has sought fair methods of reaching the truth in criminal
cases because every tribe and every people devised a system for protecting the lives
and property of its citizens. 1 Whenever there is a dispute, whether in a civil or a
criminal case, the task of the trial court is to unravel and identify the relevant facts in
the case, and then resolve the dispute for the parties by applying the appropriate legal
principles to those facts?

During the dispute-resolving process, every fact-finder

must explore what happened in the past.

The process employed to prove what has

been alleged is more important for an accuser in a criminal case because usually, he
must prove his case. 3
In common parlance, justice means a fair, equitable, or morally correct result
wherever it occurs. 4

However, logically assuming that the purpose of the trial is to

seek the truth, any lay observer of an American criminal trial is often confused and

1

See John C. Klotter, Criminal Evidence, 1-2 (Ohio Anderson Publishing, I992) .

2

See Penny Darbyshire, Eddey on the English Legal System, I 07 (London Sweet & Maxwell, 1992) .

3

See John C. Klotter, supra note 753, 3. ("Under the early Mesopotamin system, the king was the
fountain of justice, receiving the law from divine guidance. But under King Hammurabi,
approximately 2100 B.C., the administration of justice passed from the hands of the royal priests to a
body of royal secular judges sitting at the great gate and marketplace of the city. A record of the trials
of this period indicates that the judges called upon the accusers to "produce witnesses or instruments to
show guilt." The judges then examined the facts and reached a conclusion as to guilt or innocence.
This perhaps was the origin of the modem use of testimony and real evidence.")
4

See Roger C. Park, David P. Leonard and Steven H. Goldberg, Evidence Law: A Student's Guide to
the Law of Evidence as Applied in American Trials, I ( West, I998 ) .
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bewildered by the proceedings. 5
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The observer will see many objections to the

'•
introduction of apparently relevant evidence and other evidence that could have a
direct bearing on the case, being excluded at the trial.

6

This phenomenon implies

that resolving issues of law is usually the least important aspect of adjudicating
disputes because the facts must be determined before the law can be applied to the
8

facts. 7 The main work of a legal system is deciding matters of past facts and
achieving justice.

Nonetheless, with a belief that no after-the-fact determination

could produce the real and verifiable truth, the adversary justice achieved in the
common law trial is something a little different from that of the common parlance
because it might not mirror what actually happened in the past. 9
As Professor Mhjan Damaska has stated, "You cannot decide which facts matter
unless you have already selected, at least tentatively, applicable decisional

5

See John C. Klotter, supra note 753, 1.

6

Id.

7

See William Burnham, supra note 385, 77.

8

9

• I

I

I

See John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence, 96 Colum. L. Rev. ·1168, 1168
(1996) .

However, it is believed that most of the results from adversarial trials will be fair, equitable, morally
correct, and reflective of the events that actually occurred, and that the adversary process is the fairest
way to resolve disputes. In criminal trials, for example, justice does not depend upon the
decision-maker's best estimate of what happened, but rather, upon the decision-maker's extraordinary
certainty--- proof beyond a reasonable doubt-- that the defendant did what the prosecution claims.
If the decision-maker believes it is more likely than not that the defendant did the crime, but it has
reasonable doubts, the defendant is found not guilty and is not punished. See Roger C. Park, supra
note 756, 2.
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standards." 10

There is a general belief that people tend to judge too swiftly in terms

of the familiar that which is not yet fully known, 11 and that an investigator can not

I

I,

II
possibly determine what questions to ask, or what direction to take the investigation
without first assessing the meaning of the information that is already known.

r.

12

Hence, proponents of an adversary system insist that the only way to avoid the
skewing effects of the investigative role is to take the responsibility for investigation
away from the decision-maker and give it to the parties themselves.

13

The medieval

system of self-informing juries could hardly have any place for a law of evidence. 14
In contrast to modern procedure, medieval jurors were first left to their own discretion
in the use of evidence and were allowed to go among the people in the community
and ask for information outside of court. 15

During the Tudor and Stuart eras,

10

See Mirjan Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1083,
1087 ( 1975) .
11

See Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 382 ( 1978) .

12

See William Burnham, supra note 385, 78-9.

13

Id.

14

See John H. Langbein, supra note 760, 1170. ("In an age of tiny, intensely interdependent
agricultural communities, jurors were drawn from the neighborhood of the contested events. The
hope was that a jury of the locality would contain witness-like persons who would know the facts, or if
not, that these jurors would be well positioned to investigate the facts on their own. The early jury
was self-informj.ng. No instructional trial was held to inform its verdict. If the jurors thought they
needed more information, they obtained it 'by consulting informed persons not called into court.' The
medieval jury came to court not to listen but to speak, not to hear evidence but to deliver a verdict
formulated in advance. The court accepted this 'rough verdict,' as Maitland described it, 'without
caring to investigate the logical processes, if logical they were, of which that verdict was the_
outcome.'" )
15

In fact, medieval jurors were forbidden to call in outside witnesses and the prospective medieval
jurors would be excused if they were ignorant of the facts of the case. See John C. Klotter, supra note
753, 7. ("Following the Norman Conquest, the Norman judges organized the jury to assist in their
investigation. However, jurors were not selected as unbiased triers of fact, as is the practice today, but

l
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initially few evidence rules were utilized to control the presentation of proof at trial. 16
However, toward the end of the Middle Ages, the trial jury underwent its epochal
transformation from active neighborhood investigators to passive triers of fact
requiring a courtroom instructional proceeding at which outside witnesses could
inform them. 17
While there came the need for a passive decision-maker, under the adversarial
approach, there emerged another need for rules on fairly regulating presentations of
the evidence.

In a sense the law of evidence assists the court toward this goal by

establishing rules about the means by which the facts of a case are to be presented to
the court. 18

Derivative from the English common law tradition, as a result, the

American trial is the theoretical centerpiece of adversary justice where the parties
control the gathering, preparation, and presentation of information for decision by a
relatively passive neutral body. 19

As a consequence, the great chasm that separates

the modem Continental legal systems from the Anglo-American systems is largely

were selected because they had knowledge of the case. An ordinance of Henry II in the twelfth
century provided that a certain number of jurors should be selected in criminal cases; it specified that
jurors be knights.")
16

See John H. Langbein, supra note 402, 315.

17

See John H. Langbein, supra note 760, 1170-1.

18

See Penny Darbyshire, supra note 754, 107.

19

See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, I.

I.
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21

about the conduct offact-finding. 20 An independent evidence law system

has

become a distinguishable characteristic in common law systems,22 as Professor James

ft.
\

Bradley Thayer described in 1898:
"When a man raises his eyes from the common-law system of evidence, he is
struck with the fact that our system is radically peculiar.... a great mass of
evidential matter, logically important and probative, is shut out ... by an
imperative rule, while the same matter is not thus excluded anywhere else.
English-speaking countries have what we caJl a 'Law of Evidence'; but no other
country has it; we alone have generated and evolved this large, elaborate, and
difficult doctrine." 23
To date, Professor Thayer's observations retain nearly all of their original force.2 4
Although vigorously criticized by C. P. Harvey in his book, "The Advocate's Devil,"
20

See John H. Langbein, supra note 760, 1168. ("On the Continent, professional judges take the main
responsibility for investigating and adjudicating, although the lawyers for the parties guide and limit
the judicial inquiry in important ways. In the Anglo-American legal tradition, by contrast, we parcel
out this work of fact-finding among three sets of actors: the lawyers for the parties, the professional
judge, and the laypersons who serve as jurors. We leave to the lawyers the responsibility for
gathering, sifting, and presenting evidence of the facts. Prototypically, our trial judge sits with a jury.
Although many cases fall outside the jury entitlement, and in many others the parties waive it, jury trial
remains the presumptive norm in American civil and criminal procedure.")
21

Different from the Civil Law tradition, evidence law in Common Law system is not included in
procedural rules, which results it in an independent course taught in law schools.
22

A fundamental consequence ofthese radically different arrangements for the conduct of fact-finding
has been the difference in attitude toward what Anglo-American lawyers call the law of evidence.
See John H. Langbein, supra note 760, 1169.
23

See James Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, 1-2 (Boston
Little Brown, 1898) .

24

See Thomas P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modem Evidence Law, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 499, 500 ( 1999) .
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I

I.

that evidence law should be "founded apparently on the propositions that all jurymen
are deaf to reason, that all witnesses are presumptively liars, and that all documents
are presumptively forgeries," 25 Anglo-American law still remains devoted to
determining what is not evidence and what is inadmissible evidence. 26

This

approach is wholly unfathomable to lawyers trained in the civilian systems of
Continental Europe. 27
While there are many reasons why evidence law is necessary in an adversarial
and accusatorial disputes-resolving system, the following concern should be
considered the most significant.

In a sense, mistrust of juries is the single overriding

reason for the law of evidence; for example, the hearsay doctrine 28 exists largely
because a lay jury can not properly evaluate statements made outside of its presence,
and the rules governing character evidence assume that juries usually place too much
weight on such proof or often employ it improperly for punitive purposes. 29

The

.1

25

See Penny Darbyshire, supra note 754, 108.

26

See Thomas P. Gallanis, supra note 776, 500.

27

Id.

28

See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304, 565. ("Hearsay evidence is that which incorporates in a
courtroom presentation words written or spoken on a prior occasion by a person unavailable for present
examination. It asks the trier of fact to believe that what was previously said or written is true.
When such words are used in court there is no way for an opposing party to cross-examine the
out-of-court speaker and thus no chance to examine his or her reliability. By banning the use of much
out-of-court material, the hearsay rule compels more live testimony and increases opportunities for
adversarial scrutiny. Because of the hearsay rule's direct link to cross-examination it, in itself, may be
used as a barometer of adversarial change. The stricter the enforcement of the hearsay rule, the more
adversarial the proceedings are likely to be, all else being equal.")
29

See Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence Under the Rules, 1 (New York
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Chief Justice of Common Pleas once remarked on the institutional logic of the
hearsay rule in the famous Berkeley Peerage Case in 1816:
"In most of the Continental States, the Judges determine upon the facts in dispute
as well as upon the law; and they think there is no danger in their listening to
evidence of hearsay, because when they come to consider of their judgment on the
merits of the case, they can trust themselves entirely to disregard the hearsay
evidence, or to give it any little weight which it may seem to deserve.

But in

England, where the jury is the sole judges of the fact, hearsay evidence is properly
excluded, because no man can tell what effect it might have upon their minds."30
Although the Sixth Amendment provides that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him ... ,"
unlike other Sixth Amendment rights, the origins of this Confrontation Clause are
murky. 31

It is settled that this clause generally entitles the accused to be present

when witnesses testify against him, and to cross-examine them. 32

As a matter of law,

·the language of this amendment does not provide clear guidance about hearsay

Aspen Law & Business, 2000) .
30

However, Professor Langbein found this explanation of the hearsay rule improper by mentioning
that: "from the historical standpoint, this effort to account for the Jaw of evidence as a response to the
shortcomings of the jury system is awkward, because the jury system originated in the twelfth century,
whereas the Jaw of evidence is much more recent." See John H. Langbein, supra note 760, 1169-70.
31

See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative History, 27
Rutgers L. J. 77,77 ( 1995) .

32

See Christopher B. Mueller, supra note 781, 423.
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I

I

I

I

issues. 33

In addition, as to why a defendant has a right to confront the witnesses

against him was seldom explained in early historical documents, the precise source of
the word 'confront' is also obscure. 34

It is almost impossible to trace the Framer's

intent in that this clause was debated for a mere five minutes before its adoption. 35
More than any other story, the story of Raleigh's case, 36 handed down over
generations, has driven Anglo-American lawyers to limit the use of hearsay and to

33

...

See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 368. ("It is susceptible to a variety of textually plausible
interpretations. Under one possible interpretation, all hearsay declarants whose statements are offered
by the prosecution would be considered "witnesses against'' the defendant, and therefore the
Constitution would require that the defendant be confronted with them at trial. This interpretation
would lead to the exclusion of all hearsay, even hearsay that fell under an exception established at the
time of the adoption of the amendment Alternatively, one could interpret the amendment to require
merely that the defendant be confronted with whatever witness the prosecution chose to produce at trial.
Under this interpretation, trial witness could testify about hearsay declarations, and the confrontation
clause would impose no limits upon the creation of new hearsay exceptions. It would merely require
the presence of the defendant when evidence was presented to the trier of fact. The amendment could
also be construed so that "witnesses against'' the defendant referred only to persons who were available
to testify. Under this interpretation, the prosecution would be required to produce declarants for
cross-examination when possible, but the statements of unavailable declarants could be freely
admitted.")

~

34

See Murl A. Larkin, The Right of Confrontation: What Next?, 1 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 67, 67 ( 1969 ) .

35

See Howard W. Gutman, Academic Determinism: The Division of the Bill of Rights, 54 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 295, 332 ( 1981) .

36

.I

See 399 U.S. 149, 156, 157 n. 10 ( 1970). ("The origin and development of the hearsay rules and of
the Confrontation Clause have been traced by others and need not be recounted in detail here. It is
sufficient to note that the particular vice that gave impetus to the confrontation claim was the practice
of trying defendants on 'evidence' which consisted solely of ex parte affidavits or depositions secured
by the examining magistrates, thus denying the defendant the opportunity to challenge his accuser in a
face-to-face encounter in front of the trier offact Prosecuting attorneys 'would frequently allege
matters which the prisoner denied and called upon them to prove. The proof was usually given by
reading depositions, confessions of accomplices, letters, and the like; and this occasioned frequent
demands by the prisoner to have his accusers, i. e. the witnesses against him, brought before him face
to face .... ' A famous example is provided by the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh for treason in 1603. A
crucial element of the evidence against him consisted of the statements of one Cobham, implicating
Raleigh in a plot to seize the throne. Raleigh had since received a written retraction from Cobham,
and believed that Cobham would now testify in his favor. After a lengthy dispute over Raleigh's right
to have Cobham called as a witness, Cobham was not called, and Raleigh was convicted. At least one
author traces the Confrontation Clause to the common-law reaction against these abuses of the Raleigh
trial.")
See also Christopher B. Mueller, supra note 781, 424.
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However, with a belief that historical inquiry will

demonstrate that bringing accusing witnesses before the accused has been
acknowledged for at least 1500 years, some argued the right of confrontation, in the
sense of an accused person's right to be present while accusers and accusing witnesses
are physically produced at trial, should reach far beyond Raleigh's trial. 38

In the

following section, this study will explore the Roman roots of the Confrontation
Clause.

Moreover, not until 1895 did the United States Supreme Court, in Mattox v.

37

See 502 U.S. 346, 352 ( 1992) . ("The United States contends that petitioner's Confrontation Clause
claim should be rejected because the Confrontation Clause's limited purpose is to prevent a particular
abuse common in 16th- and 17th-century England: prosecuting a defendant through the presentation of
ex parte affidavits, without the affiants ever being produced at trial.") See also Charles R. Nesson
and Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay: Requiring Foundamental Testing and Corroboration
Under the Confrontation Clause, 81 Va. L. Rev. 149, 151-52( 1995 ) .(According to legend, King James
I disposed of Sir Walter Raleigh, a political enemy, by rigging a prosecution against him. At King
James' instigation, Lord Coke, the king's Law Lord, prosecuted Raleigh for treason. Coke based his
case against Raleigh on a confession coerced from Raleigh's friend, Lord Cobham, whom Coke had
incarcerated in the Tower of London. Cobham, in his confession, accused Raleigh of conspiring to kill
the king. At the trial, when Coke introduced Cobham's confession into evidence, Raleigh objected:
"But it is strange to see how you press me still with my Lord Cobham, and yet will not produce him ...
He is in the house hard by and may soon be brought hither; let him be produced, and if he will yet
accuse me or avow this Confession of his, it shall convict me and ease you of further proof." But
instead of producing Cobham, Coke offered further proof. To corroborate Cobham's hearsay
accusation, Coke called a witness, a boat pilot named Dyer, who reported what a Portuguese gentleman
had said to him. According to Dyer, the Portuguese gentleman said: "Your King [James] shall never
be crowned, for Don Cobham and Don Raleigh will cut his throat before he come to be crowned."
Raleigh objected again: "This is the saying of some wild Jesuit or beggarly Priest; but what proof is it
against me?" Lord Coke responded: "It must per force arise out of some preceding intelligence, ·and
shows that your treason had wings." The court allowed the evidence, and on this evidence--- the
hearsay of Cobham's confession and the hearsay of the Portuguese gentleman-- Raleigh was
convicted and eventually executed. )
38

See Frank R. Herrmann, S.J., and Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval
Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 34 Va. J. Int'l L. 481, 482-83 ( 1994) . (In Coy y. Iowa, the
Court noted the Confrontation Clause's antiquity by quoting an English-language version of Acts of the
Apostles (Acts) 25:16 as providing: "indications that a right of confrontation existed under Roman law.
The Roman Governor Festus, discussing the proper treatment of his prisoner, Paul, stated: 'It is not the
manner of the Romans to deliver any man up to die before the accused has met his accusers face to face,
and has been given a chance to defend himself against the charges."') See also Kenneth J. Graham,
The Right to Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 Crim. L.
Bull. 99, 100 ( 1972) ; Graham C. Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U.
Fla. L. Rev. 207, 209 ( 1984) .

f..
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United States, for the first time interpret the Confrontation Clause by recognizing that:

r I

"The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent
depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases,
being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and
cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not
only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of
compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at
him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives
his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.

There is doubtless reason for

saying that the accused should never lose the benefit of any of these safeguards
even by the death of the witness; and that, if notes of his testimony are permitted
to be read, he is deprived of the advantage of that personal presence of the witness
before the jury which the law has designed for his protection."39
Based upon this decision, the Court in the twentieth century has substantially

39

See 156 U.S. 237, 242, 243 ( 1895) . See also Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 56 ( 1899) .
("In other words, the United States having secured the conviction of Wallace, Baxter and King as
principal felons, the defendant charged by a separate indictment with a different crime -- that of
receiving the property in question with knowledge that it was so stolen and with intent to convert in to
his own use or gain- was held to be presumptively or prima facie guilty so far as the vital fact of the
property having been stolen was concerned, as soon as the Government produced the record of such
conviction and without its making any proof whatever by witnesses confronting the accused of the
existence of such vital fact. We cannot assent to this view. We could not do so without conceding
the power of the legislature, when prescribing the effect as evidence of the records and proceedings of
courts, to impair the very substance of a right long deemed so essential for the due protection of life
and liberty that it is guarded against legislative and judicial action by provisions in the Constitution of
the United States and in the constitutions of most if not of all the States composing the Union.")

!
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expanded the scope of application of the Confrontation Clause to both federal and
state trials.

As Professor Carol A. Chase pointed out, judicial interpretation of the

Confrontation Clause has affected a criminal defendant's trial rights in at least five
ways:
"First, the Confrontation Clause gives the defendant the right to be present at his
trial.

Second, it enables the defendant to require the witnesses to testify in the

defendant's presence.
witnesses against him.
evidence.

Third, it gives the defendant the right to cross-examine
Fourth, it places some limitations on the use of hearsay

Finally, it limits the use of confessions by one accused individual that

'spillover' and incriminates another." 40
Accordingly, as the Court conceded that, in California v. Green, "hearsay rules and the
Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values." 41

In Dutton

v. Evans, "it seems apparent that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and
the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same roots." 42

Changes regarding

hearsay admissibility usually occur whenever the Supreme Court adopts a new
approach of interpreting the Confrontation Clause.

40

As the Supreme Court

See Carol A. Chase, The Five Faces ofthe Confrontation Clause, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 1003, 1005
(2003) .

41

See399U.S.149, 155 (1970).

42

See 400 U.S. 74, 86 ( 1970) .
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recognized in Coy v. Iowa, the right of confrontation comes to us on faded parchment,
with a lineage that traces back to the beginnings of Western legal culture. 43

From

that parchment, one can discern that the core of the right lies in the simple act of
producing accusing witnesses in court in the defendant's presence. 44

Since the

Confrontation Clause provides a criminal defendant with a constitutional right to
confront the witnesses against him, over the years, it has been the subject of
voluminous scholarly discussion, much of it aimed at analyzing the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on the subject. 45

Accordingly, justifications to hearsay exceptions

should not conflict with purposes of the Confrontation Clause.

Of course, to

understand why certain evidence is admitted is necessary to study the long history of
the rules of evidence. 46

4.2 Early History and Development of the Confrontation Clause and Hearsay
4.2.1 The Roman Law Background
Although torture of both defendants and witnesses was common and no concept
of equal protection existed, Roman criminal procedure, like that of the United States,

43

See 487 U.S. 1012, 1015 ( 1988) .

44

See Frank R. Herrmann, supra note 790,543.

45

See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 368 .

46

See John C. Klotter, supra note 753, 1.

.I
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was radically accusatorial. 47
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It also demanded that defendants have the opportunity

to be present at the proceedings against them. 48

In addition, similar to the holding of

Illinois v. Allen that "one of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the
Confrontation Clause is the accused's right to be present in the courtroom at ~very
stage of his trial, " 49 as stated in Cicero's Verrine Orations, Roman law also required
that the accuser be present in court to state the charge and to produce the evidence so
that a defendant had the opportunity for a personal encounter with the accuse! in
court. 50

Notwithstanding, these procedural requirements did not apply to the

47

For a detailed overview ofthe Roman law of evidence, see C.A. Morrison, Some Features of the
Roman and the English Law of Evidence, 33 Tul. L. Rev. 577, 579-81 (1959).
48

See Frank R. Herrmann, supra note 790, 484-5. ("During Roman Era, an individual accuser
(accusator) generally undertook the prosecution of a defendant (reus) and bore the burden of proving
the charge. The testimony of witnesses provided a principal means of proof. These and other broad
structural similarities to U.S. proceedings, however, should not lead to assumptions idealizing Roman
criminal justice. Torture of both defendants and witnesses became increasingly common under the
emperors, and no concept of equal protection existed under Roman criminal law. The procedural
rights a defendant might have had in any given case depended largely on the accused's social status and
the nature of the charges. Nonetheless, Roman criminal procedure consistently demanded that
defendants have the opportunity to be present at the proceedings against them. The Romans viewed
this rule as a guarantee against any unjust conviction of the innocent. For example, the early third
century jurist Ulpian, in his De officio proconsulis, quoting imperial rescripts of the preceding century,
links the rule directly to the principle that it is better that the crime of a guilty person remain
unpunished than that an innocent person be convicted.")
49

50

See 397 U.S. 337, 338 ( 1970) .

See Frank R. Herrmann, supra note 790, 486-8. ("This right is the one to which the Roman governor
Festus refers in Acts of the Apostles. Although no Roman legislative text reaching us formulates in
precise terms the juridical prescription expressed by Festus ... , the declaration of Festus excellently
conveys the constant practice of Roman procedure. Cicero's Verrine Orations (Orations) provide the
clearest corroboration of the accuracy of Acts 25: 16 as a statement of procedural requirements. The
Orations concern Cicero's prosecution of Gaius Verres, governor of Sicily, on various charges of
malfeasance in office. Among the instances of misconduct Cicero advanced were Verres' acts while
sitting as judge in the prosecution of one Sthenius, first on a charge of forgery and, subsequently, for a
capital offense. Verres had arranged for both trials to take place in Sthenius' absence and found him
guilty on both occasions, even though the accusator failed to appear at the second trial. Cicero
asserted that Verres had thereby violated both the requirement that a defendant be given the opportunity
to be present at his trial and the requirement that his accuser be present: 'the one he had made a
defendant in his absence, he convicted in the absence ofthe accuser.' Roman imperial constitutiones
of the second and third centuries repeatedly assert the defendant's right to be present at trial. Further,
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prosecution's witnesses. 51
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This allowed either the prosecution or defense to produce

testimony in writing to the court without producing the witness personally. 52

When

witnesses were present, they testified on direct examination and were subject to
cross-examination by the adverse party. 53

Since the Hadrian rescript reflected

preference for the testimony of witnesses present in court, it in a sense marks the
beginning in Roman legal history of the requirement that accusing witnesses appear
personally in court. 54

In summary, the Romans appear to have considered two

elements of the modem right of confrontation as significant components of their

the requirement that the accuser be present in court along with the defendant appears in the Sententiae
attributed to the early third century jurist Paulus: 'In a capital case no absent person is convicted, nor
can an absent person accuse, through another, or be accused.' This authoritative formulation does not,
however, expressly state that the accuser and the accused must be present in court at the same time. It
was the apparent intention of a late fourth century imperial constitutio to close that gap by denying any
effect to an accuser's statement not made in the presence of the accused: 'It is improper for whatever is
said against an absent person, by him alone who is accusing, immediately to be considered as true, as if
against one who is present and even convicted.' This constitutio is particularly significant because it
is included in the first official collection of Roman laws, the Theodosian Code of 438.")
51

Id., at 488.

sz Id.
53

Id. (Indeed, "Quintilian, in his Institutio oratoria (c. 95), gives extensive advice to practitioners on
the conduct of both direct and cross-examination of witnesses in criminal cases. Although Quintilian
is explicit on the point that written testimony from absent witnesses is admissible --- testimony 'is
stated either in writing or by persons who are present,' --- he advises that the fact-tinder is likely to
give much more credence to the testimony of live witnesses.")
54

Id., at 489-90. ("This preference for the testimony of witnesses present in court is clearly reflected in
an oft-cited rescript of the Emperor Hadrian (117-138). Once, while sitting as judge, Hadrian rejected
an attempt to enter written testimony against a criminal defendant: 'Alexander brought criminal
charges against Aper before me, and because he was not proving [the charges] nor producing witnesses
[testes] but wanted to use written statements [testimoniis], which have no place before me (for it is my
practice to examine the witnesses themselves), I sent him back to the provincial governor so _that he
would inquire into the credibility of the witnesses ... ' However, Hadrian's rescript, which appears to
assume that it is for the judge alone to examine the witnesses, may also signal the demise of
cross-examination by the parties. Although Quintilian, in his Institutio oratoria, treated methods of
cross-examination with the sophistication of an accomplished trial practitioner, that practice disappears
without comment or explanation in the surviving contemporary legal sources.")

I .
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criminal procedure: the right of a defendant to be present at trial and the defendant's
right to encounter an accuser in court. 55
When the Romanesque system was first developed, judges, who were finders of
fact as well as of the law, established the rules for gathering and admitting evidence. 56
In 534 A.D., the promulgation of the Emperor Justinian's Code collected and codified
the entire corpus of Roman law then in force. 57

At that time, the usual practice

required witnesses to be presence in court to give their testimony in front of the
adverse party. 58

Since the Code did not expressly mandate the presence of witnesses

in criminal cases, or assure a defendant the right to be present when a witness testified,
in 539 A.D., a significant document in the history of the right of confrontation, Novel
90, Justinian's new rescript on witnesses, delineated the legislative foundations of the
requirements by requiring that prosecution witnesses had to appear in court before the
fact-finder. 59

55

A further requirement was that the defendant had to have the

Id., at490.

56

At first there were few rules of evidence, but eventually a complex set of rule for obtaining and
weighing evidence evolved. As often happens, these rules began to be merely restrictive, that is, they
were not guides but self-sufficient formulas. See John C. Klotter, supra note 753, 6.

57

For example, "a mid-fifth century note in a summary of the Theodosian Code of unknown
authorship--- perhaps a compilation of a law teacher's notes-- states unequivocally: 'Whatever
statements may have been made against an absent person are of no effect.' Justinian's Code seems to
assume that witnesses testified before the adverse party. For instance, Code J. 4.20.19 set time limits
within which witnesses summoned to testify in any case had to be examined." See Frank R
Herrmann, supra note 790, 490.
sa Id.
59

Id., at 491-2. ("Chapter 5 of Novel 90 provided a procedure, in civil cases, by which testimony of a
witness could be taken in the province where the witness resided when the case was pending in another
province. In such a situation, the testimony was given before a judge in the witness's province,
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opportunity to be present when the accusing witnesses were produced.

60

Thus, the

testimony against the accused before a judge was no longer admissible under this
legal framework.
It is generally accepted that, from early times, the Church was involved both in
settling disputes among its members and in disciplining the clergy.

61

Long before

Christianity became the state religion of the Roman Empire, the Church recognized
that bringing the accuser and accused together in an adjudicatory forum, based on the
model of the secular courts, was essential to doing justice.

62

After the legal

transcribed, and then sent to the trial judge. The chapter concluded, however, with the statement that
its provisions did not apply to criminal cases. In criminal cases, 'in which there is danger concerning
great things, by all means witnesses are to be present [to testify] before the judges' who were the
fact-finders. Chapter 9 ofNovel90 governed the taking of what would now be called depositions to
preserve testimony. It provided that the judicial official before whom the testimony was to be given
had to advise the adverse party 'to be present and to hear the testimony.' If, after having received
such notice, the adverse party failed to be present when the testimony was taken, the testimony would
be treated 'as if made with him present' and, therefore, could be used against him. The express
purpose of the chapter was to prevent a party from rendering deposition testimony against it 'of no
effect' by wilfully absenting itself from the testimony's taking. The chapter's broader significance,
however, lies in its assumption of a general rule that 'the production of witnesses before [a judicial
official] is not valid unless [the] adverse party is present .... "' )
60

It was in its fifth and ninth chapters.

ld., at 493.

61

See Stephen W. Findlay, Canonical Norms Governing the Deposition and Degradation of Clerics, 5
(Catholic University of America Canon Law Studies No. 130, 1941).
62

See Frank R Herrmann, supra note 790, 494-6. (For example, "the Didascalia, a disciplinary writing
of unknown authorship from the first half of the third century, cautions those judging disputes among
Church members not to 'hear only one person, with the other not present and not defending himself
against the allegation .... • A famous colloquy between Emperor Constantius and Pope Liberius in the
year 355 demonstrates how earnestly the Church adhered to this principle. The Emperor demanded
that the Pope endorse the judgment of a Church council against Athanasius, the Bishop of Alexandria.
Liberius adamantly refused. Athanas ius, he said, had not been present to be tried. Therefore, in
condemning him, the council had not followed the norms of traditional ecclesiastical procedure.
Threatened with exile by the Emperor, Liberius responded that the ecclesiastical laws were more
important to him than staying in Rome. Athanasius himself wrote with regard to the judgment against
him: 'No man is unaware that items of business which are done when one party is absent do not have
the slightest force. For this is prescribed even by divine law .... ' In support of this proposition, he
quoted Acts 25:16 which reads: 'It is not the custom among the Romans casually to deliver any man to
die before he has his accusers facing him and receives opportunity for defense to clear himself of the
charges."' )
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establishment of Christianity throughout the Roman Empire early in the fourth
century and secular accusatorial procedure came to govern the disciplinary
proceedings of the Church as a matter of law, it patterned its proceedings, which
included charges of clerical violation of the secular criminal laws, upon the
accusatorial model of the secular state. 63

In other words, the Church exercised

criminal jurisdiction, and the criminal procedure of its canon law became substantially
similar to that of the state even though the ecclesiastical procedure differed from that
of the state in that it eschewed both torture and capital punishment. 64

While the later

developing cannon of the fourth century law also endorsed the concept that nothing
against the absent and unheard should be determined, 65 it is understandable why
canon law incorporated the language of chapter 9 of Justinian's Novel 90 within a
century of its issuance, namely its guarantee to a criminal defendant the right to
encounter opposing witnesses in court. 66

63

64

Furthermore, Pope Gregory I establish the

Id., at493.
Id., at494.

65

Id., at 496. (For example, "Pope Damasus (366-384), according to a contemporary, 'ordained that
nothing be decided against the absent and unheard.' Similarly, the minutes of the Council of
Chalcedon show bishops assembled for a disciplinary proceeding asserting that 'no one condemns an
absent person.' The Statuta Ecclesiae antiqua, the work of an unknown compiler in southern Gaul,
also includes the precept: 'Let the ecclesiastical judges beware of pronouncing judgment in the absence
of him whose case is being heard, because it will be invalid .... ' Moreover, Pope Pelagius I (556-561)
declared that 'the laws do not allow' accusations to be made 'with the adversary absent."')
66

Id., at496-7. ("This incorporation was accomplished by Pope Gregory I (590-604), one of the
foremost papal legislators. The occasion was an appeal to the Pope in 603 by Stephen, a Spanish
bishop. Stephen complained that he had been deposed from his see by other bishops on the basis of
false charges and without a fair hearing. Gregory ordered an on-the-scene investigation into the
fairness of the proceedings. He prepared to send John the Defensor to Spain to conduct the inquiry.
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requirement that an accused must have the opportunity to encounter accusing
witnesses in court. 67
accused individual. 68

This opportunity was deemed a fundamental right of an
Some even argued that the development of canonical trial

procedure is grounded in Gregory's decision. 69
With the disappearance of the Roman Empire in the West, Roman criminal
procedure based on rational proofs had, outside the ecclesiastical courts, gradually
given way in much of Western Europe to Germanic procedures based on irrational
proofs, such as ordeal, oath, and battle to resolve criminal accusation. 70

On the

contrary, unlike secular states, the Church still followed the Roman law trial

Gregory provided John with a detailed letter of instruction (commonitorium) so that John could
evaluate whether the process against Stephen had been properly conducted (ordinabiliter est babitum).
In particular, Gregory directed John to determine 'if the testimony against him was spoken under oath
with him present, or if it was done in writings, or if be bad license to respond and defend himself.'
Later in his commonitorium, Gregory quoted chapter 9 of Novel 90 directly to establish that Stephen
had a right to be present when witnesses gave testimony against him: 'If what the bishop [Stephen]
says is true, that some witnesses of the worst sort were presented with him absent, it must be
acknowledged to be of no moment in the law, under the constitutio of the Novel which speaks about
witnesses. Thus the adversary must always be advised, so that he may come to bear the witnesses. If
that was omitted here, it is necessary that what was done against the laws cannot stand."')
67

Id., at 498.

61

Thus, any violation of that right would render a judgment against the accused a nullity.

Id.

69

Id., at 498-9. ( "Hincmar, Archbishop ofRheims (845-882), regarded the commonitorium as the
vehicle by which the Roman law of procedure was effectively adopted in the canon law. Hincmar
quoted from it in his own writings. In his seminal procedural treatise De presbyteris criminosis,
Hincmar wrote, referring specifically to Gregory's requirement that a defendant be present when
accusing witnesses testify against him, that Gregory in the commonitorium demonstrated how
judgment was to be reached by the judicial process and with integrity. However, the judicial process
to which Hincmar referred was a feature of the church courts of his day, but not of the secular courts.")
70

Id., at 499. ("The ordeals were important among all the Germanic peoples, including the Franks, as
the means by which persons accused of a crime might be required to prove their innocence by showing
that supernatural forces intervened to protect them. However, if an accused person enjoyed a good
reputation and was a freeman rather than a serf, and the proof against him was not conclusive, he
would normally be allowed to clear himself of the accusation by giving an oath as to his innocence,
usually supported by the oaths of others (oath-helpers, cojuratores or compurgatores).")
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procedure of rational proofs by witness testimony, which was fundamentally opposed
to the primitive irrationality of the ordeals. 71

Since there was no secular law

employing the old Roman law trial procedure, as time went by, the exact accusatorial
Roman trial procedure had been gradually forgotten, and the Church had to locate and
preserve authorities of rational Roman judicial process by which the later generations
could follow.

For example, the directives of the Second Council ofDouzy in 874,

probably drafted by Hincmar alone.

Archbishop of Rheims (845-882), who was

incontestably the most significant jurist of his time, not only provided detailed
instructions as to how the prosecution of a criminal defendant was to be conducted,
but also clearly showed that, as prerequisite to his conviction, accusing witnesses had
to testify in open court before a defendant asserting. 72

71

72

Although the directives of the

Id., at 500.

Id., at 500-2. ("The case which the Council addressed in 874 was that of one Huntbert, a priest
accused of adultery. Its background is complex. Duda, a nun, had engaged in a power struggle with
her abbess for control of the monastery. Huntbert had been her confederate in this process. On
Duda's behalf, he drafted letters against the abbess, inferentially accusing her of misconduct, for Duda
to send to various recipients. Ultimately, Huntbert formally presented Duda's charges against the
abbess to a church synod, which rejected them. The course of events then took an unusual turn.
Duda became pregnant and gave birth. Someone, by his relations with Duda, obviously had
committed a serious criminal offense. Suspicion, naturally, fell on Huntbert. Moreover, Duda
appears to have indicated that he was the father of her child. Huntbert, however, emphatically denied
his guilt and wished to purge himself by oath. The Council ofDouzy was called upon to determine
how proceedings in the matter were to be carried out. The Council declared that Huntbert could not
purge himself by oath. Having previously brought the false accusation against the abbess, he was
deemed guilty of the offense of calumny (calumniatoris crimen) and, therefore, had forfeited the right
to clear himself by oath. Thus, the Council, alluding to Pope Gregory's writings on judicial procedure,
set out the method by which the truth of the accusation against Huntbert could be determined rationally
(rationaliter). First, according to the Council's directives, a synodal court was to be convened at the
monastery. It was to be composed of ecclesiastical judges joined by royal officials (missi). Before
any court proceedings began, Duda and two other nuns, Erpreda and Berta (who allegedly participated
in the offense in some way), were to be interrogated separately from each other. They were to be
exhorted to tell the truth as to what they knew. Duda was to be cautioned sternly to avoid accusing
Huntbert if he was not, in fact, the father of her child. It is plain, however, that the Council assumed
that the 'truth' would establish Huntbert's guilt Then Huntbert was to be interrogated. If he was

l
!

~
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Second Council of Douzy clearly demonstrated the importance ninth century canon
law attached to the physical production of accusing witnesses before a criminal
defendant, from a defendant's standpoint, the directives remained silent without
offering any opportunity for the accused to defend himself against the charge. 73
Another important event occurring in the mid-ninth century, were the
pseudoisidorean forgeries which eventually required the production in court of
accusers and witnesses as the cornerstone of a defendant's opportunity for defense. 74
To secure the fundamental independence of bishops so that they would be subject
only to the Pope and be free from interference by lesser ecclesiastical authorities or
powerful lay magnates, an unknown group of clerics undertook a vast project of
forging authoritative legal texts. 75

This comprised a massive collection of decretals

identifying Isidorus Mercator as the compiler because the then extant canonical texts

ready to confess his guilt, he, Duda, Erpreda, and Berta would be brought together before the
congregation of the monastery where all four would make their public confessions in tum. If,
however, Huntbert persisted in denying his guilt, trial would commence in the synodal court before the
judges, the missi, and the congregation of the monastery (including the abbess). Duda, Erpreda, and
Berta would come into court and refute (revincant) Huntbert with the details of his offense. This
would represent Huntbert's last chance to confess and obtain some leniency in the penalty meted out to
him. If he continued to maintain his innocence, then Duda, Erpreda, and Berta would be put under
oath, and each would state her testimony against Huntbert to the court. As a result, Huntbert would be
convicted by three witnesses, deposed .from the clergy by the ecclesiastical judges, and exiled for life to
some remote place by the royal missi.")
73

Id., at 502.

74

Id., at 503.

15

For the next 300 years, until nearly the close of the twelfth century, the pseudoisidorean forgeries
would impart to canon law criminal procedure what, in modem terms, would be called a strong 'due
process' orientation. Id.
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To some extent the significance of the

pseudoisidorean corpus to the present study lies in "the forgers' repeated emphasis on
the procedural protections," including the requirements that the accused, the accuser
and the accusing witnesses be physically present at such a proceeding, with full
opportunity for the accused to defend against the charge. 77

'

However, it is worth

mentioning these procedural protections initially applied to a bishop or any other
cleric who was the subject of an ecclesiastical disciplinary proceeding. 78

Moreover,

76

For this reason, the forgers, since the conclusive detection of the forgery early in the seventeenth
century, are collectively called 'Pseudo-Isidore' or the 'pseudoisidoreans.' Id.
77

Id.

78

Id., at 503-4. ("The pseudoisidoreans extensively set forth these protections in one of their earliest
projects, the False Capitularies, which purported to be authentic proclamations of Frankish law issued
by the monarchs Charlemagne (771-814) and Louis the Pious (814-840) and compiled by one Benedict
Levitas. These were soon accepted as genuine and became the subject of citation. The
pseudoisidoreans' method of forgery was extraordinarily clever. They excerpted key phrases from
authentic ancient texts, rearranged them in various combinations to serve their purposes, and inserted
them into wholly spurious documents of their own composition. Thus the educated reader, in
perusing a pseudoisidorean text, would experience a false sense of recognition and accept the document
as genuine. In the False Capitularies, the pseudoisidoreans drew mainly on four sources to express
the principle that accusers and witnesses must appear personally in court before a defendant. These
were: first, the Lex Romana Visigothorum, a compendium of Roman law issued by the Visigothic
king Alaric II in 506; second, the Latin Vulgate version of Acts 25:16; third, a chapter ofthe Visigothic
law of 654; and fourth, the major seventh century collection of canons known as the Hispan!l. The
pseudoisidoreans excerpted language from these four sources to convey the principles of concern here.
As to the presence of the accused, the False Capitularies borrowed the following language from among
these four sources: (a) 'It is accepted that there shall be no trial of absent persons. If this is done, the
judgment pronounced shall be invalid.' (b) 'Let the ecclesiastical judges beware of pronouncing
judgment in the absence of him whose case is being heard, because it will be invalid .... ' (c) 'In a
capital case, no absent person is convicted. Nor can an absent person accuse through another or be
accused.' The False Capitularies also adopted language that guaranteed the presence of the accuser at
trial: (a) 'There is no authority to try or convict any cleric before he has accusers present and receives
opportunity for defense to clear himself of the charges.' (b) 'No one shall be tried or convicted before
the accuser is present; and the accused shall receive ample opportunity for defense to clear himself of
the charges.' As to the presence of the accused and the accuser simultaneously, the False Capitularies
required that 'whenever any accuser suggests anything about his adversary in his absence, he should
not be fully believed prior to examination of both parties.' Finally, concerning the presence of the
witnesses, the forged text reads: 'Witnesses shall not be absent nor give testimony by letter; but shall be
present and not silent about the truth they know and saw. Nor shall they give testimony about matters
other than those they know were done in their presence.'")

~

•
I
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in addition to the sources previously incorporated into the False Capitularies, the
pseudoisidoreans also drafted their own opinions in their later False Decretals, by
declaring:
"(a) An accuser shall not be heard when the adversary is absent. ...
(b) No one's accusation shall be received through written instruments, but in his
own voice, ... of course with the person whom he desires to accuse present. ...
(c) One should not be heard without the other....
(d) In every matter or place, everything done or adjudged against the absent shall
be entirely void ....
(e) No absent person shall be adjudged, because the divine and human laws
prohibit this." 79

In addition, as being the working material of the nascent ecclesiastical
jurisprudence and superseding the earlier canonical collections, the significance of the
Decretum ofGratian in the development of the canon law is important in that it gave

79

Id., at 508-9. ("All of these elements are joined in a lengthy passage ascribed by Pseudo-Isidore to
Pope Damasus writing to the Italian bishops: 'It has been reported to the Apostolic See that you receive
accusations of the brothers through written instruments without a legitimate accuser. Henceforth, by
our apostolic authority, we prohibit this from happening, and ask you to correct what has recently been
done without any delay and not first to examine through written instruments the case of those who are
accused unless, through the procedures of making complaint, they, having been canonically called to
the synod, come and personally present truly acknowledge and understand what is alleged... The
secular laws demand that accusers be present and not through written instruments absent. The
canonical constituta of the Fathers, not once but very often, declare that no accusations nor any
testimony whatever can proceed through written instruments, and that none shall give testimony about
matters other than those of which they learned in their presence. Similarly whoever chooses to accuse
someone shall accuse while personally present and not through another, ... and no one ever shall be
judged before he has lawful accusers present and receives opportunity for defense to clear himself of
the charges."')
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close and extensive attention to questions of criminal procedure. 80

With the aim of

constructing uniform rules of procedure applicable in both ecclesiastical and secular
courts, the Decretum harmonized the criminal procedure of the Church with the
criminal procedure of Roman law, and finally the ius commune in Europe. 81

These

sources eventually resulted in the secular criminal procedure of the revived Roman
law in appearing to have been substantially the same as that set out for the
ecclesiastical courts in the Decretum of Gratian. 82

For example, the Summa Olim

( 1177/90 ) , one of the earliest medieval Roman law procedural treatises, not only

80

Id., at 511-3. ("Composed about 1140 at Bologna, apparently on the private initiative of a monk and
legal scholar named Gratian, the Decretum 'became the working material of the nascent ecclesiastical
jurisprudence. It superseded the earlier [canonical] collections.' Gratian 's work was quickly
recognized as the definitive textbook of the canon law, and, as a practical matter, it also nearly attained
the status oflaw: 'In a formal legal sense the Decretum never acquired the force oflaw, but its effect
would have been essentially no different if it had been proclaimed in a legislative act, especially since it
was frequently regarded as a certified ecclesiastical codification analogous to the Roman Corpus Iuris
Civilis.' Gratian devoted a lengthy section of his Decretum exclusively to the requirement that
accusers and witnesses be produced before a defendant personally. His authorities for that principle
were drawn largely from the pseudoisidorean materials. Gratian's own formulation of the rule was
that 'an accuser is not to be heard unless the defendant is present.' In the body of the section, this rule
was plainly linked to a defendant's right to receive opportunity for defense to clear himself of the
charges. The clarity of the principle is manifest in twelfth-century commentaries on this section of the
Decretum: (a) 'Statements of accusation and testimony produced against the absent are not valid,
unless they are contumaciously absent ....' (b) 'Against those who contumaciously absent themselves,
accusations and also testimony are received ... , but concerning him who is absent from necessity and
not willingly, are wholly rejected.' (c) 'Those who are absent from necessity cannot be convicted by
the statement of an accuser or witness .... ' (d) 'In civil cases absent persons present testimony, for
example by deposition when they cannot appear ... ' But in criminal cases absent persons never give
testimony, except against the contumacious when the case has already commenced." )
81

See Charles Donahue, Jr., Ius Commune, Canon Law, and Common Law in England, 66 Tul. L. Rev.
1745, 1746, 1749 (1992). ("The important characteristics of the Continental ius commune are that it
transcends political boundaries and that it is taught in the universities ... Broadly, the ius commune is
anything that has to do with university teaching oflaw, be it Roman law or canon law .... In the absence
of local law, the courts would look to the ius commune for an authoritative statement of the law.")
82

See Frank R Herrmann, supra note 790,513-4. ("Toward the end ofthe eleventh century, with the
rediscovery of Justinian's Digest, the Glossators at the University of Bologna revived the study and
teaching of Roman law. The Roman law, as set out in the lawbooks of Justinian, was thus on its way
to becoming the ius commune on the continent of Europe. It was also gradually being revived as the
living law applied in the courts of the municipalities of northern Italy.")
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barred hearsay testimony by stating the rule that criminal matters required the
presence of the witnesses who must swear that what they testify to is absolutely so,
that they saw and heard it, and that it was done in their presence, but it also
established a party's right to be present when the testimony of an adverse witness is
given. 83

These lines of accusatorial development came to a halt in the thirteenth

century with the advent of inquisitional procedure and the accompanying practice of
)

I

examining witnesses in secret. 84

In fact, while the pseudoisidorean formulations that

"Accusers and witnesses must be present to accuse and testify viva voce and the
accused must always be present to be tried" obtained authoritative recognition from
their inclusion in the Decretum ofGratian, the False Decretals greatly influenced
canon law over the course of the next three centuries. 85

As introduced in the article entitled "Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval
Precursors of the Confrontation Clause," in summary, the principle of confrontation,

83

By the end of the twelfth century, as a result, Gratian's Decretum and the renascent Roman law
seemed to have secured a criminal defendant's right to see all the witnesses presented against him and
to hear them testify in open court. ld., at 515.
84
85

ld.

Id. ("Many of the passages quoted above appear, for example, in the Collectio Anselmo dedicata
(882/89), the Decretum of Burchard of Worms (1008/12), the Collection in 74 Titles (1050n6), the
Collectio canonum of Anselm of Lucca (1081186), the Liber canonum ofDeusdedit (1087), and Ivo of
Chartres' Decretum (c. 1094) and Panormia (1094/96). In addition, Alger of Liege quotes many of
these passages in his tract De misericordia et iustitia (1095/1121) and, in his own words, precisely
summarizes the pertinent rule: 'Accusers and witnesses must be present to accuse and testify viva voce
and the accused must always be present to be tried .... ' Because a defendant could be represented by
counsel, it would seem logical that these rights would naturally have led to the reappearance of
cross-examination and the evolution of an evidentiary process not unlike that of the modem common
law. However, this did not occur. Instead, a new mode of examining witnesses --- in secret and by
the judge alone --- took hold in Romano-canonical procedure.")

I·
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in the sense of the right of defendants to have accusing witnesses produced before
them, developed along three main lines, each originating in Roman law:
"First, legislation of the Emperor Justinian in the year 539 provided the normative
foundation of the right of witness confrontation.

This norm derived from

preexisting practice and was based on the heightened necessity for accurate
fact-finding in criminal cases.

Second, Pope Gregory I emphasized the

guarantee of fundamentally fair procedures to an accused person when he applied
Justinian's legislation in the year 603.

Finally, the great pseudoisidorean

forgeries of the mid-ninth century initiated a third line of development by creating
a powerful defense tool to ward off unfair accusations and unreliable
testimony. "

~ .•

86
4

7.
1

I

4.2.2 The Shift Away From the Roman Criminal Procedure
While Roman Criminal Procedure provided the defendant with a significant right
to be present when the testimony of an adverse witness is given, it is unclear why it
became common in the late twelfth century, in both secular and ecclesiastical courts
for judges to examine witnesses in secret, out of the presence of the parties. 87

86

87

To

Id., at 483-4.

Id., at 515-6. ("Other than the judge and the witness, only the notary was present to take down the
testimony. Under this new procedure, the examination of witnesses took place somewhere in the
courthouse, usually on the day of their production in court.")
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replace the Roman system, the continental nations of France, Germany and Italy
adopted a system that allowed a judge to hear and weigh any evidence, without
limitation.

88

Under this new procedure, the parties could submit to the judge, in

writing, questions for the judge to ask of each witness; however, the judge was not
bound to put the questions as requested. 89

Probably because secret examination

prevented parties from telling their own witnesses what other witnesses had said, legal
scholars of the day claimed that the procedure provided the best means to obtain
truthful testimony from witnesses. 90

Although important writings on procedure of

the thirteenth century regularly referred to the biblical story of 'Daniel and Susanna'
as the foundation for the secret examination of witnesses outside the presence of the
parties, this story does not justify the exclusion of parties from witness

88

See John C. Klotter, supra note 753, 6. ("Although certain rules have developed in recent times to
limit the type and amount of evidence to be considered in this judge-directed system, there are no
elaborate controlling rules, such as have been developed in the Anglo-American system. A main
reason for this is that the judge's discretion, even when a jury is used, largely determines what evidence
is to be admitted." )
89

See Frank R. Herrmann, supra note 790, 516. ("The parties would learn what the witnesses had said
when the testimony was published. Publication (publicatio) occurred after all witnesses had been
examined and when their transcribed testimony was read aloud in open court by the notary. The exact
time and place of the emergence of this new procedure, as well as the reasons for its development, are
unknown. It probably arose in Bologna towards the end of the twelfth century, and gradually spread
to courts in other parts of western Europe.")
90

Id., at 517. ("The biblical story of Daniel and Susanna served as the authority to justify the new
procedure. In the biblical narrative, Susanna spurns the advances of two elders, who in revenge
falsely report that they have seen her committing adultery with a young man in an orchard. Susanna
is put to trial on the charge of adultery before the assembly of the people, who initially believe the
elders and condemn Susanna to death. At this point, Daniel is moved by the spirit of God to intervene.
He asks, and is permitted, to examine each of the accusing witnesses separately and out of the presence
of the other. To each he puts the question, under what kind of tree did he observe Susanna and her
supposed lover? The first replies, a mastic tree. The second replies, an oak tree. The discrepancy
convin~es the assembly that the two are lying and Susanna is saved.")
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Nonetheless, since judges in the municipalities of northern Italy

intended to keep the lawyers from complicating and slowing down the process and
began to bar parties and their lawyers from hearing witness testimony, the 'Daniel and
Susanna' story may have been the closest authority that thirteenth century jurists
could find to justify a practice already in place. 92

In addition, though the practice

allowing the judge to examine each witness in secret obviously conflicted with the
requirement of Novel 90's chapter 9, providing that all parties have a right to be
present when a witness gives testimony against them, medieval jurists resolved the
conflict by interpreting chapter 9 to require only that a party have the opportunity to
be present when an adverse witness was received in court to be sworn. 93
truncated form of the former practice. 94

This was a

As Albertus Gandinus, the father of

I.

'

!'·
f

,.
91

Id., at 517-8.( Instead, ''the story makes the quite different point that examination of witnesses by the
adverse party is the best means of bringing the truth to light It supports the sequestration of witnesses
from one another to prevent tailoring of testimony, but not their examination in secret. Nothing in 'the
story suggests that Susanna was not present to see her false accusers confounded.")
92

Id., at 518. ("The 'Daniel and Susanna' story had been used earlier for yet other purposes. In the
ninth century, Agobard of Lyon, an early and vehement critic of trial by battle and ordeal, had
advanced the story in support of the proposition that 'the utility of trials consists in the examination of
cases and the exactness of investigations.' And, in the twelfth century, the glossator Placentinus had
noted it merely as authority for judicial examination of witnesses. Neither of these writers suggested
that the story supported excluding the parties from the examination.")
93

94

Id., at 519.

Id. ("Coupled with the requirement of chapter 5 of Novel 90 that, in criminal cases, witnesses be
personally present before the court, this rule at least provided a criminal defendant with the right to see
the witnesses against him and to know who they were. In the words of Azo, the leading Bolognese
glossator of the early thirteenth century, 'in criminal [cases] witnesses are absolutely compelled to
appear... [They take the] oath in the presence of each party ... But the testimony is given before the
judge alone, separate from other witnesses and unheard by any party, as was introduced through
Daniel.' Although a defendant's right to meet opposing witnesses in court was severely reduced after
the rise of 'Daniel and Susanna,' it was not wholly eliminated. The residual right of a defendant at
least to see the witnesses against him when they took the oath was taken seriously by medieval jurists,

• I
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criminal jurisprudence, stated, if witnesses are deposed without being sworn or are
sworn with the other party absent and not summoned, their statements would be as a
matter of law a nullity. 95

In a sense the right to see adverse witnesses sworn might

be of critical importance to a defendant in that knowledge of the identity of the
witness testifying against him afforded a criminal defendant his only opportunity to
prevent his conviction on the basis of the testimony of a biased or lying witnesses. 96
The core idea of the term inquisitio, which means investigation, in the context of
criminal procedure, is that the judge himself can act on his own, by virtue of his office,
to investigate the circumstances of a crime and gather the evidence pointing to the
probable perpetrator. 97

Because the accusatorial criminal procedure mandated by the

Decretum was too cumbersome in its operation, too protective of a defendant's rights,
and too reliant on the initiative of an individual accuser to serve as an efficient tool for

,I

to the degree that its violation could be argued as the ground for reversing a judgment.")
9

s Id., at 520-1. ( "Gandinus was a criminal court judge in Bologna and other Italian cities in the last
two decades of the thirteenth century. It is clear that the rule was followed in his court, because the
dockets at Bologna during that period occasionally bear the notation that an absent defendant had been
summoned to appear 'to see the witnesses swear.' Gandinus in his Tractatus indicates that the rule
was mandatory." )
96

ld., at 521. ("The benefit that accrued to the defendant from this minimal right to have witnesses
against him produced in his presence lay in the opportunity to make reproach (reprobacio) of or
objection (objectio) to the witnesses; that is, to seek to bar the reception of their testimony. In contrast
to the function of the modem jury in common law proceedings, the judge, according to medieval
Romano-canonical procedure, did not weigh the whole evidence or 'find facts' on the basis of the
testimony put before him. He either accepted or rejected each witness proffered as competent to
testify. If competent, the witness's testimony was partial proof of the fact of the matter asserted. But
the witness could be ruled incompetent to testify for a wide variety of reasons, including enmity
towards the defendant or association with, and therefore presumed partiality towards, the accuser." )
97

Id., at 523.
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the punishment of misconduct, Pope Innocent III ( 1198-1216)

developed the

procedure of inquisitio as the means by which his delegated judges could investigate

r
r

I

I
the rumor of such misconduct.

98

Generally speaking, the thirteenth century .was

marked in the realms of both Church and State by an increasing emphasis on the
detection and punishment of crime with a new inquisitional criminal procedure99
because many viewed the accusatorial criminal procedure under Romano-canonical
law as inadequate. 100

Whereas on the other hand, the learned lawyers of the

thirteenth century responded by tightening the screws, literally and figuratively, in the
name of the public interest. 101

As stated in Chambers v. Florid~

"The determination to preserve an accused's right to procedural due process
sprang in large part from knowledge of the historical truth that the rights and
liberties of people accused of crime could not be safely entrusted to secret
inquisitorial processes.

The testimony of centuries, in governments of varying

98

Id. ( "Inquisitio had its inception as a discrete procedure in the decretal legislation of a great
lawyer-pope, Innocent ill. At the beginning of his papacy, Innocent faced the situation of a Church
broadly tainted by internal corruption. Pope Innocent set out the procedure of inquisitio in his
decretals Ut nostrum, Inter sollicitudines, Licet Heli, and Qualiter et quando. He envisaged the
procedure as civil, not criminal, in nature. He aimed to remove misbehaving clergy from their clerical
offices, but not otherwise to punish them. Perhaps for this reason, the Pope omitted any mention of a
suspect's right to be present at proceedings against him or to present a defense.")
99

See Richard M. Fraher, The Theoretical Justification for the New Criminal Law of the High Middle
Ages: Rei Publicae Interest, Ne Crimina Remaneant Impunita, 1984 U. Ill. L. Rev. 577, 581 ( 1984) .
100

See Frank R. Herrmann, supra note 790, 522. ("Today the very word 'inquisition' stands for the
antithesis of fair accusatorial procedure. It calls to mind a picture of secret interrogation of a
defenseless suspect who is the target of unknown accusers, and the extraction from him of a confession
by trickery, pressure, or torture. That picture, if somewhat oversimplified, is not far off the mark.")
101

Id.

I
.
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kinds over populations of different races and beliefs, stood as proof that physical
and mental torture and coercion had brought about the tragically unjust sacrifices

j I

of some who were the noblest and most useful of their generations.

The rack,

the thumbscrew, the wheel, solitary confinement, protracted questioning and cross
questioning, and other ingenious forms of entrapment of the helpless or unpopular
had left their wake of mutilated bodies and shattered minds along the way to the
cross, the guillotine, the stake and the hangman's noose." 102
There were various torture techniques employed during the process of inquisition.
Since the continental jurisprudence of the late Middle Ages regarded a defendant's
confession as the 'queen of proofs' in criminal cases, the Roman law authorized
torture to be the legally sanctioned method of obtaining such a confession. 103
Moreover, such a prosecutorial system somehow ignored the notion that fundamental

I.

fairness requires that a defendant have an opportunity to meet accusing witnesses in
court.

For instance, despite assuring a right to a fair proceeding, and that Pope

Innocent III directed that the names and statements of accusing witnesses were to be
furnished to an inquisitional defendant, did not address the question of whether a

102

I'
I

'I

I

103

See 309 U.S. 227,237-8 ( 1940) .

From these facts, "it might appear that inquisitional procedure dispensed entirely with in-court
testimony of witnesses to prove a defendant's guilt In fact, however, this was not so. It is a
remarkable paradox that in inquisitional proceedings, except in the special situation of the inquisition
against heresy, the barbarity of torture coexisted with a careful observance of a defendant's basic right
to meet his accusers in court." See Frank R Herrmann, supra note 790, 522-3.
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defendant had the right actually to see the accusing witnesses. 104

In addition, in the

late Middle Ages, even though inquisitional procedure spread rapidly into the secular
law, 105 it also left in doubt an inquisitional defendant's right to produce opposing
witnesses. 106

I.

Although Albertus Gandinus noted that an inquisitional defendant who

104

Id., 524-5. ("An influential scholar of the time, the Bolognese canonist Vmcentius Hispanus,
sharply criticized the absence of these procedural guarantees. Commenting around 1210 on the
decretal Qualiter et quando, Vmcentius stressed the unreliability of a procedure that did not assure a
defendant an opportunity to defend himself: 'Query, whether an inquisition can take place against a
person who is absent, as is accepted by many canonists [magistri]. But I have learned through
experience that this is pernicious. If he were present, he would prove that on such-and-such a day he
was not present when it is said that he killed so-and-so, and he would prove that the fama had its origin
from his enemies in his absence; and although I would make inquisition, I would still hear him
afterwards in his defenses.' The Pope apparently responded to Vincentius' criticism in his decretal
Inquisitionis negotium. There, Innocent directed that the names and statements of accusing witnesses
were to be furnished to an inquisitional defendant. Plainly the Pope meant to assure such a
defendant's right to a fair proceeding. Three years later, in its constitutio 8, the Fourth Lateran
Council of 1215 repeated the protections oflnquisitionis negotium and expanded them to include a
defendant's rights to be present, to have notice of the charges, and to present a defense: 'He against
whom the inquisition is made shall be present, unless he contumaciously absents himself. And the
charges which are the subject of the inquisition must be set forth to him, so that he may have the ability
to defend himself, and not only the statements, but also the very names, of the witnesses must be
furnished to him, so that it may be apparent what was said by whom, and his legitimate exceptions and
responses must be admitted, lest boldness in defaming be afforded by the suppression of names and in
deposing falsehood by the exclusion of exceptions."')
105

106

It was adopted initially in the legislation of Frederick II for the kingdom of Sicily.

Id., at 527.

Id., at 526-8. ("With the Constitutions of Melfi ( 1231 ), Frederick promulgated for Sicily the first
territorial code of law known to medieval Europe. In his subsequent constitutio, De inquisitionibus
faciendis (1244), Frederick established detailed regulation of inquisitional procedure. The constitutio
also provided, with a few exceptions, that the defendant would be furnished with the names and
statements of the witnesses against him, although it did not provide that these witnesses would be
physically produced before him. The spread of inquisitional procedure in the thirteenth century into
the secular criminal law is also apparent in the Siete Partidas (1263/65), the great code compiled at the
direction of Alfonso X, king of Castille, to set out in the vernacular the principles of Roman and canon
law. With regard to inquisitional proceedings, it adopted the right-of-defense provisions enacted by
the Fourth Lateran Council: 'The inquisition having been made ... , the king, or the judges, shall have
transmitted to those whom the inquisition concerns, the names of the witnesses and their statements; so
that they can defend according to their right, speaking against the persons of the inquisition or their
statements; and shall have all the defenses which they would have against other witnesses.' This text
reflects the same ambiguity concerning the physical production of witnesses. Its silence is
particularly noteworthy in light of the fact that a separate title of the Partidas, addressing issues outside
the context of inquisitional procedure, directly afftrms a criminal defendant's right to have acctising
witnesses produced in court and to be present when those witnesses take the oath. The inquisitional
legislation of the Fourth Lateran Council, the Sicilian constitutiones, and the Siete Partidas all fail to
address the requirement ofNovel90 that adverse witnesses be produced in court in the presence of the
defendant. The omission of this principle in the Sicilian legislation of Frederick II appears to have
given rise to the question of whether such a requirement existed under the new secular inquisitional
procedure. That it did can be inferred with some confidence because, at the close of the thirteenth
century, Albertus Gandinus squarely addressed the issue in his Tractatus de maleficiis. There,
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II.
I

did not confess guilt could not be convicted unless the witnesses necessary for proof
of his guilt were produced before him and took the oath in his presence, this rule
could have been evaded by the use of torture to obtain a confession from the
defendant before any witnesses against him were produced. 107

After Bartolus'

assertion that a defendant cannot be prejudiced by the testimony of witnesses whom

•'I
'I

he has not yet had opportunity to see, there existed a prerequisite to the order for
torture 108 that the previously examined accusing witnesses be summoned to testify a
second time, this time taking the oath in front of the defendant, as stated by
Hippolytus.I09

indicating a division of opinion on the matter and asserting his own position, he noted the significance
of whether the criminal judge is inquiring against a particular named individual, or whether he is
inquiring generally about a crime and who may have committed it" )
107
0

-r.··

108

u
'

Id., at 530.

A defendant could not legally be put to torture unless a certain quantum of competent evidence of
his guilt was presented. See Walter Ullmann, Reflections on Medieval Torture, 56 Jurid. Rev. 123,
125-8 (1944). For an excellent short summary of the law of torture, see John H. Langbein, Torture
and the Law of Proof: Europe and England in the Ancien Regime, 12-6 (Uni. of Chicago Press, 1977).

l
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109

,I
I
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See Frank R. Herrmann, supra note 790, 531-4. ( "Bartolus' assertion of the rule was followed by
the leading criminal law scholars of continental Europe over the next two centuries. Accordingly,
Angelus Aretinus (Angelo Gambiglioni), in his Tractatus de maleficiis (1438/44), asserts: 'witnesses
examined on the general inquisition do not prejudice the malefactor against whom inquiry is later made
specially, if the malefactor was not summoned when the witnesses swore in the general inquisition ...
And if he denies [guilt], they [the judges] examine the witnesses again with the defendant summoned
and coming into court, so that he sees the witnesses swear and he or his counsel can then make
interrogatories.' A hypothetical case set out in Angelus' Tractatus shows that accusing witnesses
were produced before the defendant at the outset of the proceedings on the merits. Hippolytus de
Marsiliis, citing Angelus Aretinus and Bartolus as authorities in his Practica causarum criminalium
( 1528), states that if a defendant denies guilt, the judge is to give him a written summary of the
evidence against him and set a term within which he may refute it; if by the end of the term the
defendant has failed to do so, he will be put to torture.... In addition, Julius Clarus, in his Practica
crimina (1568), writes that if the defendant inculpated by the general inquisition denies guilt, 'The
judges ... examine the witnesses a second time, with him [the defendant] having been summoned to see
them swear ... And a judge would very gravely err who would proceed to torture or conviction having
omitted such a repetition of the witnesses; for witnesses received before the joinder of the issue create
no credible evidence against a defendant, since they were examined without him being summoned ...
An event in the legal history of the principality of Liege, in what is now Belgium, a jurisdiction that did
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Consequently, the requirement that "an accusing witnesses must be brought
before a defendant'' was generally accepted in the special heresy procedure which was
originally adopted for an inquisition against heresy. 110

During the thirteenth century,

however, one great exception to the requirement soon emerged and eventually became
standard practice. 111

The theory underlying this exception was that heresy was so

serious that an accusing witness's safety would be endangered if the defendant knew
the witness's identity. 112

Even though this exception was originally meant to apply

on a case-by-case basis, it quickly swallowed the rule. 113

As a result, the essence of

proceedings in the inquisition against heresy was, with the aim of obtaining a
·~

confession from him, to subject a defendant to prolonged secret interrogation

not follow this rule, underscores its importance. From the late fourteenth century, Liege employed a
procedure of 'general inquisition' to take witness testimony about any crime in which the perpetrator
was unknown to the victim. A suspect could be arrested on the basis of the testimony heard by the
inquisitors. If the general inquisition testimony was deemed sufficient to prove his guilt, he was
convicted by reason of it alone, without any recall of the witnesses; and if the testimony was
insufficient to prove his guilt, but raised a strong suspicion of it, he could be put to torture in an effort
to make him confess. However, in an order issued on October 20, 1530, the Emperor Charles V
rejected the use for these purposes of testimony taken prior to the defendant's arrest 'We do not
wish,' decreed the Emperor, 'testimonies of this sort, given extrajudicially for the sole purpose of
incarceration, to generate any prejudice in the principal case, or that it be possible on the pretext of
these testimonies to proceed against an incarcerated person to torture or conviction .... '")
110

See Henry C. Lea, A History of the Inquisition ofthe Middle Ages, 437 (New York, Harper & Bros,
1888).
Ill

See Frank R. Herrmann, supra note 790, 535. ( "The only defense left to the defendant was that the
inquisitors would ask him if he had any 'enemies.' If any of the individuals he named in response
were among the witnesses against him, their testimony might be excluded. In the words of a
renowned modem historian of the inquisition against heresy, 'the crowning infamy of the Inquisition in
its treatment of testimony was withholding from the accused all knowledge of the names of the
witnesses against him.'")
112

Id.

113

Id.
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concerning anonymous accusations, aiming to obtain a confession from him. 114

4.2.3 The Return to the Accusatorial and Adversarial Pattern
By the mid-sixteenth century, the criminal procedure of continental Europe had

..
'

established the rule that, except in heresy prosecutions, a defendant had a right to
'confront' 115 the witnesses against him and to meet his accusers 'face-to-face' 116 m

114

..
l'

I'

Id., at 53 5-7. ("The details of the tricks and pressure tactics the inquisitors employed are well
known because they are preserved in a famous manual for inquisitors, the Directorium inquisitorum
(1376) ofNicolas Eymeric, a Dominican theologian. It is one of history's ironies that the terms
'confront' and 'face-to-face,' now so inseparably attached to the concept of due process, first made
their appearance in their modem legal sense in the repressive context ofEymeric's notorious
Directorium. Eymeric writes that, when the inquisitors suspect an accusing witness of testifying
falsely against an alleged heretic, they should arrange for the accused to 'be confronted' (confrontari)
with the suspected false witness. In another passage, Eymeric suggests that occasions may arise when,
to obtain a confession from a resistant suspect, the inquisitor may wish to 'affront [him] face to face'
(facie ad faciem affrontare) with the witnesses against him. Writing two centuries later, Eymeric's
commentator, Francisco Pena, noted that the phrase facie ad faciem affrontare 'beautifully expresses
the matter in the voice of the peopl'(uoce uulgari rem pulchre expressit).")
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Id., at 537-9. ("The word 'confrontation,' in the sense of the physical production of an accusing
witness before a criminal defendant, first came into general use in late medieval France, where one of
the most oppressive of all criminal regimes was in place. For the prosecution of serious crimes,
France by the mid-fifteenth century was following the so-called procedure extraordinaire, an
inquisitional procedure stressing secrecy and torture. In this procedure, the noun confrontation and
verb confronter came to be used to designate the act of physically producing accusing witnesses before
a defendant. In this context, these terms appear in a judgment of 1458 recording the conviction of
Jean due d' Alencon of treason. The judgment makes particular reference to the fact that one Galet, an
important prosecution witness, had been 'confronted' (confronte) with the defendant. At its
conclusion, the judgment mentions that 'confrontations of witnesses' with the defendant took place.
The term must have come into use in this sense in France in that decade because, five years earlier, a
royal decree of 1453 exhaustively regulating the administration of justice did not use it, but referred
only to the customary requirement that a party had to have an opportunity 'to see ... the witnesses
swear.'... The word 'confrontation,' as the French had begun to use it, carries within itself the idea of
'facing' an accuser. Its roots are Latin: the word 'confront' ultimately derives from the prefix 'con'(from 'contra' meaning 'against' or 'opposed') and the noun 'frons' (forehead).")
116

Id., at 539-40. ("In the first half of the sixteenth century, practitioners must have begun to use the
phrase 'face-to-face' to capture the essence of a defendant's right to confrontation. The time of this
development can be inferred with some certainty. In Joos de Damhouder's Praxis rerum criminalium
(Practice in Criminal Matters), published in 1554, the author remarks that 'we call' the practice of
producing witnesses before a defendant 'confrontation, as a received word rather than one coming from
the Latin, that is, face to face.' Damhouder's Praxis, however, was a plagiarism of a then-unpublished
work written some forty years earlier, the Practijcke criminele (c. 1510) by Philips Wielant, a Flemish
jurist. Because Damhouder's parenthetical interpolation does not appear in the corresponding chapter
ofWielant's work, it must have been in the interval between the two that thephrase 'face-to-face' came
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court.

This provision did not include cross-examining the accusing witnesses, or

even hearing the witnesses while they testified. 117

Pierre Ayrault, 118 believing it is

natural and consequently common that the accused be heard, and that accusing
witnesses be brought before him to allege the crime of which they are accusing him
so that that if he has something to say against them, he may say it, and that the
witnesses may see and recognize the person whom they are deposing, suggested that
the ancient Roman practice which embraced the idea of leaving the questioning of
I

witnesses to the parties rather than to the judge should be preferable to that of his
time. 119

Ayrault also emphasized that confronting witnesses should be carried out in

;'
~

I,

~It

into general use to describe confrontation." )
117

Id., 540. ("This was far from the practice of Rome in Cicero's day, when accusing witnesses
testified in open court before the defendant and were subjected to cross-examination by the defendant's
counsel. The discrepancy between the ancient practice and the minimal procedural right of the
Middle Ages is sharp." )

t ,,'

,.

~

liB

Pierre Ayrualt was a prominent jurist of the sixteenth century.

Id., at 541.

l '
J

9

u Id. ("Ayrault (1536-1601) viewed the criminal justice system of his day from within. Ayrault was a
prominent lawyer who later became a criminal judge in the city of Angers. His contemporaries
remembered him for his rigorous severity, or, as the epitaph on his tombstone read, for being 'the terror
of the guilty.' However, they also remembered him for his wide knowledge of the criminal law, his
conscientiousness in applying it, and his ability to safeguard the rights of the accused. In a massive
treatise, entitled Ordre, formalite et instruction judiciaire, Ayrault took a searching look at the
contemporary French criminal procedure and disliked much of what he saw. Ayrault began his
consideration of the requirement of confrontation by stating why confrontation was necessary and what
it comprised. And in truth it seems that it is natural and consequently common to all men that the
accused be heard; and that the witnesses who are charging him be brought before him, to sustain face to
face the crime of which they are accusing him, in order that if he has something to say against them, he
may say it; and that the witnesses may see and recognize the person about whom they are deposing.
As thus circumscribed, suggested Ayrault, the right proved too limited to serve the truth-finding
purpose of a criminal trial, because it did not encompass any right of the defendant to hear the witness's
testimony when given, nor did it provide an opportunity for the defendant to question the witness.
The ancient Romans, by contrast, left the interrogation of witnesses to the parties, 'for the interrogation,
to be good, must be done captiously and subtly; ... now in heat, now gently: which are all matters for
the adversary, ... not the judge ... These interrogations cannot be well suited to him who must be neutral
or impartial between the accuser and the accused'... He asserted that this practice provided for a
more searching interrogation and allowed the judge to retain his gravity and authority. 'We have
taken one ofthe extremes: and in formally removing from the parties this faculty of interrogating,

{~·
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public in order to achieve its truth-finding goal. 120

This should be done not only

',,

because in classical antiquity all trial proceedings took place outdoors and in public
and in the presence of the people, with all the judges and parties present, but also
because it is easy, behind closed doors, to adjust or diminish the evidence and to
effect intrigues or pressures. 121

While some may agree with Wigmore's viewpoint

of cross-examination as the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
I'

truth, some might question his dismissal of the production witness in the sight of the
defendant as serving only the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being

,

~

~

.

gazed upon by him. 122

Nonetheless, only that something deep in human nature, as

I'

j)

~.,,

hearing, and examining their witnesses, we have attached it to the judge in such a way that it seems that
today the poor parties are in wardship, and more blind in their proceedings than those who fence at full
midnight.'")

~
...

... e.

120

ld., at 542.

121

I'
t

I.

I~
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'

Id., at 542-4.( "Ayrault's vision was remarkable. He was espousing the right of confrontation in its
modem dimensions, as the Sixth Amendment has been held to protect it. Yet he had no contemporary
models to guide him. The expanded right he envisioned was unknown not only in the legal systems of
continental Europe, but in the common law of England as well. The trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, the
point of departure for the development of the right in Anglo-American criminal procedure, was still
fifteen years in the future. What the parchment fails to disclose is the reason why the
Romano-canonical legal system insisted upon this act in all cases, except for the canonical inquisition
against heresy. The sources are not forthcoming on this point. Certainly it was not for the sake of
cross-examination of the witnesses by the defendant, because, by the time Roman law began to require
the presence of accusing witnesses in a criminal case, the practice of cross-examination had already
gradually begun to disappear. Yet the requirement persisted. It was rigorously adhered to even in
the later Middle Ages, when it consisted solely of an opportunity for defendants to see the witnesses
against them as the witnesses took the oath. Medieval commentators indicate that this requirement
enabled a defendant to respond to a witness's testimony and to have questions put to the witness. This
does not explain, however, why many believed it so important to have the accusing witness physically
produced in court in the defendant's presence. These purposes could have been achieved simply by
providing the defendant with the names of the witnesses against him and their statements. It was the
particular genius of Ayrault to have realized that confrontation, to fulfill its truth-seeking function, had
to include cross-examination of accusing witnesses in open court. But Ayrault also perceived that the
production of the witness in court, face-to-face with the accused, was in itself fundamental.")
122

,,

Id.
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held in Coy v. Iowa, could properly justify the rule that requires having the accusing
witness physically produced in court in the defendant's presence.

123

Thus, in a sense

the right to have the accusing witness physically produced in court in the defendant's
presence itself has been rooted in the Roman and canon law for at least a thousand
years.

124

Corresponding to the development in continental Europe, in a period of three or
four hundred years, there was a complete reversal of the juror's role in England.

125

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the criminal trial was a brief and simple
affair that began almost immediately after the defendant had agreed to, or had been
coerced to submit his case to a jury. 126

123

With the development of the jury system, 127

See 487 U.S 1012, 1017, 1020 ( 1988) .

124

See Frank R. Herrmann, supra note 790, 544-5. ("Through the fifteenth century, no suggestion of
any such right existed in the English common law because witness testimony was not a feature of
criminal trials. Criminal charges were determined by the jury on the basis of its personal knowledge
of the facts and its out-of-court inquiries. In the sixteenth century, witnesses began to testify before
juries in court This procedure, however, was a matter of prosecutorial convenience, not a right of the
defendant. The deposition testimony of absent prosecution witnesses was admissible in evidence in a
criminal trial. Raleigh's trial in 1603 is significant because, there, the defendant demanded
'face-to-face' production of the witness against him as a matter of right.") See also P.R. Glazebrook,
The Reign of Mary Tudor, 1977 Crim. L. Rev. 582, 585 (1977) .
125

Initially, witnesses were used more frequently, and gradually the requirement that the trier of fact
possess knowledge of the crime came to be less important. By the end of the 1600s, the jury was
allowed to receive no information except that which was offered in court. See John C. K.lotter, supra
note 753, 7.
126

See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304, 504-5.( "In 1565 Sir Thomas Smith wrote what has become
one of the most widely quoted descriptions of the criminal felony trial of the Tudor era. According to
Smith, the trial was a brief and simple affair that began almost immediately after the defendant had
agreed or been coerced to submit his case to a jury. The jury impaneled to hear the case comprised
previously summoned local citizens. The first twelve men seated constituted the jury unless the
defendant challenged one or more. When twelve had been selected, all were sworn and the
presentation of proof began. The case for the prosecution frequently was initiated by a justice of the
peace, who read to the court from a written account of his pretrial examination ofthe defendant and
other witnesses. At the conclusion of this presentation, the witnesses were called upon, one at a time,
to provide the court with a narrative version of their experiences. Throughout this recitation process,

~I
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a complex set of rules for determining the admissibility of evidence gradually
developed 128 even though few rules appeared to have restricted the introduction of
evidence in Tudor times. 129

Once witnesses routinely testified in open court, the

jurors' practical monopoly over knowledge of the facts was broken, and once the trial

,I

judge had heard the same testimony as had the jurors, he was able to comment on the
evidence and advise the jury on how to apply the law. 130

Thus, evidence law became

necessary and the opportunity arose for the judge to regulate the trial testimony of

the witnesses and defendant were subject to disputatious questioning by the judge, jury, and each other.
Hence, the main body of the trial often became a freewheeling enquiry aptly described by Smith as an
'altercation.' Once the judge was satisfied that all relevant information had been presented, he called
a halt to the altercation, made whatever closing remarks he thought pertinent, and charged the jury to
decide the case. The jury frequently heard evidence in a number of cases before retiring to consider
its decision. Reports emanating from the Old Bailey in the 1670s and 1680s sketch a process
strikingly similar to that described by Smith more than 100 years before.")
I

~

127

See John H. Langbein, supra note 760, 1170-1. ("Toward the end of the Middle Ages the trial jury
underwent its epochal transformation from active neighborhood investigators to passive triers. The
jury came to resemble the panel that we recognize in modern practice, a group of citizens no longer
chosen for their knowledge of the events, but rather chosen in the expectation that they would be
ignorant of the events. This passive jury required a courtroom instructional proceeding at which
outside witnesses could inform them.")
128

See John C. Klotter, supra note 753, 13.

129

See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304, 505-6. (As in Smith's day, "counsel generally was not
involved in the prosecution of cases, and the judge was the primary enquirer. He did most of the
questioning, felt free to discuss the merits of the case, and even went so far as to compel jurors to
reconsider decisions with which he did not agree. Defendants could not employ counsel in felony
cases, and were personally responsible for the presentation of their defense. They could call and
examine witnesses, but, in contrast to the prosecution, witnesses offered by the defendant were not
permitted to give their testimony under oath. This was particularly important because unsworn
testimony was held to be of lesser value than that given under oath and the distinction could serve as
the basis for decision.... In all, the felony trial remained a strikingly non-adversarial proceeding.
The judge and jury were active examiners who felt themselves responsible for the development of the
case. Counsel was virtually never present Such proofs as were adduced were generally the fruits of
the judge's questioning or the altercation rather than the parties' efforts. There were few rules to
constrain the proceedings and there was virtually no recourse to appellate review." )
130

See John H. Langbein, supra note 760, 1171. (In fact, "Wigmore saw the dawning of the
instructional trial as the watershed of the law of evidence. He detected the outline of the modern law
of evidence already in the years 1500-1700, although not until the years 1790-1830 could he document
the full spring-tide of the system.")

'
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witnesses. 131

Given the development of the jury system and the English tradition of

protecting the rights of the individual, the need for guidance was obvious in that the
judges, and the laymen who participated in the trial, recognized that the jurors must
have guidance to prevent their being misled by false testimony or by evidence that
was not relevant to the issue. 132

However, since the trial merely produces the

psychological experience of conviction, not an epistemically valid truth-statement, it
is shaped and structured to emulate our most widely shared cultural understanding
about what leads to conviction. 133

While ''the rules for determining the admissibility

of evidence have changed and will continue to change," 134 along with changes in the
level of adversariness of court proceedings in English history, 135 the old approach
employed in Tudor and Stuart times 136 to prove and to determine the truth at trial was

131

Id.

132

See John C. Klotter, supra note 753, 7.

133

See Charles R. Nesson, supra note 789, 151-2. ("What is the outcome of a criminal trial? A
verdict, a conviction. These terms reflect a cultural yearning for social peace based on truth and
certitude. They project a conception of peace based on our capacity as a society objectively to
identify certain forms of behavior as good in the face of diverse, and often conflicting, subjective
notions of good behavior. This basis for peace depends on three components. First, we must be able
to articulate a widely acceptable set of rules defining good behavior. Second, we must have an
enforcement mechanism that closely tracks the rules of behavior, so that individuals may not evade
those rules by complying narrowly with the requirements of the enforcement mechanism. Finally, we
must believe that the individuals whom we coerce and subject to violence through our enforcement
mechanism have actually behaved in ways that violate our rules of behavior. Without this final
component, enforcement will yield social fear rather than social peace.")
134

See John C. Klotter, supra note 753, 13.

135

See John H. Langbein, supra note 760, 1172. ("This system hardened only in the last decades of the
eighteenth century. The precipitating event could not have been the jury, which dominated English
civil and criminal procedure from the Middle Ages, nor the instructional mode of jury trial, which was
firmly in place by the sixteenth century." )
136

See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304, 513. ("Judicial interrogation of witnesses was a prominent
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abandoned in favor of a new one.
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From a historical viewpoint, the essential attribute

of the modem law of evidence is the effort to exclude probative but problematic oral
testimony, such as hearsay, for fear of the jurors' inability to evaluate the information
properly. 137

4.3 Late Developments of the Confrontation Clause and Modem Hearsay
4.3 .1 An Overview
Although Sir Walter Raleigh had his problems with hearsay in 1603, the general
j)

rule excluding hearsay statements did not become firmly fixed in England until the

~

~

_e:
:;:')

latter decades ofthe seventeenth century. 138 During the course of the eighteenth

~~

c.
~
,.,

century, changes advanced the adversariness of criminal trials. 139

~

Accordingly,

I

~

!

based upon long judicial experience with parties, witnesses and jurors, numerous
exclusionary rules were developed which kept certain kinds of evidence from the

i'

jurors unless it met various tests, as determined by the judge. 140 In addition to the

feature of criminal courtroom procedure in Tudor and Stuart times. Such questioning tended to
concentrate power in the court's hands, and made it possible for English judges to act like inquisitors ....
It maximizes judicial power while holding to a minimum the parties' opportunity to develop the
proof.")
137

See John H. Langbein, supra note 760, 1172.

138

See Jon R. Waltz and Roger C. Park, Evidence: Cases and Materials, 89 (Foundation Press, 1999) .

139

Changes here include the growth of the party responsible for producing evidence, the involvement
of counsel in the courtroom contest, and the employment of forensic rules to regulate the prosecution of
proof. See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304, 513-72.
140

'

I

The purpose of these rules was to allow the jury to consider only evidence that was as free as
possible from the risks of irrelevancy, confusion and fraud. See John C. Klotter, supra note 753, 7.
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dominant view that the exclusionary rules evolved as a means of protecting lay jurors
from being confused and misled by potentially unreliable evidence, 141 Professor
Edmund M. Morgan once argued that the common law exclusionary approaches, such
as the hearsay rule, were mainly caused by the limitations of the adversary system,
focusing on the production of proof by the parties. 142

Regardless of answering why

these complicated rules developed at common law, this controversy at least
demonstrates that a passive fact-finder as a legal institution plays an important role in

,,

I

the development of hearsay.

The lack of such an institution explains why this

exclusionary approach did not evolve in the inquisitorial criminal procedure.

After

the development of evidence law during the eighteenth century, M. Cottu reported that
by the early nineteenth century the lawyer-driven criminal procedure emerged in
which the judge remained almost a stranger to what was going on at trial. 143
Prosecution and defense counsel examined and cross-examined the witnesses, and the
privilege against self-incrimination and the articulation of the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof appeared. 144

141

The dominant view, advanced by Professors Thayer, Wigmore, and Holdsworth, focused on the jury
itself. See Thomas P. Gallanis, supra note 776, 50 I.
142

143

144

See Edmund M. Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence, 243 ( 1963 ) .
See John H. Langbein, supra note 760, 1199.

Id.
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Professor John H. Langbein noted that "the central event in the formation of

I I

the modem law of evidence was the rapid development of adversary criminal
procedure in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, an event which thereafter came
to influence the conduct of civil trials as well;" 145 however, the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment which was passed in 1791 with little debate 146 did not exist
during the course of the development of hearsay rule that began in the mid-eighteenth
century.

What kind of influence the adoption of the Confrontation Clause would

have upon the development of evidence law, especially hearsay rule, has long become
an important issue since its promulgation in 1791.

For example, while the

Confrontation Clause does not clearly provide guidance about hearsay issues, it is

.,
I'

susceptible to a variety of textually plausible interpretations, including the following:
"Under one possible interpretation, all hearsay declarants whose statements are
offered by the prosecution would be considered 'witnesses against' the defendant,

'!

and therefore the Constitution would require that the defendant be confronted
with them at trial.

This interpretation would lead to the exclusion of all hearsay,

even hearsay that fell under an exception established at the time of the adoption of
the amendment.

~I

l'

Alternatively, one could interpret the amendment to require

145

Id., at 1172.

146

See Randolph N. Jonakait, supra note 783, 77.
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merely that the defendant be confronted with whatever witness the prosecution
chose to produce at trial.

Under this interpretation, trial witness could testify

about hearsay declarations, and the confrontation clause would impose no limits
upon the creation of new hearsay exceptions.

It would merely require the

presence of the defendant when evidence was presented to the trier of fact.

The

amendment could also be construed so that 'witnesses against' the defendant
referred only to persons who were available to testify.

Under this interpretation,

the prosecution would be required to produce declarants for cross-examination
when possible, but the statements of unavailable declarants could be freely
admitted. " 147
Thus, analysis of whether the introduction of hearsay would violate the Confrontation
Clause is necessary in determining the criminal admissibility of hearsay.

At least

five confrontation theories, including the minimalist theory, the production theory, the
l,
•I

reliability theory, the centrality theory, and the procedural theory might explain how

!!

I

·~
I

the Confrontation Clause operates on hearsay offered into evidence. 148

As a result,

in criminal trials, even if hearsay testimony meets the requirements of a hearsay
exception, by invoking the Confrontation Clause, the criminal defendant still has a

147

The Supreme Court has never adopted either of the extreme interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause. See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 368.
148

See Christopher B. Mueller, supra note 781, 428-9.

r:J.r•
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last resort to challenge it. 149
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Notwithstanding, under the adversarial and accusatorial

criminal procedure, what developed as a matter of law concerning the Confrontation
Clause and hearsay, as stated in Funk v. United States, should comply with the
following sentiment:
"The fundamental basis upon which all rules of evidence must rest if they are to
rest upon reason is their adaptation to the successful development of the truth.
And, since experience is of all teachers the most dependable, and since experience
also is a continuous process, it follows that a rule of evidence at one time thought
necessary to the ascertainment of the truth should yield to the experience of a
succeeding generation whenever that experience has clearly demonstrated the
fallacy or unwisdom of the old rule." 150
Even though the central task of the modem law of evidence is to control the
fact-adducing process at oral jury trial, 151 not until 1895 did the United States
Supreme Court, in Mattox v. United States, begin to address issues between the
introduction of hearsay and the Confrontation Clause.
,,
,,

.,

After the Court started to

review the relationship between hearsay and the Confrontation Clause, the
Post-Mattox practice of evidential hearsay would definitely look different from the
149

See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 367.

tso See 290 U.S. 371,381 ( 1933) .
lSI

See John H. Langbein, supra note 760, 1174.
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development of its Pre-Mattox counterparts.

Moreover, starting with Pointer v.

I

l

Texas in 1965, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the states
are obliged to provide the defendant with the fundamental right to confront the
witnesses against him. 152

4.3.2 Hearsay in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries
It is generally accepted that in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, it
was the trial judge who examined the witnesses and the accused. 153

Further, the trial

judge, like the modern Continental presiding judge, dominated the proceedings. 154
As recorded by Geoffrey Gilbert, who had little thought for exclusionary hearsay in

l.i
his posthumous publication on "The Law ofEvidence," 155 criminal procedure by the
end of the seventeenth century was decidedly non-adversarial where lawyers had no
great part to play in courtroom proceedings. 156

152

See 380 U.S. 400 ( 1965) .

153

See Randolph N. Jonakait, supra note 783, 82.

154

See John H. Langbein, supra note 402, 315.

155

Moreover, in addition to relying very

See Thomas P. Gallanis, supra note 776, 503-5. ("According to Wigmore, Gilbert's treatise did not
reflect mideighteenth-century practice. The treatise had emphasized the rules governing written
evidence - records, deeds, bills of exchange, wills, and the like -- and this struck Wigmore as an
out-of-date, seventeenth-century perspective. The real developments in the eighteenth century, said
Wigmore, occurred with respect to oral evidence and sprang from the increased use of
cross-examination by counsel. Such developments were not discussed in Gilbert's text, and therefore
Wigmore argued that the book was chiefly the natural culmination of the prior century's work.")
Furthermore, Gilbert's book was essentially an abridgement, a law-finder that collected precedents,
mostly from published yearbooks and law reports, but also from the juristic literature. See John H.
Langbein, supra note 760, 1173.
156

See Randolph N. Jonakait, supra note 783, 83.
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little on cross examination, evidence law focused mainly on written rather than oral
proof. 157

It is unclear why courts continued to allow witnesses to recite what they

had learned from someone else, and why hearsay was generally and heavily relied
upon in determining criminal cases until the early eighteenth century.

The

widespread acceptance of hearsay might be explained by the lack of other readily
available sources of information, for example, the original speaker's inability to
testify. 158

That counsel rarely appeared in the course of criminal trials 159 resulted in

little evidence law to regulate counsel's courtroom behaviors. 160

Accordingly,

157

See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304, 595. (At the beginning of the eighteenth century, legal
scholars portrayed the trial as a process which narrowly confined the introduction of evidence and
allowed litigants few opportunities for direction and control. The chief expositor of this view and a
seminal figure in the development of the rules of evidence was Sir Geoffrey Gilbert, Lord Chief Baron
of the Exchequer. Although his treatise, The Law of Evidence, was not published in authoritative
form untill754 (28 years after his death), it is generally agreed that Gilbert's work reflects an
understanding of evidence formed no later than the opening decade of the eighteenth century.) See
also Thomas P. Gallanis, supra note 776, 505.(Furthermore, "Gilbert's treatise had a five-part structure.
The first part, a short introduction, discussed degrees of probability and the so-called best evidence rule.
The second part classified various forms of written evidence and explained the rules governing their
presentation in court The third part concerned problems of unwritten evidence, focusing entirely on
the competence of witnesses. The fourth part offered guidance on how to evaluate evidence, using
(among other tools) legal presumptions and a hierarchy of proofs. The fifth and final part explored
the relationship between evidence and pleading.") and see Geoffrey Gilbert, The Law of Evidence
(Facsimile of the 1754 edition) , 112 (Garland Publishing Inc., 1979) .
158

See Thomas P. Gallanis, supra note 776, 514-5. (For instance, "statements by persons since
deceased were routinely accepted without any of the indicia of reliability later required of so-called
dying declarations. Only in five cases, each involving blatant hearsay, do the sources record that the
judges showed any concern about its probative value. In one of the cases, the original speaker himself
later testified; in the other four cases, the prisoner was ultimately acquitted. Some notion thus existed
of hearsay as an evidentiary problem, but the rules restricting it had not yet fully developed.")
159

160

I.
I

See Randolph N. Jonakait, supra note 783, 94.

See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304, 533-4. (As noted by Professor Stephan Landsman, "from
1717 to 172 7, lawyers were said to be present in no more than three 0 ld Bailey cases in any year
analyzed. While this does not necessarily mean that advocates appeared in only three cases in each of
those years, it does signal a very low level oflegal participation in the cases tried and little interest in
the exploits of counsel by the editor, and perhaps readers, of the OBSP. In the absence of counsel, the
judge obviously managed proceedings and adversarial developments were few.. .. It is virtually
impossible to generalize about the role of counsel based upon the tiny sample of six cases available
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thanks to the broad discretion of individual trial judges, the embryonic exclusionary
rules of hearsay were frequently disregarded even as late as the 1750s. 161

J

r

Under this

trend, hearsay evidence was treated very loosely and inconsistently and both oral and
written materials were permissively used with very little restraint. 162

Nevertheless,

from the early period (1717 -1727). Three of the six early cases were misdemeanors in which none of
the restrictive rules concerning felony litigation applied. These cases are, therefore, of limited
assistance in providing information about procedure in the Old Bailey's regular felony caseload.
What lawyers seemed to do in their few reported appearances, both misdemeanor and felony, was to
press legal arguments on a variety of technical points and occasionally engage in cross-examination.
Both these tasks were to become mainstays of the lawyer's function in later times and were to be used
by counsel as a means of guiding or controlling litigation. In the early years, however, both functions
seemed to have been narrowly circumscribed. The general impression made by these cases is that
counsel was an adjunct to the proceedings and his activities were not critical to the development of the
proof.")
161

To some extent, Gilberts emphasis on writings captured an important aspect of civil practice, where
documentary proof was required in a number of cases. In addition, Gilbert's decision to spend little
time on questions of oral evidence mirrored the approach of mid-eighteenth-century law; the modem
rules governing testimony had not yet hardened, If anything, the treatise underestimated the power of
individual trial judges to decide evidentiary matters as they saw fit. Some ofthe firm principles that
Gilbert announced, such as the best evidence rule, the various grounds for testimonial incapacity, and
the rule that hearsay should have no value, gave way in particular cases as juries heard witness after
witness and judges exercised their broad discretion. See Thomas P. Gallanis, supra note 776, 503, 515.
Besides, necessity provided a motive for the introduction of hearsay in situations other than the death
of a critical witness. For example, "one 1722 rape case involved an assault upon a five year old who
apparently was unable or incompetent to testify. If her assailant were to be prosecuted, the child's
out-of-court remarks had to be utilized. To all appearances they were and the defendant was
convicted. Hearsay might prove useful in less dramatic situations as well. It might help explain, for
example, how the prosecutor had come to suspect the defendant or provide a substitute for the
testimony of a witness rendered unavailable because of his or her pecuniary interest in the
proceedings." See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304, 566.

''!
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162

See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304, 565-6. (For example, "when Mrs. Welsted found some of
her things missing she suspected her servant, Bithiah Mitchel. '[U]pon inquiry [she] found some of
them sold to a Chandler Woman, who bought them of the Prisoner's Mother.' This information
appeared to have been presented at trial by the victim rather than the chandler woman and falls into the
classic hearsay pattern of out-of-court statements introduced to prove the truth of what they assert -- in
this case that the defendant's mother had sold some of the stolen items. The pattern was repeated
throughout the era. In the case of Christopher Atkinson it was claimed that the defendant had beaten
Alice Peak to death. The second witness against Atkinson was Mrs. Hart. She testified '[t]hat the
Deceased told her, that the Prisoner threw her down a pair of Stairs in his own House ... [t]hat the
Deceased said, the Prisoner stampt on her Belly in the Coach, and that she laid her Death to him.'
Again the testimony was based upon out-of-court words and seems to have been received without
objection. Letters and other writings were used in the same manner. When Thomas Panting was
accused of filing down gold coins so that the filings might be separately sold for a profit, he denied the
charge and claimed that he was pursuing honest business on behalf of a gentleman living in Beesley,
Gloucestershire. One of the prosecution's witnesses was allowed to testify that 'he sent to the
Minister of the Place and received from him two Letters which were produced in Court: The Import of
which was, that he had made very diligent Inquiry, and that there was no such Person there.' The
unhesitating use of hearsay here was perhaps even more significant than in the preceding cases because

.j
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judges and jurists in the latter seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries seemed to
understand that something was wrong with hearsay. 163

Since hearsay evidence asks

the trier of fact to believe that what was previously said or written is true, it is
recognized that if such words are used in court there is no way for an opposing party
to cross-examine the out-of-court speaker and thus no chance to examine his or her
credibility. 164
Sporadically, rather than respond to party objections, courts voluntarily started to
develop hearsay rules in order to exclude untested material and began to require the
party offering it to demonstrate its particular reliability. 165

With the growth of

counsel prosecuted the action and appeared to have carefully assembled the evidence. It would seem
that not even counsel was particularly concerned about potential hearsay problems in this era.")
In
other words, the courts treated the whole matter inconsistently, and in most cases permissively. See
also Thomas P. Gallanis, supra note 776, 514-5.
163

See John H. Langbein, supra note 760, 1187-8. ("There are cases in the State Trials and in the
nominate reports disapproving of hearsay, cases that led Wigmore to the mistaken view that the hearsay
rule received a complete development and final precision in the early 1700s. We recall the case in
which counsel raised the hearsay objection that Ryder dismissed, and we have noticed Gilbert's
peculiar two-paragraph account addressing that.hearsay is no Evidence.")
I

I

I

164

See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304,566-7. ("The use ofhearsay in all these circumstances
deprived the opposing party of any opportunity to conduct cross-examination. Participants in Old
Bailey proceedings apparently grasped the dangerous potential of using untested materials to convict
defendants. Butler Fox was accused of robbing Sir Edward Lawrence. Arrayed against him were a
number of witnesses including Jonathan WLld who would, in a few short years, be exposed as the
mastermind of a series of criminal schemes including the framing of innocent men. In Fox's case,
Wild 'deposed that when the prisoner was taken, his Wife said, This is your Friend Hawkins's doing.'
This sort of inculpatory hearsay statement could be incredibly damning and was virtually immune to
effective refutation. For schemes like those of the mercenary and cunning Wild, lax hearsay rules
were made to order.")
165

II

I

Id., at 567-9. ("In any given year, cases sensitive to a particular hearsay issue might be found
immediately preceeding reports failing to identify an almost identical hearsay problem. Alternatively,
one sort of hearsay might be successfully challenged in a case, while other sorts might be admitted
without question in the same proceeding. There are a number of explanations for these variations.
First, in any developing area of the law, accurate identification of a problem is only likely to be
managed by the more skilled and sophisticated judges and lawyers. Since Old Bailey cases were
handled by a number of different judges and advocates, fluctuations are to be expected. Further, both
the OBSP and other materials suggest that the hearsay problem was not seen in the eighteenth century
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exploiting cross-examination and counsel's use of the evidentiary objection in the
1730's, judicial control of trial proceedings began to decline, 166 and a new approach
of contentious criminal procedure relying more on party-conducted interrogation
started to arise. 167

This approach shifted responsibility for the development of the

case from the court to the litigants. 168
circumspect about hearsay.169

Over the years, courts gradually grew more

This resulted, especially from the middle of the

~·
l
I

as a single issue but rather as a series of discrete questions about different sorts of statements made in
different circumstances. This division made it virtually inevitable that there would be a diversity of
results in different settings. Despite these difficulties, rules proscribing hearsay did grow.... Most
of the early hearsay rulings came about when judges acted sua sponte rather than in response to party
objections. Such was the situation in Mason and in the case of William Flemming. In the latter,
when two of the defendant's witnesses wanted to repeat what a man named Cartwright had said about
the offering of bribes to frame the defendant, the court cut them off. The judge declared: 'What they
said is no Evidence, they should have been here to have sworn it.' The same thing happened in the
case of Colonel Francis Fuller, where the court stopped a surgeon from repeating the out-of-court
observation of a barber that the deceased victim's blood seemed fizy. The Fuller case, however,
illustrates how much hearsay was still beyond notice or objection. Words from the deceased were
quoted by at least two witnesses without objection. Similarly, the coroner quoted, without restraint,
from the out-of-court declarations of several surgeons (who later testified), as well as from an
anonymous letter of accusation. Finally, one of the physicians who examined the body of the
deceased was asked by counsel to relate a conversation he had had with a corporal in the dead man's
military detachment. This statement also was admitted without objection.")
166

See Randolph N. Jonakait, supra note 783, 89.

167

See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304, 514, 534-5. ("In the 1730s, counsel appeared to take a far
more significant part in 0 ld Bailey proceedings. Their presence on behalf of both prosecutors and
prisoners was noted with increasing frequency. The apparent influx of lawyers on the defense side
was particularly interesting because limitations on a prisoner's use of counsel were still in effect. The
courts appear to have reinterpreted these limits not as a total ban but simply as a prohibition of
speeches, observations, or arguments about the facts. Defense counsel could interrogate witnesses,
argue points of law, and seek enforcement of the rules of evidence. These options were increasingly
exploited.... Through cross-examination, defense counsel could present his theory of the case, refute
an opponen 's claims, develop favorable proof, discredit opposing witnesses, and generally advance his
client's position before the jury. In the 1730s, the process of exploiting cross-examination for all
these ends grew significantly.")
16s
169

Id.

Id., at 569.( "The court made an effort to confme the victim of a theft in this manner in the Symonds
case. The judge said: 'You don't know any thing particularly, whether this House was locked or
fastened, but as you have been told.' The same was true in the case of Jane Stabock, when the judge
said to the prosecuting witness: 'Then all you know of your own Knowledge is, that you lost Money at
several Times out of your Till; do you know any Thing of your own Knowledge against the Prisoner at
the Bar ... ?' With the passage of the years, the pace of such questioning quickened. The
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eighteenth century on, in a common refrain of trial judges admonishing witnesses they
should limit themselves to their personal knowledge. 170

As courts and counsel

moved with increasing frequency to bar witnesses from reciting hearsay material,
judges and lawyers alike were getting more and more adept at identifying hearsay and
keeping it away from the jury. 171

Eventually, the growing level of sophistication

about hearsay led to disputes between counsel and the court about the application of
the rule. 172
rules.

Such disputes spurred and shaped the modem development of hearsay

While the rule prohibiting the use of hearsay is intimately associated with an

adversarial approach to litigation, 173 the stricter the enforcement of the hearsay rule,
I '

!
!
I

!

equivalence between such questions and worries about hearsay was made particularly clear in the case
of Samuel Drybutter. There, when one of the prosecution's witnesses made a questionable assertion
he was immediately asked: 'Do you know this of your own knowledge, or by hear-say?"')

; I

iI I
!

I

i'

110

Id.

171

Id., at 569-70.

I

172

Id., at 570-1. ("A notable example occurred in the forgery prosecution of Dr. William Dodd. The
hearsay question arose when Mr. Manley, a key prosecution witness, sought to narrate a conversation
he had engaged in with the prosecutor, Lord Chesterfield. The court was in favor of giving Manley
latitude, but defense counsel objected: 'Mr. Manley knows very well what is evidence, and therefore I
desire he will not enter into any other particulars. The court dismissed counsel's objection and desired
that the witness be allowed to 'go on without interruption.' The testimony resumed and immediately
Manley launched into a detailed description of his conversation with Chesterfield. Counsel objected
again." "Counsel for the Prisoner: 'This is, my Lord, what passed in conversation with Mr. Manley
and other persons in the absence of Dr. Dodd, your lordship knows it is not admissible evidence against
the prisoner.' Court: 'Lord Chesterfield has been already examined as an evidence. They may ask
the question of Lord Chesterfield, whether, when the bond was offered by Mr. Manley, he disowned it:
this is in the course of the narrative; I shall not sum this up to the jury; but when they bring Dr. Dodd
present it will be evidence."' "Counsel here made it clear that there was a serious hearsay problem.
The court understood the claim but, because of the availability of Lord Chesterfield, saw the matter as
trivial since Chesterfield could easily be recalled to the stand to confirm the fact that he had disowned
the bond. Yet the court conceded counsel's correctness and, in a gesture familiar to practitioners in
modem adversarial courts, promised to take steps to insure that the jury would not place excessive
reliance on this hearsay information." )
173

See Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 1339, 1375-76
( 1987) .
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the more adversarial the proceedings are likely to be.

174

1..

I
I

In other words, because

judges gradually began to recognize the dangers of hearsay during the eighteenth
century, a rather strict rule of exclusion of hearsay developed. 175

l

I"

I'I

Afterwards, the

hearsay rule, which generally worked to compel the production of live testimony and
increased the opportunities for contentious examination, became ever more formal. 176
Consequently, both counsel and the court were increasingly likely to insist on its
enforcement. 177

As a result, the prohibition against hearsay became the centerpiece

of modem evidence law by the nineteenth century. 178

In summary, during the

eighteenth century, the growth of the hearsay rule came in three stages:
"In the earliest years of the century there was little concern about the use of
out-of-court words.

By the 1730s, the rudiments of the hearsay rule were

established and at least sporadically applied.

By the closing decades of the

century a more sophisticated rule had been developed and was being applied in a
constantly broadening range of cases." 179

In addition, as John M. Beattie observed, for the purpose of avoiding the
174

See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304, 565.

115

Id., at 572.

176

In addition, it also served as a tool that counsel might manipulate in pursuing a client's interests.

Id.
177

178

179

Id.
See Thomas P. Gallanis, supra note 776, 503.
Id.

•'
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prosecuting witness standing to receive a substantial reward for convicting the
defendant, 180 defense counsel in the 1780's conducted particularly vigorous and
effective cross-examinations in cases involving potentially tainted witnesses.

181

The

late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the era known as the "spring-tide" of
the evidence system, witnessed the vigorous development of the rules of evidence. 182

180

See John M. Beattie, supra note 378, 231, 245.

181

See John H. Langbein, supra note 760, l197-8. ("Beattie attributes some of the clarification of the
rules of evidence in criminal cases in the eighteenth century to the growing influence of defense
counsel. For a before-and-after contrast, consider the handling of potentially involuntary confessions
early and late in the century. Beattie extracts from a pamphlet report of Surrey assize proceedings
held in 173 8 a case in which a master had induced his female servant to confess to a felony upon the
promise of impunity; the master then used the confession to prosecute her. Willes, C.J ., presiding at
the trial, denounced the master's behavior. He told the jury, 'I hope what [the master] ... said will
have no Weight with the Jury .... ' Thus, in 1738 the defect still affected credit, or 'Weight with the
Jury,' as Willes put it By 1783, the confession rule in Warickshall had cast the matter as a rule of
exclusion.")
182

See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304, 595-6. ("Wigmore described this era as the spring-tide of
the evidence system. Between 1800 and 1815 a series of remarkable volumes concerning the topic
were produced. These demonstrated that substantial change had occurred since the early 1700s in
conceptions of both the trial and the rules that managed it By general consensus the leading works of
the era were Thomas Peake's, A Compendium of the Law of Evidence (1801); William David Evans's
essay, On the Law of Evidence, attached as Appendix XVI to his translation from the French of
Pothier's, A Treatise on the Law of Obligations (1806); and S.M. Phillipps's, A Treatise on the Law of
Evidence (1814). These books approached their topic from a variety of perspectives. Peake, like
Gilbert before him, attempted to catalogue the evidence rules ofhis day. His was an extension of the
techniques used by the Lord Chief Baron to categorize and classify all proof. Peake's work was
essentially a practitioner's handbook that, Wigmore suggested, was out of date within a few years of its
publication. Evans took a far more analytical approach to the subject Wigmore claimed that
Evans's essay was the first reasoned analysis of the rules. Its impact may be seen in a number of
works that followed, including Phillipps's treatise which sought to combine the practitioner's
perspective with the critical approach suggested by Evans. In what follows, the views of each of these
scholars will be compared with those of Gilbert in an effort to highlight the growing influence ofthe
adversarial concept. Gilbert used the best evidence concept as the organizing and limiting principle of
the rules of evidence. While none of his three successors rejected the best evidence rule, all sought to
cabin it by according oral evidence greater importance. Peake stressed the regular need for recourse
to the testimony of others. Evans went further and argued that the best evidence system of precaution
may be carried too far. Phillipps followed Evans's lead and relegated the best evidence rule to the
sixth section of Chapter VII of his Treatise, some 176 pages into the text. It was treated with no
greater dignity than rules concerning relevance, presumptions, or hearsay, and more pages were
devoted to its exceptions than its attributes. While Phillipps's analysis contained no radical alteration
of the law, the relegation of the rule to this subordinate position clearly signaled a diminution in its
importance. It was no longer, in any sense, the organizing principle of evidence analysis. On the
strength of the best evidence concept Gilbert built a whole hierarchy of proofs and mathematics of
decision. One of the key assumptions of this structure was the superiority of written proofs to oral
testimony. Peake, Evans, and Phillipps did not directly challenge Gilbert's assertion about writings.
In fact, Evans specifically reiterated it. Their analyses, however, suggested a far more balanced view
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Obviously, while Thomas Peake, William David Evans, and S.M. Phillips were all
concerned with the use of oral testimony in their leading works, parole evidence
became the most significant area of growth and change in the field of evidence law. 183
By distinguishing between questions of credibility and competence, and recognizing
that exclusions based on a lack of competence ought to be curtailed, these individuals
advocated changes that opened the doors of the courtroom to an increased volume of
evidence. 184

The views of these writers were instrumental in shifting criminal

procedure to a more adversarial approach based on litigant presentation and
interrogation. 185

Unlike Gilbert's vision, 186 these writers considered that the oath

of the relation between oral and written proof. Peake and Evans devoted approximately as much
space to questions concerning unwritten as written proof. Phillipps went further. Not only did he
lend about equal space to the two sorts of evidence, he began the Treatise by considering testimonial
matters and relegated the question of written materials to the second half of the volume.")
183

As Peake said in his Preface of A Compendium of the Law of Evidence: "The chapter on Parol
Testimony, ... is in a great measure new; for the rules of evidence in this respect have been so much
altered, and so much light have been thrown on them by modem decisions, that, comparatively, little is
to be collected from ancient books that is satisfactory on the subject It was said by Lord
Mansfield ... , We do not sit here to take our rules of evidence from Sidesin or Kebe." This new
approach recognized the greater importance of testimony in court. Gone was much of the hierarchical
analysis and mathematical thinking that constrained Gilbert's work. ld., at 597.
184

Id.

ISS

ld.

186

See Thomas P. Gallanis, supra note 776, 509. ("Taking Gilbert's treatise as a whole, we can see at
least one theme with crystal clarity: the primacy of writings over testimony. For Gilbert, the law of
evidence fundamentally concerned written proof. Not only did he devote considerably more space to
questions of documentary evidence, but his organizing principle -- the best evidence rule -- was itself
primarily aimed at writings. It appeared on numerous occasions throughout the section on written
evidence, for example, but at no point did it appear in the section on competence. The law of oral
evidence, which occupies so much of modem attention, meant for Gilbert simply the rules governing
the capacity to testify; compared with modem writers on evidence, he had relatively little to say about
what should happen once a witness began to speak.")
See also John H. Langbein, supra note 760,
1174-5. ("The main topic of Gilbert's treatment of unwritten evidence is his account of the rules that
mndisqualify from testifying those persons who were deemed to be interested in the outcome of the
litigation, another subject that figures centrally in the Ryder notes. The rest of Gilbert's book
concerns the sufficiency of evidence, a topic that actually sounds in substantive law: What facts support
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alone no longer occupied the center of oral testimony. 187

:I

Instead, they embraced

cross-examination as the crucial element in courtroom adjudication. 188

For instance,

in his critical book, "A Compendium of the Law of Evidence," Thomas Peake stated:
"The Law never gives credit to the bare assertion of any one, however high his
rank, or pure his morals, but always requires the sanction of an oath: It further
requires his personal attendance in Court, that he may be examined and cross
examined by the different parties, and, therefore, in cases depending on parole
evidence, the testimony of persons who are themselves conusant [sic] of the facts

~

I

what causes of action? Much of this law arose in the setting of pleading, or on post-trial proceedings.
Accordingly, these cases are not much concerned with the central task of the modem law of evidence,
which is to control the fact-adducing process at oral jury trial. Gilbert prefaced this discussion with a
slight account of burdens of proof and presumptions, from which be digressed for his two-paragraph
treatment of hearsay. ' [A] mere Hearsay is no Evidence,' Gilbert writes, because although the
courtroom witness is on oath, 'yet the Person who spoke it was not upon Oath .... • This want of oath
renders the testimony 'of no Value in a Court of Justice, where all Things [require] ... the Solemnities
of an Oath .... ' Unlike the modem rationale for excluding hearsay, which emphasizes as the critical
deficiency that the hearsay declarant cannot be cross-examined, Gilbert focuses entirely on the
cautionary effect of 'the Solemnities of an Oath.' Gilbert also favored admitting hearsay when other
evidence corroborated it, a notion that is impossible to reconcile either with Gilbert's oath-based
account of what is wrong with hearsay, or with the emphasis in nineteenth-century hearsay doctrine on
the importance of cross-examining the declarant. Thus hearsay, that centerpiece ofthe modem law of
evidence, was for Gilbert, as for his followers Bathurst and Buller, a curio that rated only a passing
mention. We shall see that the Ryder notes and other evidence from contemporaneous practice
strongly confirm the impression that we derive from Gilbert, that the hearsay rule was not yet in place
in a recognizably modem form. In sum, as Gilbert envisioned the law of evidence, it dealt with three
broad topics: the proof of writings, the disqualification of witnesses for interest, and the sufficiency of
evidence according to the criteria of substantive law." )
187

See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304, 597-8. ("The oath figured centrally in Gilbert's vision of
the worth of oral testimony. It was, however, relegated to a strikingly marginal position by his
successors. While Peake continued to refer to the importance of the oath, his real emphasis was on its
connection with cross-examination. Oaths remained a necessary part of the courtroom apparatus, but
they were far from the evidentiary sin qua non that Gilbert had hypothesized. They were beginning to
assume the appearance of a formality. The oath was abandoned as the mechanical yardstick for
measuring credibility. As noted by both Evans and Phillipps, the holding in Ormichund v. Barker, a
case allowing a Gentoo to swear according to the dictates of his religion rather than conform to
Judeo-Christian requirements, had rendered the oath a matter of individualized application rather than a
uniform shibboleth. The very necessity for an oath was questioned in situations like those involving
Quakers.")
t88
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they relate, must in general be produced .... " 189
Moreover, writing in 1806 in what was at that time the most sophisticated
account of the Anglo-American law of evidence yet produced, William David Evans
commented on the changed dynamic of the adversary trial, which required the judge
to become passive while counsel conducted the trial. 190

He also emphasized the

need for cross-examination, which embodied a new conception of the legal process
where the cross-examination of witnesses by skilled counsel was of such importance
that the process was rendered suspect without it. 191

Based upon the Roman law

189

See Thomas Peake, A Compendium ofthe Law of Evidence (Facsimile ofthe 1801 edition) , 7-8
( Garland Publishing Inc., 1979 ) . In addition, as noted by Professor Stephan Landsman,
"Questioning here was presented as an integral part of the process. The sense of routine incorporation
of cross-examination pervaded Peake's work and presented a significant contrast to Gilbert's position.
While it cannot be said that Peake viewed interrogation as the core of the courtroom process, it
certainly bad come to occupy a place of genuine importance. With this growth in importance came an
increased inclination to see trials as adversarial events involving the give-and-take of rigorous
questioning." See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304, 598.
190

See John H. Langbein, supra note 760, 1200-1. ("The benefits of cross-examination are sometimes
defeated by the interposition of the Court, to require an explanation of the motive and object of the
questions proposed, or to pronounce a judgment upon their immateriality. The trial judge, acting only
upon the impressions of what has already been disclosed, cannot by any possibility anticipate what
counsel is attempting to show." )
191

See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304, 599-600. ("Evans challenged the use of a magistrate's
pretrial examination of witnesses in felony prosecutions because the accused has not those assistances
for analysing the proofs which are adduced against him, which exist upon a solemn trial, where he can
call in aid the exertions of judicious advocates. There was nothing in Gilbert's work that even
remotely approached this sensitivity to the need for cross-examination. Before the early nineteenth
century, the most that was ever called for was physical confrontation between witness and accused.
As long as the defendant was present, words spoken at pretrial hearings generally were admissible.
Evans depicted advocates as vigorous and skilled examiners. Their effectiveness created problems
because witnesses could be prevented by an intimidating and acrimonious course of inquiry from
giving an accurate and complete account of what they knew. Evans provided a detailed review of
advocates' tricks (disengenuous artifices) ranging from suggestive interrogation to captious
cross-examination. In the end, one gets the impression that for Evans, cross-examination bad become
the central focus of adjudication and that its regulation was vital to the administration of justice. No
fixed rules, however, could limit examination. The abuses to which this procedure is liable are the
subject of very frequent complaint, but it would be absolutely impossible, by any general rules, to
apply a preventive to these abuses, without destroying the liberty upon which the benefits above
averted to essentially depend: and all that can be effected by the interposition of the Court, is a
discouragement of any virulence towards the witnesses which is not justified by the nature of the cause,
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tradition that if any fact is to be substantiated against a person, it ought to be proved in
his presence by the testimony of a witness sworn to speak the truth where the person,
who is to be affected by the evidence, may have the opportunity to interrogate the
witness as to his means of knowledge and concerning all the particulars of the fact. 192

Mr. S.M. Phillips later made it clear that vigorous cross-examination and
interrogation were integral parts of courtroom procedure in that the rules of
interrogation, including those about leading questions, compulsion to respond to
potentially incriminating questions, and the handling of hostile witnesses, were
premised upon the assumption that cross-examination would be rigorous and vital to
decision-making. 193
~
l

I

While early nineteenth century writers began to view litigation

as a fundamentally adversarial contest, rules regulating cross-examination were
becoming firmly established as one of the pillars of the adjudicatory edifice. 194

.!
I

By

and a sedulous attention to remove from the minds of the jury the impressions which are rather to be
imputed to the vehemence of the advocate, than to the prevarication of the witness. Counsel had to be
allowed great latitude to ensure effective examination. Evans urged judicial restraint because the
judge, acting only upon the impressions of what has already been disclosed, cannot by any possibility
anticipate what is of critical importance in the testimony. In these views the contentious spirit is
ascendant. Advocates had become masters of the courtroom, and their adversarial enquiry the heart of
the process.")
192

Id., at 600.

193

Id.

194

Id., at 601-2. ("The participants in the adjudicatory process generally were assigned what would,
today, be considered adversarial roles. The jury was treated as a neutral and passive factfinding body
that was to be informed by means of party interrogation of witnesses. This interrogation was the core
of courtroom procedure and the basis for judgment. Categorical restraints and numerical notions had,
for the most part, been abandoned as guides to decision. Preference for writings had been eroded, as
had insistence on oaths and exclusion of witnesses. Counsel were now depicted as critical
participants in the gathering of proof. In criminal, as well as civil cases, lawyers were viewed as a
vital part of the process. They, rather than judges, guided interrogation. When courts interfered with
examination they were criticized. The rising intensity of zealous advocacy was observed and

297

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

the early nineteenth century, the earlier regime of judicial discretion had been largely
replaced by considerably less flexible exclusionary rules. 195

These rules had

experienced significant development and were not only in a much more recognizably
modem form, but were also applied in a more distinctly modem way. 196 As. a whole,

I·
with the belief that a neutral and essentially passive judiciary would be the most
effective defender of what Blackstone called liberty, following the development of
evidence law, the adversary system grew as a consequence of the steady narrowing of

I
f
I

f

judicial authority, wherein "Lawyers replaced judges as managers of the courtroom
contest.

The rules of evidence limited judicial discretion, and contentious

examination replaced the inquisition." 197
The change to think heavily of parole evidence could also be verified by

~

Professor Thomas Starkie's leading work, "A Practical Treatise of the Law of

I

Evidence, And Digest of Proofs in Civil and Criminal Proceedings." 198

J.
According to

commented upon. Excesses of zeal including improper witness preparation, the use of experts who
were little more than advocates themselves, and pressures to adopt the passions, and prejudices of ...
clients, were all noted as sources of concern.... The contentious approach was established as the
fundamental means of conducting business. What the evidence scholars had done was validate or
legitimate the adversarial mechanism. Even the most outspoken critic of then-existing courtroom
procedure, Jeremy Bentham, seemed to accept much of the adversarial view with his sweeping
endorsement of oral testimony, broad reliance on adversarial interrogation, and recognition of the need
for zealous advocates.")
195

196

See Thomas P. Gallanis, supra note 776, 503.
Id.

197

In fact, the too active judge, like Buller in Rex v. Shipley, 21 St Tr. 847 ( 1783-84) , was subjected
to the sharpest criticism. See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304, 604.
198

See Thomas P. Gallanis, supra note 776, 516-7. ( "Starkie divided his treatise into four sections.
The first examined selected 'Principles of Evidence,' including the distinction between direct and
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:I
Professor John Henry Wigmore's treatise, there emerged a consciously and fully
realized system of evidence by 1824 in that the influence of Gilbert's treatise between
1790 and 1830 was in decline and the rules regulating testimonial proof seemed to
reach the same level of prominence as those governing writings. 199

Because Starkie

thought oral proof was more important and reliable than its documentary equivalent,

II
.I

not only did he devote far more attention to the rule against hearsay, but he also
discussed a number of topics that Gilbert had left completely untouched. 200

A

; I

well-settled rule was that a witness was prevented from testifying only if the verdict in

'I

the case at hand might be used for or against that witness in a subsequent action. 201
The judges were often called upon to determine how this rule should be applied in
particular contexts. 202

New questions focusing on the admissibility of oral evidence

iB'

.

1~1
' \

•

circumstantial proof, the hearsay rule and its exceptions, and the tests used to determine the truth of
evidence offered by witnesses. The second section, labeled 'Instruments of Evidence,' set forth the
general rules governing oral and documentary proof. The third section discussed 'Proofs in General,'
a hodge-podge of topics ranging from the burden of proof and the best evidence rule to the distinction
between law and fact and the use of post-trial remedies. The fourth and final section considered the
application of evidence law to the 'Proof of Particular Issues' such as assumpsit, bankruptcy, goods
sold and delivered, and replevin; this section also contained treatments of certain types of proof
including dying declarations and evidence of character.")
199

Id., at 516. ("Wigmore's famous publication, "A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of
Evidence in Trials at Common Law," has long remained the standard historical account in this field.
Wigmore described these developments as the result of two mutually reinforcing causes. First, the
last decade of the eighteenth century saw the beginning of the regular nisi prius reports, which captured
questions of evidence and procedure raised at trials throughout the country. Second, the growing
number of reported cases led to a new generation of treatises summarizing and analyzing the new
evidentiary rulings.")
200

Among these were the use of expert evidence, the restrictions on references to character, the role of
lawyers in the process of examining witnesses, and the use of post-trial remedies for correcting
mistaken evidentiary rulings. Id., at 523.
201

SeeBentv.Baker,3T.R.27, 100Eng.Rep.437 (K.B.1789).

202

See Evans v. Yeatherd, 2 Bing. 133, 130 Eng. Rep. 256 (K.B. 1824) .
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I

started to occupy the court's attention in the early 1820s. 203

I

Although questions

about writings and the competence of witnesses still attracted attention, a wide range
of issues pertaining to, and restricting, the admissibility of oral evidence could
demonstrate the significant extent to which the law and practice of evidence had
changed between 1755 and 1824.2°4

With the development of rules against hearsay,

when witnesses testified, their words were subject to much more regulation than in
1755; moreover, when witnesses attempted to offer hearsay, unless it fell within a
recognized exception, it was routinely the target of an objection from opposing

203

See Thomas P. Gallanis, supra note 776, 524-5. ("Between 1820 and 1824, the most common
evidentiary issue at West-minster concerned the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. This
should come as no surprise; challenges to proof typically came before the central royal courts on a
motion for a new trial, a remedy that was more likely to succeed where the royal judges doubted the
overall weight of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict. What is particularly interesting, however,
is that where the courts were asked to consider more specific' evidentiary questions, these concerned
not only the use of documents and the competence of witnesses -- matters that were litigated in 1755 -but also the admissibility of testimony.")
204

Id., at 530. ("Hearsay, expert testimony, and statements about character, to take but three examples,
were considerably more regulated in 1824 than they had been seventy years earlier. Put differently,
the judicial discretion observed in the mid-eighteenth-century had become increasingly subject to fixed
rules governing the admissibility of testimonial proof.") See also John H. Langbein, supra note 760,
1188-9. ("According to Sylvester Douglas, later Lord Glenbervie, the compiler of two well-known sets
of late-eighteenth-century law reports, when judges determined questions of admissibility, they did so
in the presence of the jury. Perhaps it would be an improvement, Douglas mused in 1776, when
questions of admissibility are raised, that the jury, as well as the witnesses, should withdraw, till the
point was argued and decided. Douglas' observation calls into question the fundamental distinction
between evidentiary objections that affect admissibility, and those that affect only weight or credit.
What is distinctive about the modem Anglo-American hearsay rule is precisely this effort to deal with
the infirmities of hearsay by excluding it from the jury, rather than allowing its weaknesses to affect
credit as in modem Continental law. If, however, the eighteenth-century jury was routinely in the
courtroom when the judge purported to rule on admissibility, then there was in truth little difference
between excluding hearsay and admitting it with diminished credit. Indeed, the idea that hearsay
objections should affect credit rather than admissibility had been propounded as doctrine in Lilly's
Abridgment, published in 1719. Lilly attributes to the King's Bench in an anonymous opinion
decided in the year 1670 the position that a trial witness may testify to an out-of-court declarant's
Words in Evidence, because it is but matter of Evidence, and is left to the Jury how far they will give
credit to them ...." )

I

I

I
~'
~·

~

\'
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counsel or an admonition from the judge?05

In summary, as described by Professor

John H. Langbein,
"The modem law of evidence, centered on the oral testimony of witnesses at trial,
supplanted the older law at the end of the eighteenth century and across the
nineteenth century.

The modem law abandoned the effort to treat the

document-preferring best evidence rule as the organizing principle of the law of
evidence.

Cross-examination replaced oath as the fundamental safeguard for the

receipt of oral evidence, defeating the competency regime that had disqualified the
parties for interest, and allowing the hearsay rule to assume its ultimate character.
From the Middle Ages to our own day, the driving concern animating the
Anglo-American law of evidence has been to protect against the shortcomings of
trial by jury.

Despite its merits, jury trial has always been fraught with danger.

Jurors are untrained in the law, they decide without giving reasons, they have no
continuing responsibility for the consequences of their decisions, and their verdicts
are quite difficult to review.
adjudication are ineradicable.

The risks of error and partiality in this system of
The law of evidence has changed mightily since

the Middle Ages, along with the jury itself, but the primary mission of our law of

205

See Thomas P. Gallanis, supra note 776, 529. ("In one instance, a witness was even urged by his
own side's lawyer not to speak beyond his personal knowledge. One important exception, however,
concerned the prisoner's character. As in 1755, witnesses in the early 1820s routinely testified to
what they had heard about the prisoner's general reputation.")

''
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evidence --- to guard against the inherent weaknesses of jury trial --- has remained

I

constant" 206

4.3.3 The Pre-Mattox Practice of the Sixth Amendment in the United States
While, before the nineteenth century, the English common law did not
guarantee the assistance of counsel in all prosecutions, the Sixth Amendment, in
granting a full right to counsel in all cases, was not constitutionalizing English law. 207
Regardless of its origins, as noted by Professor Akhil Reed Amar, the Bill of Rights
"was not simply an enactment of We the People as the Sovereign Legislature bringing

t
I

t

new rights into existence, but a declaratory judgment by We the People as the
Sovereign High Court that certain natural or fundamental rights already existed. " 208
Thus, the Framers' concerns about federal encroachment and their desire to provide a
check on federal judges209 resulted in an attempt to constitutionalize the criminal

206

See John H. Langbein, supra note 760, 1194.

207

See Randolph N. Jonakait, supra note 783, 109. ("The right to counsel guarantee does not stand
alone here. Neither the Sixth Amendment notice provision nor even the compulsory process clause
simply adopted the English common law used for ordinary felonies. The common law on notice
forbade the defendant from having a copy of the indictment specifying the charges against him, not
only in advance of trial, but even at trial. Instead, the court clerk summarized the indictment to the
defendant upon his arraignment. The Treason Act of 1696 abrogated the rule against allowing the
accused access to the text of the indictment, but only for cases of treason. For ordinary felony cases,
the rule endured throughout the eighteenth century, and it impaired the defendant's ability to prepare his
defense with precision." )
208

See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L. J. 1193,
1206 (1992).

209

For example, "even an Article III judge, after all, had been appointed by the President, looked to
the President for possible promotion to a higher court, and drew his salary from the government payroll,
people still wondered if the handful of elite federal judges truly be able to empathize with the concerns

I

I

~

rI
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procedure that had been developed in the colonies and the states. 210

As a result,

since confrontation came to be the guarantee to allow an accused to challenge the
information against him, and defense cross-examination had become the chief
procedure for challenging such evidence, the right to confrontation was guaranteeing
an accused the right to cross-examine witnesses as part of the newly emerging
adversary system. 211
As already mentioned, there was no federal case law totally focusing on the
confrontation issue before the end of the nineteenth century.
opinions had been mentioning this topic since 1791.

However, a few judicial

For instance, in 1807, Chief

Justice Marshall, in United States v. Burr, reasoned that the Confrontation Clause was
adopted to restrict the admission ofhearsay. 212

of ordinary folk."

Since Justice Marshall did not

See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757,

773 (1994).
210

I

, I

I

I
I

I
'I

l-

See Randolph N. Jonakait, supra note 783, 113. ("n this light, the Sixth Amendment
constitutionalized the trial procedure used in the states. The rights underlying that procedure may not
have had a universally-accepted, specific meaning. As we have seen, there was not just one law
throughout the states, but many, and the new American criminal trial system had only recently emerged
and was no doubt still evolving.")
211

Id., at 115-6. ("This view of the Confrontation Clause and related provisions depends on the
conclusion that Americans had truly institutionalized a trial system with defense cross-examination at
its core by the time of the Sixth Amendment That premise is supported by deductions made and
inferences drawn from the facts that Americans had adopted a full right to counsel; that an emerging
right to counsel transformed the English trial system into an adversarial one with defense
cross-examination at its core; and that an adversarial system comported with distinctive American
notions about crime, checks-and-balances, and changed societal relationships. Such proof, while
suggestive, is at best circumstantial and hardly conclusive. More proof, including colonial records,
comments in the constitutional debates, and early judicial decisions, while admittedly being too
fragmentary to be definitive, also supports the conclusion that cross-examination was at the heart of the
new trial process and confrontation." )
212

The Court held: "The rule of evidence which rejects mere hearsay testimony, which excludes from
trials of a criminal or civil nature the declaration of any other individual than of him against whom the
proceedings are instituted, has been generally deemed as essential to the correct administration of
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explain why hearsay should be restricted, some constitutional-era opinions
interpreting state provisions, however, indicated that confrontation's purpose was to
guarantee the accused the opportunity to cross-examine at trial. 213
found cross-examination at the core of the right. 214

These opinions

In State v. Webb. a North

Carolina case, the court rejected a South Carolinian's deposition that the absent
accused had sold him the stolen horse by reasoning that, "it is a rule of common law,
founded on natural justice, that no man shall be prejudiced by evidence which he had
not had the liberty to cross examine ... " 215

In State v. Atkins, a Tennessee case, the

court also rejected the former testimony as evidence, holding that, "frequent deaths
may take place between the trial there and here, and it seems to us, that it would be
dangerous to liberty to admit such evidence.

It would go a great length in

overthrowing this wise provision of the constitution.

An inconvenience which could

not exist in England, where there is no appeal as to matter of fact, as here.

The

justice. I know not why a declaration in court should be unavailing, unless made upon oath, if a
declaration out of court was to incriminate others than him who made it; nor why a man should have a
constitutional claim to be confronted with the witnesses against him, if mere verbal declarations, made
in his absence, may be evidence against him. I know of no principle in the preservation of which all
are more concerned. I know none, by undermining which, life, liberty and property, might be more
endangered. It is therefore incumbent on courts to be watchful of every inroad on a principle so truly
important." See 25 F. Cas. 187, 193 ( 1807) .
213

See Randolph N. Jonakait, supra note 783, 122.

214

Id.

215

See2N.C. (1Hayw.) 77,77 (1794).

l

l
l
~·
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evidence cannot be received." 216
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Even though North Carolina's confrontation

guararttee was worded differently from Tennessee's, each, according to the Tennessee
court,217 signified the same.2 18

Moreover, in State v. Campbell, a South Carolina

case, for the purpose of pursuing a fair trial, the court rejected the testimony of a
then~dead

witness, who had testified at a coroner's inquest in the absence of the

accused. 219

The court stated, "one of the indispensable conditions of such due

course of law is, that prosecutions be carried on to the conviction of the accused, by
witnesses confronted by him, and subjected to his personal examination ... . it is only
in the examination and cross~examination, that the knave can be detected, errors of
fact exposed, or false imaginations expunged .... " 220

In short, the Pre~Mattox

development of the Confrontation Clause in the United States appeared mainly on the
state level, with a focus on cross~examination.
216

As proposed by Professor Randolph

See 1 Tenn. ( 1 Overt. ) 229, 229 ( 1807) .

217

The court noted that: "The expression in our constitution ... is, the accused has a right to meet the
witnesses face to face. In the constitution of North Carolina, it is ... every man hath a right to confront
the accusers and witnesses with other testimony. The expression in both means the same thing ...."
See 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 58, 59-60 ( 1821) .
218

See Randolph N. Jonakait, supra note 783, 123. ("A different outcome from that in Webb was
dictated not because the states had different wordings for the confrontation guarantee, but because there
had been no cross-examination in the North Carolina case. The evidence was rejected, the Tennessee
court concluded, because it was not taken in the defendant's presence, when he could have had the
liberty to cross-examine. This case necessarily admits the principle, that depositions, under proper
circumstances, may be read on trial against a prisoner.... Proper circumstances required that the
accused have the chance to cross-examine the witness, and absent that opportunity, the former
testimony could not be admitted without infringing the right to confrontation. As this and other early
opinions indicated, cross-examination was at the core of confrontation." )
219

See 30 S.C.L. ( 1 Rich 124, 125) 51 ( 1844) .

220

Id., at 51-2.
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N. Jonakait, "the Confrontation Clause, and other Sixth Amendment provisions,
constitutionalized procedures already used in the states.
effective advocacy on behalf of the accused.
to this.

These procedures allowed

Defense cross-examination was central

In trying to make sure that federal trials would use the procedures already

~·

developed by the Americans, the Sixth Amendment sought to guarantee defense
cross-examination in the Confrontation Clause."

221

4.3.4 Under the Confrontation Clause: the Post-Mattox Practice
After the Supreme Court started to review the Confrontation Clause, it focused
on the admissibility of hearsay.

222

To some extent, both the right to confrontation

and the rule against hearsa~ 3 are directed at accurate fact finding.

It was not

necessary to clarify the relationship between the right of confrontation and the hearsay
rule before 1965 in that the Court in Krulewitch v. United States reasoned its

l
I

supervisory power over the inferior federal courts permitted it to control the
admission of hearsay. 224

221

r.

Moreover, on the basis of the Confrontation Clause, the

See Randolph N. Jonakait, supra note 783, 124.

222

In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court held that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to augment
accuracy in the factfinding process. See 448 U.S. 56, 65 ( 1980) .

223

See G. Michael Fenner, The Hearsay Rule, 4 (Carolina Academic Press, 2003) .

224

See 366 U.S. 440 ( 1949) . See also FindLaw, Confrontation, available at
htn>://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/amendment06/08.html( last visited, Oct. 20, 2004 ).
addition, the Court in Delaney v. United States concluded that the co-conspirator exception to the
hearsay rule was consistent with the Confrontation Clause. See 263 U.S. 586, 590 ( 1924) .

In
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Court in Motes v. United States had concluded that evidence given at a preliminary
hearing could not be used as a hearsay exception at the trial if the absence of the
witness was attributable to the negligence of the prosecution. 225

In addition to

recognizing the admissibility of 'testimony given at a former trial by a witness since
deceased' in Mattox v. United States, 226 the Court also permitted 'dying declarations'
in Kirby v. United States. 227
Clause with the hearsay rule.

The Court even seemed to equate the Confrontation
228

Nonetheless, even though these two issues might look similar, they are not
identical.

The Court in Barber v. Page held the right to confrontation should be a

225

See 178 U.S. 458 ( 1900) . However, if a witness' absence had been procured by the defendant,
testimony given at a previous trial on a different indictment could be used at the subsequent trial. See
Reynolds v. United States. 98 U.S. 145 ( 1879) .

226

See 156 U.S. 237,240 (1895) .

227

The prosecution was not permitted to use a judgment of conviction against other defendants on
charges of theft in order to prove that the property found in the possession of defendant now on trial
was stolen.
See 174U.S.47,61 (1899).
228

I

I·

See FindLaw, supra note 976. ("In a series of decisions beginning in 1965, the Court seemed to
equate the Confrontation Clause with the hearsay rule, positing that a major purpose of the clause was
to give the defendant charged with crime an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him,
unless one of the hearsay exceptions applies. Thus, in Pointer v. Texas. the complaining witness had
testified at a preliminary hearing at which he was not cross-examined and the defendant was not
represented by counsel; by the time of trial, the witness had moved to another State and the prosecutor
made no effort to obtain his return. Offering the preliminary hearing testimony violated defendant's
right of confrontation. In Douglas v. Alabama. the prosecution called as a witness the defendant's
alleged accomplice, and when the accomplice refused to testify, pleading his privilege against
self-incrimination, the prosecutor read to him to refresh his memory a confession in which he
implicated defendant. Because defendant could not cross-examine the accomplice with regard to the
truth of the confession, the Court held the Confrontation Clause had been violated. In Bruton v.
United States. the use at a joint trial of a confession made by one of the defendants was held to violate
the confrontation rights of the other defendant who was implicated by it because he could not
cross-examine the codefendant not taking the stand. The Court continues to view as presumptively
unreliable accomplices' confessions that incriminate defendants.")
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trial right which allows the accused to cross-examine an important witness at trial, and
unless the witness is unavailable, only granting the defendant the opportunity to
cross-examine a crucial witness at a preliminary hearing would violate the
,_

Confrontation Clause.

229

Hence, the protection provided by the Confrontation

Clause is broader than that provided by the hearsay rule.

c

Besides seeking the truth,

the right to confrontation should incorporate an element of fairness, of affording the
defendant an opportunity to test evidence against him, no matter how reliable that
evidence may seem. 23

°

For instance, in California v. Green, the Court noted that:

"While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation
Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing

I

I

~

to suggest that the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is

{

'

I ,

nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their
exceptions as they existed historically at common law.

Our decisions have never

I

I

I

I:

established such congruence; indeed, we have more than once found a violation of

II·
.
I'

confrontation values even though the statements in issue were admitted under an

I

,
I

<

~

229

The Court mentioned that: "The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the
opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness. A
preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial,
simply because its function is the more limited one of determining whether probable cause exists to
hold the accused for trial. While there may be some justification for holding that the opportunity for
cross-examination of a witness at a preliminary hearing satisfies the demands of the confrontation
clause where the witness is shown to be actually unavailable, this is not, as we have pointed out, such a
case." See 390 U.S. 719, 725-6 (1968) .

f

230

See Note, Confrontation, Cross-Examination, and the Right to Prepare a Defense, 56 Geo. L. J. 939,
940 ( 1968) .

j·
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arguably recognized hearsay exception...

Given the similarity of the values

protected, however, the modification of a State's hearsay rules to create new
exceptions for the admission of evidence against a defendant, will often raise
questions of compatibility with the defendant's constitutional right to
confrontation.

Such questions require attention to the reasons for, and the basic

scope of, the protections offered by the Confrontation Clause." 231
According to these decisions, a rooted hearsay exception might be considered
a violation of the Confrontation Clause.

Thus, whenever a witness is available, he is

required by the Confrontation Clause to be subjected to cross-examination by the
defense at trial even though his prior testimony did bear indicia of reliability.
I
II

other words, to comport with the defendant's right to confrontation, the unavailability

'•

:

I!..

In

!

of the witness must be shown if his prior out-of-court statement seeks to be introduced
I

I
II·

'I'

as non-hearsay at trial.

I

I'
I

However, in Dutton v. Evans,232 under Snyder v. Massachusetts, 233 the Court

I,
II

231

232

'I
I,
II

II

See 399 U.S. 149, 155-6 ( 1970) .

See 400 U.S. 74, 76 ( 1970) . ("Early on an April morning in 1964, three police officers were
brutally murdered in Gwinnett County, Georgia. Their bodies were found a few hours later,
handcuffed together in a pine thicket, each with multiple gunshot wounds in the back of the head.
After many months of investigation, Georgia authorities charged the appellee, Evans, and two other
men, Wade Truett and Venson Williams, with the officers' murders. Evans and Williams were indicted
by a grand jury; Truett was granted immunity from prosecution in return for his testimony. Evans
pleaded not guilty and exercised his right under Georgia law to be tried separately. After a jury trial,
he was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. The judgment of conviction was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Georgia, and this Court denied certiorari. Evans then brought the present habeas
corpus proceeding in a federal district court, alleging, among other things, that he had been denied the
constitutional right of confrontation at his trial. The District Court denied the writ, but the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Georgia had, indeed, denied Evans the right,
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seemed to abandon this strict requirement by noting:
"The decisions of this Court make it clear that the mission of the Confrontation
Clause is to advance a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining
process in criminal trials by assuring that 'the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory
basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.'

Evans exercised, and

exercised effectively, his right to confrontation on the factual question whether
Shaw had actually heard Williams make the statement Shaw related.

And the

,.

possibility that cross-examination of Williams could conceivably have shown the
jury that the statement, though made, might have been unreliable was wholly
unreal. ,234

presence of the jury, and subject to cross-examination by the defendant was

l

considered the only way of complying with the Confrontation Clause,

l.

Therefore, while presentation of a statement by a witness who was under oath, in the

"At least in the absence ofprosecutorial misconduct or negligence and where the
evidence is not crucial or devastating, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied if the
circumstances of presentation of out-of-court statements are such that the trier of

guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to be confronted by the witnesses against him.")
233

The Court held: "There is danger that the criminal law will be brought into contempt -- that
discredit will even touch the great immunities assured by the Fourteenth Amendment --- if gossamer
possibilities of prejudice to a defendant are to nullify a sentence pronounced by a court of competent
jurisdiction in obedience to local law, and set the guilty free." See 291 U.S. 97, 122 ( 1934) .
234

See 400 U.S. 74,89 ( 1970) .
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fact has a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the hearsay statement, and
this is to be ascertained in each case by focusing on the reliability of the proffered
hearsay statement, that is, by an inquiry into the likelihood that cross-examination
of the declarant at trial could successfully call into question the declaration's
apparent meaning or the declarant's sincerity, perception, or memory." 235

It

Ten years later, the Court in Ohio v. Roberts 236 established a two-pronged test
for deciding whether the Confrontation Clause was violated.

Roberts held that,

"The Confrontation Clause operates in two separate ways to restrict the range of

..

admissible hearsay.

First, in conformance with the Framers' preference for

face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity.

In

the usual case (including cases where prior cross-examination has occurred), the
prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the
declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant.

The second

I
I,

aspect operates once a witness is shown to be unavailable.

I

Reflecting its

I

I
I

I

I

I

underlying purpose to augment accuracy in the fact-finding process by ensuring

rl

I

the defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence, the Clause
' II

countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that 'there is no

I'
I

I~

235

See FindLaw, supra note 976.

236

See 448 U.S. 56 ( 1980) .
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material departure from the reason of the general rule.' . . .

In sum, when a

hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation
Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable.

Even then, his

statement is admissible only if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability.'
Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within
a firmly rooted hearsay exception.

In other cases, the evidence must be excluded,

at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. " 237
In summary, the Confrontation Clause did not exclude out-of-court statements of an
unavailable declarant if they bore sufficient indicia of reliability.

Moreover,

evidence should be considered reliable if it fell within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception or it showed particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.

While many

hearsay exceptions provided in Federal Rules of Evidence 803 do not require a
showing of unavailability, however, there emerged a question whether this
requirement could be waived after Roberts.

By citing Dutton v. Evans, the Court in

a footnote to Ohio v. Roberts noted that a demonstration of unavailability was not
always required, especially when the utility of trial confrontation seemed so
remote. 238

As a result, since the prosecution was not always required to produce a

237

ld., at 65-6.

238

Id., at 65 note 7.
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seemingly available witness, 239 only the reliability prong should be met in ~y given
case.

Hence, Roberts did not establish a real two-pronged test.
Nonetheless, the Court later in United States v. Inadi240 addressed the question

left by Roberts; when should the prosecutor show the unavailability of the witness?
Although the Court in Inadi affirmed Roberts by ruling that the Confrontation Clause
did not require showing the unavailability of the declarant, 241 since the better
evidence referred to the conspirator's out-of-court testimony made during conspiracy

I~

239

Id.

,i.

240

See 475 U.S. 387 ( 1985) .

I

241

I,

.1

II

q'

,.,
II

Jl

,,

. I

1'1
f.'

I,

I

I~
I,

'J
',

'

Id., 394-6. ("Unlike some other exceptions to the hearsay rules, or the exemption from the hearsay
definition involved in this case, former testimony often is only a weaker substitute for live testimony.
It seldom bas independent evidentiary significance of its own, but is intended to replace live testimony.
If the declarant is available and the same information can be presented to the trier offact in the form of
live testimony, with full cross-examination and the opportunity to view the demeanor of the declarant,
there is little justification for relying on the weaker version. When two versions of the same evidence
are available, longstanding principles of the law of hearsay, applicable as well to Confrontation Clause
analysis, favor the better evidence. But if the declarant is unavailable, no 'better' version of the
evidence exists, and the former testimony may be admitted as a substitute for live testimony on the
same point Those same principles do not apply to co-conspirator statements. Because they are
made while the conspiracy is in progress, such statements provide evidence of the conspiracy's context
that cannot be replicated, even if the declarant testifies to the same matters in court. When the
Government --- as here --- offers the statement of one drug dealer to another in furtherance of an illegal
conspiracy, the statement often will derive its significance from the circumstances in which it was
made. Conspirators are likely to speak differently when talking to each other in furtherance of their
illegal aims than when testifying on the witness stand. Even when the declarant takes the stand, his
in-court testimony seldom will reproduce a significant portion of the evidentiary value of his
statements during the course of the conspiracy. In addition, the relative positions of the parties will
have changed substantially between the time of the statements and the trial. The declarant and the
defendant will have changed from partners in an illegal conspiracy to suspects or defendants. in a
criminal trial, each with information potentially damaging to the other. The declarant himself may be
facing indictment or trial, in which case he has little incentive to aid the prosecution, and yet will be
equally wary of coming to the aid of his former partners in crime. In that situation, it is extremely
unlikely that in-court testimony will recapture the evidentiary significance of statements made when
the conspiracy was operating in full force. These points distinguish co-conspirators' statements from
the statements involved in Roberts and our other prior testimony cases. Those cases rested in part on
the strong similarities between the prior judicial proceedings and the trial. No such strong similarities
exist between co-conspirator statements and live testimony at trial. To the contrary, co-conspirator
statements derive much of their value from the fact that they are made in a context very different from
trial, and therefore are usually irreplaceable as substantive evidence. Under these circumstances,
'only clear folly would dictate an across-the-board policy of doing without' such statement.")
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in this case, Inadi in fact narrowed Roberts by holding that "the rule of 'necessity' is
confined to use of testimony from a prior judicial proceeding, and is inapplicable to
co-conspirators' out- of-court statements."242

Thereinafter, in addition to

co-conspirator's out-of-court statements made during conspiracy, under Inadi, only in
the case of out-of-court statements made during a prior judicial proceeding could the
prosecutor waive the requirement of producing, or demonstrating the unavailability of

~:

the declarant.

I

Based upon Roberts, the Court in Coy v. Iowa outlawed an Iowa statute that
authorized placing a one-way screen between a child victim and a defendant at trial
because "the exception created by the Iowa statute, which was passed in 1985, could
hardly be viewed as firmly rooted. " 243

However, two years later, the Court in
'I

·'

Maryland v. Craig upheld Maryland's law allowing the use of a one-way and closed
circuit television to prevent a child victim in a sex crime from 'facing' the defendant

~I
'
J I

..

t,l
•.

.'
,.

1;
fI

(:

at trial. 244

While Coy's interpretation of the Confrontation Clause focused mainly on

\•

'..

.
242

See FindLaw, supra note 976. ("The latter--- at least those 'made while the conspiracy is in
progress'--- have 'independent evidentiary significance of[their] own;' hence in-court testimony is not
a necessary or valid substitute. Similarly, evidence embraced within such firmly rooted exceptions to
the hearsay rule as those for spontaneous declarations and statements made for medical treatment is not
barred from trial by the Confrontation Clause. Particularized guarantees of trustworthiness inherent in
the circumstances under which a statement is made must be shown for admission of other hearsay
evidence not covered by a firmly rooted exception; evidence tending to corroborate the truthfulness of
a statement may not be relied upon as a bootstrap.")
243

244

See 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 ( 1988) .

See 497 U.S. 836 ( 1990) . As in Coy, "procedural protections other than confrontation were
afforded: the child witness must testify under oath, is subject to cross examination, and is viewed by
the judge, jury, and defendant. The critical factual difference between the two cases was that

,·
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protecting the defendant's trial right to confront his accuser, 245 Craig adopted a
different view since "hearsay statements of nontestifying co-conspirators may be
admitted against a defendant despite the lack of any face-to-face encounter with the
accused. " 246

Thus, as evidenced by hearsay exceptions, even though the precedents

have established that the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face
confrontation at trial, 247 this preference must occasionally give way to considerations
of public policy and the necessities of the case. 248

As suggested in Coy, precedents

confirming "a defendant's right to confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied
absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where denial of such
confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and only where the
reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured." 249

The word 'confronted' provided

Maryland required a case-specific finding that the child witness would be traumatized by presence of
the defendant, while the Iowa procedures struck down in Coy rested on a statutory presumption of
trauma." See FindLaw, supra note 976.
'•

'•

24

I
I

s See 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 ( 1988) .

I

246

See 497 U.S., at 849 ( 1990) .

247

See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 ( 1980) .

248

See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 ( 1895) .

I'
(

I

I
249

See 497 U.S., at 850 ( 1990). See also FindLaw, supra note 976. ("Relying on the traditional and
transcendent state interest in protecting the welfare of children, on the significant number of state laws
designed to protect child witnesses, and on the growing body of academic literature documenting the
psychological trauma suffered by child abuse victims, the Court found a state interest sufficiently
important to outweigh a defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation. Reliability of the testimony
was assured by the rigorous adversarial testing that preserves the essence of effective confrontation.
All of this, of course, would have led to a different result in Coy as well, but QQy was distinguished
with the caveat that the requisite finding of necessity must of course be a case-specific one; Maryland's
required finding that a child witness would suffer serious emotional distress if not protected was clearly
adequate for this purpose.")
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l

in the Sixth Amendment does not "simply mean face-to-face confrontation, for the
Clause would then, contrary to our cases, prohibit the admission of any accusatory
hearsay statement made by an absent declarant --- a declarant who is undoubtedly as
much a 'witness against' a defendant as one who actually testifies at trial." 250
In 2004, in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court again inserted new
vitality into the Confrontation Clause,251 which has already been described to be a
revolutionary bombshell and an important paradigm shift in confrontation clause
analysis. 252

Roberts and Inadi established the two-pronged test for determining

...
..~
~I

whether admitting an out-of-court statement would violate the Confrontation Clause.
The Crawford Court, however, realizing that the Confrontation Clause "commands
not that the evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner

.I
250

See Coy v. Iowa, 497 U.S. 836, 849 ( 1990) . See also Find.Law, supra note 976. ("In another case
involving child sex crime victims, the Court held that there is no right of face-to-face confrontation at
an in- chambers hearing to determine the competency of a child victim to testify, since the defendant's
attorney participated in the hearing, and since the procedures allowed full and effective opportunity to
cross-examine the witness at trial and request reconsideration of the competency ruling. And there is
no absolute right to confront witnesses with relevant evidence impeaching those witnesses; failure to
comply with a rape shield law's notice requirement can validly preclude introduction of evidence
relating to a witness's prior sexual history." )
251

In this case, Michael Crawford was tried for stabbing a man who allegedly tried to rape his wife,
Sylvia. At his trial, Crawford claimed self-defense and his wife who was present during the offense
did not testify by invoking Washington's marital privilege. The State played for the jury Sylvia's
tape-recorded statement to the police describing the stabbing, even though Crawford had no
opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford then objected by arguing that his wife was unavailable
due to the marital privilege and that admission of the statement violated the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause. The Washington Supreme Court finally upheld Crawford's conviction after
determining that Sylvia's statement was sufficiently reliable. See 124 S. Ct. 1354 ( 2004) .
252

See People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 851 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); United States v. Manfre, 368 F.
3d 832, 833 (8th Cir. 2004) . See also Neil P. Cohen, Crawford v. Washington: Confrontation
Revolution, 40 Tenn. B. J. 22 ( 2004) .

.·II
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I

I

by testing in the crucible of cross-examination,253 discarded this test and reshaped the

~

i•I

legal framework for the admission of testimonial hearsay.

Under Crawford, there are

two types of hearsay evidence: testimonial and non-testimonial.

As a result,

"[w]here nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers'
design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law--- as does
Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation
Clause scrutiny altogether.

Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the

Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior
opportunity for cross-examination." 254

In other words, if the statement is testimonial

hearsay, Crawford supplements Roberts by subjecting the prior out-of-court statement
r

I •

.r

made during judicial process to previous cross-examination, which also extends the
requirement of demonstrating the unavailability of the witness to those beyond the

253

I,

The Court ruled that: "Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds
with the right of confrontation. To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of
evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of
cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable
evidence (a point on which there could be little dissent), but about how reliability can best be
determined. The Roberts test allows a jury to hear evidence, untested by the adversary process, based
on a mere judicial determination of reliability. It thus replaces the constitutionally prescribed method
of assessing reliability with a wholly foreign one. In this respect, it is very different from exceptions
to the Confrontation Clause that make no claim to be a surrogate means of assessing reliability. For
example, the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation claims on
essentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability."
See 124 S Ct 1354, 1370 ( 2004) .
254

The Court further mentioned: "We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive
definition of 'testimonial.' Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony
at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations. These
are the modem practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was
directed." Id., at 1374.
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limitation of Inadi.

Hence, Roberts and Inadi will no longer apply if the prior

out-of-court statement made during judicial process is not previously subject to
cross-examination.

Nevertheless, while the Court intentionally declined to define

the precise parameters of what is a testimonial statement in Crawford, it leaves an
open question as to what statements are testimonial.

Due to legislation of federal or

r.

state rules of evidence and court decisions, some of which interpret constitutional
r.

provisions, the rules for obtaining and weighing evidence are now more restrictive in

~I

the United States than in England. 255

4.4 Modem Evidential Hearsay: Definition and Exceptions
4.4.1 An Overview
I
It

Non-lawyers have for centuries used the term 'hearsay' to signify that
information is second-handed and therefore possibly unreliable. 256

However, as a

legal concept, the common-law courts 'created' the term 'hearsay' .257

In fact, there

was no need for a hearsay rule before the sixteenth century when juries were

~ 5 In other words, although a jury system patterned after that of England was adopted by the United
States, the rules for admitting the evidence have been changed by American courts and legislative
bodies. Today, the rules of exclusion are more strict in the United States than in England. See John
C. Klotter, supra note 753, 8.
~ 6 For example, soon after Queen Anne Boleyn's beheading in 1536, palace governess Lady Bryan
wrote a letter stating that she did not know the current whereabouts of the Queen's daughter Elizabeth
"except by hearsay." See Steven I. Friedland, Paul Bergman and Andrew E. Taslitz, Evidence Law
and Practice, 308 ( LexisNexis, 2000) .
~ 7 See G. Michael Fenner, supra note 975, 8.
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permitted to obtain evidence by consulting non-witness persons, and where jurors
were chosen because they knew something about the case.258

Chief Justice Marshall

in 1813 justified the hearsay rule by stating
"[a]ll questions upon the rules of evidence are of vast importance to all orders and
degrees of men: our lives, our liberty, and our property are all concerned in the
support of these rules, which have been matured by the wisdom of ages, and are
now reversed from their antiquity and the good sense in which they are founded.
r.

One of these rules is, that hearsay evidence is in its own nature inadmissible.
That this species of testimony supposes some better testimony that might be
1,.

adduced in the particular case, is not the sole ground of its exclusion.

Its

intrinsic weakness, its incompetency to satisfy the mind of the existence of the
fact, and the frauds which might be practiced under its cover, combine to support
1

1,1

the rule that hearsay evidence is totally inadmissible."259
11

Therefore, the Court in Hickory v. United States recognized that "[h]earsay is the

II

,.

prior out-of-court statements of a person, offered affirmatively for the truth of the

1.'

matters asserted, presented at trial either orally by another person or in written

ol

fonn." 26

°

Consequently, when the statement is hearsay, the trier of fact is not in a

I

I
,I

258

See John C. Klotter, supra note 753, 280.

259

See Mirna Queen and Child v, Hepburn, 11 U.S. 290,295-6 ( 1813) .

260

See 151 U.S.303,309 (1894).
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position to assess the proper weight to be accorded the out-of-court statement. 261
Currently Rule 802 ofthe Federal Rules ofEvidence (FRE 802) provides "[h]earsay
is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress."

Hearsay is

the legal equivalent of the common expression, "Tell it to the judge, or jury. " 262

The

hearsay rule is a general rule of inadmissibility that must be considered whenever a
witness testifies to a statement that made outside of the courtroom.

263

~.

1

Notwithstanding, hearsay itself is not an easy issue, as described by Professor Arthur
Best, "[t]he myth of hearsay is that no one understands it, and students and practicing
lawyers always make mistakes about it.

It does seem sometimes that the people who

understand the hearsay doctrine are a kind of secret society. " 264
Generally speaking, four main risks are associated with out-of-court statements
I

that would be substantially reduced by the safeguards of the trial process: the risk of

261

See Michael H. Graham, "Stickperson Hearsay": A Simplified Approach to Understanding the Rule
Against Hearsay, 1982 U. of III. L. Rev. 887, 888 ( 1982) . In fact, "the exclusionary rule on hearsay
dates back to the Commonwealth Fund Act proposed in New York in 1927 and later adopted by the
Federal government and a number of states. In 1936, the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws approved a Uniform Act on Business Records, which was widely adopted by the states. In
1942, the American Law Institutes Model Code proposed the draft ofthe Uniform Rule of Evidence. In
1953, The National Conference on Commissioners and the American Bar Association approved of the
draft. Ultimately, the Federal Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates
came into effect from July 1975." See Watchara Neitivanich, supra note 51,223.
262

See Steven I. Friedland, supra note 1008, 312.

263

See G. Michael Fenner, supra note 975, 5.

264

See Authur Best, Evidence, 61 (New York Aspen Law & Business, 2001 ) .

li

~I
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misperception, the risk of faulty memory, the risk of misstatement, and the risk of
distortion. 265

What FRE I 02 provides266 explains that the purpose be construed to

secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable construction of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.

Except for the privilege rules, the rules of evidence aim

at the truth so that only relevant evidence is admissible.267
about why hearsay statements should be excluded.

268

There are many concerns

As shown in Crawford, most

importantly, hearsay is excluded because the out-of-court declarant has not been
subject to meaningful cross-examination by the adverse party,

269

which creates an

unacceptable danger that the trier of fact will give too much value to the declarant's
statement. 270

In other words, the reliability problems of out-of-court statements are

thought to be so great that common law decisions and the Federal Rules of Evidence
take the position that a rule of exclusion will produce the fairest results overall. 271
However, while a party could usually try to prove its case with any kind of evidence it
can find, subject only to the requirement that the material be relevant, the hearsay rule
II
265

See Christopher B. Mueller, supra note 781, 125-6.

266

It provides: "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to
the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."
267

See G. Michael Fenner, supra note 975, 4.

268

See John C. K.lotter, supra note 753, 275.

269

See Steven I. Friedland, supra note 1008, 312.

270

See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 241.

271

See Authur Best, supra note 1016, 65.
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contradicts the general freedom that evidence law gives parties to select their own
kinds of proof.

272

Of course, it is obvious that some hearsay is more reliable than others, or there
exists some particular need which is worth risking unreliable evidence in order to
allow hearsay into court. 273

In seeking to allow as much evidence into court as

possible while sifting out unreliable evidence, with certain justification to assure
trustworthiness of the hearsay evidence, the courts have developed many exceptions
to the hearsay rule. 274

In a sense the hearsay rules are based on some intuitive

assumptions about what kinds of communications are likely to be the most
accurate. 275

No matter what exceptions to the hearsay rule are adopted, fairness and

judicial effectiveness are major concerns.

For instance, as stated in the Commission

Report, "[a]n inquiry into the performance of America's criminal courts, therefore,
must of necessity examine both their effectiveness and their fairness, and proposals
for improving their operations must aim at maintaining or redressing the essential
equilibrium between these two qualities." 276

Accordingly, it should be emphasized

212

Id.

273

See G. Michael Fenner, supra note 975, 9.

274

See John C. Klotter, supra note 753, 276.

275

See Authur Best, supra note 1016, 61.

276

See Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence, Revised Draft, 51 F.RD. 315 ( 1971) .
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that the goal of the hearsay rule is to assist the trier of fact in the search for the truth
by keeping the unreliable evidence away from the trier of fact. 277

4.4.2 The Definition of Hearsay
FRE 801(c) defines "hearsay" as a "statement,278 other than one made by the
declarant279 while testifying at a trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted."

Under this provision, the term hearsay is a statement,

oral, written, or nonverbal conduct of a person intended as a statement by that person,

'

I

and not the witness, who has not seen, heard, or known of the fact by himself, but
who has heard that statement and later testified what he has heard to the court. 280
Although hearsay is itself defined in this article, the language employed here is
criticized as having turned a basically simple idea into a tangle of language and ideas
so obtuse that it becomes truly difficult to think or talk about that idea with clarity and
simplicity. 281

277

To put it as simply as possible, hearsay is an out-of-court statement

See G. Michael Fenner, supra note 975, 8.

278

I'

Rule 801(a) of Federal Rules of Evidence provides: "A 'statement' is (1) an oral or written
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion."
279

Rule 801(b) of Federal Rules of Evidence provides: "A 'declarant' is a person who makes a
statement."

I'

280

See Watchara Neitivanich, supra note 51, 224.

281

See James W. McElhaney, The Heart of the Matter, 89 ABA J. 50, 52 ( 2003) .
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offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 282

While this plain definition is

much easier to follow, it still does not explain 'what an out-of-court statement is' or
'whether the statement is offered to prove the truth. ' 283
Nonetheless, under FRE 80l(d), both 'prior statement by witness' and
'admission by party-opponent' are defined as nonhearsay. 284

Opposing 'exceptions'

in FRE 803 and FRE 804, FRE 801(d) (2) have often been referred to as 'exemptions'
or 'exclusions' from the hearsay rule.

It seems conflicting since admission by

party-opponent, nonhearsay, under FRE 80l(d) (2) fits the definition ofFRE 801(c)
that defines hearsay as an out-of-court statement offered for its truth.

Whether Rule

801(d) (2) is hearsay or not becomes confusing and troubling at this point.

In fact,

instead of treating admissions and statements of co-conspirators as nonhearsay
currently, 285 the traditional common law treated what now in Rule 801 (d) (2) as
admissible exceptions to hearsay, which is still followed by a number of state versions
of evidence rules. 286

To some extent the theory behind saying that admissions are

not hearsay at all, as opposed to saying that they are hearsay that falls within an

282
283

See Christopher B. Mueller, supra note 781, 123.
See James W. McElhaney, supra note 1033, 52.

284

It provides: A statement is not hearsay if- (1) Prior statement by witness.
party-opponent

285

See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 267.

286

See James W. McElhaney, supra note 1033, 54.

(2) Admission by
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exception, is rather abstruse and perhaps over-refined. 287

John Henry Wigmore suggested it be easier to deal with admissions if they could no

~

'

Probably because Dean

more be treated as hearsay, the drafters of the federal rules then adopted Wigmore's
suggestion and called admissions nonhearsay. 288

The advisory committee eventually

adopted 'admission by a party-opponent' as nonhearsay in that simple notions of
fairness are requiring a party to be stuck with his or her own statement, as noted,
"[a]dmission[s] by a party-opponent are excluded from the category of hearsay on the
theory that their admissibility in evidence is the result of the adversary system rather
than satisfaction of the conditions of the hearsay rule." 289

As a result, no matter

what it is called, the nonhearsay admission under FRE 80l(d)(2), which refers to
' I

anything said or done by a party opponent that is inconsistent with the position now
taken at trial, should be admissible to prove its truth. 290

Moreover, after Crawford, if

I

I

I'

,j

I

I

I

I

287

See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 254.

288

See James W. McElhaney, supra note I033, 54.

289

See FRE 80I (d) (2) advisory committee's note, cited in Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 254 n 58.

'I

290

See James W. McElhaney, supra note I 033, 56. ("This is a good definition for the following reasons.
First, an admission does not have to be against the interests of the party when it was said or done.
Often, it is not. An admission only has to turn out to be inconsistent with the position the party takes
at trial. Second, an admission can be something that is either said or done. It is not limited to
statements, or acts that are intended to be substitutes for statements. And even though Federal Rule
80 I refers only to statements, a party's inconsistent conduct gets admitted in evidence all the time.
Third, unlike prior inconsistent statements, there is no need to confront the opposing party with her
admission while she is on the stand. Because she is a party to the case, if she wants to explain what
she meant or put the admission into context, she has got the rest of the trial to do it. Fourth, because
the definition of admissions is so broad and they can be so powerful in trial, each party should spend a
lot of his discovery time looking for them. No matter whether they are hearsay or not, they are
admissible.")

~·
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a statement fits the co-conspirator rule under FRE 80l(d) (2) (E),291 whether the

I

~{

i
'

defendant may claim that his constitutional right to confrontation was violated in
federal courts becomes unclear; however, this argument should still be available at
least under the confrontation clause of state constitutions.

292

There are two types of definitions of hearsay according to Professor Roger C.
Park's description: "Definitions of hearsay are usually either assertion-centered or
declarant-centered.

Under an assertion-centered definition, an out-of-court statement

is hearsay when it is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Under a declarant-centered definition, an out-of-court statement is hearsay when it
depends for value upon the credibility of the declarant." 293

The core idea against

hearsay complies with the Confrontation Clause; however, after Crawford, the
definition of hearsay should be both assertion-centered, seeking the truth, and

li

declarant-centered, providing the defendant with an opportunity to challenge the

rJ
declarant's testimonial qualities of sincerity, narrative ability, memory, and
291

The statements have to be made in furtherance of the conspiracy and during the course of the
conspiracy. See United States v. Tombrello. 666 F. 2d 485, 490 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994
( 1982) . However, mere conversations between conspirators, merely narrative declarations, and
causal admissions of culpability are not statements in furtherance ofthe conspiracy. See United States
v. Tille, 729 F. 2d 615 (9th Cir. 1984) . There must be independent evidence of the conspiracy. See
United States v. Jannotti, 729 F. 2d 213 ( 3nl Cir. 1984). See also Patrick J. Sullivan, Bootstrapping of
Hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) (2) (E): Further Erosion of the Coconspirator
Exemption, 7 4 Iowa L. Rev. 467 (1989) .
292

See Arnold v. State, 751 P. 2d 494,504-5 (Alaska App. 1988) ; Nunez v. People, 737 H 2d 422,
424-6 (Colo. 1987) ; cited in Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 266 n l 06.
293

See Roger C. Park, "I Didn't Tell Them Anything About You": Implied Assertions as Hearsay
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 783, 783 ( 1990) .

r.
f:
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perception.294
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Hence, to better understand the definition of hearsay, if the testifying

witness is not the same person the defendant wants to cross-examine, the testifying
witness is not the real witness and the statement at issue is an out-of-court
statement. 295

When an out-of-court statement is relevant without regard to whether

it conveys accurate information, then the hearsay prohibition does not operate, and
testimony about the statement is allowed. 296

Basically, there is no need to

cross-examine the out-of-court declarant especially when the trier of fact can use the
declarant's out-of-court statement in deciding issues other than the truth of the

I

I

declarant's out-of-court statement. 297

While testimony that a witness heard a person

say, "Look out," is just like testimony that a witness saw a person wearing a blue
sweater or running across a street, nonhearsay statements are not offered to prove the
truth of what they assert. 298
I

I

'~

I,

In general, the answer to 'who the defendant wants to cross-examine to test what
294

See Christopher B. Mueller, supra note 781, 126.

295

See James W. McElhaney, supra note 1033, 52.

296

See Authur Best, supra note 1016, 65.

297

For example, "when the out-of-court statement "Help me!" is offered solely for the purpose of
showing that the declarant was alive at the time of making the statement, the trier is not being asked to
rely upon the declarant's credibility. In this situation, nothing is lost by the fact that the out-of-court
declarant was not subject to cross-examination." See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 241.
298

See Authur Best, supra note 1016, 68. ("Where proof that words were said is relevant in a trial,
without regard to whether or not the content of the words provides a true account of some past reality, a
witness may quote those words. Proof such as a witness's testimony that words of warning or words
of a bussiness agreement were said, when they are being introduced not to prove that they were true but
just to prove that they were said, does not involve any hearsay problems. A witness can report to the
jury that the words were uttered, just as a witness can report any other event that a witness has
observed.")
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is being said or observed' depends on 'whether the truth of the out-of-court statement
matters.299

1
I

Therefore, on one hand, if the truth of the out-of-court statement does not

make any difference and the declarant, the actual witness, is on the stand, the
statement is not hearsay; 300 on the other hand, if the truth of the out-of-court
statement matters and the testifying witness is not the real witness, the statement is
hearsay.

Obviously, the hearsay rule's preference for having the actual speaker

present in court and available to answer clarifying questions has no application where
the proponent's effort is to prove that words were said rather than words were true.

301

Under this analysis, only a few out-of-court statements might constitute hearsay; for
example, verbal acts, when something is done with words, verbal parts of acts, when
an act and its accompanying words constitute a whole, and knowledge whether
someone knows something. 302

4.4.3 Exceptions to Hearsay

299

See James W. McElhaney, supra note 1033, 53.

300

For instance, "the witness on the stand says he heard an auto mechanic warn a driver that the tread
on his right front tire was starting to separate from the casing and the tire could blow apart any time,
throwing the car out of control. If the other side is offering this evidence to show that the tire was
defective, the auto mechanic is the real witness to be cross-examined because only he knows whether
tire was in fact defective. On the contrary, if the other side just intends to offer the mechanic's
statement to show that the driver was on notice that there might be something wrong with his car, it
does not matter whether the mechanic's statement was true or not. Thus, the person on the stand is a
real witness who heard the mechanic warned the driver." I d.
301

See Authur Best, supra note 1016, 68.

302

See James W. McElhaney, supra note 1033, 54.

[f
I
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As jurors began to be chosen only if they had no knowledge of the case that
would influence their decision, the hearsay rule began its development. 303

While the

hearsay rule's primary purpose is to exclude testimony about out-of-court statements
unless the adverse party has the opportunity for meaningful cross-examination,304 the
supreme irony of the hearsay doctrine is that a vast amount of hearsay is admissible at
common la~ 05 and under the Federal Rules ofEvidence. 306 Despite the strong

I

I

'I

policy grounds for excluding hearsay, and despite the fact that Justice Marshall argued
that hearsay evidence should not be admitted because of its intrinsic weakness and
incompetency, 307 and where the risks inherent in admitting some types of hearsay are
less than those connected with others, the Federal Rules of Evidence and common law
allow hearsay to be admitted in many circumstances covered by exceptions to the
general principle of exclusion. 308

In general, the exceptions to the hearsay rule apply

to admit hearsay when surrounding circumstances provide guarantees ofreliability. 309

303

See John C. Klotter, supra note 753, 280.

304

See Steven I. Friedland, supra note 1008, 312.

30

s See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 266. ("Under the traditional common law approach to hearsay,
the question whether the hearsay rule barred the reception of a statement could be reduced to two
questions: 1. Was the statement being offered for the truth of the matter asserted? If not, it was not
hearsay, and the hearsay rule posed no obstacle. 2. If the statement was hearsay, did it fall under an
exception?")
306

See Authur Best, supra note 1016, 89.

307

See John C. Klotter, supra note 753, 280.

308

See Authur Best, supra note 1016, 65, 102.

309

See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 254.
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Thus, if the purpose of the hearsay rule is not present in a specific case and if the
interests of justice will be best served by admission of the statement into evidence,
then the evidence should be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.

310

The Federal Rules of Evidence divide their 28 exceptions to the hearsay rule into
two categories.

In the first are those that apply only when the declarant is

unavailable under FRE 804. 311

The second category includes those where the risks

inherent in admitting some types of hearsay are minimal;312 this second set apply
whether or not the declarant is available under FRE 803 313 and by far includes the
larger number of exceptions. 314

According to FRE 805, hearsay included within

hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements
conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules.

Additionally,

there is a 'catch-all exception' 315 that allows admission of hearsay in circumstances

310

See John C. Klotter, supra note 753, 281.

311

It provides: "(a) Definition of unavailability. (b) Hearsay exceptions." (Sub-Provisions omitted.)

312

See Authur Best, supra note 1016, 102.

313

Sub-Provisoes omitted.

314

See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 268.

315

FRE 807 provides: "A statement no specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804, but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the court determines
that (A) the statement is offered as evidence ofa material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on
the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under
this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of
the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the
proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of
the declarant."

~I

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

that are not covered in any of the other 28 exceptions. 316

330

Although one might expect

a more widespread use of the idea that the declarant should be called if available, 317
more than twenty exceptions in FRE 803 do not have this requirement. 318

The only

exceptions requiring unavailability in FRE 804 are those for dying declarations, for
statements against interest, for former testimony, and for statements of personal and
family history. 319

In summary, even though the rule prohibiting the admission of

hearsay statements was formulated in criminal cases by A.D. 1700, exceptions to the
hearsay rule have developed through centuries because of the strict exclusionary
nature of the rule. 320

Nonetheless, where the arguments supporting the exceptions

are based on the necessity to use the out-of-court statements rather than on the likely
truthfulness of the out-of-court declarant, the exception is allowed only if there is
proof that the declarant is unavailable. 321

4.5 The Testimony of Expert Witness

316

See Authur Best, supra note 1016, 102.

317

See Daniel Stewart, Jr., Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism ofPresent Law and the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1 Utah L. Rev. 1 ( 1970) .
318

See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 268.

319

As a result, "one can put into evidence excited utterances, business records, statements for medical
diagnosis or treatment, and many other statements even if one has failed to call a declarant who is
sitting in the back of the courtroom." Id.
320

See John C. Klotter, supra note 753, 280.

321

See Authur Best, supra note 1016, 102.

331
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4.5.1 An Overview
Professor Tal Golan notes that, "Situated at the intersection of the two dominant
institutions of science and law, scientific expert testimony has long been overlooked
by both."322

While scientific evidence has been called the backbone of every

circumstantial evidence case since the Due Process Revolution, in more than one third
of all American criminal trials today, 323 it was relatively unimportant in criminal
trials until the 1960s,324 notwithstanding there being important legal arguments
concerning this issue. 325

The adversary system, for example, was criticized for

"limiting the contributions of science to the evidence of paid champions, selected not
for truth and skill but for partisan advantage."326

The expert had also been referred

to as "a kind of intellectual prostitute ready to sell his opinion and enlist in the

322

See Tal Golan, Laws ofMen and Laws ofNature, The History of Scientific Expert Testimony in
England and America, 1 (Harvard University Press, 2004) . ("Historians of science ignored it because
they did not consider courts of law to be important sites of scientific activity before the twentieth
century. Historians of law ignored it because they never considered science to be a significant factor
in the development of judicial practices and jurisprudence related to evidence." )
323

See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique From the
Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 Vill. L. Rev. 554, 554 ( 1982) .

324

See Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence --- A Primer on
Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 Wm & Mary L. Rev. 261,261 ( 1981) .

325

See Emory Washburn, Testimony of Experts, 1 Am. L. Rev. 45 ( 1866) ; William L. Foster, Expert
Testimony --- Prevalent Complaints and Proposed Remedies, 11 Harv. L. Rev. 169 ( 1897) ; Learned
Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 40( 1902 );
Charles T. McCormick, Some Observations Opon the Opinion Ru1e and Expert Testimony, 23 Tex. L.
Rev. 109 (1945) ... etc.
326

See Charles T. McCormick, Science, Experts, and the Courts, 29 Tex. L. Rev. 611, 626 ( 195 1 ) .
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services of the side that pays him."327

In addition, by holding, in Schermber v.

California. that the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to physical
evidence,328 in Gilbert v. California, 329 that the right to assistance of counsel does not
apply to handwriting exemplars and that evidence in the form of handwriting and
sound are not protected by the Fourth Amendment, nor in United States v. Dionisio330
does the compelled production of voice exemplars violate the privilege against
self-incrimination in it is clear the Supreme Court has declined to extend the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendment guarantees to physical characteristics and evidence
derived therefrom. 331

These decisions also created a prosecutorial 'evidence void' 332

which seemed to place an urgency upon the development and use of scientific
methods of crime detection. 333

Moreover, with the increasing need to employ expert

testimony in criminal cases, as well as advancing modem technology, the legal
~

I
I

'1

arguments that have long-focused on expert testimony have attracted growing
attention and consideration.

It is obvious that the need to assess technical

327

See Lee M. Friedman, Expert Testimony, Its Abuse and Reformation, 19 Yale L. J. 247 ( 1964) .

328

See 384 U.S. 757 ( 1966) .

329

See 388 U.S. 263 ( 1967) .

330

See 410 U.S. 1 (1973) .

331

See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Fry v. United States, A
Half-Century Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 1200 ( 1980) .

332

See Edward J. Imwinkelried, supra note 1076, 262.

333

See Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613, 616 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) .

333
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information intelligently and competently is not only limited to common law

. . d'1ctions.
.
334

JUflS

Furthermore, since the main goal of criminal procedure is to seek a trouble-free
method of assisting the finder of fact in those areas where he or she encounters
difficulties in making an informed finding, how to bring expert testimony into the
courtroom has become an important issue to be dealt with.

335

'
~

~

I

The traditional use of

expert opinion testimony, which allowed the expert witness to testify only if necessary

~

~·1
I·,'
I

to provide information that was beyond the ken of the average juror, and only in

~

'
l

response to hypothetical questions, was changed by Congress adopting Article VII of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 336

For example, FRE 701 provides:

"If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a)
rationally based on the perception of the witness, and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding or the witness' testimqny or the determination of a fact in issue,
and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within
the scope of Rule 702."
This rule clearly permits inference testimony from lay witnesses when it is rationally
334

See Robert F. Taylor, supra note 313, 182.

335

Id., at 183.

336

See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 473 .

See also Beech v. Aircraft. 488 U.S. 153, 169 ( 1988) .
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based upon perception.

334

Moreover, the overall liberalizing influence of the Federal

Rules of Evidence has been nowhere more apparent than in its expansion of expert
witness in FRE 702 through FRE 706.337

Because using an expert to provide

scientific testimony takes time and jurors may give greater deference to the
observations of someone with significant professional qualifications, introducing
expert testimony is permitted only when the trial court is persuaded by the presenting
party that jurors will benefit from help on the topic for which the expert testimony is
proposed. 338

Although the Federal Rules of Evidence have been extant since 1975,

and FRE 702339 does provide some clues as to how to let expert testimony in, the
Supreme Court's understanding and interpretation ofFRE 702 has long been the core
concern of this forensic issue.
It is true that modem technology has always advanced faster than the court's
ability to assimilate such technology into the courtroom.

°

34

Courts in the world will

inevitably face new technological problems as long as the world is progressing.

In

337

See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 473. In addition to FRE 702, FRE 703, 704, 705, and 706
provide: Rule 703. Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts; Rule 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue;
Rule 705. Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion; Rule 706. Court Appointed
Experts.
338

See Authur Best, supra note 1016, 169-70.

339

It provides: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if(1)
the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts
of the case."
340

.I

See Robert F. Taylor, supra note 313, 182.

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

335

short, while the non-expert, with some exceptions, may testify only if he has firsthand
knowledge of the event, the expert is generally permitted to give an opinion, even if

I
~

he does not have firsthand knowledge, after foundational questions help establish his
or her expertise, and when the subject matter is such that the jury can not be expected
to draw correct information from the facts only. 341

While expert testimony may no

longer be necessary to provide information beyond the ken of the jurors to be
admissible, it is now enough if the testimony will assist the jurors. 342

Experts may

be asked their opinions about the specific case without resort to a hypothetical
question, and may offer opinions about the ultimate issue for the jurors'
consideration. 343

Finally, though their testimony may be based on material that

could never be admitted into evidence, testifying experts need not offer a basis for
their opinions. 344

4.5.2 Origins and Early Common Law Developments of Expert Evidence
Generally speaking, medical testimony by doctors is one of the earliest forms
of expert testimony. 345

This is because doctors were highly respected and well

341

See John C. Klotter, supra note 753, 257.

342

See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 473.

343

Id.

344

Id.

345

See Stephan Landsman, Of Witches, Madmen, and Products Liability: A Historical Survey ofthe
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educated about the magic of medicine, a matter of which jurors knew very little. 346
Even though the Code of Hammurabi, the earliest known legal codification, did not
regulate the use of experts in Mesopotamia, prior to the codification of Roman law,
the Egyptians, the Greeks, the Sicilians, the English, and the Palestinians had used
experts in resolving questions of pregnancy, parentage, and medical or clinical
facts. 347

While the Roman judge often acted as an inquisitor in criminal trials,

experts were believed to have been called by the courts to determine the truth when
necessary. 348

Opposing the modem view that expert evidence is purely advisory and

can be accepted or rejected by the court, Roman law seemed to require the fact-finder

UseofExpertTestimony, 13Behav.Sci.&L.l31 (1995).
346

See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 478.

347

See Robert F. Taylor, supra note 313, 184. ("For instance, it is known that the Egyptians used
experts, at least in those areas where medical or clinical facts came into question. In Greece, the
Pythagoreans made numerous comments regarding the use of experts in dispute resolution. From
ancient law until this century, questions of pregnancy and parentage were among the most popular
areas for reliance on expert investigation in both civil and common law jurisdictions. The Sicilian
philosopher, Diodora, commented on laws precluding execution of condemned pregnant women prior
to confinement. Under the Sicilian legal order, a women condemned to death, for whatever reason,
could raise a claim of pregnancy to delay the execution of her sentence by the court. In those
instances, the court would verify her claim through the expert assistance of physicians or midwives.
Indeed, the earliest known English document sanctioning the use of expert witnesses, the writ de ventre
inspiciendo recorded in the thirteenth century by Bracton, concerned this same issue. Prior to the
codification of Roman law, the most expansive development oflegal reliance on technical experts was
in biblical Israel. During the Talmudic period (fourth century A.D.) it was standard procedure in
Palestine for rabbis to enhance their religious education with studies in law and natural sciences. The
Hebraic educational regime of the day provided a method for those in power with both juridical and
technical knowledge to act as both judge and technical expert. Subsequent legal systems have strived
unsuccessfully to emulate this dual function. For example, in the course of an action to nullify a
marriage because of the bride's tainted virginity, Talmudic law allowed the father of the bride to present
the blood-stained bedclothes of the newlyweds as evidence of the bride's defloration. It then fell to
the judge/rabbi to detennine whether the blood was human or not. From time to time these Talmudic
judges were required to function as experts to determine whether a substance presented as proof in an
action for adultery was actually human sperm, or merely egg white.")
348

SeeM. Carr. Ferguson, A Day in Court in Justinian's Rome: Some Problems of Evidence, Proof
and Justice in Roman Law, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 732,757 (1961).
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to accept the experts' conclusions as definitive, and probably as part of the final
judgment.

349

Nevertheless, after the fall of the Roman Empire, court-sanctioned use of experts

II

and other aspects of the highly developed Roman system experienced a severe decline
that lasted almost a thousand years. 350

During which time Roman institutions of

judicial fact finding were superseded by the ancient modes of proof based upon the
intervention of the deity; trial by ordeal is one such example.

351

During the ·early

development of English rules of evidence, experts in England were considered to be
helpers of the court, under which English judges were required to instruct the jury on
349

See Robert F. Taylor, supra note 313, 185. ("In Rome, courts expanded their reliance on technical
experts and consulted such experts on more than medical or parentage issues. Although imperial
tribunals relied upon opinion testimony to resolve many different kinds of disputes involving technical
questions, it is not known whether the experts were called by the tribunal sua sponte or at the request of
the parties. Although specific enactments by Justinian regarding the use of handwriting experts imply
a fear of expert bias (which would make sense only if the expert were called by the parties themselves),
the fact that the Roman judge often acted in the role of inquisitor gives added weight to the belief that
experts may often have been called by the court. Whatever the Roman method might have been for
obtaining the assistance of experts, it appears that Roman law required the fact finder to accept the
expert's conclusions as definitive (i.e., probably as part of the final judgment, as opposed to the modem
view that expert evidence is purely advisory and can be accepted or rejected by the court).")
See Paul R. Hyams, Trial by Ordeal: The Key to Proof in the Early Common Law, in Morris S.
Arnold and Samuel Edmund Thome, eds., On the Laws and Customs of England, Essays in Honor of
Samuel E. Thome, 90 (University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1981).

Jso

See Robert F. Taylor, supra note 313, 185. ("An ordeal has been defined as an ancient mode oftrial,
in which a suspected person was subjected to some physical test fraught with danger, ... the result being
regarded as the immediate judgment of the Deity. See Paul R. Hyams, supra note 1102, 90. The rise
of the ordeal as a legal institution eclipsed all other forms of dispute resolution from the fifth century
A.D. through the cultural renaissance of the high middle ages, both on the Continent and in England.
The earliest English court records discussing ordeals date from 1198. Gradually, however, societies
across Europe recognized the limitations of deific consultation or ordeals as a method of determining
the truth or facts of a matter. Instead, courts turned increasingly to existing records as the keeping of
accurate records became more commonplace and to evolving scientific techniques as they became
recognized as reliable. Finally in 1215, the Fourth Lateran Council proclaimed the Catholic Church's
official disapproval of ordeals in the administration of evidence. It was largely to avoid employing
the legal ordeal -- a dangerous, costly, and increasingly discredited method of obtaining evidence --that juries in their first organized form were introduced in England. This rapidly developing trial
technique soon filled the wide gap left when the ordeal was abandoned by the courts.")

Jst

I

I.
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points which the judge deemed required the admission of opinion evidence.

It was

only later in the jury's evolution that experts were permitted to testify directly to these
fact-finders and the jurors themselves were allowed to weigh the probative value of
the evidence. 352

In fact, opinions from expert witnesses were not much more

welcome in nineteenth century and early twentieth century American courts than
inferences from lay witnesses. 353

Moreover, experts were relatively rare and their

testimony comparatively limited until adoption of the Federal Rules. 354

4.5.3 The Right to Obtain Expert Assistance in United States
When resolving a disputed issue involves information or analysis beyond the
knowledge or capabilities of a typical juror, based upon the so-called 'sporting

352

Id., at 186. ("Only when evidentiary rules were amalgamated into the respective systems did a true
dichotomy emerge between civil and common law systems. The courts during this early stage of jury
development in England probably had two uses for expert knowledge. First, the court could select
jurors who, based on their experiences outside the courtroom, were able to assess technical questions in
the courtroom. These came to be known as 'expert juries.' Second, the court could call skilled
persons into court to help resolve technical questions. These came to be known as 'expert witnesses.'
Over time, the use of expert witnesses eclipsed the use of expert juries, giving rise to the modem
distinction between expert opinion evidence and factual evidence.")
353

See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 472. ("The American opinion rule assumed a division between
'fact' and 'opinion.' The orthodox American rule was that witnesses testified to 'facts,' but the
'opinion' about what those facts meant was for the jurors to decide. However, the dividing line
between the facts of what a witness observes and the witness' opinion about those facts is rarely so
clear as this theory suggests. Even in the halcyon days of the American opinion rule, courts were
often better at articulating the distinction between fact and opinion than they were at identifying it and
excluding opinion.")
354

Id., at 472-3. ("As influenced by the orthodox American distaste for expert opinion testimony, rules
before adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence sharply curtailed the influence that an expert might
have on the trial, so that the expert witness could testify only if necessary to provide information that
was beyond the ken of the average juror, could testify only in response to a hypothetical question,
could not assume anything that was not already in evidence, and could not offer an opinion on the
ultimate issue before the jury.")
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theory, '

355

339

"the parties are presumed to be able to look after their own interests, and

the court is thought to have no independent interest in reviewing evidence that the
parties do not present."
testimony.

357

356

As a result, parties are allowed to present expert witness

These experts testify based on their own general experience and

knowledge. 358

American lawyers, however, care less about whether they have

aided the trier of fact in discovering the facts, than whether they can win the case
adversarially. 359

Similar to Jerome Frank's description that the current trial method

concerning the truth seems to throw pepper in the eyes of a surgeon when he is
performing an operation,360 the disadvantage of using expert witnesses is more
obvious and serious under the tenet of party autonomy and party presentation. 361
The inherent danger is that trials might inevitably turn into 'battles of experts. ' 362
Under the adversary system, "without the contrasting proofs of the opposing sides, the

355

See Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial, Myth and Reality in American Justice, 85 (Princeton University
Press, 1949 ) .

356

See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Witness, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 1113, 1126 ( 1991 ) .

357

See Authur Best, supra note 1016, 169.

35B

Id.

359

See Thomas L. Steffen, Truth as Second Fiddle: Reevaluating the Place of Truth in the Adversarial
Trial Ensemble, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 799, 822 ( 1988) .
360

See Jerome Frank, supra note 1107, 85.

361

See Samuel R. Gross, supra note 1108, 1128.

362

See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823, 836
(1985) .

l
f
I

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

340

fact finder is left to assume that uncontested facts are true. " 363

Therefore, it is

important to provide the defendant an opportunity to challenge the prosecutor's expert
evidence.
Usually the prosecutor's experts are full-time employees in some division of the
local, state, or federal government. 364

Although the commercial market of experts is

not in danger of running low,365 when the defendant side is too poor to obtain suitable
and qualified experts in a criminal case to counter prosecution's experts, the result of
the 'uneven' trial could hardly be fair under the concept of due process. 366
·I

Even

with the ablest lawyer in the world, a man may lose a suit he ought to win, if he has
not the funds to pay for an investigation, before trial, of evidence necessary to sustain
his case. 367

The recognized inability of the defendant to challenge the prosecutor's

expert evidence could also constitute an actual threat to the viability of the adversary

363

See David A. Harris, The Constitution and Truth Seeking: A New Theory on Expert Service for
Indigent Defendants, 83 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 469, 501 ( 1992) .
364

See Andre A. Moenssens, Fred E. Inbau and James E. Starrs, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases,
22 (Foundation Press, 1986 ) . In fact, the paid expert did not become an epidemic until enactment of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. See also David Faigman,, Elise Porter, and Michael J. Saks, Check
Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and
Worrying about the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 Cadozo L. Rev. 1799, 1808 ( 1994) .
365

See Phylis Skloot Bamberger, The Dangerous Expert Witness, 52 Brook. L. Rev. 855, 860 ( 1986) .

366

In fact, most criminal defendants are indigent persons in the world. Those indigent defendants are
not able to get scientific expert witnesses through their own financial resources. See James E. Starrs,
Recent Developments in Federal and State Rules Pertaining to Medical apd Scientific Testimony, 34
Duq. L.Rev. 813, 833 ( 1996) ; see also David A. Harris, supra note 1115,471.
367

. I

See Jerome Frank, supra note 1107, 94 .

341
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system.

368

As stated in United States v. Johnson, "if the government does not supply

the funds, justice is denied the poor --- and represents but
privilege."369

l

an upper-bracket

Nevertheless, whether the indigent defendant should have a right to

expert assistance was still unclear after Johnson.

I

Although the Court in States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi declared that an indigent

)

defendant had no constitutional right to obtain pretrial psychiatric assistance in order

rI

to determine the defendant's sanity under the Due Process Clause,

370

subsequently,

the Warren Court required each state to provide an indigent defendant with the "basic
tools for an adequate defense or appeal."371
rationale of Baldi.

This ruling seemed to undercut the

While state courts gradually believed that the Due Process Clause

provide indigent defendants right to expert assistance,372 the breakdown of Baldi
came in when the Court started to recognize that the Due Process Clause provides
indigent defendants with access to expert service. 373

368

See Yale Kamisar, supra note 675, 65.

369

See 238 F. 2d 565, 572 (2nd Cir., 1956) .

370

See 344 U.S. 561 ( 1953) .

In Ake v. Oklahoma, in

371

See Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226,227 ( 1971) . See also Griffin v. Illinois. 351 U.S. 12
( 1956 ); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353( 1963 ); and Gideon v. Wainwright. 372 U.S. 335( 1963 ).

372

See State v. Green, 258 A. 2d 889(N.J. 1969 ); United States v. Stifel, 433 F. 2d 431( 6th Cir., 1970 );
Patterson v. State, 232 S. E. 2d 233 (Ga. 1977) . See also John F. Decker, Expert Service in the
Defense of Criminal Cases: The Constitutional and Statutory Rights ofindigents, 51 U. Cin. L. Rev.
574, 585-86 ( 1982) ; Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Defendants, 47 Minn. L.
Rev. 1045( 1963 ); Note, The Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense, 55 Cornell L. Rev. 632( 1970 ).
373

See Little v. Straeter, 452 U.S. 1 ( 1981 ) .

I

r

\·

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

342

responding to 'whether the Constitution requires that an indigent defendant have
access to the psychiatric examination and assistance necessary to prepare an effective
defense based on his mental condition,' the Court ruled,
"This Court has long recognized that when a State brings its judicial power to
bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps to
assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense.

This

elementary principle, grounded in significant part on the Fourteenth Amendment's
due process guarantee of fundamental fairness, derives from the belief that justice
cannot be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the
opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his
liberty is at stake....

We recognized long ago that mere access to the courthouse

doors does not by itself assure a proper functioning of the adversary process, and
that a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an
indigent defendant without making certain that he has access to the raw materials
integral to the building of an effective defense.

Thus, while the Court has not

held that a State must purchase for the indigent defendant all the assistance that
his wealthier counterpart might buy, it has often reaffirmed that fundamental
fairness entitle indigent defendants to 'an adequate opportunity to present their
claims fairly within the adversary system.'

To implement this principle, we have
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I'

I

focused on identifying the 'basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal,' and we
have required that such tools be provided to those defendants who cannot afford
to pay for them."374
While Ake left some questions open, 375 at least it recognized that indigent
defendants have a constitutional right to claim access to expert services in some cases.
In addition, since "only by comparing the government's case to the defense's case can
the defendant answer the question whether he can receive a fair trial without the
expert's help."376

This dilemma persists, even though the Warren Court in Brady v.

Maryland held that "[t]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to

~/

guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the

h
l.
1•.
374

In addition, the Court also mentioned that "To say that these basic tools must be provided is, of
course, merely to begin our inquiry. In this case we must decide whether, and under what conditions,
the participation of a psychiatrist is important enough to preparation of a defense to require the State to
provide an indigent defendant with access to competent psychiatric assistance in preparing the defense.
Three factors are relevant to this determination. The first is the private interest that will be affected by
the action of the State. The second is the governmental interest that will be affected if the safeguard is
to be provided. The third is the probable value of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards
that are sought, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards are
not provided." See 470 U.S. 68,76-7 (1985) .
375

Such as: what kind of assistance is needed, see Beth Levine, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
and An Indigent's Right to Court-Appointed Psychiatric Assistance in State Criminal Proceedings, 76 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 1065, 1083 ( 1985) ; whether it applies to capital case only, see concurring
opinion and dissent opinion in ~; and whether this decision covers only psychiatric assistance, see
Note, Expert Services and the Indigent Criminal Defendant: The Constitutional Mandate of Ake v.
Oklahoma. 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1326, 1362 ( 1986) ... etc.
376

See David A. Harris, Ake Revisited: Expert Psychiatric Witnesses Remain Beyond the Reach for
the Indigent, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 763, 772 ( 1990) .
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As declared in Weatherford v. Bursey, "there is no general

constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one."378

4.5.4 Qualification as an Expert
The Federal Rules of Evidence are extremely broad in their definition of how a

·I

person may qualify as an expert witness. 379

As defined in City of Chicago v.

Lehmann, an expert witness should be able to deduce correct inferences from
hypothetically stated facts or from facts involving scientific or technical
knowledge. 380

In the following passage, a judge describes his approach to

ascertaining an expert witness' qualification:
"My rule of thumb test for whether or not a witness is qualified as an expert is
simple.

I hear the witness explain his experience, and if there is an objection to

the qualifications I would explain to the jury that under the Federal Rules of
Evidence an expert is any person who knows more about what he is talking about

than I do." 381

377

See 373 U.S. 83,87 ( 1963) .

378

See 429 U.S. 545, 559 ( 1977) .

379

See Authur Best, supra note 10 16, 171.

380

See 262 Ill. 468 (1914) .

381

See George C. Pratt, Expert Testimony, 11 Touro L. Rev. 107, 143 (1994).
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Hence, a person with suitable training or education may qualify as an expert although
he is not a real specialist or not renowned, and even though she lacks certification or
experience in the matter to which she will testify.

382

People with only practical

training but no formal training could also been considered as experts. 383

In one

extreme and illustrative case, a crucial issue was whether a particular sample of
marijuana had been grown inside or outside of the United States.

384

An expert,

whose sole expertise was based upon his frequent smoking of Colombian marijuana
and in selling that and other varieties, was permitted to testify whether the alleged
marijuana was grown inside the United States. 385
Moreover, because FRE 702 merely requires that expert witnesses be qualified
by 'knowledge, skill, experience, training or education,' areas of knowledge on which
expert testimony will be accepted are broad. 386

These include issues ranging from

how drug deals work to how brakes function, to why airplanes crash, to what a dead
person is worth, and so on.387

While FRE 702 just requires that the testimony 'assist

I'

382

See Garrett v. Desa Industries. 705 F. 2d 721, 725 (4th Cir., 1983) ; Payton v. Abbott Laboratories,
780 F. 2d 147, 156 (1st Cir., 1985) .
383

See United States v. Thomas, 676 F. 2d 239, 245 (7th Cir., 1980) .

384

See United States v. Johnson, 575 F. 2d 1347 (5th Cir., 1979) .
1016, 171.

38s

See also Authur Best, supra note

Id.

386

See L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness Testimony: Back to the Future, 29 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1389,
1395 (1995) .

387

See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 476.

••
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the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,' the subject
testimony need only be 'helpful' to the trier of fact to be admissible. 388

Although

Dean John Henry Wigmore required on this subject a jury to receive appreciable help
from this expert, many regard FRE 702 to be more lenient than many state courts'
standards. 389

In other words, since FRE 702 opens the door quite wide to the receipt

of expert testimony,390 meeting its standards for the qualification of expert witnesses
is quite easy. 391

However, even if a person is qualified as an expert, under FRE 702,

his testimony must meet a certain degree of 'reliability' to be admissible. 392

4.5.5 The Admissibility of Scientific Expert Evidence: Frye and Daubert
4.5.5.1 Introduction
I
''I

I
'

All relevant evidence "having any tendency to make the existence of any fact

..

that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less

388

See Michael C. McCarthy, Note, "Helpful" or "Reasonably Reliable"? Analyzing the Expert
Witness's Methodology Under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 350, 355
(1992).

t.
I

389

For example, New York requires that expert evidence be of material aid to the just determination of
the action. See Eric Ilhyung Lee, Expert Evidence in the Republic of Korea and Under the U.S.
Federal Rules of Evidence: A Comparative Study, 19 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J. 585, 613-4( 1997).
390

See Irving Younger, A Practical Approach to the Use of Expert Testimony, 31 Clev. St. L. Rev. 1, 3
(1982).

~

I

l

I

391

See Eric llhyung Lee, supra note 1141, 614. With respect to the qualification of technical expert
witnesses, see Christopher P. Murphy, Note, Experts, Liars, and Guns for Hire: A Different Perspective
on the Qualification of Technical Expert Witnesses, 69 Ind. L. J. 637 (1994).
392

),I
I

I

l'

I;

See Authur Best, supra note 1016, 172.
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probable than it would be without the evidence" is currently admissible in American
trials. 393

r

Under FRE 104, courts should decide admissibility as a preliminary
I

question oflaw. 394

However, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, while

I·
the beginning inquiry for the judge in deciding whether expert testimony was
appropriate was whether the testimony provided information beyond the ken of the
average juror, there was little need to categorize expert testimony. 395

Although both

prosecutor and defendant may seek to introduce expert evidence in its case in chief, as
held in Bourjaily v. United States. the party offering expert evidence has the burden of
establishing that the requirements for admissibility under FRE 702 are met by a
preponderance of the evidence. 396

.

I'

Expert evidence has to meet certain standards

which both legislators and courts have set out.

Nonetheless, it does not necessarily

I

1:·
follow that the jury will receive all evidence at trial since inadmissible evidence
393

See FRE 40 1.

394

As to Preliminary Questions, see FRE 104. It provides:
"(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a
person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be detennined
by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound
by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a
condition of act, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to
support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.
(c) Hearing of jury. Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of
the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be so conducted when the interests
of justice require, or when an accused is a witness and so requests.
{d) Testimony by accused. The accused does not, by testifying upon a preliminary matter, become
subject to cross-examination as to other issues in the case.
(3) Weight and credibility. This rule does not limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury
evidence relevant to weight or credibility."
395

See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 478.

396

See 483 U.S. 171 (1987) .

i

I

fI

I
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should be excluded under FRE 402 and 403,397 the two rules that generally limit the
presentation of irrelevant and unreliable evidence.

When an expert is qualified to

offer his expert opinion, according to Holmgren v. Massey-Ferguson Inc., the only

i

I

question left to decide is "whether his knowledge of the subject matter is such that his

I

opinion will most likely assist the trier of fact in arriving at the truth. " 398

~

,I

I
4.5.5.2 The Frye Test
Over the past decades, standards for evaluating the admissibility of expert

It

evidence have been submitted by courts.

In 1923, Mr. William Marston, an attorney

and research psychologist, bid to testify that defendant James Frye had passed the
'systolic blood pressure deception test.' 399

In general, the scientific basis of this test

was not only beyond the ken of the jurors but at that time, also beyond that of almost
everyone else in the world. 400

However, the Court of Appeals of District of

397

FRE 402 and FRE 403 provide:
"Rule 402. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant
to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
Rule 403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
398

See516F.2d856,858 (SthCir., 1975).

399

See 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir., 1923) .

400

See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 478.
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Columbia in Frye v. United States ruled:
"Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.

Somewhere in this

twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."401
This decision, also known as the "Frye Test" (the "Test"), established a rule requiring
the proponent of testimony based on scientific procedures to show that the procedures
were generally accepted in their field. 402

~eventually became the dominant

standard by which scientific expert testimony would be measured for more than half a
century. 403

In short, expert scientific evidence was admissible only if the principles

on which it was based had gained 'general acceptance' in the scientific community
401

The court in fact approved the defense side's viewpoint that: "The rule is that the opinions of
experts or skilled witnesses are admissible in evidence in those cases in which the matter of inquiry is
such that inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment upon it,
for the reason that the subject-matter so far partakes of a science, art, or trade as to require a previous
habit or experience or study in it, in order to acquire a knowledge of it When the question involved
does not lie within the range of common experience or common knowledge, but requires special
experience or special knowledge, then the opinions of witnesses skilled in that particular science, art, or
trade to which the question relates are admissible in evidence." Hence, "the systolic blood pressure
deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and
psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the
discovery, development, and experiments thus far made." See 293 F., at 1014.
402

See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 479.

4o3

Id.
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under the Test. 404
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Since the consensus of scientists in the expert's field controlled

the admissibility of the testimony, testimony based on theories sitting on the cutting
edge of knowledge was rejected. 405

This selectivity would impose a lag on the

availability of current technical knowledge in trials. 406
By any measure, the _t:m opinion had extraordinary influence, despite the fact
that it was only three pages long, cited no authority and failed to delve into the
problem of integrating science into trials. 407

Under the Test, it was relatively easy

for opponents of scientific evidence to obtain rival experts to interpret and critique
any admitted scientific testimony. 408

Since the Test would ensure that ''those most

qualified to access the general validity of a scientific method will have the
determinative voice," 409 beginning in the late 1960s, "courts have cited _t:m in
virtually every criminal prosecution dealing with a novel form of expert evidence."410
Although the _t:m approach might be attractive to trial judges, after _t:m was decided,

404

See The Daubert World view, at btq>://www.daubertontheweb.com/Cbapter 2.htm (last visited, Nov.
30, 2004) .
405

See Authur Best, supra note 1016, 172.

406

Id.

407

See Christopher B. Mueller, supra note 781, 720.

401

See Authur Best, supra note 1016, 172.

409

See United States v. Addison, 498 F. 2d 741,744 (D.C. Cir., 1974) .

410

See Andre A. Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence -·· An Alternative to the Frye Rule,
25 Wm & Mary L. Rev. 545,546 ( 1984) .
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l
I

many able courts have tried to reject it as being vague, manipulable, and too
restrictive in excluding the fruits of cutting-edge and unestablished scientific
learning. 411

For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

rejected Em in United States v. Downing in 1985. 412

;

,(

4.5.5.3 The Daubert Standard

~

Despite the courts' widespread adoption of the "Frye Test," many viewed its
'general acceptance' standard as unduly restrictive, because it sometimes barred
testimony based on intellectually credible but somewhat novel scientific
r

approaches. 413

Though "general acceptance" was thought to mistakenly assume that

r:

"the scientific community speaks with a single voice on the acceptance of novel
scientific procedures,"414 the "Frye Test" was not referred to as a governing test for
the admissibility of expert evidence during the long-term legislative process of the

r.
Federal Rules ofEvidence. 415

The Test is, therefore, absent in the Federal Rules of
'

Evidence.

Instead, a more liberal approach to expert evidence, the relevancy test,

411

See Christopher B. Mueller, supra note 781, 721.

412

See 753 F. 2d 1224 (3 111 Cir., 1985) .

413

See The Daubert Worldview, supra note 1156.

414

See Andre A. Moenssens, supra note 1162, 562.

415

See Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 Cadozo L. Rev.

1999, 1999 (1994) .

r.
r

I
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I
:I

'I

II

I

I

not requiring a showing of general acceptance of expert evidence, has been
established under FRE 702. 416

After adoption ofFRE 702, some courts gradually

have abandoned the "Frye Test."417

However, since the Federal Rules of Evidence

do not clearly intend to replace it, other courts have continued to apply the Test in
deciding the admissibility of expert evidence. 418

In a famous case of Daubert v.

Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 419 where the issue 'whether the Frye test had been
superceded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence' was asked, the United
States Supreme Court for the first time decided the proper standard of admissibility
II
I'

for scientific expert evidence.

Without discussing the merits of the Frye test,

\
Daubert recognized that the Federal Rules of Evidence did not require general
acceptance as a prerequisite to admissibility because their general approach to
relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion evidence420 inevitably rendered Em

416

See Charles McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence, 363 (West, 1954) .

417

I

r

See United States v. Williams. 583 F. 2d 1194 (2nd Cir., 1978 ) ; State y. Williams, 3 88 A. 2d 500
(Me. 1978) ; United States v. Kozminksi, 821 F. 2d 1186 (6th Cir., 1987 ) ; United States y. J akobetz.
955 F. 2d 786 (2nd Cir., 1992) ... etc.
418

See Vicki Christian, Admissibility of Scientific Expert Testimony: Is Bad Science Making Law? 18
N. Ky. L. Rev. 21, 28,40 ( 1990) .
419

420

See 509 U.S. 579 ( 1993) .

The Court held that: "Nothing in the text of this Rule establishes 'general acceptance' as an
absolute prerequisite to admissibility. Nor does respondent present any clear indication that Rule 702
or the Rules as a whole were intended to incorporate a 'general acceptance' standard. The drafting
history makes no mention of~ and a rigid 'general acceptance' requirement would be at odds with
the 'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules and their 'general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers
to opinion testimony.' Given the Rules' permissive backdrop and their inclusion of a specific rule on
expert testimony that does not mention 'general acceptance,' the assertion that the Rules somehow
assimilated~ is unconvincing. ~made 'general acceptance' the exclusive test for admitting
expert scientific testimony. That austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal
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inapplicable in federal trials.
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Notwithstanding, according to Daubert,

"That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence does not mean,
however, that the Rules themselves place no limits on the admissibility of
purportedly scientific evidence.
such evidence.

Nor is the trial judge disabled from screening

To the contrary, under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that

any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but

r
r

reliable. " 421
To assuage fears that its ruling would result in a free for all in which juries would be
confounded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions, Daubert not only
emphasized the continued availability of traditional tools under the adversary system,
including vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful

v.
t

instructions to jurors on burdens of proof, but also noted the availability of other
mechanisms of judicial control, including summary judgment and the ability to

Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials."
421

ld., at 588-9.

Id., at 589-90. ("The primary locus of this obligation is Rule 702, which clearly contemplates some
degree of regulation of the subjects and theories about which an expert may testify. 'If scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue' an expert 'may testify thereto.' (Emphasis added.) The subject of an
expert's testimony must be 'scientific ... knowledge.' The adjective 'scientific' implies a grounding
in the methods and procedures of science. Similarly, the word 'knowledge' connotes more than
subjective belief or unsupported speculation. The term 'applies to any body of known facts or to any
body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds.' Of course, it would be
unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific testimony must be 'known' to a certainty;
arguably, there are no certainties in science. But, in order to qualify as 'scientific knowledge,' an
inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must be
supported by appropriate validation-- i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is known. In short, the
requirement that an expert's testimony pertain to 'scientific knowledge' establishes a standard of
evidentiary reliability.")

!'.
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exclude confusing or prejudicial evidence under FRE 403. 422
Since FRE 702 requires experts to assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, 423 which was formerly, and primarily a
question of relevancy, Daubert ruled that the testimony must be sufficiently tied to the
I

I

facts of the case to aid in the resolution of an issue in dispute, 424 and "the trial judge

I,
must determine at the outset, pursuant to Ru1e 104(a), whether the expert is proposing
to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand
or determine a fact in issue. " 425

While the Court explicitly refused to adopt any

'definitive checklist or test' for determining the reliability of expert scientific

422

As a result, this decision implied that the testimony must be grounded in the methods and
procedures of science, 'the scientific method,' which would possess the requisite scientific validity to
establish evidentiary reliability. See The Daubert Worldview, supra note 1156.
423

I·

I'I
'I

II

l·'
'

I!
·Jj
.11

•f

II

At this point, the Court provided further guidence for deciding if the testimony is scientifically
valid. The Court held that: "Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a
theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be
(and has been) tested. 'Scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing
them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes science from other
fields of human inquiry.' Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication. Publication (which is but one element of peer review) is not
a sine qua non of admissibility; it does not necessarily correlate with reliability, and in some instances
well-grounded but innovative theories will not have been published. Some propositions, moreover,
are too particular, too new, or of too limited interest to be published. But submission to the scrutiny of
the scientific community is a component of' good science,' in part because it increases the likelihood
that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected. The fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a
peer reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the
scientific validity of a particular technique or methodology on which an opinion is premised.
Additionally, in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court ordinarily should consider the
known or potential rate of error, and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the
technique's operation. Finally, 'general acceptance' can yet have a bearing on the inquiry. A
'reliability assessment does not require, although it does permit, explicit identification of a relevant
scientific community and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that
community.' Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence
admissible, and 'a known technique which has been able to attract only minimal support within the
community' may properly be viewed with skepticism." See 509 U.S., at 593-4.
424

See The Daubert Worldview, supra note 1156.

425

See 509 U.S., at 592 .

'l
I

I
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F

testimony, and emphasized the need for flexibility, it not only emphasized that the
admissibility inquiry must focus solely on the expert's principles and methodology
instead of on the conclusions that they generate, but also listed several commonly
pertinent but non-exclusive factors: "(1) whether the theories and techniques
employed by the scientific expert have been tested, (2) whether they have been
subjected to peer review and publication, (3) whether the techniques employed by the
expert have a known error rate, (4) whether they are subject to standards governing
their application, and (5) whether the theories and techniques employed by the expert
enjoy widespread acceptance." 426

As a result, Daubert established new requirements

for admission of scientific evidence. 427
Nonetheless, in response to the fear that its new evidentiary standards would
sometimes stifle courtroom debate, Daubert acknowledged that those standards would
occasionally prevent juries from learning of authentic insights and innovations, but
concluded that such was the inevitable consequence of evidentiary rules designed not
for the exhaustive search for cosmic understanding but for the particularized
resolution oflegal disputes. 428

As Justice Blackmun, J. noted in Daubert:

"To summarize: 'General acceptance' is not a necessary precondition to the
426

See The Daubert Worldview, supra note 1156.

427

See Authur Best, supra note 1016, 172.

428

See The Daubert Worldview, supra note 1156.
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admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, but the
Rules of Evidence --- especially Rule 702 --- do assign to the trial judge the task
of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is
relevant to the task at hand.

Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid

principles will satisfy those demands." 429

'I
While ~ dominated the discussion about the admissibility of scientific evidence for
half a century, Daubert seems destined to be the starting point for the discussion of
expert testimony over the next half-century. 430

4.5.5.4 The Post-Daubert Practices
After Daubert was decided, some scholars asserted it to be "a major advance in
the jurisprudence oflaw and science."431

In his partly dissenting and partly

concurring opinion of Daubert, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, "Questions
arise simply from reading this part of the Court's opinion, and countless more
questions will surely arise when hundreds of district judges try to apply its teaching to

I

I
II
II

I

I

429

See 509 U.S., at 597.

430

See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 480.

431

See Ronald Simon, Some Answers to the Daubert Puzzle, 9 St. John's J. Legal Comment. 37, 39
( 1993) . See also Kenneth J. Chesebro, Taking Daubert's 'Focus' Seriously: The
Methodology/Conclusion Distinction, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1745 ( 1994) .
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particular offers of expert testimony." 432

Other scholars claimed the Daubert

standard to be ambiguous in that this opinion failed to provide meaningful guidance
on how to follow the path. 433

Moreover, while criminal cases should to some extent

warrant a more conservative evidentiary standard towards novel scientific evidence,434
Daubert would not play a proper role in protecting criminal defendants without
assistance from trial courts. 435

Because Daubert did not mention if it would apply to

all expert testimony, lower federal courts disagree on whether Daubert speaks only to
scientific evidence. 436

For instance, while the Sixth Circuit decided that Daubert

also applied to non-scientific expert testimony, 437 the Seventh Circuit held that
Daubert applied only to scientific expert testimony. 438
In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Court resolved this disagreement by
432

Such as: "Does all of this dicta apply to an expert seeking to testify on the basis of 'technical or
other specialized knowledge'-- the other types of expert knowledge to which Rule 702 applies-- or are
the 'general observations' limited only to 'scientific knowledge'? What is the difference between
scientific knowledge and technical knowledge; does Rule 702 actually contemplate that the phrase
'scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge' be broken down into numerous subspecies of
expertise, or did its authors simply pick general descriptive language covering the sort of expert
testimony which courts have customarily received?" See 509 U.S., at 599 ( 1993) .
433

See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Meaning of Daubert and What It Means for Forensic Science, 15
Cardozo L. Rev. 2103, 2104( 1994 ). See also PaulS. Milich, Controversial Science in the Courtroom:
Daubert and the Law's Hubris, 43 Emory L. J. 913, 926 ( 1994) .
434

See Note, Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1481, 1508
(1995) .

435

See Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert test, 78 Minn. L. Rev.
1345, 1354 ( 1994) .

·'

436

See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 481.

~\'·

437

See Beny v. City of Detroit 25 F. 3d 1342 (6th Cir., 1994) .

'I

438

See United States y. Sinclair, 74 F. 3d 753 (7th Cir., 1996) .

~I,
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concluding that,
"Daubert's general holding--- setting forth the trial judge's general 'gatekeeping'
obligation--- applies not only to testimony based on 'scientific' knowledge, but
also to testimony based on 'technical' and 'other specialized' knowledge ... a trial
fi

court may consider one or more of the more specific factors that Daubert

1

t

mentioned when doing so will help determine that testimony's reliability." 439
Consequently, under Daubert and Kumho, the trial court must assess the sufflciency
of the expert's underlying data, the reliability of the expert's methods, and the
I

I

reliability of the expert's application of those methods to the facts of the case. 440

I

While the judge's rationale may seldom be explicit when excluding expert testimony,
even under a 'hard look,' 441 absent a clear abuse of discretion, the judge's ruling on
the admissibility of expert testimony will survive appeal. 442
II

Finally, since Kumho

provides that the language in FRE 702 makes no relevant distinction between

I

~.,,
439

'I

The Court also mentioned that: "But, as the Court stated in Daubert, the test of reliability is
'flexible,' and Daubert's list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts
or in every case. Rather, the law grants a district court the same broad latitude when it decides how to
determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability determination." See 526 U.S. 137,
141-42 (1999) .
440

I

~I'

See Authur Best, supra note 1016, 173.

441

A 'hard look' will be given "when the district court's exclusionary evidential rulings with respect to
scientific opinion testimony will result in summary or directed judgement." See In re Paoli P.R. Yard
PCB Litig., 35 F. 3d 717, 750 (3"' Cir., 1994) .
442

Kumho held: "In sum, Rule 702 grants the district judge the discretionary authority, reviewable for
its abuse, to determine reliability in light of the particular facts and circumstances of the particular
case." See 526 U.S. 137, 158 ( 1999) . See also Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 476. See also
General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 ( 1997) .
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'scientific' knowledge and 'technical' or 'other specialized' knowledge, any such
knowledge might become the subject of expert testimony and the rule would apply its
reliability standard to all 'scientific,' 'technical,' or 'other specialized' matters within
its scope. 443

In a sense, 'experts' of the so-called 'fringe' or 'junk' science seem to

be allowed to testify at trial under FRE 702 and Kumho.

However, opponents of

L.

expert testimony, which they characterize as based on the so-called fringe or junk
science can argue against its admissibility in terms of its topic, the training of the
proposed expert, and the reliability of the expert's methods and application of those
methods. 444

An exclusionary ruling might result from that this kind of expert

testimony based on fringe or junk science is not based on sufficient facts or data, that
it is not the product of reliable principles and methods, and that it is not based on a
reliable application of reliable principles to the facts of the case. 445

443

The Court also mentioned that: "But, as the Court stated in Daubert, the test of reliability is
'flexible,' and Daubert's list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts
or in every case. Rather, the law grants a district court the same broad latitude when it decides how to
determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability determination." See 526 U.S. 137,
147 (1999) .
444

445

See Authur Best, supra note 1016, 173-4.

For instance, "if an accused bank robber sought to introduce testimony by a psychic that a person
with an appearance different from his had committed the crime, a court would reject that testimony.
Applying FRE 702, it might say that the topic of the proposed witness's testimony is not one on which
specialized knowledge can assist the trier of fact in determining whether the defendant committed the
crime. The basis for this would be a belief that psychics are frauds. The court might say that the
proposed psychic is not an expert psychic, since there is no legitimate field in which people can obtain
training or recognition as psychics. Finally, the court might say that the proposed expert's basis for
having an opinion --- psychic feelings --- is not reliable enough. Using the Daubert factors, a court
would likely conclude that psychic feelings can not be tested, have not been documented in
publications subject to peer review, do not have known error rates, are not used with controls, and have
not gained acceptance in some significant community. This would support a ruling that the testimony
is not based on sufficient facts or data, that it is not the product of reliable principles and methods, and
that it is not based on a reliable application of reliable principles to the facts of the case. Thus,

I'
..
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I
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I

II
lri

'I
I

~

I

testimony from a psychic about who robbed a bank would be rejected on three bases: Psychic
evaluation of robber's identities is not a field of knowledge that can help a jury decide who robbed a
bank; the proposed witness is not a qualified psychic because there can be no such thing as a qualified
psychic; and the witness's testimony would not be the product of reliable methods that the witness
applied reliably to the facts of the case." Id.
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Chanter Five: Comparative Analyses on the Exclusionary Rights and Judicial Powers

r
/.'I

I

5.1 Introduction
I

'

Chapter Two of this study introduces a few major historical developmen,ts in the
ROC criminal justice system as well as its pro-accusatorial legal reforms in 2003.

In

general, pro-accusatorial reforms on the ROC Criminal Procedure Code in 2003
focused mainly on adoption of the exclusionary and hearsay rules.

As a

consequence, when to exclude evidence and what results in inadmissible evidence at
trial have become main concerns in the current ROC criminal justice system.

Before

conducting comparative analyses on these evidentiary issues between Taiwan and the
United States, it is necessary to understand the operation of these rules in the United
States.

Thus, Chapter Three focuses on significant historical developments of the

accusatorial Criminal Procedure of the United States.

Origins and developments of

the exclusionary rule are also presented in this chapter.

Chapter Four then provides

an overview of evidence law.
necessary.

It explains how evidence law evolved and why it was

Moreover, this chapter also accounts for the necessity of the hearsay rule,

an exclusionary approach of evidence law.

Under the Confrontation Clause of the

Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the hearsay rule protects a
defendant from conviction without confronting the witness against him.
In this chapter, this study intends to draw comparative analyses upon these

I
'

.

I
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foundations mentioned supra.
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While adopting these accusatorial elements in a

civil-law-based jurisdiction may unavoidably result in unpredictable problems, if
possible, this study will present tentative resolutions for these problems.

In principle,

this chapter attempts to provide resolutions for problems arising from the 2003
1,,

enactments of the exclusionary rule and the hearsay rule in the ROC Criminal
Procedure Code.

Additionally, this chapter will address some other evidentiary

issues relating to building a pro-accusatorial criminal justice system.
expert evidence is an important issue.

For instance,

It not only relates to whether judges and

lawyers are capable of questioning expert witnesses, but also whether judges should
be purely passive in deciding scientific issues at trial, especially when in Taiwan, they
I,
11

have to make a detailed written judgment.

Beyond this traditional viewpoint, while

professional judges are less suitable for deciding scientific issues, what a more
I

I

feasible alternative could be, deserves more attention.

Hence, after comparing the

'I

exclusionary and hearsay rules of Taiwan and the United States, this study will
introduce the "expert jury" institution which is designed to resolve scientific disputes
.,,

more efficiently and rationally.

Of course, submitting this whole new concept just

I

II

intends to provide an opportunity for the ROC criminal justice system to examine

I

l

what aspects of its current "expert evidence" system is insufficient and questionable.
It is too early to say if this expert jury institution will operate better than any other

'l

363

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

scientific-resolving mechanism in Taiwan.

5.2 The Exclusionary Rule
As mentioned in Chapter Two, there are three issues emerging after enacting
Article 158-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

The first is whether Article

158-4 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code would apply to
non-law-enforcement-officers.

The second asks whether the exclusionary rule

applies to evidence illegally obtained by private persons.

Finally, the third ponders

the question of how to properly exercise the discretionary power to exclude evidence;
i.e., what should be considered while exercising this discretionary power pursuant to
Article 158-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code?

In this section, this study

endeavors to resolve these issues by drawing upon the United States experience, if
possible.

5 .2.1 Different Approaches of Constitutional Protections of Human Rights

I~

i:
i'

'

The structure of human rights protection in the United States Constitution
influences the application of the exclusionary rule.

While the illegality of evidence

seized by the police is itself a matter of constitutional law under the Fourth
Amendment, whether or not to use it at trial is also regarded as a constitutional issue
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in the United States.
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The exclusionary rule provides a remedy for a defen~t whose

'

I
II

I
I

Constitutional rights have been violated by a government agent.

Different from the

United States style of human rights protection, the ROC Constitution provides its
people with a more abstract style of human rights protection.

For instance, while the

Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution clearly grant
people rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, double jeopardy, and
self-incrimination, the rights of confrontation, and a speedy trial, the ROC
Constitution merely says in general that all people shall be equal before the law; 1
personal freedom shall be guaranteed to the people?

I'

Further, people shall have

freedom of residence and of change of residence,3 freedom of speech, teaching,

,I

,,,
r
'

~

I
j
k

I,

I

1 See Article 7 ofthe ROC Constitution, providing: "All citizens of the Republic of China, irrespective
of sex, religion, race, class, or party affiliation, shall be equal before the law."
2 See Article 8 of the ROC Constitution, providing: "Personal freedom shall be guaranteed to the
people. Except in case of flagrante delicto as provided by law, no person shall be arrested or detained
otherwise than by a judicial or a police organ in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. No
person shall be tried or punished otherwise than by a law court in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law. Any arrest, detention, trial, or punishment which is not in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law may be resisted. When a person is arrested or detained on suspicion of
having committed a crime, the organ making the arrest or detention shall in writing infonn the said
person, and his designated relative or friend, of the grounds for his arrest or detention, and shall, within
24 hours, turn him over to a competent court for trial. The said person, or any other person, may
petition the competent court that a writ be served within 24 hours on the organ making the arrest for the
surrender of the said person for trial. The court shall not reject the petition mentioned in the
preceding paragraph, nor shall it order the organ concerned to make an investigation and report first.
The organ concerned shall not refuse to execute, or delay in executing, the writ of the court for the
surrender of the said person for trial. When a person is unlawfully arrested or detained by any organ,
he or any other person may petition the court for an investigation. The court shall not reject such a
petition, and shall, within 24 hours, investigate the action of the organ concerned and deal with the
matter in accordance with law."
3 See Article 10 of the ROC Constitution, providing: "The people shall have freedom of residence and
of change of residence."
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writing and publication,4 and freedom of privacy of correspondence. 5

This list is by

no means exhaustive of all freedoms guaranteed by the ROC Constitution. 6

·'

Because

Article 22 7 and Article 23 8 of the ROC Constitution authorize the government to
restrict those freedoms of rights under the name of social order and public interest,
rarely do courts and scholars in general treat human rights protection as a matter of a
constitutional issue under positive laws unless otherwise provided by the ROC Grand
Justice Council.
For example, the Statute for Prevention of Gangsters of 1985 was designed and
drafted to incarcerate violent hoodlums.

Under the statute, the police were

authorized to arbitrarily classify a person as a gangster, to force him to appear before

'II

the police, or arrest him if he failed to appear. 9 The police were further allowed to
l

I

·'
4 See Article 11 of the ROC Constitution, providing: "The people shall have freedom of speech,
teaching, writing and publication."

5 See Article 12 of the ROC Constitution, providing: "The people shall have freedom of privacy of
correspondence."
6 Such as: Article 13: "The people shall have freedom of religious belief." Article 14: "The people
shall have freedom of assembly and association." Article 15: "The right of existence, the right to
work and the right of property shall be guaranteed to the people." Article 16: "The people shall have
the right of presenting petitions, lodging complaints, or instituting legal proceedings." Article 17:
"The people shall have the right of election, recall, initiative and referendum." Article 18: "The
people shall have the right of taking public examinations and of holding public offices." Article 19:
The people shall have the duty of paying taxes in accordance with law." Article 20: "The pepple shall
have the duty of performing military service in accordance with law." Article 21: "The people shall
have the right and the duty of receiving citizens' education."
7 It provides: "All other freedoms and rights of the people that are not detrimental to social order or
public welfare shall be guaranteed under the Constitution."
8 It provides: "All the freedoms and rights enumerated in the preceding Articles shall not be restricted
by law except such as may be necessary to prevent infringement upon the freedoms of other persons, to
avert an imminent crisis, to maintain social order or to advance public welfare."
9

To some extent, the police play roles as the prosecutors do under this Statute.

See the former

I

I

I
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adopt a secret witness system, and to impose a rehabilitative program upon him,
meaning an accused person could be sent to a vagrant camp where he or she would be
deprived of nearly all civil rights without any participation or supervision of the
prosecutor. 10

With this uncontrolled power of arbitrarily classifying certain persons

as gangsters or hoodlums, the police could easily detain suspects, effectively avoiding
procedural requirements prescribed in the ROC Criminal Procedure Code. 11

Under

this police administrative maneuver, many gangsters or hoodlums were in fact
"created" instead of being "discovered."

The police then had full discretion to

charge an individual as a hoodlum because the suspect was deprived of the right to
cross-examine the witness under the secret witness system, which offered the police
an opportunity to produce fake witness in order to detain or incarcerate a suspect.
I

Before the ROC Grand Justice Council declared this practice unconstitutional in 1995,
~

rarely did lawyers and judges challenge those Gangster proceedings based upon the

·' ~

I

United States style constitutional confrontation right because neither the ROC
Constitution nor the ROC Criminal Procedure Code clearly provides a defendant the
right to confront an accusing witness.

In other words, because all "ordinary courts"

are required to apply the statute if the matter at issue is enacted under the civil law

Articles 5, 6, 7, 12, and 21 of the Statute for Prevention of Gangster.
10

See Interpretation No. 384 ofthe Grand Justice Council ( 1990) , supra note 123.

II

Id.

367

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

tradition, in most given cases, any restriction on human rights protection would be
held constitutional if promulgated in law.
Since courts and scholars in Taiwan usually deal with criminal procedure issues
directly based on the ROC Criminal Procedure Code rather than the ROC Constitution
itself, in prior years, what those freedoms of rights mentioned in the Constitution
•.
I

meant were unclear.

This practice, as well as the civil law tradition would definitely

I

I'

make it even more difficult to review criminal procedure issues rooted in the

'~

Constitution itself, which might answer why in the past; courts in Taiwan rarely

\

addressed the issue of human rights protection.

tl
~

Given this practice it is no wonder

II

I

,.

there existed, on the constitutional level, no court decision concerning an exclusionary
rule.

However, as the ROC Grand Justice Council recognizes a new pattern of

human rights protection, such as the confrontation right in its Interpretations of No.
384, 396, and 418, the practice of human rights protection will become more similar
to that of the United States.

The 1998 ROC Supreme Court decision, 87 Tai Sun

4025, which was decided directly based on constitutional human rights protection,
held that since any evidence obtained through illegal wiretaps prejudices the judicial
integrity and fairness it could not be allowed as evidence in a criminal trial. 12 This

12

See 87 Tai Sun 4025 ( 1998) . It held that illegally wiretapped communication by police should be
excluded or it would prejudice the judicial integrity and fairness according to Article 8 and 16 of the
ROC Constitution and Interpretation No. 384, 396, and 418 of the Grand Justice Council. Therefore it
is necessary to investigate if there was illegal wiretapping.

I
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holding reflects this judicial trend because the ROC Grand Justice Council clarified
the related contents of human rights protection before 1998.

Similar to Germany, if

the court in Taiwan determines that the evidence in question was not seized in
violation of procedural law, it must then consider whether admitting the evidence
would violate the constitutional principle of proportionality.

I

l

court has to balance the defendant's interests against the importance of the evidence
and seriousness ofthe offense charged. 13

I

I

~I

I
II

Thus, while privately obtained evidence

might be subject to the exclusionary rule in Taiwan, it is not the case in the United
States.

I

In other words, the

Even if the court in Taiwan finds evidence to be obtained in violation of

procedural law, there does not necessarily exist any violation of constitution rights
because procedural law sometimes relates to mere administrative process.

Without

any clear constitutional mandate like that in the Fourth Amendment to the United

I
I,

.I

States Constitution, it seems necessary to employ a balancing test under the

nam~

of

due process if the court intends to exclude evidence based on constitutional principles .
In short, 87 Tai Sun 4025 represented a new direction that the court should look to the
ROC Constitution for human rights protection.
However, the newly enacted Article 158-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code
in 2003 sets up a new exclusionary approach that is based mainly on the statute level

13

See Craig M. Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1032, 1034 ( 1983) .
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instead of on the constitution level.

Similar to the Pre-2003 practice of the

r

I.
r
I.

exclusionary rule, this law also provides the court with discretionary power to exclude
evidence.

Under this new legislation, without first applying a kind of balancing test,

the court cannot exclude illegally obtained evidence at trial merely because the
government may have violated the constitutionally protected human rights.
Furthermore, public prosecutors are also entitled to exercise this discretionary power

,,

to exclude evidence.

I

Both courts and public prosecutors have to give reasons why or

why not to exclude the alleged illegally obtained evidence in written decisions.

This

differs much from the United States practices since courts in the United States have to
exclude illegally obtained evidence unless "the deterrence rationale loses much of its
force," 14 which results in the exclusionary practices of the United States to be "the
most rigid system insofar as unlawfully obtained evidence must be excluded, and the
court does not have discretion whether to admit the evidence." 15

As Professor

Mirjan Damaska once emphasized, "the idea that criminal proceedings could
justifiably be used for purposes other than those of establishing the truth and
enforcing the substantive criminal law is simply not part of the continental legal

14

See 428 U.S., at 918.

IS However, it should be noted that this does not mean that the balancing of interests is abse~t: the
exclusionary rule does not apply to all kinds of police misconduct nor does it apply in all kinds of
proceedings. For example, the American exclusionary rule does not apply in the grand jury or in
deportation proceedings. See Craig M. Bradley, supra note 628, 376.
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tradition." 16

The different approaches of administrative process of police power

between Taiwan and the United States might explain why the exclusionary rule in the
United States has to be more rigid than that in the ROC jurisdiction.

,l

I'

5.2.2 Different Practices of Police Administration
In the United States, the police are "fragmented." 17

The linked concepts of

'r

local control and decentralization are two of the most important characteristics of the
~

'I

English system as adopted by the United States. 18

Since the police in the United

States derived their authority and obtained their jobs largely from local politicians, 19
I I

the police in a sense have historically had a vested interest in keeping in office the

,,,I

politicians to whom they owed their jobs from the outset. 20

Based upon this

I

''

historical background, it is fair to say that different local and political concerns have
result in different police administrations in the United States.

For example, while

I
I1
I

,I
f

16

See Mirjan Damaska, supra note 150, 526.

17

See Kuk Cho, Reconstruction of the English Criminal Justice System and its Reinvigorated
Exclusionary Rules, 21 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 259,299 ( 1999) . ("As the Royal Commission
pointed out, the English criminal justice system retains features distinct from those of the United States.
For example, 'the police are less fragmented than in the United States; there is a common discipline
code for all forces; there are national representative bodies and a single Minister with responsibilities
for the police service at national level; and there is a central inspectorate."') See also Gordon Van
Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A Comparison of the English and American
Approaches, 38 Hastings L.J. 1, 130-1 (1986).
18

See Freda Adler, supra note 604, 135.

19

See Wilbur R. Miller, Police Authority in London and New York City, 8 Journal of Social History 81
(1975) .

20

See Freda Adler, supra note 604, 138.
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drug smuggling might be a main concern in a jurisdiction, the focus of its local police
administration would be much different from that of another jurisdiction in which
another kind of criminal offense is its main concern.

Given this locally controlled

and decentralized police power, each county or state might adopt its particular policy
regarding police activities that are much different from others.

However, without a

nationwide police administration, it is difficult to require all police departments to
nationally abandon particular investigative misconduct especially when this specific
police behavior would have been held unconstitutional or illegal in any given
jurisdiction.

In other words, judicial control seems to be an effective method to

regulate daily policing activities.

To assure against unreasonable searches and

seizures being a valueless string ofwords,21 and against the police engaging in
conduct depriving a defendant of constitutionally protected rights, 22 the exclusionary
rule has been considered a better way to deter illegal governmental activity that would
infringe upon those rights.
On the contrary, the ROC has had a national police force since the ROC
Constitution became effective in 1947.

According to Subparagraph 17 of Paragraph

1 of Article 108 of the ROC Constitution, 23 Taiwan has a unified and centralized

21

See 367 U.S., at 655.

22

See 428 U.S., at 918.

23

Paragraph 1 of Article 108 of ROC Constitution provides: "In the following matters, the Central

t
i
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'
'1:

police system that is very different from that of the United State's localized or

.I
I

\

decentralized police system.

In addition, under Subparagraph 10 of Paragraph 1 of

Article 109 and Subparagraph 9 of Paragraph 1 of Article 110 of the ROC
Constitution,24 the police force can be subdivided into national and local levels.
Both are under the national police administration power of the Ministry of Interior
(the ROC MOI) .

The ROC MOI conducts nationwide programs for training and

promoting all police officers in Taiwan. 25

Moreover, the ROC MOI enacts police

regulations to control and supervise the police power.
The police functions in Taiwan are clearly defined in the Police Act.
I

These

'

include maintaining public order, protecting social security, preventing all dangers,
and promoting the welfare of all people. 26

Generally speaking, there is a common

discipline code for all police forces; and there is a single supervisor with
responsibilities for the police service at the national level.

Even without the

,·I
l

I

Government shall have the power of legislation and administration, but the Central Government may
delegate the power of Administration to the provincial and hsien governments ... 17. Police system ... "
24

Paragraph 1 of Article 109 of ROC Constitution provides: 'In the following matters, the provinces
shall have the power of legislation and administration, but the provinces may delegate the power of
administration to the hsien ... 10. Provincial police administration ... " And Paragraph 1 of Article 110
of ROC Constitution provides: "In the following matters, the hsien shall have the power oflegislation
and administration ... 9. Admistration ofhsien police and defense ... "
25

r

.I

'4

26

See Howard A. Kurtz, supra note 107.

See Article 1 of the Police Act. In addition, the police are not only responsible for enforcing the
law and maintaining public order but also for crime prevention and the protection of the lives and
property of others. They are also assigned particular duties that are not practiced in many countries,
which include: management of exit from and entry into Taiwan since the police handle immigration
affairs, civil defense and disaster rescue, order maintenance and riot control, and assistance for other
government affairs whenever necessary. See Chuen-Jim Sheu, supra note 8.
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exclusionary rule, it is also possible to prevent the police from conducting illegal
activities by setting forth a standardized process requiring them to comply with
criminal procedural rules.

This might be a more effective way to protect

constitutional human rights than applying the exclusionary rule. 27

Thus, the more

rigid exclusionary rule created by judicial power in the United States would not, in
Taiwan, be considered a necessary and important method by which to administer local
police power.

For example, if nationwide police activities are considered improper,

irrespective of the reason, either the ROC Legislative Yuan passes a new law or the
Ministry of Interior enacts a new administrative regulation will prohibit those
improper activities.

Any violation of law or regulation may result in the violator
I '

being demoted or punished.

If the problem is merely of local concern, it is easier to

h

change since both national and local administrations are capable of improving it.

••

Under this administrative process, it is reasonable that a rigid exclusionary rule

·~

r
f.

excluding almost all illegally obtained evidence as a remedy for violation of
constitutional rights would not have evolved in Taiwan until after its development in
the United States.

Of course, for the purpose of human rights protection, it would be

much better to have the national level of police administration, as well as the
exclusionary rule rather than only one of the two.

27

See Howard A. Kurtz, supra note 107.
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5.2.3 Application of the Exclusionary Rule to Law-enforcement-officers Only
Since Article 158-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code provides: "Unless
otherwise provided by law, whether evidence derived from violation of procedure rule
conducted by law-enforcement-government-officers should be excluded in a criminal
case depends on the result of balancing human right protection of the defendant
against the public interest,,, the ROC courts do not extend the exclusionary rule to
evidence illegally obtained by non-law-enforcement-officers.

For example, the

Post-2003 decisions focus mainly on the provisional term of"violation of procedure
rule conducted by law-enforcement-government-officers."28

There are two major

rationales behind the exclusionary rule: the first is to maintain the fairness of the
proceedings and to safeguard the integrity of judicial process; the other is, like that of
the United States, is to only deterring police misconduct only. 29

It is necessary to

identify which of the two is the main concern behind Article 158-4 of the ROC
Criminal Procedure Code.

If Article 158-4 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code is

28

The Pre-2003 exclusionary practices clearly focused on the first rationale since decisions as 87 Tai
Sun 4025 and 88 Sun E 1953 mainly addressed on judicial integrity and fairness.

29

See Craig M. Bradley, supra note 628, 376. As Leon declared, the American style exclusionary
rule is based on the second reasoning. See 428 U.S. 897 ( 1984) . ("Suppression of evidence obtained
pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in
which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule... The deterrent purpose of the
exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least
negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right.")

'I

I!
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designed to deter police misconduct only, then decisions similar to 92 Sun E 1812
should be affirmed.

Otherwise, the exclusionary rule applies to both the private

obtained evidence and the non-law-enforcement-officers obtained evidence.
I

Under the civil law tradition, only the legislative branch may create laws.

l
I

Ordinary courts are not entitled to make laws; they instead are merely designed to
interpret laws.

Even if ordinary courts suspect a law might be unconstitutional, they

can only file their opinions to the ROC Grand Justice Council( the constitution court),
which is the only institution empowered to decide constitutional issues.

Since

Article 158-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code requires the commitment of
illegal activity on the part of the law-enforcement-government-officer, as prerequisite
\

I'
to exercise the exclusionary power, courts should comply with this statute.

If courts

I
I

can apply Article 158-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code to exclude both
privately obtained evidence and that gathered by the non-law-enforcement-o:fficers, 30
then the constitutional court will lose its function because no ordinary court will seek
for constitutional review of the legislation.

Furthermore, this provision will become

meaningless since the court can then exercise discretionary power beyond the
legislation.

In other words, without any contradictory legislative opinion, this

legislation seems to focus on deterring illegal activity of the

30

In fact, no supporting legislative intent or implication can be found in this way.

I '

,
\I

!I
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I'

law-enforcement-government-officer. This is similar to the American approach.
Hence, the Taipei High Court decision, 92 Sun E 2258, which ignored this provision,
and excluded the illegal wiretap obtained by the victim, by directly exercising the
constitutional power, should be reversed.

As a consequence, Article 158-4 of the

ROC Criminal Procedure Code supersedes the Pre-2003 judicial power to exclude
evidence illegally obtained by the non-law-enforcement-officers and the private
I;

persons.
As mentioned supra, even though the United States exclusionary rule is rigid, it
does not apply to all unlawfully obtained evidence. 31

In a sense the United States

Supreme Court has ruled the exclusionary rule inapplicable in proceedings where
applying it will neither professionalize the police behavior nor deter the poli~e
misconduct.

For example, in Arizona v. Evans, evidence obtained from an illegal

search relying on court clerk misconduct is admissible because excluding evidence in
this case will not deter further police misconduct. 32

While

non-law-enforcement-officers are not responsible for investigating criminal activity, it
does not matter whether the criminal goes free because they will not bear no blame.
31

As mentioned supra, the exclusionary approach of the United States seems to be "the most rigid
system insofar as unlawfully obtained evidence must be excluded, and the court does not have
discretion whether to admit the evidence. However, it should be noted that this does not mean that
balancing of interests is absent: the exclusionary rule does not apply to all kinds of police misconduct
nor does it apply in all kinds of proceedings. For example, the American exclusionary rule does not
apply in the grand jury or in deportation proceedings." See Craig M. Bradley, supra note 628,376.
32

See514 U.S. I (1995) .
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There is no deterrent effect even if their illegally obtained evidence is excluded at trial.
From this viewpoint, it is reasonable why Article 158-4 of the ROC Criminal
Procedure Code focuses merely on evidence illegally obtained by
law-enforcement-officers since it is not necessary to exclude all evidence unlawfully
obtained by any government-officer.

~.

i
As to the deterrent effect, although Article 15 8-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure

I

I'
I

\

Code does not adopt a mandatory exclusionary rule, it does not necessarily result in
the criminal investigatory process full of intentional illegal governmental activities.
While Paragraph 3 of Article 156 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code requires the
court to first investigate if the defendant's confession results from any illegal
governmental activity, the law-enforcement-officers should be careful about the
legality of their investigating process.

If their investigating process is finally found

illegal by the court, not only will their working product be excluded as evidence at
trial, but they will be subject to either disciplinary or criminal process.

Since the

court will find out if the illegal governmental activity is intentionally conducted
before deciding whether to apply the exclusionary rule in any give case, the
disciplinary and criminal process will eventually deter the government officers from
intentionally violating the citizen's constitutional rights.

No one wishes to risk being

investigated and found to have intentionally violated a procedure rule.

In addition,

I.
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., .
the judicial process regarding whether to exclude illegally obtained evidence is itself
an extra burden to the government officers' ordinary work.

This phenomenon

somehow will allow government officers to avoid any intentional violation of
procedure law because the investigation of any violation is burdensome.

It is

unreasonable for them to intentionally violate the procedural law to investigate a
crime since doing so will bring them big troubles.

While the exclusionary rule in

Taiwan is not established on the constitutional level, to apply it or not will not
automatically result in issues of unconstitutionality.

In short, the discretionary

approach of applying the rule also has a deterrent effect on governmental activities
although it may not be the same as that of a mandatory exclusionary rule.

Even a

non-mandatory exclusionary will deter the law-enforcement-officers from infringing
the defendant's constitutional rights.

5.2.4 Inferences from the Private Prosecution Institution
Unlike the United States criminal justice system, Taiwan has the private
prosecution institution which originated from German sources.

Thus, considerations

derived from a private prosecution institution do not exist in the exclusionary
practices in the United States.

In general, a private prosecution allows the victim of

a crime to assume the responsibility of prosecuting a suspect without the government

I
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.j
interfering.

In Taiwan, a crime victim may believe that he or she can more

effectively prosecute a defendant than can the public prosecutors.

This is especially

true when the victim has collected enough evidence to prosecute, and wishes to avoid
the risk of the defendant going free because the government has failed to put together
a solid case against the accused. 33

Before the establishment of "asking for trial" in

2002, private prosecution was the only choice available while facing unfavorable
prosecutorial policy. 34

When a public prosecutor has already started to investigate a

case, a private prosecution will no longer be allowed unless the case is chargeable
upon complaint; 35 consequently, without delegating to a lawyer, the court will

33

However, a victim has to pay for investigating the crime without financial assistance from the
government even though it is free to institute a private prosecution. Even though there is no grand
jury system in Taiwan, the public prosecutors do not have the exclusive authority to initiate prosecution
since there is a parallel "private prosecution" system in Taiwan. In general, private prosecution is
designed to prevent arbitrary prosecutorial policy. The victim considers it impossible for a public
prosecutor to decide to indict, but believes the suspect will be convicted. It is worthy to mention that
a merely vexatious and malicious private prosecution is basically prohibited since the private
prosecutor is required to prove it is not a case for civil action and the private prosecution is not being
used to threaten the alleged offender. See Paragraph 2 of Article 326 of the ROC Criminal Procedure
Code.
34

The victim of a crime may file a private prosecution except that he or she is without, or limited,
legal capacity, or is dead. It is noteworthy that there exist limitations of private prosecution where
"the unpleaded part under Article 55 of the Criminal Code" constitutes a more serious offenses or its
first instance is under the jurisdiction of a higher court. It provides: If one act constitutes several
unlike offenses or the means employed or the results of the commission of one offense constitute
another unlike offense, only the most severe of the prescribed punishments shall be imposed.
Therefore, the "unpleaded part'' means there exists a more serious offense than the "pleaded part'' filed
by the private prosecutor under Article 319 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code. Moreover, the law
prohibits a private prosecution from being initiated against a lineal ascendant or spouse. See Article
321 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code. In a case chargeable only upon complaint or request, a
private prosecution may not be initiated if such complaint or request is no longer permitted. See
Article 322 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
35

See Paragraph 1 of Article 323 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code. Before 2000, a private
prosecution was allowed before a public prosecutor concludes his investigation in the same case.
Besides, if a public prosecutor knows prior to the conclusion of his investigation that a private
prosecution has been initiated, he shall immediately stop such investigation and refer the case to the
court.

~I

1I

~
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dismiss the private prosecution. 36
With a private prosecution, as with a public one, there is the requirement to
provide the full name, sex, age, domicile or residence of the accused, other special
identifying features, as well as facts and evidence of the offense. 37

Since the private

l'
prosecutor attorney is assumed to play the public prosecutor's role, a private
prosecutor may perform any procedural act performable by a public prosecutor.

38

A

private prosecutor has to prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt while the court
is also entitled to investigate the evidence.

Interestingly, the law treats the private

prosecution differently from the public prosecution.

The ROC Criminal Procedure

Code does not provide the private prosecutor attorney with rules for interrogating the
accused or the witness, or to request assistance from the police before the trial.

In

addition, the court questions the private prosecutor before examining the accused.
This is to clarify and determine if it is a case for civil action or to insure that the
private prosecution procedure is not being used to pressure the accused. 39

36

See Paragraph 2 of Article 319 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code. Before 2000, the private
prosecution did not require an attorney to be delegated by a private prosecutor.

37

See Paragraph 1 of Article 320 (private prosecution)
prosecution) of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
31

39

and Paragraph 2of Article 264 (public

See Paragraph 1 of Article 329 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

See Paragraph 2 of Article 326 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code. In practice, the court
distrusts the private prosecution to some extent because there is much commercial consideration before
an attorney accepts delegation to file a private prosecution while a public prosecutor decides a case
mainly based on legal opinion.
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Even though a private prosecution does not provide the victim with public
assistance in regard with investigation, it is an opportunity for the victim to carry out
justice by himself if he believes himself to be more capable of convicting the accused.
While Article 320 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code requires the private
prosecutor to provide the full name, sex, age, domicile or residence of the accused, or
other special identifying features, as well as facts and evidence of the offense, it is
reasonable for the private prosecutor to investigate and collect evidence; otherwise, it

~I

would be impossible to provide the information which the statute requires.
Nonetheless, there is no procedural rule regulating private investigation or evidence
collection.

The current law only provides procedural rules for flling applications to

obtain evidence that might be destroyed, forged, or altered immediately. 40

The

victim has nothing to do after filing application if the public prosecutor or the court
does not respond to it in time.

When the public prosecutor or the court does not

respond to the evidence-obtaining application in time, it seems necessarily for the
victim to obtain evidence or risk losing the case because of insufficient evidence. 41
If evidence unlawfully obtained by private parties is excluded, the private prosecution
system will become void because it is impossible to convict the offender with

40

41

See Articles 219-1 to 219-8 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
In reality, rarely will a criminal offender allow the victim to collect evidence against him.

.....
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inadmissible evidence.

Without procedural rules regulating the private evidence

obtaining process, how the victim can "legally" conduct investigation and evidence
collection depends mainly upon the "legality" of substantial law instead of procedural
law in Taiwan.

There is no evidentiary problem when private prosecutor obtains

evidence without violating substantiallaw.

42

If the victim, however, violates

substantial law when obtaining evidence, whether to exclude evidence emerges as an
evidentiary problem.
In general, if the victim violates substantial law when obtaining evidence, he
should be punished.
any.

I'
I'
I

Moreover, he is also responsible for monetary compensation if

If there is any violation of substantial law during the private evidence-obtaining

process, is it fair to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained by private persons if they
are already subject to criminal punishment?

From Taiwanese decisions similar to 87

Tai Sun 4025 and 88 Sun E 1953, the answer seems to be "Yes."

Nevertheless,

based upon the following explanation, this study opposes this viewpoint.
According to Paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the ROC Constitution, providing
II
I

II

"Personal freedom shall be guaranteed to the people.

Except in case of flagrante

I'

I
I

I

I.

'•

I

delicto as provided by law, no person shall be arrested or detained otherwise than by a
judicial or a police organ in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law,"

42

It is impossible to violate procedural law because no such law is currently effective.
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Paragraph 1 of Article 88 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code provides "A person in
flagrante delicto may be arrested without a warrant by any person."43

In other words,

the law allows any person to arrest another, without a warrant, if that other is in
flagrante delicto.

While the arresting person may misunderstand the requirement of

the warrantless arrest, it is reasonable to imagine that the court may finally find out
the warrantless arrest is unlawful under Article 88 of the ROC Criminal Procedure
Code. 44

Regardless of the arresting person's good faith, the ROC courts neyer hold

evidence derived from from this kind of illegal warrantless arrest is inadmissible.

If

privately obtained evidence derived from an illegal warrantless arrest is admissible,
what is the supporting rationale to exclude privately obtained evidence derived from

.

illegal search or seizure while interests of personal freedom are much higher than all

'I

• J

others?45

For example, in fornication cases in Taiwan, if the Taipei High Court

decision of 88 Sun E 1953 is affirmed, the illegal wiretap should be excluded

43

As to flagrante delicto, Paragraph 2 of Article 88 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code provides: "A
person in flagrante delicto is a person who is discovered in the act of committing an offense or
immediately thereafter." In addition, Paragraph 3 of Article 88 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code
provides: "A person is considered to be in flagrante delicto under one of the following circumstances:
( 1 ) He is pursued with cries that he is an offender; ( 2) He is found in possession of a weapon, stolen
property, or other item sufficient to warrant a suspicion that he is an offender or his person, clothes and
the like show traces of the commission of an offense sufficient to warrant such suspicion."
44

Under this article, anyone discovered in the act of committing an offense, or immediately thereafter,
and who is pursued with cries that he is an offender, or who is found in possession of a weapon, stolen
property, or other item sufficient to warrant a suspicion that he is an offender or his person, clothes and
the like show traces of the commission of an offense sufficient to warrant such suspicion is subject to
warrantless arrest.
45

For example, personal freedom is in a higher rank than freedom of residence and of change of
residence, speech, teaching, writing and publication, privacy of correspondence, religious belief, and
assembly and association.
·

,.
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afterwards.
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The victim spouse then has to follow the suspects or otherwise he or she

will lose any opportunity to immediately arrest according to Article 88 of the ROC

t

I

Criminal Procedure Code.

This possibility encourages the victim to adopt a more

,

I

serious freedom-infringing approach to obtain evidence in order to convict the
accused.

If so, this practice would be against the proportional principle behind

Article 23 of the ROC Constitution46 because it creates a more serious
freedom-infringing institution rather than a necessarily minimal one.
However, in addition to violation of constitutional proportional principle,
excluding evidence unlawfully obtained by private persons will also harm the
practicality of criminal justice system.

For instance, if illegal wiretapping is finally

found punishable according to Article 315-1 of the ROC Criminal Code, then
punishing the offender is enough to do criminal justice.

In addition to punishing the

criminal offender, i.e., the wiretapping in 88 Sun E 1953, it is a bad way to exclude
evidence unlawfully obtained by private persons for protecting the victim; i.e., the
non-fornicating side in 88 Sun E 1953 who intends to resolve criminal disputes
I·

through criminal law suits.

If the victim finally finds it impossible to believe the

court will resolve criminal disputes, then private revenge might emerge as a remedy

46

It provides: "All the freedoms and rights enumerated in the preceding Articles shall not be restricted
by law except such as may be necessary to prevent infringement upon the freedoms of other persons, to
avert an imminent crisis, to maintain social order or to advance public welfare."

J·
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for legal incompetence.

385

This is absolutely against the legal principle of rule of law.

~

1.1

,~

Moreover, since it is impossible to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained by private
parties without determining the legality of the evidence-obtaining conduct, another
legal issue emerges.

It is questionable to decide the legality of a non-indicted

offense (illegal wiretapping) in the present fornication case.

Thus, Article 15 8-4 of

the ROC Criminal Procedure Code should not apply to evidence unlawfully obtained
by private parties.

Judicial decisions such as 87 Tai Sun 4025, 88 Sun E 1953, and

92 Sun E 2258 should be reversed under Article 158-4 of the ROC Criminal
Procedure Code.

In other words, only illegal behavior of the

law-enforcement-officers will result in the invocation of the exclusionary rule in

.
l

'

Taiwan.

'
t

tT

'•

5.2.5 Invocation of the Exclusionary Rule
In order to exclude evidence via the exclusionary rule in the United States, three
conditions must be met.

First, the evidence should be the result of an improper

governmental activity; second, in addition to an illegal governmental activity, there
must be actual evidence secured; and third, there must be a causal connection between
the illegal governmental activity and the evidence secured from that illegal activity. 47

47

See Peter Evangelista, supra note 659.
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If those conditions are met, under Rakas, the defendant also needs standing to object

II
II
I

the admission of the evidence.

On the contrary, in Taiwan, there is not the standing

I~

requirement for application of the exclusionary rule.

I

Even if one is not the Victim of

the alleged illegal governmental activity one is allowed to seek the exclusion of the

.r
illegally obtained evidence.
In addition, under the accusatorial tradition, parties are in charge of the
invocation of the exclusionary rule, traditionally done by way of a motion to suppress.
If there is no argument whether to suppress the alleged illegally obtained evidence,
I

~

the court is not entitled to exclude evidence on its own initiative.

I'

On the contrary,

the ROC court has the power to make a decision whether to exclude evidence, even
1

~I
I

without parties' participation. 48

While the newly promulgated Paragraph 1 of Article

273 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code allows the defense to argue whether to
exclude evidence at the pre-trial stage, unlike the previous practice before 2003, the
defense now has the opportunity to allege the exclusionary rule in both pre-trial and
trial stages.

A public prosecutor thus has to address the exclusionary issue, too.

Since the exclusionary rule in Taiwan is less rigid than that in the United States
and nothing should be excluded before applying a balancing test, it seems
unnecessary to require any standard to narrow the scope of the exclusionary rule.
48

This judicial power makes the new practice in Taiwan pro-inquisitorial while the court in an
accusatorial system is not entitled to decide this issue on its own initiative.

't
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While the 1998 ROC Supreme Court ruling, 87 Tai Sun 4025, was established on the
fairness and the integrity of judicial proceedings instead of on the single purpose to
deter the governmental illegal activities, the Leon justification49 and the Rakas
requirement50 would not be suitable for the previous ROC criminal justice system.
Upon this foundation, the private party would not be allowed to employ all possible
means to "discover" the truth since sometimes illegal methods of investigation and
their result might prejudice the integrity of judicial proceedings.

For instance, any

evidence secured in violation of law is not admissible even if carried out by ordinary
people instead of police officers.

As the Taipei High Court held that: "Since

wiretapping other's telephone conversation is a criminal offense, it violates the
defendants' privacy protection if the tape is admitted as evidence at trial.

In addition,
I •

admitting the tape into evidence would prejudice judicial integrity and fairness and

'I

II

l•r
it

encourage others to do the same.

Therefore, the wiretapped tape is inadmissible." 51

While the 2003 legislation about the exclusionary rule clearly focuses on illegal
governmental activities, it obviously departs from the 1998 ROC Supreme Court
decision.

Thus, the potential application of the exclusionary rule in Taiwan should

49

The only rationale behind the exclusionary rule is the deterrent effect of police misconducts.
428 u.s. 897 ( 1984) .

so This standing requirement narrows the scope of the exclusionary rule.
sr See 88 Sun E 1953 ( 1999) .

See

See 439 U.S. 128 ( 1978) .
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be similar to that in the United States except for the discretionary part.

Since Article

158-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code does not adopt a mandatory approach of
the exclusionary rule either, the Rakas standing requirement is not applicable because
it is not necessary to narrow the scope of the exclusionary rule via Rakas in Taiwan.

5.2.6 Similarity between the ROC and the United States Exclusionary Rules
Back to the United States exclusionary rule, it is based on the Bill of Rights
setting up standards with which the government has to comply.

Because the

evidence that is excluded by the rule may in fact establish the defendant's guilt,
applying this rule which results in the defendant's acquittal might cause more critics
even thougl?- it is recognized that freedom from unwarranted police intrusions into
individual privacy is a freedom worth the societal cost of allowing the guilty to
sometimes go unpunished due to the exclusion of otherwise reliable evidence. 52
Although the ROC adopts a less rigid exclusionary rule that allows the court as well
as the public prosecutor to exercise a discretionary power before excluding evidence,
there are similar aspects between the ROC and the United States exclusionary rules.
I

·'

Attempting to avoid attacks from the forces of law and order, the United States
Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates held that a search warrant based on an corroborated

52

See Adone v. State. 408 So. 2d 567, at 577 (Fla. 1981 ) .

~~
389

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

I

L

"

informant's tip may be properly issued if, under the totality of the circumstances set
forth in the warrant application, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of the
informant and any corroboration of the informant's information, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence will be found in the place to be searched. 53
It is arguable that Gates relaxed probable cause requirements and made it easier for
police to secure search warrants.

To some extent, this case uses the rather vague

term "reasonable" that is found in the Fourth Amendment and subjects it to an even
more vague definition.

Prior to Gates, "reasonableness" had been grounded in the

two-pronged "Aguilar-Spinelli" standard, which gave some guidance to judges in
determining reasonableness. 54 By replacing this two-pronged standard with a
"common sense" test based on the "totality-of-the-circumstances" standard in Gates,
the court has opted for what many critics claim is no standard at all. 55

Given this

commonsense approach, the court in fact has to apply its "discretionary power" on a
case-by-case basis instead of setting forth a clear and determinative standard in
determining the reasonableness in which probable cause results.

In other words,

because the rigid exclusionary rule will not apply if no "unreasonable" search or

53

See 462 U.S. 213 (1983) .

54

For a more detailed description of this two-pronged test, see Yale Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause,"
"Good Faith," and Beyond, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 551, 556 ( 1984) .
55

See Joseph D. Grano, supra note 595, 465.

~.
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seizure is found, especially when the court would not like to suppress evidence, it will
uphold the alleged search and seizure and find them reasonable based upon the

'

I

"totality-of-the-circumstances" standard.

I

While this discretionary power makes the

I

practice of the strict exclusionary rule more flexible, it is conceivable that some kinds

I'

'I

of "improper police behavior," which might be resUlting in "unreasonableness" under

I

'I

the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test in the previous United States practice or to be

I

!•
against promulgated laws in Taiwan, would not result in any exclusion of evidence
•I

under each exclusionary approach.

For example, if improper police behavior

occurred in Taiwan, even though the court, after employing the two-pronged
Aguilar-Spinelli test, might hold there existed no probable cause which would result
in such search and seizure to be illegal, any evidence illegally obtained by
,,

l'

law-enforcement-officers might not be excluded if the court would find public interest
I

I

I

overweighed private interest in this given case.

Unlike this Taiwanese practice,

~~

;

•

courts in the United States have to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained by police

'•

officers in general if applying the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test would result in
such search and seizure derived from improper police behaviors to be illegal.

,,

However, the same "improperly-obtained" evidence could be held "legal" under the
so-called "totality-of-the-circumstances" standard.

This approach is more elastic in

deciding the legality of search and seizure if the court does not intend to exclude
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evidence derived from improper police conducts.

In short, according to Gates,

courts in the United States are allowed to hold those improper police activities
reasonable based upon the more flexible "totality-of-the-circumstances" standard.
It is worth mentioning that the most significant distinguishable characteristic
between these two discretionary processes is "when" to exercise the discretio.nary
power employing the balancing test or the commonsense test.

For instance, while

the Forth Amendment applies to any search and seizure conducted under color of law,
whether by federal, state or local authorities, 56 courts in the United States still have to
decide whether there existed probable cause even though the alleged government
behavior was authorized by law or a warrant, like that in Gates.

On the contrary,

while courts in Taiwan rarely challenge the constitutionality of a promulgated law,
illegal government misconduct might be held reasonable and evidence derived from
this illegal government misconduct might be admissible at trial.

Since the abstract

nature of an enacted statute might outlaw reasonable and constitutional government
conduct in Taiwan, it appears necessary for the court to apply a balancing test in
determining whether to exclude the alleged illegally obtained evidence lest evidence
derivative from illegal but reasonable search should be excluded merely bec~use of
the deficiency and improperness of any enactment.

56

Thus, this study argues that

At http://www.newsfromthefront.com/archives/vol3no 1 circle.htm (last visited Sep. 18, 2004) .
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whether to exclude evidence under this American commonsense approach in
~I

determining the reasonableness57 is somehow similar to that of the Taiwanese

I

approach in balancing human right protection against the public interest although the
former one does not focus on application of the exclusionary rule itself.

It seems fair

to say that the American judiciary also employs a kind of balancing test under color of
the commonsense approach to decide "whether the police have probable cause" and
"whether the alleged police conducts are reasonable."

At least at this point, the

United States style exclusionary rule has its discretionary aspect, which makes its
rigid approach similar to its flexible counterpart in practice even though the
discretionary power of the court is employed in different phrases.
Since the United States Supreme Court has made certain exceptions to the
exclusionary rule, such as: impeachment of a defendant's trial testimony at the
criminal trial, grand jury testimony, sentencing, parole hearings, juvenile hearings,
and deportation proceedings, and applies the discretionary power to decide whether
there exist unreasonable searches and seizures, the "so-called mandatory exclusionary
rule" looks less "mandatory" than initially described.

As above-mentioned, the

scope of the exclusionary rule in both Taiwan and the United States may look almost
the same although the discretionary powers are exercised in different phases when
57

It seems to indicate that constitutional restraints do not handicap law enforcement but leads to
improved police training. See Freda Adler, supra note 604, 224.

I
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deciding different issues. 58

5.2.7 Suggestions for Exercising the Discretionary Exclusionary Power in Taiwan

,,
While it is clear admitting evidence derived from "illegal search and seizure" is

'~1
I

unconstitutional in the United States, it is not clear whether official behavior that
violates procedural law will also result in unconstitutionality in Taiwan.

,I

The

~l

procedure issue is primarily administrative; therefore, violating it might not
automatically result in unconstitutionality.

If violating a procedural rule is not

unconstitutional, it is not necessary to exclude evidence derived from the violation.
In other words, in the United States, the constitutionality of government conduct is
decided through determining whether there is unreasonable search and seizure.

On

the contrary, in Taiwan, the same issue is determined via the process of concluding
whether admitting evidence derived from illegal law-enforcement-officers violates the
constitutional proportional principle under Article 23 of the ROC Constitution.

This

difference justifies why Article 158-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code allows
the co~ and the public prosecutor to exercise the discretionary power even though
58

For instance, in the United States, the discretionary power is exercised to decide whether evidence
derived from improper official misconducts would result in search and seizure to be illegal under the
Gates commonsense test. On the other hand, in Taiwan, the discretionary power is exercised to decide
whether violation of promulgated laws of law-enforcement-officers is unconstitutional under a
balancing test. Thus, the discretionary powers to exclude evidence in both Taiwan and the United
States are almost the same regardless of its "mandatory" or "discretionary'' characteristic. Moreover,
the exclusionary rule in Taiwan is more flexible than that in the United States not only because there
has been no binding Supreme Court decision after the 2003 legislation in Taiwan but also because the
exclusionary rule itself is of statutory issue.
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the illegality of improper police behavior has been already decided.

As already

analyzed supra under the civil law interpretative tradition and the deterrent purpose in
Leon, Article 158-4 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code applies to
law-enforcement-officers only.

Since courts in Taiwan have the discretionary power

to exclude illegal evidence, the Gates approach in determining whether the searched
and seized person has a reasonable privacy expectation, which might result in
improperly-obtained evidence being illegal, is similar to the ROC discretionary
approach in deciding whether to exclude evidence.

The flexible

"totality-of-the-circumstances" standard, other than the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli
test, would better serve as a guide for the ROC courts to determine whether to exclude
evidence unlawfully obtained by law-enforcement-officers.
The Advisory Committee of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code in Taiwan has
already suggested seven standards to be considered in deciding whether to exclude
evidence. 59

These are consistent with former practical developments.

Regardless

of its direct authority, exercising the discretionary power, according to Article 158-4
of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code, is almost the same as its previous counterpart
under the ROC Constitution.

59

This seems to be unavoidable because the exclusionary

Those are: I) the seriousness of the violation of procedure rule, 2) the subjective intent of the
violation, 3) the infringement of human right protection, 4) the seriousness of the offense, 5) the
potential deterrence to government officers, 6) the possibility to discover the evidence without this
violation, and 7) prejudice to defense.
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rule itself is created as a remedy to prevent constitutional rights from being "little
more than an empty platitude. " 60

Though this new exclusionary approach is set out

on a statutory level, the power to exclude is originally constitutional.

Any

invocation of the exclusionary rule, thus, should be directly base on Article 158-4 of
the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

The constitution was enacted to protect anyone

from unconstitutional governmental activities; therefore, it is reasonable not to apply
the exclusionary rule to private illegal search and seizure. 61
Since determining whether to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained by
law-enforcement-officers is itself a constitutional issue, determining if this illegal
evidence will violate the defendant's constitutional rights becomes the issue to be
decided in Taiwan.

Because there is no judicial opinion of the ROC Supreme Court

instructing how to employ the exclusionary rule after 2003, and the suggestions of the
Advisory Committee of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code are too abstract, the
totality-of-the-circumstances standard in Gates as well as other United States Supreme
Court decisions might be informative for the exclusionary practice in Taiwan.
Before referring to Gates, it is necessary to distinguish the factual circumstances

60

See Ronald J. Allen, Richard B. Kuhns, and William J. Stuntz, Constitutional Criminal Procedure:
An Examination of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments and Related Areas, 604 (Aspen Law &
Business, 1995 ) .
61

See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 ( 1921) . See also Burkoff, Not So Private Searches and
the Constitution, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 627 ( 1987) .

I.,.
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I

II

between Gates and the ROC exclusionary practices.

.\

Usually the exclusionary issue

'

arises from a warrantless case in Taiwan.

Since Gates is not a warrantless case, it

seems improper to draw upon it to deal with the exclusionary issues in Taiwan.
I

I

Nevertheless, even though the United States Supreme Court reasoned "it may•not be
easy to determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the
'I

resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by
the preference to be accorded to warrants." 62

As held in Gates. "this reflects both a

desire to encourage use of the warrant process by police officers and a recognition
,I

that once a warrant has been obtained, intrusion upon interests protected by the Fourth

I'

I

1\
I'

Amendment is less severe than otherwise may be the case." 63

Moreover, if the

I
'

I'
,I

I'

I
I

constitutionality of governmental activities is the main concern of the exclusionary

I'
I'
I

rule in both Taiwan and the United States, citing Gates as a reference to decide the
exclusionary issues in Taiwan is appropriate.
Thus, while deciding whether to exclude evidence according to Article 158-4 of
the ROC Criminal Procedure Code, courts in Taiwan should consider those standards
suggested by the Advisory Committee of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
'I
I,

Referring to the United States, experience with the exclusionary rule may result in

62

See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965).

63

See 462 U.S., at 237.
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those standards becoming less abstract.

For example, in issuing a warrant, a judge

has to "make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances
set forth in the affidavit. .. , including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of
persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." 64

Without any substantial

malice, the ROC courts should not exclude evidence from warrantless search and
seizures if the pre-trial judge would have made a practical and common-sense
decision, there was a fair probability that criminal evidence would be found,
warrant.

~o

issue a

Whether the illegal governmental activity constitutes a criminal offense, if

the defendant has no reasonable privacy expectation, any warrantless search and

dI

l

seizure should not infringe privacy.

I'

Without deciding the existence of any

reasonable privacy expectation, it is impossible to know if admitting illegally obtained
evidence will result in the court to become a conspirator to invade privacy. 65

In

theory, it was unnecessary for the Taipei High Court to be afraid of becoming a
conspirator in a privacy invasion because it was unclear if the defendant had
reas'onable privacy expectation in 90 Sun E 1085.

This Taipei High Court decision

should have been reversed.
j,

I
64
65

Id, at 238.
In other words, if there had been no reasonable privacy expectation, there was no privacy invasion.
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After the Taipei High Court in 90 Sun E 2046 declared what should be
considered in excluding illegally obtained evidence,66 it is clear why it did not do so
given the exigency of the situation which might have seriously prejudiced the societal
peaceful order even though the police had acted in bad faith in 90 Sun Su 2229. , It is
not beyond reason why the court excluded the illegally obtained financial records or
commercial statements because those documents might not prejudice the societal
peaceful order in 91 Sun Gum One 197.

Those decisions as well as the

totality-of-the-circumstances test will provide a less abstract overview of the
exclusionary rule in Taiwan.
While trials are only about guilt in the United States, 67 trials in Taiwan are
unitary because both the accused's guilt and sentence are determined at a single

process. 68
Taiwan.

Hence, it is impossible to apply the exclusionary rule only about guilt in
Unlike the United States, if evidence is excluded at trial, the same evidence

will not be applicable in the following sentencing process in Taiwan.

Nonetheless,

the exclusionary rule is held not applicable in the proceeding of impeachment of a

66

Those are: the seriousness of the violation, the relevance of the piece of evidence for the resolution
of the case, and the seriousness of the offense. Thus, violation of procedure rules does not necessarily
lead to exclusion of evidence.
67

68

See Myron Moskovitz, supra note 11, 1135.

Also note that: "The presumption in civil law systems is that the defendant should cooperate with
the trial judge and answer questions completely. The defendant's cooperation is also encouraged by
the fact that his sentence, as well as his guilt, is determined at a single trial." See William T. Pizzi,
supra note 41, 8.
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defendant's trial testimony at the criminal trial in the United States. 69

This practice

might be referred to in Taiwan. Of course, to what extent will referring to this
practice influence the convict in a unitary trial system remains to be seen.

5.3 The Evidentiary Hearsay
In this section, comparative analyses are drawn between the legal foundations
mentioned supra.

While adopting accusatorial elements in a civil-law-based

jurisdiction may unavoidably result in unpredictable problems, this study will submit,
if possible, tentative resolutions.

In principle, this study tries to provide resolutions

for problems arising from the 2003 enactments of the hearsay rule in the ROC
Criminal Procedure Code.

Before comparing the practices of Taiwan and the United

States, it is significant that the defendant is not considered a witness if he testifies in
Taiwan.

In other words, the defendant does not testify under oath.

This practice is

much different from that in the United States.

5.3.1 Hearsay Definition
While Paragraph 1 of Article 159 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code simply
defines inadmissible hearsay, the Federal Rules of Evidence of the United States

69

See Walder v. United States. 347 U.S. 62 ( 1954) , and Harris v. New York. 401 U.S. 222 ( 1971) .
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provides a much more complicated definition.

Similar to Paragraph 1 of Article 159

of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code, FRE 802 provides "Hearsay is not admissible
except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress."

Even though there is no

provision in the ROC Criminal Procedure Code providing the definitions similar fo
FRE 801 (a) and (b), like the definitions applied in FRE 801 (a) and (b), a 'statement'
referred to in the ROC Criminal Procedure Code should include (1) an oral or written
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an
assertion; and the term 'anyone other than the defendant' means a person who makes
a statement.

Nevertheless, while FRE 801(c) provides "'Hearsay' is a statement,

other than one made by the declarant while testifying at a trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted," which focuses mainly on 'if it is an
out-of-court statement' and 'if it is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted,'
inadmissible hearsay under Paragraph 1 of Article 159 of the ROC Criminal
Procedure Code merely refers to an out-of-court statement 'made by anyone other
than the defendant.'

In other words, according to the hearsay definition provided by

Paragraph 1 of Article 159 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code, an out-of-court
statement made by a defendant is not hearsay whether he testifies at trial in Taiwan.
Similarly, whether the defendant testifies at trial, although what he previously stated

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?
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constitutes inadmissible hearsay under FRE 801 (c) and FRE 802, according to FRE
801 (d) (2) 70 excluding admissions from being hearsay, the defendant's prior

I

out-of-court statement is not hearsay even if it is offered against the defendant.
While common law defined these admissions as exceptions to inadmiss.ible hearsay/ 1
the Federal Rules of Evidence does not follow the common law approach patently.
Notwithstanding, while FRE 801 (d) (1) 72 provides 'prior statement by witness'
is not hearsay, according to Paragraph 1 of Article 159 of the ROC Criminal
Procedure Code, this out-of-court statement is hearsay because the declarant is not the
defendant.

Thus, although a prior statement by a witness is admissible at trial in the

United States/3 whether it is admissible at trial in Taiwan depends on if it complies

r
I

with any hearsay exception provided in Articles 159-1 to 159-5 of the ROC Criminal

Il. .
70

It provides: "A statement is not hearsay if the statement is offered against a party and is (A) the
party's own statement in either an individual or a representative capacity or (B) a statement of which
the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by
the party to make a statement concerning the subject, of (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant
concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the
relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy. The contents of the statement shall be considered but are not alone sufficient to establish
the declarant's authority under subdivision (C), the agency or employment relationship and scope
there9funder subdivision (D), or the existence of the conspiracy and the participation therein of the
declarant and the party against whom the statement is offered under subdivision (E)."
71

See Authur Best, supra note 1016, 90.

72

It provides: "A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject
to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the
declarant's testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or
other proceedings, or in a deposition, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to
rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person."
73

In fact, FRE 801 (d) (1) treats selected types of statements by witnesses as outside the hearsay
definition, under particular circumstances. Not all prior statements are defined non-hearsay by FRE
801 (d)(l). See Authur Best, supra note 1016,93.

\f
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Procedure Code.

In addition, since hearsay in the United States means a statement

offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted under FRE 801 (c), if the statement is
'

.I

not offered to prove the truth, it is not hearsay. 74

In other words, in American courts,

the out-of-court verbal statement is admissible in evidence for the purpose of other
than proving the truth.

For example, if the out-of-court statement "I want to kill

John" is offered to prove "the declarant did intend to kill John," then it is inadmissible
hearsay because the fact-finder has to rely on the credibility of the declarant to decide
if he really intended to kill John.

But if it is offered merely to prove the declarant

was alive at the time of making this statement, since nothing will be lost by the fact
that the out-of-court declarant was not subject to cross-examination, it is not
I

~

'

necessary to exclude it as hearsay. 75

Moreover, FRE 806 admits any inconsistent

evidence of a statement or conduct made by the declarant as a hearsay exception to
attack the credibility of the declarant. 76

On the contrary, while Paragraph 1 of

Article 159-1 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code does not provide the purpose of

, I

the out-of-court statement for defining inadmissible hearsay, even if it is not offered to
74

See Roger C. Park, supra note 756, 241.

7S

Id.

76

It provides: "When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in rule 801(d)(2), (C), (D), or (E),
has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be
supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a
witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with the
declarant's hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that the declarant may have been
afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. If the party against whom a hearsay statement has been
admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine the declarant on the statement
as if under cross-examination."

·.
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prove the truth of the matter asserted, it seems to fall within the scope of inadmissible
hearsay provided by Paragraph 1 of Article 159-1 of the ROC Criminal Procedure
Code.

Under this viewpoint, the pre-2003 ROC Supreme Court decision 91 Tai Sun

2363 admitting an out-of-court statement for the purpose of impeachment should be
reversed.

However, this 2003 legislation differs much from the hearsay practice in

the United States.

l
l'
I

1·.

It is questionable whether Paragraph 1 of Article 159-1 of the

ROC Criminal Procedure Code should exclude an out-of-court statement provided
mainly for impeachment.
As mentioned in the Advisory Committee Note, hearsay is adopted to protect the
rights of an accused to confront someone testifying against him or her.

This is

j

~
!
I

identical to its counterpart in the United States.

In general, hearsay is excluded

mainly because the out-of-court declarant has not been subject to cross-examination.

~·

The admission of hearsay creates an unacceptable danger that the fact-fmder will put
too much weight on the non-testifying declarant's statement.

When there is no

.r

need to cross-examine the out-of-court declarant because the fact-finder can use the

'

out-of-court statement without relying on the credibility of the declarant, the

!l

• I

I

out-of-court statement should not be excluded from evidence. 77

In other words,

admitting an out-of-court statement into evidence for the purpose of other than
77

Id.

That is without relying on the sincerity, perception, memory, or narrative ability of the declarant.

[

'
l

I
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proving the truth of the matter asserted will infringe upon no right of the accused.
Accepting it into evidence will not result in any violation of constitutionally protected
rights.

Thus, even though the 2003 legislation does not recognize the ROC Supreme

Court decision 91 Tai Sun 2363, affirming this decision afterwards will not conflict
with the legislative purpose of adopting the hearsay rule.

Since any relevant and

probative evidence is important to find facts, if an out-of-court is not used to prove the
truth of the matter asserted, it should not be excluded from evidence merely because it
happens to fall within the scope of the definition of inadmissible hearsay.

Courts in

Taiwan should feel free to follow 91 Tai Sun 2363 in admitting out-of-court
statements as evidence.

5.3.2 Hearsay Exceptions
Regarding hearsay exceptions, it is both questionable and interesting because the
2003 legislation only provides five provisions including eleven types for hearsay
exceptions

78

but FRE 803, 804 and 807 provide twenty-nine hearsay exceptions. 79

As a result, some hearsay exceptions provided in the Federal Rules of Evidence are

78

Those are: (!)Paragraph 1 of Article 159-1, (2)Paragraph 2 of Article 159-1, (3)Article 159-2,
(4)Subparagraph 1 of Article 159-3, (5)Subparagraph 2 of Article 159-3, (6)Subparagraph 3 of Article
159-3, (?)Subparagraph 4 of Article 159-3, (8)Subparagraph 1 of Article 159-4, (9)Subparagraph 2 of
Article 159-4, (1 O)Subparagraph 3 of Article 159-4, and (11 )Article 159-5.
79

In fact, FRE 803 provides 23 exceptions; FRE 804 provides 5 exceptions; and FRE 807 provides 1
residual exception.
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not adopted by the 2003 ROC legislation; some ROC hearsay exceptions are strange
to the Federal Rules of Evidence.

This study will compare those hearsay exceptions

in this subsection and discuss whether the 2003 ROC legislation provides enough
hearsay exceptions.

The following comparative analyses are based on the

classifications of the ROC hearsay exceptions.

5.3.2.1 An Out-of-court Statement made before A Judge or A Public Prosecutor
Article 159-1 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code deals with out-of-court
statements made before a judge or a public prosecutor.

According to the Advisory

Committee Note, this kind of out-of-court statement is admissible in that neither a
judge nor a public prosecutor will coerce a witness to make a statement.

Under this

provision, any out-of-court statement made before a judge or a public prosecutor,
whether in a criminal proceeding or a civil proceeding, and whether the declarant was
under oath, is admissible because a witness is voluntarily making a statement or
testifying.

For example, if witness X testified in a civil proceeding mentioning Y

was hit by Z, in a criminal proceeding charging Z with injuring Y, what X testified in
the civil proceeding is admissible at this criminal trial whether X is available as a
witness.

Moreover, if a judge or a public prosecutor K heard L said he saw M killed

N in person, even L never testified in any criminal proceeding, what L said is
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I

I

admissible in M's trial according to this article.
This legislation admitting any out-of-court statement made before a judge or a
public prosecutor is quite particular.
the Federal Rules of Evidence.

No similar hearsay exception will be found in

It is unclear where this article is from.

The

rationale behind this provision is merely based on the voluntariness of the witness,
which might result from the continental tradition of trusting judges and public
prosecutors.

It is quite controversial, however, because these two hearsay exceptions

do not protect the accused's right of confrontation.

While this article provides no

protection of the right to confront, what is the core value of the ROC hearsay rule
I

1

becomes confusing even though the Advisory Committee Note clearly declared the
ROC hearsay rule was adopted to protect the right to confront.

Is it possible for the

ROC criminal justice system to develop a unique hearsay system based on a
non-American style basis?

Since it is impossible to draw an answer of this question

on the United States hearsay practice, this study will discuss this problem in the next
section.

5.3.2.2 A Prior Inconsistent Out-of-court Statement Made before Law-enforcementofficers under More Reliable Circumstances
As already mentioned supra, under FRE 801 (c), a witness's own out-of-court
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..
words can be hearsay, even if they are recited at trial by that witness, so long as they
are being offered for the truth of the matter asserted. 80

Since the fact-finder can

observe the declarant's in-court behavior and hear responses to cross-examination
regarding the out-of-court statement, it is not necessary to exclude an out-of-court
statement made by a declarant who testifies at trial. 81

This is why FRE 801 (d) (1)

excludes prior statements by witness from inadmissible hearsay.
Unlike this approach of the United States, under Paragraph 1 of Article 159-2 of
the ROC Criminal Procedure Code, even if the witness testifies at trial, his prior
out-of-court statement still falls within the scope of inadmissible hearsay.

Without

any provision similar to FRE 801 (d) (1) excluding prior statement by witness from
hearsay, it is necessary for the ROC Criminal Procedure Code to create a hearsay
exception to admit prior statements by witnesses because there is no need to exclude
this kind of out-of-court statement in general.

Thus, Article 159-2 of the ROC

Criminal Procedure Code has been adopted to provide an authority admitting the same
declarant's prior inconsistent out-of-court statement.

Although it does not exclude

the prior statement by witness from the definition of hearsay, it still admits a prior
inconsistent out-of-court statement by a percipient witness admissible in evidence at

80

See Authur Best, supra note 1016, 93.

81

Id.

,.
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trial.
In addition, Article 159-2 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code only admits the
prior inconsistent out-of-court statement by witness when he testifies at trial and when
the court finds the prior out-of-court statement more reliable which is necessary to
prove the truth of the alleged offense asserted.

This means not every prior

inconsistent out-of-court statement by witness is admissible.

I

It is arguable, however,

under what circumstances should the court find the prior out-of-court statement more

I

reliable which is necessary to prove the truth of the alleged offense asserted.

FRE

801 (d) (1) (A) excludes prior inconsistent statements by witness from hearsay only
when "the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination

I

concerning the statement, and the statement is inconsistent with the declarant's

I
j!

testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial,

l
hearing, or other proceedings, or in a deposition."
the following concerns.

These requirements result from

While some scholars claim the hearsay rule should be

completely withdrawn from past statements of a person who is currently a witness at

I'

trial, others believe that the hearsay exclusion might be applied to out-of-court
statements by someone who is presently a witness at trial. 82

To some extent,

cross-examination at trial time may be less effective than cross-examination would

82

Id.

409

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

't

~

I

have been at the time the speaker made the statement. 83

To prevent well-organized

~-

parties from developing a practice of making records of interviews with prospective
witness, which may result in no cross-examination at the time obtaining these
statements, as well as subsequent introduction of these prior statements at a later
trial,84 the Federal Rules of Evidence thus requires theses prior statement to be "given
under oath subject to the penalty of perjury" in addition to ask the declarant to be
available for cross-examination.

In other words, according to FRE 801 (d) (1) (A), if

the prior inconsistent testimony was not under oath and not subject to the penalty of
perjury, it is still hearsay.

Even though Article 159-2 of the ROC Criminal

Procedure Code requires the prior inconsistent out-of-court statement made before

rr
r

law-enforcement-officers, it does not clearly set out similar requirements under which
a prior inconsistent out-of-court statement can become admissible in evidence at trial.
While judges are fact-finders in Taiwan, whether it is necessary to exclude a prior
inconsistent out-of-court statement without being under oath subject to the penalty of
perjury from admissible hearsay in the ROC criminal justice system remains unclear.
Thus, unless the ROC court adopts a viewpoint referring to FRE 801 (d) (1) (A) to
interpret "when the court finds the prior out-of-court statement more reliable which is

1'
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necessary to prove the truth of the alleged offense asserted," the scope of the
admissibility of a prior inconsistent out-of-court statement looks broader than that in

I

.

the United States.

5.3.2.3 An Out-of-court Statement Made in the Presence of Law-enforcement-officers

!

l

When the Declarant is currently Unavailable as a Witness at Trial
While Article 159-2 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code requires the declarant
of the prior out-of-court statement to testify at trial, Article 159-3 of the ROC
Criminal Procedure Code then creates a hearsay exception without this requirement.
As a result, when the declarant is not available as a witness at trial, whether his prior
out-of-court statement is admissible falls within the scope of Article 159-3 of the
ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

Similar to Article 159-2, Article 159-3 of the ROC

Criminal Procedure Code admits into evidence a prior out-of-court statement by a
witness only 'when the court finds the prior out-of-court statement more reliable
which is necessary to prove the truth of the alleged offense asserted.'

According to

this provision, a prior out-of-court statement by a witness should be made in the
presence law-enforcement-officers.

It then creates four circumstances either of

which could result in admissible hearsay.

In general, a prior out-of-court statement

made by witness before law-enforcement-officers is admissible when the declarant is
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unable to make a statement at trial because of death, 85 a lack of memory, a then
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity, 86 when the declarant's attendance at
trial can not be produced by judicial process or other reasonable means, 87 and when
the declarant refuses to testify at trial without reasonable justification. 88

These

hearsay exceptions have identical counterparts in the Federal Ru1es of Evidence.
First of all, FRE 804 (a) defines "Unavailability as a witness."

In a sense

"imposing the requirement of unavailability in connection with certain hearsay
exceptions is partly a resu1t of tradition. " 89

Generally speaking, this ru1e applies

only when the in-court testimony of the out-of-court declarant is unavailable, i.e.
"testimony unavailable."90

If the declarant's in-court testimony of the out-of-court

statement is available, then hearsay exceptions in FRE 804 do not apply. 91

It is fair

to say that FRE 804 (a) (2) is identical to Subparagraph 4 of Article 159-3 of the ROC
Criminal Procedure Code; FRE 804 (a) (3) and (4) are identical to Subparagraphs 1
and 2 of Article 159-3 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code; and FRE 804 (a) (5) is

8

s See Subparagraph 1 of Article 159-3 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

86

See Subparagraph 2 of Article 159-3 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

87

See Subparagraph 3 of Article 159-3 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

88

See Subparagraph 4 of Article 159-3 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

89

See Authur Best, supra note 1016, 122.

90

See G. Michael Fenner, supra note 975, 282.

91

Id.

fl

j
l
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identical to Subparagraph 3 of Article 159-3 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code. 92
Secondly, as a hearsay exception, while "former testimony" in FRE 804 (b) (1) should
be made before a government officer in charge of a legal proceeding, 93 it is similar to
Article 159-3 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code that also requires the prior
out-of-court statement to be made before law-enforcement-officers.
Nevertheless, while discussing the issue of unavailability, there are different
characteristics between Taiwan and the United States.

FRE 804 (b) (1) provides the

witness making a prior out-of-court statement should have "an opportunity and
similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination."
On the contrary, there is not the same requirement in Article 159-3 of the ROC
Criminal Procedure Code.

In other words, a prior out-of-court statement not subject

to cross-examination might be admissible at trial in the ROC jurisdiction.

Moreover,

92

FRE 804 (a) provides: "'Unavailability as a witness' includes situations in which the declarant:
( 1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject
matter of the declarant's statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement despite an
order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or
mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement has been unable to procure the
declarant's attendance (or in the case of a hearsay exception under subdivision b(2), (3), or (4), the
declarant's attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or
absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for the purpose of
preventing the witness from attending or testifying."
93

It provides: "Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding,
or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same of another proceeding, if the
party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in
interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect
examination."
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while FRE 804 (b) (1) also requires a prior out-of-court statement to be given under
oath, Article 159-3 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code does not have this
prerequisite.

Any prior out-of-court statement not made under oath, thus, might be

admissible according to this provision.

While Article 159-3 of the ROC Criminal

Procedure Code requires the declarant to be unavailable at trial, it indeed suggests that
these exceptions in this provision are less reliable than those in Article 159-4 of the
ROC Criminal Procedure Code where there is no such a requirement.

I,

These less

reliable prior out-of-court statements are tolerated as evidence "because they involve
situations where the out-of-court statements have some claim to reliability and there is
a strong need for the information they contain." 94

Of course, if courts in Taiwan

I

I,

F
I.
I

adopts a viewpoint referring to FRE 804 (b) (1) requiring a prior out-of-court
statement to be given under oath and subject to cross-examination95 to interpret
"when the court finds the prior out-of-court statement more reliable which is
necessary to prove the truth of the alleged offense asserted," the scope of the
admissibility of a prior out-of-court statement when the declarant is unavailable as a
witness at trial might look similar to that in the United States.

94

See Authur Best, supra note 1016, 122.

95

Id., at 123.

I!
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5.3.2.4 Admissible Out-of-court Statements in Writing
In addition to Articles 159-1 to 159-3 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code,
Article 159-4 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code also provides hearsay exceptions
focusing on out-of-court statements in writing.

It is worth mentioning this article

imposes the requirement of "in writing" in connection with certain hearsay exceptions.
As a result, if out-of-court statements are not in writing, they will not be admissible at
trial under this provision.

Unlike Article 159-3, Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal

Procedure Code does not require the unavailability of the declarant as a witness at
trial.

I
0

I

I
I

While the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence believed the risk inherent

in admitting hearsay exceptions in FRE 803 is less than those in FRE 804, 96
situations provided in Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code are more
reliable than those in Article 159-3 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

In general,

hearsay exceptions in Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code are based

.I

·I

on the likely truthfulness; when the arguments supporting the exceptions are based on
the necessity to use the out-of-court statements, hearsay exceptions are allowed only
if the declarant is unavailable,97 as those exceptions in Article 15 9-3 of the ROC
Criminal Procedure Code.

96

Id., at 102.

97

Id.
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Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code creates three types of
hearsay exceptions.

~

i

I

Usually documents made by government officers other than

law-enforcement-officers are admissible unless they were made under unreliable
circumstances. 98

A document, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business

activity, and if it is the regular practice of that business activity to make the document,

'I

and if made by someone in charge of making that document, it is admissible unless it
was made under unreliable circumstances. 99

In addition to these two types, there is a

residual provision admitting other documents made under reliable circumstances into
evidence at trial. 100

While the 2003 Advisory Committee Note of the ROC Criminal

Procedure Code clearly refers to FRE 803, which also provides hearsay exceptions

.lI,

not imposing a requirement of the availability of the declarant as a witness at trial, it

!,

is helpful to understand the rationale behind those hearsay exceptions in FRE 803.

I·

FRE 803 (4) excludes statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment
from inadmissible hearsay. 101

There are two foundational elements of this exception;

"the declarant believed that the out-of-court statement would result in medical

98

See Subparagraph 1 of Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

99

See Subparagraph 2 of Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

100

101

See Subparagraph 3 of Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

It provides: "(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made for
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms,
pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar
as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment."

f·
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diagnosis or treatment," and "a doctor would reasonably rely upon the out-of-court
statement in diagnosing or treating a patient." 102

Since it is reasonable to believe the

declarant to tell the truth while he is seeking for medical diagnosis or treatment, its
highly likely truthfulness will result in statements made for purposes of medi~al
diagnosis or treatment.

Hence, such statements can be deemed admissible hearsay.

In Taiwan, under this rationale, it is permissible if statements for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment are excluded from inadmissible hearsay according to Article
159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

It is clear they are admissible under

Subparagraph 2 of this article if medical doctors work in private hospitals.

It is

questionable, however, under which subparagraph they are admissible because
medical doctors are considered non-law-enforcement-government-officers if they
work for public hospitals, which might invoke Subparagraph 1 of this article.
Anyway, this question will not make any difference whether "statements for purposes
of medical diagnosis or treatment" are admissible hearsay.
FRE 803 (5) excludes recorded recollection from inadmissible hearsay. 103
There are six foundational elements of this exception; "the out-of-court statement

102

103

See G. Michael Fenner, supra note 975, 194.

It provides: "(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about
which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to
testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was
fresh in the witness' memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum
or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an
adverse party."
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must be recorded somewhere, in some way;" "the out-of-court statement must have
been made or adopted by the testifying witness;" "at the time the testifying witness
made or adopted the statement, she must have had knowledge of the matter recorded
and that knowledge must have been fresh in her memory;" "at the time of the trial, the

'

I

testifying witness must no longer have no sufficient memory of the matter recorded to
allow her to testify fully or accurately;" "at trial, the witness must remember that

II
l,

I.·I

III
I

record is accurate;" and it "may be read into evidence but may not itself be received
as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party." 104

In a sense this exception results

from the fact that "the witness has forgotten something relevant." 105
exception is also accepted because of its high likely truthfulness.

Meanwhile, this

While FRE 803 (5)
,.,

admits recorded recollection into evidence only when the testifying witness was the
recorder of the out-of-court statement, 106 Subparagraph 2 of Article 159-4 of the

104

See G. Michael Fenner, supra note 975, 211.

105

Id., at 213.

106

It should be noted that FRE 612 provides additional safeguards against misleading use of the past
recollection refreshed procedure which is different form FRE 803 (5). See Authur Best, supra note ,
108. FRE 612 provides: "Except as otherwise provided in criminal proceedings by section 3500 of
title 18, United States Code, if a witness uses a writing to refresh memory for the purpose of testifying,
either- (1) while testifying, or (2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is
necessary in the interests of justice, an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the
hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions
which relate to the testimony of the witness. If it is claimed that the writing contains matters not related
to the subject matter of the testimony the court shall examine the writing in camera, excise any portions
not so related, and order delivery of the remainder to the party entitled thereto. Any portion withheld
over objections shall be preserved and made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. If
a writing is not produced or delivered pursuant to order under this rule, the court shall make any order
justice requires, except that in criminal cases when the prosecution elects not to comply, the order shall
be one striking the testimony or, if the court in its discretion determines that the interests of justice so
require, declaring a mistrial."

I

I
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ROC Criminal Procedure Code does not impose a similar requirement.

Unlike FRE

803 (5), even if no witness testifying at trial adopts this kind of out-of-court statement,
it is admissible into evidence in Taiwan if it is already collected in the dossier. 107
Furthermore, while FRE 803 (5) ends with the following: "the memorandum or record
may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered
by an adverse party," it seems not necessary to impose a similar requirement on
Subparagraph 2 of Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code because there
is no jury trial and the fact-finders, the judges, already have full access to each of
those documents in the ROC criminal justice system.108

Thus, it is fair to say

Subparagraph 2 of Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code does not
conflict with FRE 803 (5) in nature.
FRE 803 ( 6) and (7) deal with records, as well as absence of records of a
regularly conducted activity as hearsay exceptions. 109

There are four fundamental

107

Of course, the court has to inform the accused of this kind of record under Paragraph 1 of Article
165 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
·

108

There are two reasons why FRE 803 (5) ends in this way, as explained by Professor G. Michael
Fenner: "First, viva voce evidence is not physically in the jury room. It is not transcribed and sent
into the jury room. Exhibits are physically presented in the jury room. If the record of the witness's
recollection received into evidence, then it would go into the jury room, and would be a physical
presence there the whole time the jurors were deliberating. Its presence in the room would give the
recorded recollection more significance than it deserves. It would make the evidence easier to
remember, and perhaps more prominent than it would otherwise be. Second, if there is a tendency to
believe more readily things we read than things we hear, then giving the jury the statement in writing
makes it more likely the jury will find it credible." See G. Michael Fenner, supra note 975, 212.
109

FRE 803 (6) provides: "A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation in any form, of acts,
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted
by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of regularly conducted business activity, and if it was
the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by
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elements of these two exceptions: "the out-of-court statement must be a record or an
absence of an entry in a record that was made in the course of a regularly conducted
business activity;" "the record must have been made at or near the time of the event
recorded;" "the record must be made by someone who is either: (a) had personal
knowledge of what is recorded; or (b) based the record on information provided by
someone who both had personal knowledge and provided the information in the
regular course of the particular activity involved;" and "a trustworthiness clause ...

.•
I

allows the judge to keep the evidence out, even if the foundational elements are

l

~

i

satisfied, if the judge is suspicious of the evidence." 110

These two exceptions come

from the fact that no one will have a current memory of the details recorded of the
lr

I

documents covered by FRE 803 (6) and (7). 111

Since business records are mainly

"made for the purpose of running an enterprise rather than for some purpose in
litigation," 112 excluding them from inadmissible hearsay is persuasive.

As explained

in United States v. Baker, "business records have a high degree of accuracy because
certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless
the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of
trustworthiness. The term 'business' as used in this paragraph includes business, institution,
association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit."
And FRE 803 (7) provides: "Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, records,
or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (6), to prove the
nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum,
report, record, or data compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of information
or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness."
110

See G. Michael Fenner, supra note 975, 225-6.

111

Id., at 226.

112

See Arthur Best, supra note 1016, 109.

I

r.II'
'
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•

the nation's business demands it, because the records are customarily checked for
correctness, and because record keepers are trained in habits ofprecision." 113

In

short, these records in FRE 803 (6) and (7) are considered reliable not only because
they are important to the business, but also because "they are kept with regularity and
someone's job depends on keeping them and keeping them accurately." 114

Although

these records are generally considered reliable, in order to prevent unreliable records
when there is a problem with the particular record, the final clause in FRE 803 (7)
allows the trial judge to deny this hearsay exception. liS Generally speaking, these
'

I

two exceptions come from the reliability of these business records.

Since

Subparagraph 2 of Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code does not
mention 'absence of entry in records kept in accordance with records of regular! y
conducted activity' at all, and there is already a similar trustworthiness clause in it,
whether it is admissible is up to the court.

It is not necessary to have a provision

focusing especially on 'absence of entry in records kept in accordance with records of
regularly conducted activity.'
FRE 803 (8) excludes public records and reports from inadmissible hearsay. 116

113

See 693 F. 2d 183, 188 (D.C. Cir., 1982) .

114

See G. Michael Fenner, supra note 975,227.

IIs

Id.

116

It provides: "(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in
any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B)
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J.
I

There are three foundational elements of this exception; "the out-of-court statement

~.

must be a public record or report;" "it must set forth one of the following three kinds
of things: (a) the activities of the office or agency that prepared the report; (b) matters
the agency had a legal duty to observe and a legal duty to report upon; (c) factual
findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law;"
and "once the foundation for the exception is established the court can still decide that

I
I

I

. the h earsay ob'~ection.
. " 117
the ev1'dence does not seem trustwo rthy and sustain

While

it is almost impossible for the declarant who prepared public records and reports to

Ij
I

t
J

I

remember the thing recorded, and this kind of information might not be avail~ble

/!
elsewhere, any out-of-court statement in public records or reports will not be

I

It
I'

admissible at trial without this exception.

118

In addition, public records and reports

are more reliable than live testimony because public officers are assumed to
their jobs properly and, therefore, that public records can be trusted." 119

'~perform

matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report,
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement
personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual
findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources
of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness."
See G. Michael Fenner, supra note 975,239-40.

118

Usually the declarant is unlikely to have present firsthand knowledge ofthe information recorded
on the report. Id., at 241.
119

Id.

/!
I

~~ •
Nonetheless,

there is also a trustworthiness clause authorizing the trial court to deny the reliability

117

t'
I

1\
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l,

of evidence admitted under this exception. 120

According to Subparagraph 1 of

Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code, documents made by government
officers other than law-enforcement-officers are admissible unless they were made
under unreliable circumstances.

This provision is quite identical to FRE 803 (8),

both of which admit almost all public records and reports but those made by
law-enforcement-officers.

Besides, the reliability clause of Subparagraph! of

Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code, "unless they were made under
unreliable circumstances," is similar to the trustworthiness clause in FRE 803 (8).
Similarly, FRE 803 (9) and (14) admits "records of vi~ statistics" and "records of
documents affecting an interest in property" in evidence. 121

Since both these records

required to be made under law will be considered the public record or report in
Taiwan, FRE 803 (9) and (14) are also covered by Subparagraph 1 of Article 159-4 of
the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

Moreover, under this analysis, out-of-court

statements adopted in previous judgments concerning previous conviction and
personal, family, or general history, or boundaries, like those in FRE 803 (22) and

120

121

ld., at 242.

FRE 803 (9) provides: "Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any form, of
births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a public office pursuant to
requirements oflaw." FRE 803 (14) provides: "(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in
property. The record of a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof
of the content of the original recorded document and its execution and delivery by each person by
whom it purports to have been executed, ifthe record is a record of a public office and an applicable
statute authorizes the recording of documents of that kind in that office."
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(23), 122 are admissible under Subparagraph 1 of Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal
Procedure Code.
Like FRE 803(7), FRE 803 (10) excludes absence of public record or entry. 123
There are two fundamental elements of this exception: "there must be evidence that
the public official or agency in question regularly made and preserved such records or

I

1.

entries" and "there must be either testimony or a Rule 902 (4) certification that a
diligent search failed to uncover such a record or such an entry." 124

The need of

admitting this evidence comes from the possibility that no public officer will
remember what he did not make a particular entry about. 125

Since having a public

officer testify what he did not make a particular entry about at trial is usually less
reliable, admitting the absence of public record or entry in evidence is thus acceptable.
Nonetheless, while Subparagraph 1 of Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure

122

FRE 803 (22) provides: "(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment,
entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a
person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact
essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered by the Government in a criminal
prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons other than the accused.
The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility." FRE 803 (23) provides:
"(23) Judgment as to personal, family, or general history, or boundaries. Judgments as proof of
matters of personal, family or general history, or boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the same
would be provable by evidence at trial."
123

It provides: "(1 0) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a record, report,
statement, or data compilation, in any fonn, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which
a record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any fonn, was regularly made and preserved by a
public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with rule 902, or
testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or
entry."
124

See G. Michael Fenner, supra note 975, 253.

125

Id.
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Code does not mention anything about 'absence of public record or entry,' and there
is already a similar trustworthiness clause in it, whether this evidence is adm.lssible is
up to the court.

It is not necessary to have a provision focusing especially on

'absence of public record or entry.'
Similar to FRE 803 (6), FRE 803 (11) excludes records of religious
organizations from inadmissible hearsay.

126

Although there is no article equivalent

to it in the ROC Criminal Procedure Code, FRE 803 (11) is covered by Subparagraph
2 of Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code because religious records are
usually made in regularly conducted activities.

While FRE 803 (12) admits marriage,

baptismal, and similar certificates in evidence at trial,
Taiwan.

127

its counterpart is unknown in

These marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates, however, can be

admissible into evidence at trial through Subparagraphs 1 or 2 of Article 159-4 of the
ROC Criminal Procedure Code, depending on whether the recorder is authorized by
public branches.

If a certificate is made by a public officer or the recorder is

authorized by law, then Subparagraph 1 of Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal
Procedure Code applies.

Otherwise Subparagraph 2 of Article 159-4 of the ROC

126

It provides: "(11) Records of religious organizations. Statements of births, marriages, divorces,
deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage, or other similar facts of personal or
family history, contained in a regularly kept record of a religious organization."
127

It provides: "(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of fact contained in a
certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony or administered a sacrament, made
by a clergyman, public official, or other person authorized by the rules or practices of a religious
organization or by law to perform the act certified, and purporting to have been issued at the time of the
act or within a reasonable time thereafter."

I •
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Criminal Procedure Code is applicable.
Unlike FRE 803 (13) clearly admitting family records into evidence,

128

there is

no provision excluding these records from inadmissible hearsay in the ROC Criminal
Procedure Code.

Nevertheless, there is a residual subparagraph, Subparagraph 3 of ·

Article 159-4, allowing the court to admit other kinds of reliable out-of-court
statements in writing at trial.

Although the 2003 Advisory Committee Note of the

ROC Criminal Procedure Code does not clearly indicate what this subparagraph
includes, based on high likelihood of truthfulness, "records of family history kept in
family Bibles have by long tradition been received in evidence,"

129

family records in

according to FRE 803 (13) may be admissible into evidence under Subparagraph 3 of
Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

Moreover, under this analysis,

I.,.

II

!•
~

the other out-of-court statements similar to those in FRE 803 (15), (16), (17), or (18)
may also be admissible into evidence at trial in Taiwan. 130

In short, while there is no

128

It provides: "(13) Family records. Statements of act concerning personal or family history
contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family portraits,
engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones or the like."
129

In addition, "opinions in the area also include inscriptions on tombstones, publicly displayed
pedigrees, and engravings on rings." See Advisory Committee Note to Original Rule, Exception (13),
in Steven I. Friedland, Paul Bergman, and Andrew E. Taslitz, Evidence Law and Practice, 2001
Supplement, Appendices: Federal Rules of Evidence, 109 ( LexisNexis, 2001) .
13

°

FRE 803 (15), (16), (17), and (18) provide: "(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in
property. A statement contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property
if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the document, unless dealings with the property since
the document was made have been inconsistent with the truth or the statement or the purport of the
document.
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in existence twenty years or more
the authenticity of which is established.
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or
other published compilations, generally used and relied upon by the public or by persons in particular
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category needs to have as many as FRE 803 exceptions, 131 Subparagraph 3 of Article
159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code might be proper legislation.
Similar to Subparagraph 3 of Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code,

occupations.
( 18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon
cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination, statements contained in
published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art,
established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert
testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not be
received as exhibits."
Moreover, Advisory Committee Note to Original Rule provides the rationales behind these exceptions:
"Exception (15). Dispositive documents often contain recitals of fact. Thus a deed purporting to
have been executed by an attorney in fact may recite the existence of the power of attorney, or a deed
may recite that the grantors are all the heirs of the last record owner. Under the rule, these recitals are
exempted from the hearsay rule. The circumstances under which dispositive documents are executed
and the requirement that the recital be germane to the purpose of the document are believed to be
adequate guarantees of trustworthiness, particularly in view of the non-applicability of the rule if
dealings with the property have been inconsistent with the documents. The age of the document is of
no significance, though in practical application the document will most often be an ancient one;"
"Exception (16). Authenticating a document as ancient, essentially in the pattern of the common law,
as provided in Rule 901(b)(8), leaves open as a separate question the admissibility of assertive
statements contained therein as against a hearsay objection. Wigmore further states that the ancient
document technique of authentication is universally conceded to apply to all sorts of documents,
including letters, records, contracts, maps, and certificates, in addition to title documents, citing
numerous decisions. Since most of these items are significant evidentially only insofar as they are
assertive, their admission in evidence must be as a hearsay exception;" "Exception (17). Ample
authority at common law supported the admission in evidence of items falling in this category. While
Wigmore's text is narrowly oriented to lists, etc., prepared for the use a trade or profession, authorities
are cited which include other kinds of publications, for example, newspaper market reports, telephone
directories, and city directories. The basis of trustworthiness is general reliance by the public or by a
particular segment of it, and the motivation of the compiler to foster reliance by being accurate;" and
"Exception (18). The writers have generally favored the admissibility of learned treatises, ... but the
great weight of authority has been that learned treatises are not admissible as substantive evidence
though usable in the cross-examination of experts. The foundation of the minority view is that the
hearsay objection must be regarded as unimpressive when directed against treatises since a high
standard of accuracy is engendered by various factors: the treatise is written primarily and impartially
for professionals, subject to scrutiny and exposure for inaccuracy, with the reputation of the writer at
stake. Sound as this position may be with respect to trustworthiness, there is, nevertheless, an
additional difficulty in the likelihood that the treatise will be misunderstood and misapplied without
expert assistance and supervision. This difficulty is recognized in the cases demonstrating
unwillingness to sustain findings relative to disability on the basis of judicially noticed medical texts.
The rule avoids the ,danger of misunderstanding and misapplication by limiting the use of treatises as
substantive evidence to situations in which an expert is on the stand and available to explain and assist
in the application of the treatise if desired. The limitation upon receiving the publication itself
physically in evidence, contained in the last sentence, is designed to further this policy." Citations
omitted. Id., at 110-1.
131

See G. Michael Fenner, supra note 975, 256.

r~
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FRE 807 also provides a residual exception to the inadmissible hearsay.

132

In order

probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable effects," 133 "no other evidence is
134

In a

sense this exception responds to the need for flexibility in the hearsay rules since
common law rules allow judges to create hearsay exceptions when necessary.

135

If

an offering party does not give notice of his intention to offer the evidence in question
to the opposing party, this exception will not apply. 136

There are five foundational

elements of this exception: "trustworthiness;" "relevance;" "relative probative value;"
"application of the exception will serve the general purposes of these rules and the
interests of justice;" and "proponent's advance notice of his or her intention to use the

132

FRE 807 provides: ''A statement no specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804, but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the court determines
that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on
the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes ofthese rules and the interests of justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under
this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of
the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the
proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of
the declarant"
133

Id.

134

See G. Michael Fenner, supra note 975, 347.

135

Id.

136

ld., at 345.

~·

I

l

to be admissible under this rule, FRE 807 requires the statement to be "more

reasonably available and is as probative as that offered under this exception."

.i'
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rule." 137
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While Subparagraph 3 of Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure

Code does not mention the requirement to invoke the residual exception, referring to
FRE 807 might be a proper approach when deciding whether Subparagraph 3 of
Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code applies.

5.3.2.5 Admissible Under Parties Agreement
Although Articles 159-1 to 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code create
many hearsay exceptions, parties are not allowed to admit any of them.

In fact,

while parties agree to accept an out-of-court statement, admitting it into evidence at
trial should not abolish the right to confront because the accused gives it up.

As a

result, Article 159-5 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code creates another hearsay
exception allowing parties to admit an out-of-court statement not included in Articles
159-1 to 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

If allowing this parties-agreed

out-of-court statement results in an unfair trial, however, the court can deny the
admissibility of it.

This fair trial clause is meaningful especially in a private

prosecution where there is no government participation and parties might agree to
accept an obviously false out-of-court statement for an unjust reason; for example; to
impute the blame to another criminally or civilly.

137

Id., at 346.

In other words, under this fair trial
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clause, not all parties-agreed out-of-court statements are admissible.

The court can
r

also deny the admissibility of this evidence even if the opposing party does not object

i

to the out-of-court statement proffered.

j

There is no rule similar to Article 159-5 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code in
the Federal Rules of Evidence.

The practice in the United States adversarial criminal

justice system, however, might be similar because the trial judge will not exclude
inadmissible hearsay from evidence either if the opponent accepts it or does not object
to it in time.

Because a public prosecutor is assumed to play his role without

prejudice, 138 a fair trial issue will not result from a pure adversarial trial system where
there is no private prosecution.

In other words, it is not necessary to provide a

similar fair trial clause in the Federal Rules of Evidence while a district attorney
should not make an agreement with the defense party admitting obviously false
out-of-court statements into evidence at trial. 139

Providing a legal authority allowing

the ROC courts to deny the admissibility of parties-agreed out-of-court statements,

138

As noted, "the prosecutor's duty to the public is far more complex than merely representing the
individual victim in the instant case, and a prosecutor's judgement and conduct have implications that
reach far beyond it: Although the prosecutor operates within the adversary system, it is fundamental
that the prosecutor's obligation is to protect the innocent as well as to convict the guilty, to guard the
rights of the accused as well as to enforce the rights of the public. Thus, the prosecutor has sometimes
been described as a 'minister of justice' or as occupying a quasi-judicial position." See Ellen
Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 163.
139

l

As the United States Supreme Court ruled: "The United States Attorney is the representative not of
an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." See Berger v. United States, 29s·u.s. 78,
88 (1935) .
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j
however, might be necessary under the civil law tradition requiring the courts to apply
enacted law especially when the ROC Criminal Procedure Code admits the
parties-agreed out-of-court statements in evidence.

Without this fair trial clause,

courts in Taiwan have to admit obviously false out-of-court statements accepted by
parties in evidence.

This practice is improper especially when these out-of-court

statements are admitted by parties to impute the blame to another criminally or civilly.

5.3.2.6 Other Admissible Hearsay Exceptions in the Federal Rules of Evidence but
Not Found in the 2003 Legislation
Although many hearsay exceptions provided in the Federal Rules of Evidence
can be available in Taiwan through directly interpreting Articles 159-1 to 159-4 of the
ROC Criminal Procedure Code, there are still many FRE hearsay exceptions
unavailable because no article among Articles 159-1 to 159-5 of the ROC Criminal
Procedure Code will cover them through direct interpretation and courts in Taiwan are
not allowed to admit them into evidence without reasonable justifications under the
civil law tradition.

Nonetheless, it is questionable whether some FRE hearsay

exceptions not mentioned supra might be implied in the ROC hearsay exceptions.

In

this subsection, this study will explore those hearsay exceptions in the Federal Rules
of Evidence that are not available in the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

I

I .•

'I
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First of all, hearsay exceptions similar to FRE 803 (1 ), (2), (3), (19), (20), and
(21) are not provided in the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

Although Articles

159-1 to 159-3 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code admit out-of-court statements
into evidence at trial, these articles apply only when these out-of-court statements are

,.

made before a judge, a public prosecutor, or other law-enforcement-officers.

'

Nevertheless, these FRE 803 hearsay exceptions do not require these statements to be
made before government officers.

For example, when a FRE 803 (1)-like

out-of-court statement is made before a judge, a public prosecutor, or other
law-enforcement-officers, it might be admissible according to Articles 159-1 to 159-3
of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

Otherwise its admissibility depends on

whether Articles 159-4 to 159-5 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code apply.

In fact,

Article 159-5 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code usually does not apply in a public
prosecution.

There is no need to discuss the admissibility of these hearsay

exceptions under Article 159-5 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code because there is
no objection if it is already agreed upon.

As a consequence, if the declarant of either

a FRE (1), (2), (3), (19), (20) or (21) out-of-court statement does not make a statement
before a judge, a public prosecutor, or other law-enforcement-officers, the
admissibility of each of them at trial under Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal
Procedure Code is questionable since this ROC law requires all admissible
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out-of-court statements to be in writing.
FRE 803 (1) excludes present sense impression from inadmissible hearsay.
There are two foundational elements of this exception: "the out-of-court statement
must have been made while the declarant was perceiving an event or a condition, or
immediately thereafter" and "the out-of-court must describe or explain the thing being
perceived." 140

In fact, there is no categorical need for this exception. 141

While

spontaneity may replace cross-examination, which provides a way to probe for
testimonial infirmities, including faulty perception, bad memory, lack of sincerity,
dishonesty, and ambiguity, the underlying rationale of this exception is that
spontaneity is reflexive. 142
because of its reliability.

In other words, present sense impression is admissible
Based on this reliability test, it is reasonable to admit a

FRE 803 (1) out-of-court statement not in writing, even if the declarant is not
available as a witness at trial.

While Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure

Code merely admits out-of-courts statements in writing in evidence at trial, it is a
problem how a FRE 803 (1)-like out-of-court statement becomes admissible into
evidence under this legislation.

Similarly, how out-of-court statements similar to

140

See G. Michael Fenner, supra note 975, 142.

141

Id.

142

Id., at 143.
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FRE 803 (2), (3), (19), (20) or (21) 143 can be admissible in evidence at trial according
to Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code is also questionable.
Secondly, when the declarant is unavailable, FRE 804 (b) creates a few hearsay
exceptions.

FRE 804 (a) defines the unavailability for these hearsay exceptions.144

It is accepted FRE 804 (a) (1) includes "any of the evidentiary privileges 145 and the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination." 146

Although Article 159-3 of the

143

These FRE 803 exceptions provide: "(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling
event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition;" "(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the
declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan,
motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or
belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation,
identification, or terms of declarant's will;" "(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history.
Reputation among members of a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a person's
associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, death,
legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or
family history;" "(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation is a
community, arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs affecting lands in the
community, and reputation as to events of general history important to the community or State or
nation in which located;" and "(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character
among associates or in the community."
144

FRE 804 (a) provides: "'Unavailability as a witness' includes situations in which the declarant(!) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject
matter of the declarant's statement; or (2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of
the declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or (3) testifies to a lack of memory of
the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or (4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing
because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or (5) is absent from the
hearing and the proponent of a statement has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance (or in
the case of a hearsay exception under subdivision b(2), (3), or (4), the declarant's attendance or
testimony) by process or other reasonable means. A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if
exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or
wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or
testifying."
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See FRE 501. It provides: "Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States
or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be
governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect
to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of
a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall e determined in accordance
with State law."
146

See G. Michael Fenner, supra note 975, 283.
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'·

li

It

434

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

ROC Criminal Procedure Code also admits some out-of-court statements made in the
presence of law-enforcement-officers into evidence when the declarant is unavailable
to testify as a witness at trial, it does not provide a definition of the unavailability
similar to that ofFRE 804 (a) (1).

As a result, even if the out-of-court declarant "is

exempted by ruling of the court on the ground ofprivilege" 147 from testifying at trial,
his prior out-of-court statement should be inadmissible since Article 159-3 of the
ROC Criminal Procedure Code does not create a hearsay exception like that of FRE
804 (a) (1).

The ROC Supreme Court decision admitting an out-of-court statement

after the declarant invoked his privilege at trial, 90 Sun Zon Gum One 17, where the
witness make a statement against the defendant during police interrogation but
refused to testify at trial by invoking his privilege, 148 thus would be reversed under
this legislation.

Nonetheless, it is unclear why the 2003 legislation does not adopt

the FRE 804 (a) (1) style exception in Article 159-3 of the ROC Criminal Procedure
Code.

Generally speaking, FRE 804 (a) (1) upholds the out-of-court statement

declarant's unavailability after the declarant invoking the privilege to refuse to testify
and admits the prior out-of-court statement into evidence because of its reliability and

147
148

See FRE 804 (a) (I).

In this pre-2003 legislation murder case, the out-of-court statement against the defendant is like that
provided in FRE 804 (b) (I).
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Based on this high likelihood of truthfulness, the

pre-2003 ROC Supreme Court decision, 90 Sun Zon Gum One 17, should be affirmed.
Hence, how a FRE 804 (a) (I)-like out-of-court statement can be admissible into
evidence under this 2003 legislation demands further discussion.

In addition, FRE 804 (b) (1), hearsay exceptions similar to FRE 804 (2), (3), (4),
and (6) 150 are not provided in the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

As already

discussed supra, if these out-of-court statements are made before a judge, a public
prosecutor, or other law-enforcement-officers, they might be admissible into evidence
at trial through Articles 159-1 to 159-3 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

If

they are in writing, they might also be admissible by Article 159-4 of the ROC
Criminal Procedure Code.

The problem of the admissibility of these out-of-court

statements arises from the circumstance when they are neither in writing nor being

149

150

See Authur Best, supra note 1016, 123.

These FRE 804 (b) exceptions include: "(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a
prosecution for homicide or in a civil action or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while
believing that the declarant's death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the
declarant believed to be impending death. (3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at
the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far
tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant
against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement
unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless unless corroborating circumstances·clearly
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. (4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A
statement concerning the declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by
blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history, even though
declarant had no means of acquiring personal knowledge of the matter stated; or (B) a statement
concerning the foregoing matters, and death also, of another person, if the declarant was related to the
other by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with the other's family as to be
likely to have accurate information concerning the matter declared. (6) Forfeiture by wrongdoing.
A statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to,
and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness."

••I•
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made in front of law-enforcement-officers.
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While these hearsay exceptions similar

to FRE 804 (b) are also based on the reliability of these out-of-court statements, 151
how courts in Taiwan admit these out-of-court statements into evidence undet no
statutory authority is quite problematic, if it is necessary to let them in.
After examining the hearsay rule in both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the
ROC Criminal Procedure Code, it is obvious that the ROC Criminal Procedure Code
omits several important reliability-based hearsay exceptions.

While courts in

Taiwan have to apply an enacted statute, they are not allowed to create any hearsay
exceptions other than those provided in Articles 159-1 to 159-5 under civil law
traditions.

It is difficult and unreasonable for the Taiwanese courts to admit an

out-of-court statement in violation of an enacted law.

Especially when these

out-of-court statements are neither in writing nor being made in front of
law-enforcement-officers, the question of the admissibility of these out-of-court
statements is salient in Taiwan since these statements are considered quite reliable for
the truth.

Since the hearsay rule of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code itself does not

provide enough exceptions to admit [al]most kinds of reliable and trustworthy
out-of-court statements contained in the Federal Rules of Evidence, which are
considered necessary to find the truth, "how to admit these out-of-court statements not

lSI

For the rationales behind FRE 804 (b), see Authur Best, supra note 1016, 123-7.
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provided as hearsay exceptions in the ROC Criminal Procedure Code" depends on
"whether they could be admitted in evidence by other non-hearsay provisions in the
ROC Criminal Procedure Code."

An analysis of the latter question will be necessary

and meaningful in a civil-law-based criminal justice system where the court is still
entitled to collect and investigate evidence without any party participation.

5.3.3 The Trial Court
The most distinct characteristic of the adjudicating proceeding between Taiwan
and the United States is the jury trial.

As already mentioned supra, evidence law

becomes necessary only after there came the need for a passive and neutral fact-finder.
Consequently, this resulted in Anglo-American law being devoted to determining
what non-evidence is and what inadmissible evidence is. 152

In continental criminal

justice systems where the judge decides both law and fact, "strict enforcement of
hearsay ... is less practicable." 153

While there is no jury trial in Taiwan, and the

judge decides both law and fact, it seems reasonable why there was no hearsay rule in
the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

Nonetheless, while the 2003 Advisory

Committee Note clearly declares this 2003 legislation of hearsay rule derives mainly

152

See Thomas P. Gallanis, supra note 776, 500.

153

See Gordon Van Kessel, A Summary ofMirjan R Damaska's Evidence Law Adrift, 49 Hastings L.

J. 359, 359 ( 1998) .

t '
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from the Federal Rules of Evidence of the United States, it is interesting that the
drafters of this 2003 hearsay rule did not adopt the whole set of the hearsay rule like
those in the Federal Rules of Evidence.

On the contrary, for example, the 2003 ROC

legislation omits some hearsay exceptions provided in FRE 803 and 804, but creates
Article 159-1 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code unseen in the Federal Rules of
Evidence.

It is also interesting to know whether the Taiwanese drafters had sensed a

reason for creating these differences and what they might result in.
what was the purpose?

If intentional,

If not, how can the court admit those unprovided hearsay

exceptions into evidence under the current framework of the ROC Criminal Procedure
Code?

Since the hearsay doctrine exists largely because a lay jury cannot properly

evaluate statements made outside of its presence, and the rules governing character
evidence assume that lay juries usually place too much weight on such proof or often
employ it improperly for punitive purposes, 1s4 mistrust of lay juries is the single
overriding reason for the law of evidence. Iss

Thus, it is obvious the common law

hearsay rule will not play the same role in a non-jury trial system.

It is then

interesting to see what the common law hearsay rule means in a non-jury trial
jurisdiction.

In this subsection, this study attempts to justify why it was almost

154

See Christopher B. Mueller, supra note 781, 1.

155

See Stephan Landsman, supra note 304, 565.
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impossible for continental criminal justice systems to develop a common law trial
system that supports common law rules of evidence.156

Moreover, this study will

also explore the institutional limitation of hearsay rule in a civil-law-based legal
framework and suggest the potential resolutions for those problems arising from the

I

t

2003 hearsay legislation in Taiwan.

l
\·l

5.3 .3 .1 The Obligations of the Trial Court In Fact-finding

t\
~~

l\o~\·

The United States Supreme Court in Faretta v. California found the Sixth
Amendment to "guarantee that a criminal charge may be answered in a manner now
considered fundamental to the fair administration of American justice --- through the
calling and interrogation of favorable witnesses, the cross-examination of adverse
witnesses, and the orderly introduction of evidence.

In short, the Amendment

constitutionalizes the right in an adversarial criminal trial to make a defense." 157

As

Professor Stephan Landsman pointed out, there are three essential elements in an
adversarial criminal trial: "utilization of a neutral and passive fact finder, reliance on
party presentation of evidence, and use of a highly structured forensic procedure." 158

156

Id.

157

See422 U.S. 806,818 (1975).

158

See Stephan Landsman, Adversarial Justice: The American Approach to Adjudication, 2 (West,
1988) .
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Under this adjudicating approach, the trial court reviews evidence for the fact finder,
the jury.

Nonetheless, the trial court is not responsible for collecting evidence for

the jury.

In a criminal case, the prosecutor has to present evidence in order to

convict the defendant.
necessary.

Similarly, the defendant also has to produce evidence when

In other words, both fact investigation and presentation of evidence are

controlled by the parties. 159

The trial court merely decides whether the presented

evidence is admissible so that the fact finder can consider it.

As described in

Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., the trial court just plays the role as a
"gate keeper" because it merely detennines which evidence should be admitted. 160
On the contrary, the situation in a civil law country is different.
there is no common law jury trial.

First of all,

The trial court is itself a fact fmder.

Instead of

having parties produce satisfying evidence to the trial court, it has to inquire into all
circumstances of the case so that it can know more necessary information. 161

While

the parties and their attorneys are not in charge of evidence gathering and
presentation, 162 and the court has to make a written judgment explaining why to
convict or acquit, continental criminal justice systems usually allow the judge to
159

See Renee Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems: An American on Trial for An
American Murder in the French Cout D'assise, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 791,797 (2001) .
160

See 509 U.S. 579 ( 1993 ) .

161

See Renee Lettow Lerner, supra note 1356,797.

162

See Gordon Van Kessel, supra note 1350, 360.
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collect and investigate evidence in addition to those presented by the parties. 163

This

procedural aspect concerning the court as a fact finder is distinguishable between both
inquisitorial and accusatorial adjudicating proceedings.

Nevertheless, it itself is not

enough to justify why there could not emerge a common-law-like practice of
parties-controlled fact investigation and presentation of evidence in the developments
of continental criminal justice systems.
In addition to this procedural viewpoint, there is another important factor why
continental criminal justice systems would not develop common law rules of evidence.
This is beyond the procedural law itself; however, it is because of the substantive
criminal law.

For instance, in Taiwan, under the civil-law-derived-from Article 55

of the ROC Criminal Law, providing "If one act constitutes several unlike offenses or
the means employed or the results of the commission of one offense constitute
another unlike offense, only the most severe of the prescribed punishments shall be
imposed," the court is required to investigate and consider the other offense not
charged by the public or private prosecutor because otherwise the uncharged offense
could not be punished or indicted anymore.

Moreover, while Article 56 of the ROC

Criminal Law provides: "If several successive acts constitute like offenses, such
successive acts may be considered to be one offense, but the punishment prescribed
163

For example, the former Paragraph 1 of Article 163 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code provided:
"The court shall, for the sake of discovering the truth, ex officio investigate evidence."
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for such offense may be increased up to one half," and treats several successive
offenses as a single one, the court is also required to discover "how many like
offenses in the world" the defendant has committed lest the defendant should benefit
from an incomplete investigation. 164 In a sense the defendant is subject to only one
·,

criminal punishment if all of his misconducts fall within the scope of Articles 55 and
56 of the ROC Criminal Law.

These articles are more decisive especially when the

defendant continues to make related or successive offenses after he has already been
indicted. 165

Under these continental criminal. law provisions, it is understandable

why common law rules of evidence focusing mainly on the presentation of evidence
by the parties would not emerge: because the court is assumed to investigate all
related crimes in addition to what is already indicted or charged. 166

In other words,

allowing absolute parties-controlled collection and presentation of evidence would
inevitably render obsolete these criminal law provisions, which might eventually
impair the function of the trial court as a fact finder required to convict the defendant
164

In fact, both Articles 55 and 56 of the ROC Criminal Law stem from the 1871 German Criminal
Law. Although the current German Criminal Law does not provide provisions similar to the second
half of Article 55 and Article 56 of the ROC Criminal Code, while the German Criminal Procedure
Code does not adopt common law evidence rule at all, abolishment of these provisions after World War
II did not consider whether this provisions would result in a common law style criminal trial.
165

In these circumstances, it is impossible for the prosecutor (public or private) to indict all
misconducts subject to one punishable power of the defendant.
166

After the 2005 legislation, which will be in effect from July 1st 2006, only the following paragraph
of the current Article 55 of the ROC Criminal Law survives: "If one act constitutes several unlike
offenses, only the most severe of the prescribed punishments shall be imposed." In other words, the
court is still required to investigate if there is other offense falling within the scope of the newly
enacted provision. Of course, the scope requiring the court to investigate ex officio is much smaller
than that in the past.
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based on all of his punishable misconducts.
These criminal law provisions not only make the past ROC criminal justice
practice merely "nominally adversarial" but also make the current "Pro-Accusatorial
reforms on the ROC Criminal Procedure Code" look more like "Pro-Inquisitorial." 167
The court is still required and entitled to investigate whether the scope of the
prosecution completely covers all misconduct under one punishable power. 168

In

I

I

I

II

short, whenever the court has a duty to discover the whole scope subject to one
punishable power rather than to focus on merely what has been prosecuted or indicted,
the real world criminal practice in Taiwan or any other civil-law-based jurisdiction
with similar criminal law provisions would still be similar to the traditional
inquisitorial model since the court still has to play an active role in fact investigation
at trial.

While Professor Mirjan R. Damaska notes three important pillars support

common law rules of evidence 169 and justify the Anglo-American fact-finding
process: "the peculiar organization of the trial court, the temporal concentration of
proceedings, and the prominent roles of the parties and their counsel in legal
proceedings.

A viewpoint derived from continental substantive criminal law

167

As mentioned already, a fundamental difference in the Inquisitorial system and the Accusatorial
system is the fact investigation and presentation of evidence: party control versus judicial control.
See Renee Lettow Lerner, supra note 1356, 797.
168

See Article 267 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
Sunl435 (1937).
169

See Gordon Van Kessel, supra note 1350, 359.

See also 88 Tai Sun 2576 ( 1999) and 26 U
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mentioned supra might supplement his claims by explaining why continental criminal
justice systems did not evolve the common law evidence rules in the late eighteenth
and the nineteenth centuries. 170
Although the 2003 Advisory Committee Note of the ROC Criminal Procedure
Code did not unambiguously address this issue as to why to adopt Article 159-1 of the
ROC Criminal Procedure Code admitting the out-of-court statement made in front of
a judge, or a public prosecutor, into evidence at trial, the fact that the court still plays
a role as a fact fmder and the need to discover all material evidence to prove all
offenses falling within the scope of Articles 55 and 56 of the ROC Criminal Law
might partly justify it.

In other words, Paragraph 2 of Article 163 of the ROC

Criminal Procedure Code still allows the court to investigate evidence ex officio
especially when it is necessary to discover the truth and conduct a fair trial. ·An
inquisitorial approach of fact-finding process emphasizing largely "official inquiry" 171
survives the 2003 pro-accusatorial reforms on the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
Adoption of Article 159-1 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code represents that the
2003 legislation of hearsay rule tolerates a non-adversarial fact-finding proceeding,
which is much different form its counterpart in the United States.

110

Id.

171

See Renee Lettow Lerner, supra note 1356, 797.

While the hearsay
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rule was initially adopted to prevent lay jurors from hearing unreliable hearsay, 172
deriving from the bifurcated trial structure, it is not designed for a civil-law-based
inquisitorial criminal justice system.

In a sense adoption of the common-law-based

hearsay rule is conflicting with the civil-law-based fact-finding process.
Nonetheless, since the ROC lawmakers intended to build a more accusatorial trial
proceeding on the continental basis, it was considered necessary to adopt certain
accusatorial elements including hearsay rule into the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
To prevent the court from playing its active role at trial as in the past, the 2003
hearsay rule provides the defendant with a procedural right to challenge the
admissibility of the out-of-court statements and requires the prosecutor to respond to
this challenge.

This legislation indeed results in a less inquisitorial criminal process.

Since the trial process is not pure inquisitorial any more, there is space for adoption of
hearsay rule, which is not in conflict with the current ROC trial system in nature.
While the trial process in Taiwan is not purely accusatorial, a few inquisitorial
characteristics remain.

As a result, there are two types of hearsay exceptions in the

ROC Criminal Procedure Code: one is from the inquisitorial tradition 173 and the other
is based on the adversarial or accusatoriallegacy. 174

172

See Christopher B. Mueller, supra note 781, 1.

173

See Article 159-1 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

174

See Articles 159-2 to 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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Even though some hearsay exceptions provided in the Federal Rules of Evidence
are not found in the ROC Criminal Procedure Code, they might be admissible under
an inquisitorial hearsay exception according to Article 159-1 of the ROC Criminal
Procedure Code especially when an adversarial and accusatorial approach of
fact-fmding is unavailable and impossible.

For example, if the prosecutor seeks to

admit an out-of-court statement similar to FRE 803 (2), it may ask the court to apply
an inquisitorial hearsay exception according to Article 159-1 of the ROC Criminal
Procedure Code.

Furthermore, the court can invoke its inquisitorial power to

investigate evidence ex officio according to Paragraph 2 of Article 163 even the
parties do not require the court to do so.
no hearsay rule applies.

When the court collects evidence ex officio,

This is not only because it is not designed for an

inquisitorial process, but also because even hearsay evidence is admissible under the
inquisitorial evidential tradition. 175

Hearsay evidence is considered by the

fact-finder in continental criminal justice systems mainly because "there is enough
time to seek out the declarant when available or to collect information regarding the
declarant's credibility when unavailable." 176

Thus, if a judge or a public prosecutor

interrogated the witness who heard the excited utterance during a pretrial stage or

175

See Renee Lettow Lerner, supra note 1356, 831.

176

See Gordon Van Kessel, supra note 1350, 359.

;
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investigation, it may be admissible.

In addition, if the court tends to admit this

out-of-court statement, it can then borrow the dossier of another case, in which an
out-of-court statement was made before a judge or a public prosecutor.

It is clear

Article 159-1 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code is not designed to protect the right
of confrontation.

In fact, it is basically an enactment stemming from the inquisitorial

evidential legacy even though no jurisdiction adopts an article similar to Article 159-1
of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

Even though it is found the 2003 legislation

adopts two types of hearsay exceptions, it is not clear if the framers "intentionally"
created this distinction since this legislation has never been seen and there is no clue
of this intention in the 2003 Advisory Committee Note.

Nonetheless, Article 159-1

and Paragraph 2 of Article 163 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code really provide
an inquisitorial fact-finding proceeding to assist the court to determine the truth when

~

(.

r...

I.

.,

I,

these 2003 adversarial and accusatorial hearsay exceptions are not available for
fact-finding.

This might be why the 2003 reforms on the ROC Criminal Procedure

Code is merely entitled "Pro-Accusatorial" instead of"Accusatorial" and no one
really thinks it is proper and necessary to establish a pure accusatorial and adversarial
trial system in Taiwan.
If the purpose of the 2003 reforms on the ROC Criminal Procedure Code
includes establishing a more accusatorial model of its criminal justice system in

...
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addition to corresponding demands of human rights protection, it is necessary to

.r
consider abandoning, or at least revising, Articles 55 and 56 of the ROC Criminal
Law in order to release the court's duty of investigating whether there exists another
offense falling within the scope of Articles 55 and 56 of the ROC Criminal Law,
which might make the court less active and more neutral at trial. 177

It is interesting

that rarely do scholars or experts in the field of comparative criminal procedure,
however, mention the reason 'why merely revising the civil-law-based criminal
procedure code is not enough to establish an accusatorial model of criminal trial' from
the viewpoint of substantial criminal law.

Even those scholars from civil-law-based

jurisdictions that have already adopted some accusatorial elements into their criminal
justice systems 178 do not address this viewpoint, either.

Nevertheless, 'to what

extent of accusatorial and adversarial the ROC criminal justice system will look like'
depends partly on 'to what extent the court is required to investigate and collect
evidence ex officio under Articles 55 and 56 ofthe ROC Criminal Law.' 179

The less

the court is required to investigate ex officio, the more accusatorial the ROC trial
177

The author of this study is glad to note that: partly based on the author's suggestions to abolish or
revise Articles 55 and 56 of the ROC Criminal Law, the ROC Legislative Yuan in January 2005 revised
the ROC Criminal Law, including abolishing the second half of Article 55 and Article 56 of the ROC
Criminal Law. See the author, Articles 55 and 56 of the ROC Criminal Law and the Pro-Accusatorial
Reforms on the ROC Criminal Procedure Code, in the ROC Judicial Yuan eds, Anniversary Review of
the Pro-Accusatorial Reforms on the ROC Criminal Procedure Code, 39-63 (Taipei, Sep, 2004) (in
Chinese) .
178

These jurisdictions include Japan and Italy.

179

Only Article 55 ofthe ROC Criminal Law will govern this issue after July 1'1 2006.
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process will look like.

Of course, even without these criminal law problems, if the

court still plays its role as a fact finder, it is questionable to what extent should the
ROC criminal justice system become accusatorial and adversarial.

5.3.3.2 The Relationship between Jury Trial and Evidence Law
While some scholars and judges describe evidence law as the "child of the jury
system," 180 exclusionary hearsay rules are necessary "to protect the jury against
cognitive shortcomings." 181

As a result, the jury, the fact-fmder, can only consider

admissible evidence. 182 The admissibility of evidence means the jury's contact of
evidence.

The jury will not be in contact with inadmissible evidence in general so

that there is no danger the fact finder will decide a case based on unreliable hearsay.
While the parties are responsible for fact investigation and presentation of evidence,
the adversarial and accusatorial evidence law including the hearsay rule is focusing on
this parties-controlled fact investigation process.

In other words, the common law

hearsay rule is applicable to evidence presented by the parties initially.
On the contrary, the court, instead of the jury, is the fact finder in the ROC

180

See Charles T. McCormick, Law and the Future: Evidence, 51 Nw. U. L.Rev. 218, 225 ( 1956) .

181

See Roger C. Park, An Outsider's View of Common Law Evidence, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1486, 1486
(1998) .

182

Usually the fact-finder knows nothing about inadmissible evidence because the court has already
excluded it.

J
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In addition to evidence presented by the parties, the court

also collects evidence for fact investigation through official inquiry and other methods
of evidence gathering.

As a consequence, there are two categories of evidence: one

is presented by the parties and the other is collected by the court.

While the court

still plays a role as a fact finder, it seems less meaningful to discuss the admissibility
of evidence because the fact fmder will inevitably be in contact with all kinds of
evidence.

In other words, the fact-fmder in a continental criminal justice system will

scrutinize the out-of-court statement for certain, regardless of its admissibility.

The

rationale behind the common law hearsay rule preventing lay jurors from considering
unreliable and untrustworthy out-of-court statements is thus not available and
persuasive in continental bench trials.

Since continental criminal justice systems put

a greater reliance on judicial power, the exclusionary hearsay rule is less necessary in
an inquisitorial criminal justice system because professional judges are assumed and
believed to be capable of finding the material truth.

In addition, since jury verdicts

are inscrutable in a common law jury trial system, a strict hearsay rule excluding the
danger of putting too much weight on unreliable information and avoiding "unfair
surprise in light of lack of ability to continuously check foundational factors" 183 as "a
good prophylactic measure to counteract the defects of derivative informational

183

See Gordon Van Kessel, supra note 1350, 359.
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sources" 184 becomes necessary.

Hence, without the adversarial fact-finding
I,

f

proceeding, distrustful of all kinds of government power and the jury trial, there is no
need to adopt the whole set of common law hearsay rule in Taiwan.

Because Taiwan

courts have to decide both legal and factual issues by providing a scrutable written
reason, and the fact-finder will unavoidably be in contact with hearsay evidence, strict
enforcement of common law hearsay rule distinguishing admissible and inadmissible
out-of-court statements is less practicable. 185

5.3.4 The Exclusionary Approach of Hearsay Rule
As this study suggests, there are two categories of hearsay exceptions in the ROC

Criminal Procedure Code.

While Articles 159-2 to 159-4 of the ROC Criminal

Procedure Code stem from common law hearsay exceptions, which protect a
defendant's right to confrontation, 186 it is desirable to understand what the right of
confrontation means in the United States.

In other words, the recent developments

of the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
might provide to legal professionals in Taiwan many important clues when
determining what the confrontation right means and what is protected by the hearsay
184

18

See Mirjan R. Damaska, Evidence Law Adrift, 65 (Yale University Press, 1997 ) .

s See Gordon Van Kessel, supra note 1350, 359.

186

See the 2003 Advisory Committee Note of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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exceptions in Articles 159-2 to 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

5.3.4.1 Roberts
Although there are many hearsay exceptions provided in the Federal Ru1es of
Evidence, the United States Supreme Court in California v. Green still recognized
there might be a violation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause under a
provided hearsay exception in a criminal case. 187

This is to say, even an out-of-court

statement falling within the scope of the hearsay exceptions might be excluded from
evidence at trial especially when its admission wou1d deny a defendant the right to
confront an accusing witness.

As a consequence, the kind of out-of-court statement

falling within the scope of the hearsay exceptions that cou1d be admissible without
any violation of the Confrontation Clause becomes a significant issue in deciding an
admissible hearsay.

In Ohio v. Roberts, the United States Supreme Court considered "the relationship

187

The Court ruled: "The issue before us is the considerably narrower one of whether a defendant's
constitutional right 'to be confronted with the witnesses against him' is necessarily inconsistent with a
State's decision to change its hearsay rules to reflect the minority view described above. While it may
readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect
similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap is complete and that the
Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their
exceptions as they existed historically at common law. Our decisions have never established such a
congruence; indeed, we have more than once found a violation of confrontation values even though the
statements in issue were admitted under an arguably recognized hearsay exception. The converse is
equally true: merely because evidence is admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay rule does
not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been denied." See 399 U.S. 149,
155-6 (1970) .
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between the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule with its many exceptions." 188
Recognizing that literally reading the Sixth Amendment as in Mattox v. United States .
would inevitably result in abrogating every hearsay exception that had long been
rejected as unintended and too extreme, Roberts refused an extreme and rigid
application of the Sixth Amendment. 189

Moreover, without seeking an underlying

theory of the Confrontation Clause in deciding the validity of all hearsay
exceptions, 190 Roberts announced that the Confrontation Clause restricted the range
of admissible hearsay in two ways. 191

The Court first established a rule of necessity

that required the prosecutors to produce or demonstrate the unavailability of the
declarant. 192

After establishing the unavailability of a witness, the Court also

required the prior testimony to bear adequate indicia of reliability 193 because hearsay
rules and the Confrontation Clause stemmed from the same roots. 194

Generally

speaking, according to the Roberts Court, an out-of-court statement would be
"admissible only if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability,"' which might "be inferred

188

See 448 U.S. 56, 62 (1980) .

189

Id.

190

See 399 U.S., at 162.

191

See 448 U.S., at 65.

192

Id.

193

Id.

194

See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 ( 1970) .
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without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception." 195

In other words, even though the court is not a fact-finder in a jury

trial, it was entitled to decide whether an out-of-court statement should bear adequate
indicia of reliability if the evidence was not within a firmly rooted hearsay exception;
how to assess the evidential reliability would indeed be up to the trial court's
discretion.

Hence, after Roberts, the discretionary power of the trial court would

surely play a significant role in excluding an out-of-court statement not falling within
a firmly rooted hearsay exception.

Under the Roberts approach, a defendant right to

confront any particular witness would be null and void, if the trial court found the
hearsay evidence reliable.
would not apply.

The Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment

In sum, whether the jurors would consider the hearsay evidence is

up to the trial court's evidential decision.

5.3.4.2 Crawford
In Crawford v. Washington, Justice Antonio Scalia, writing for seven members
of the United States Supreme Court, overruled Ohio v. Roberts and its progeny. 196
In determining whether the Washington State Code at issue violated the Sixth

195

It also held: "In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." See 448 U.S., at 66.
196

See 541 U.S. 36; 124 S. Ct 1354 ( 2004) .

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

455

Amendment, Crawford turned to the historical background of the Confrontation
Clause which did not alone provide sufficient information to resolve this case. 197
Roberts allowing the reliability test to govern the admissibility of an out-of-court
statement deprived the accused of the right to confront a testifying witness if the trial
court found that the out-of-court statement showed particular guarantees of
trustworthiness. 198

Nonetheless, unlike the civil law tradition which "condones

examination in private by judicial officers," 199 Crawford t.:ecognizes that "the
common-law tradition is one oflive testimony in court subject to adversarial
testing," 200 even though "England at times adopted elements of the civil-law.
practice." 201

In defending violations of the Stamp Act in inquisitorial admiralty

courts, which allowed the judicial officials to examine witnesses by ex parte
interrogation before trial, John Adams once pointed out: "Examinations of witnesses
upon Interrogatories, are only by the Civil Law.

197

See 124 S. Ct., at 1359.

198

See 448 U.S., at 66.

199

See 124 S. Ct., at 1359.

200

ld.

201

Interrogatories are unknown at

As Crawford noted, "Justices of the peace or other officials examined suspects and witnesses before
trial. These examinations were sometimes read in court in lieu of live testimony, a practice that
'occasioned frequent demands by the prisoner to have his accusers, i.e. the witnesses against him,
brought before him face to face.' Pretrial examinations became routine under two statutes passed
during the reign of Queen Mary in the 16th century. These Marian bail and committal statutes
required justices of the peace to examine suspects and witnesses in felony cases and to certify the
results to the court. It is doubtful that the original purpose of the examinations was to produce
evidence admissible at trial. Whatever the original purpose, however, they came to be used as
evidence in some cases, resulting in an adoption of continental procedure." Id., at 1359-60.
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common Law, and Englishmen and common Lawyers have an aversion to them if not
an Abhorrence ofthem."202

Justice Scalia cited the most notorious instance of

civil-law examination in the seventeenth century, the 1603 trial of Sir Walter Raleigh
for treason, and some important English judicial reforms to justify his ruling?03
After a thorough study of the history of the Confrontation Clause, the Court in
Crawford found that the admissibility of an out-of-court hearsay statement depends on
"a prior opportunity for cross-examination. " 204

Based on this historical finding, two

inferences about the meaning of the Confrontation Clause can be drawn.

205

As asserted by Justice Scalia, "the principal evil at which the Confrontation
Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its
use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused." 206

Moreover, "that

the Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness
who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had

202

See John Adams, Draft of Argument in Sewall v Hancock (1768-1769), in 2 Legal Papers of John
Adams 194,207 (K. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965); quoted in Crawford. ld., at 1362.

203

Id., at 1360. ("Through a series of statutory and judicial reforms, English law developed a right of
confrontation that limited these abuses. For example, treason statutes required witnesses to confront
the accused 'face to face' at his arraignment Courts, meanwhile, developed relatively strict rules of
unavailability, admitting examinations only if the witness was demonstrably unable to testify in person.
Several authorities also stated that a suspect's confession could be admitted only against himself, and
not against others he implicated.")
204

Id.,atl363.

205

ld.

206

Id.
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had a prior opportunity for cross-examination."207
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It was meaningless for Raleigh to

confront those who read Cobham's confession in court. 208

Hence, Roberts would be

subjecting "out-of-court statements to the law of evidence would render the
Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant inquisitorial
practices." 209

To avoid the civil-law abuses of ex parte examinations that "might

°

sometimes be admissible under modem hearsay rules," 21 Crawford mainly applies
the Confrontation Clause to "witnesses against the accused" for distinguishing the
out-of-court testimonial statement from other styles ofhearsay211 without providing a
clear definition of"testimonial statements."212

207

As to this second aspect, the Court also notes: "The text of the Sixth Amendment does not suggest
any open-ended exceptions from the confrontation requirement to be developed by the courts. Rather,
the 'right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him,' is most naturally read as a reference to
the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the
founding. As the English authorities above reveal, the common law in 1791 conditioned admissibility
of an absent witness's examination on unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine. The
Sixth Amendment therefore incorporates those limitations. The numerous early state decisions
applying the same test confirm that these principles were received as part of the common law in this
country." Id., at 1365-6.
·
208

Id., at 1364.

209

Id.

210

Id.

211

As the Court mentioned, "'Testimony,' in turn, is typically '[a] solemn declaration or affirmation
made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact' An accuser who makes a formal
statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark
to an acquaintance does not. The constitutional text, like the history underlying the common-law right
of confrontation, thus reflects an especially acute concern with a specific type of out-of-court
statement" Id.
212

However, the Court illustrates what might be considered testimonial: "Various formulations of this
core class of 'testimonial' statements exist: 'ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent--that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was
unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be
used prosecutorially;' 'extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such
as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions;' 'statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be

j'
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As to exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, Crawford only admits those
exceptions already established at the time of adoption of the Sixth Amendment in that
"the common law in 1791 conditioned admissibility of an absent witness's
examination on unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine.
Amendment therefore incorporates those limitations.

The Sixth

The numerous early state

decisions applying the same test confirm that these principles were received as part of
the common law in this country." 213

Consequently, since the Framers expressively

refused to adopt a civil law system admitting pre-trial ex parte examinations of
witnesses in evidence at trial, establishing the unavailability of the declaring witness
and a prior opportunity to cross-examine should be necessary conditions for
admissibility of testimonial statements. 214

In other words, Crawford affirms a 1794

North Carolina ruling, State v. Webb, which held: "it is a rule of the common law,
founded on natural justice, that no man shall be prejudiced by evidence which he had
not the liberty to cross examine." 215

available for use at a later trial,' These formulations all share a common nucleus and then define the
Clause's coverage at various levels of abstraction around it Regardless of the precise articulation,
some statements qualify under any definition--for example, ex parte testimony at a preliminary
hearing." Id.
213

Id., at 1366.

214

Id., at 1367. The Court later clearly announces: "Our cases have thus remained faithful to the
Framers' understanding: Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only
where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine." Id., at 1369.
215

See 2 N. C. 103, 104( 1794 ). Moreover, Crawford also notes that: "Similarly, in State v. Campbell.
South Carolina's highest law court excluded a deposition taken by a coroner in the absence of the
accused. It held: '[I]f we are to decide the question by the established ru1es of the common law, there

459
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According to this historical analysis of the Confrontation Clause, from which
Crawford finds the Roberts test obviously departs, a particular manner assessing the
reliability of a testimonial out-of-court hearsay statement is mandatory.2 16

While

admitting testimonial statements "deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally odd
with the right of confrontation,"217 the Confrontation Clause strictly requires
cross-examination in determining the reliability. 218

As a result, Crawford concludes

"[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to
dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.
the Sixth Amendment prescribes."219

This is not what

The testimonial out-of-court statement without

an opportunity for cross-examination will not be considered by the fact-finder.

A

mere judicial determination of reliability cannot replace "the constitutionally
prescribed method of assessing reliability" 220 even though the trial court acts in
utmost good faith to find reliability. 221

Otherwise the fact-finding process in the

could not be a dissenting voice. For, notwithstanding the death of the witness, and whatever the
respectability of the court taking the depositions, the solemnity of the occasion and the weight of the
testimony, such depositions are ex parte, and, therefore, utterly incompetent.' The court said that one
of the 'indispensable conditions' implicitly guaranteed by the State Constitution was that 'prosecutions
be carried on to the conviction of the accused, by witnesses confronted by him, and subjected to his
personal examination."' I d., at 1362.
216

Id., at 1370.

211

Id.

218

Id.

219

Id., at 1371.

220

Id., at 1370.

221

Id., at 1373.
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United States will look much more inquisitorial in that the "Raleigh trial itself
involved the very sorts of reliability determinations" which Roberts authorized. 222
Afterwards, since the Roberts test "fails to protect against paradigmatic confrontation
violations,"223 the trial judge's discretionary power in deciding the reliability of the
testimonial out-of-court statement is no more decisive to a jury's consideration of
hearsay evidence.

5.3.4.3 The Proper Exclusionary Approach for the ROC Hearsay Ru1e
As discussed supra, Articles 159-2 to 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure
Code derive from the common law hearsay ru1e.

While they are also enacted to

protect the defendant's right of confrontation, it is meaningful to refer to the
American experience of the Confrontation Clause.

To date, the United States

Supreme Court has tried two different approaches dealing with this issue, as shown in
Roberts and Crawford.

According to Roberts, the admissibility of an out-of-court

statement depends on whether it falls within firmly rooted hearsay exceptions or it
bears particu1arized guarantees oftrustworthiness. 224

222

Id., at 1370.

223

Id., at 1369.

224

See 448 U.S., at 66.

Nevertheless, Crawford
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emphasizes the method of assessing the reliability of the testimonial statement, which
requires the trial court to assess the reliability through cross-examination. 225

Even

though Crawford now governs how to assess the reliability of testimonial hearsay, it
does not necessarily follow that Taiwan has to adopt this exclusionary approach.

On

the contrary, probably Crawford just illustrates what a civil-law-based criminal justice
system should not adopt.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution clearly provides: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... be confronted with the
witnesses against him."

Consequently, almost all criminal cases have focused on the

right of confrontation if an admissible hearsay is at issue.

Unlike this American

practice, under the civil law tradition focusing heavily on "direct inquisition," rarely
had courts in Taiwan addressed the right of confrontation because there is no clear
expression of the right of confrontation in the ROC Constitution.

In 1995, the

Interpretation No. 384 of the ROC Grand Justice Council recognized the right to be
confronted with the witnesses against the accused to be constitutional.

Nonetheless,

compared to the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment, the origin of right of
confrontation in Taiwan is uncertain.

Moreover, the legislators in Taiwan can still

impose .restrictions on this constitutional confrontation right not only because Article

225

See 124 S. Ct., at 1370.
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23 of the ROC Constitution allows them to do it, but also because the history of the
ROC confrontation right does not require judicial officials to assess the reliability of
an out-of-court testimonial statement through cross-examination.

These legal

characteristics of the ROC criminal justice system may justify why Article 159-1 of
the ROC Criminal Procedure Code, an unknown to the common law hearsay rule, was
adopted.

Obviously, from a historical viewpoint, the adversarial rationale behind

Crawford requiring cross-examination is the only method, with few exceptions,
recognized by the Framers of the Bill of Rights in 1791 of assessing the reliability is
not applicable in Taiwan.

While Justice Scalia heavily depends on the history of the

Confrontation Clause to draw his conclusion, it is not necessary for Taiwan to draw
upon this historical authority and require the court to assess, only through
cross-examination only through cross-examination, the reliability of an out-of-court
testimonial statement.
If cross-examination is not the only way to evaluate the reliability of an
out-of-court testimonial statement for Taiwan, then Roberts might provide a good
approach for deciding the admissibility of testimonial hearsay.

In addition to

cross-examination, Roberts allows the court to assess the reliability through two more
methods.

The first method is whether the hearsay statement falls within firmly

rooted hearsay exceptions.

Even though the civil law tradition does not address this
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issue, this method is still applicable in Taiwan.

Those firmly rooted hearsay

exceptions evolved in common law can properly illustrate what kinds of out-of-court
statements are considered reliable.

They are important clues for the ROC cnminal

justice system to determine the reliability of the out-of-court statements in any given
case.

If a hearsay exception provided in the Federal Rules of Evidence might be

covered by the residual clause of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code, 226 probably it is
correct to admit it into evidence at trial in that it is considered reliable in common law.
Even a hearsay exception provided by the Federal Rules ofEvid~nce cannot be
covered by the ROC Criminal Procedure Code, for instance, like that in FRE 804 (a)
(1); it is proper to admit this out-of-court statement by exercising an inquisitorial
power under Article 159-1 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code because of its high
reliability.
The second method allowed by Roberts is whether the out-of-court testimonial
statement bears particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.

As criticized in

Crawford, the reliability test in Roberts is too "amorphous" to provide clear protection
from even core confrontation violations.227

226

227

It is true that Roberts will inevitably

See Subparagraph 3 of Article 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

Crawford reasoned that: "Reliability is an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept. There
are countless factors bearing on whether a statement is reliable; the nine-factor balancing test applied
by the Court of Appeals below is representative. Whether a statement is deemed reliable depends
heavily on which factors the judge considers and how much weight he accords each of them. Some
courts wind up attaching the same significance to opposite facts. For example, the Colorado Supreme
Court held a statement more reliable because its inculpation of the defendant was 'detailed,' while the
Fourth Circuit found a statement more reliable because the portion implicating another was 'fleeting.'
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result in the fact-finding process depending heavily on the trial judge's discretionary
power; for instance, "which factors the judge considers and how much weight he
accords each ofthem" 228 are decisive.

Crawford expressively prevents the trial

court from exercising this discretionary power in the fact-finding process.
Nonetheless, although admitting core testimonial statements under Roberts is
considered to be the unpardonable vice which the Confrontation Clause intends to
exclude, 229 this rationale is not necessarily true in Taiwan while the civil law tradition

has never tried to avoid an inquisitorial fact-finding process like that in the Raleigh
trial.

Besides, it is questionable if it is meaningful to follow Crawford in a

civil-law-based criminal justice system.

It is worthy to mention that the fact-finding process is itself discretionary in
nature.

Whenever evidence X conflicts with evidence Y in determining a factual

issue, for example, it is up to the fact-finder's discretionary power to decide which is
more reliable.

Although Crawford prevents the trial court from discretionarily

assessing the reliability of an out-of-court testimonial statement, it allows the

The Virginia Court of Appeals found a statement more reliable because the witness was in custody and
charged with a crime (thus making the statement more obviously against her penal interest), while the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals found a statement more reliable because the witness was not in custody
and not a suspect. Finally, the Colorado Supreme Court in one case found a statement more reliable
because it was given 'immediately after' the events at issue, while that same court, in another case,
found a statement more reliable because two years had elapsed." ld., at 1371.
228

Id.

229

Id.
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fact-fmder, usually the jury, to employ an almost absolute discretionary power to
decide the factual issues with little scrutiny while the jury is not required to justify its
decision in written.

Probably the traditional distrust of judicial officials in common

law requires the trial process to be bifurcated in which only the fact-fmder is allowed
to exercise this discretionary power.

As a result, under Crawford, the fact-finder

hears testimonial evidence only when it is made under cross-examination.

Besides,

in a sense whether to admit an out-of-court statement into evidence at trial as a
hearsay exception is up to the legislators' discretionary power since not all hearsay
exceptions evolved in common law have been adopted into the Federal Ru1es of
Evidence. 230

Under Crawford, however, even the discretionary power exercised by

the state or federal legislators for evaluating the reliability of the out-of-court
testimonial statements is not allowed by the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth
Amendment. 231

The Framers of the Confrontation Clause seemed to declare that

230

As explained in the Introductory Note of the Advisory Committee, "The approach to hearsay in
these rules is that of the common law, i.e., a general rule excluding hearsay, with exceptions under
which evidence is not required to be excluded even though hearsay. The traditional hearsay
exceptions are drawn upon for the exceptions, collected under two rules, one dealing with situations
where availability of the declarant is regarded as immaterial and the other with those where
unavailability is made a condition to the admission of the hearsay statement. Each of the two rules
concludes with a provision for hearsay statements not within one of the specified exceptions 'but
having comparable [equivalent] circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.' Rules 803(24) and
804(b)(6)[5]. This plan is submitted as calculated to encourage growth and development in this area
of the Jaw, while conserving the values and experience of the past as a guide to the future." See
Steven I. Friedland, supra note 1326, 87.
231

As noted in California v. Green, "While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the
Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to
suggest that the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a
codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at common law.
Our decisions have never established such a congruence; indeed, we have more than once found a
violation of confrontation values even though the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

466

only the fact-finders, usually lay jurors, should be entitled to exercise a discr(ftionary
power in assessing the reliability. The United States Supreme Court in Crawford
once again clearly recognizes the common-law-derived-from distrust of government
officials by 1791 and continues to insist on this common law tradition in the twenty
first century.

It is fair to say that the original intent of the Confrontation Clause

avoiding the judicial and legislative powers assessing the reliability of the testimonial
hearsay by its discretionary power is built on the bifurcated trial structure.

Only

when the defendant waives his right to a jury trial will the trial court in the United
States be allowed to exercise its discretionary power to evaluate the credibility of
evidence and decide the case.
On the contrary, where the trial structure is not bifurcated and the court also
plays the role as a fact-finder, it is questionable if Crawford is able to prohibit the trial
court from exercising discretionary power.

According to Paragraph 2 of Article 163

of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code, the court is allowed to exercise its inquisitorial
power to fmd the material truth in order to decide a case.

It is clear that the

fact-finder in Taiwan will eventually hear evidence whether it is admissible under the
hearsay rule.

In fact, even following Crawford will not prevent the fact-finder in

recognized hearsay exception. The converse is equally true: merely because evidence is admitted in
violation of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation
rights have been denied." See 399 U.S. 149, 155-6 ( 1970) .
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Taiwan from hearing an out-of-court testimonial statement that is not made under
cross-examination.

..

When the court in Taiwan learns information not allowed by

Crawford, either from the dossier or from the victim or the prosecution, as a
fact-finder required to present why a decision is reached in written, it is natural for the

In

court to assess if this testimonial hearsay is helpful to the truth-finding process.

one sense, whether to investigate the fact ex officio under Article 159-1 of the ROC
Criminal Procedure Code depends on this trustworthiness-assessing process.

In

reality, evaluating the reliability and the credibility of the testimonial hearsay depends
heavily on the judicial officials' experience.

It is impossible for the court to decide

if the hearsay information is probative and reliable without exercising its discretionary
power.

This practice is neither adversarial nor accusatorial while the defense party

plays no role during the court's decision-making process.

Since the court in Taiwan

is assumed to employ the discretionary power to decide what evidence is more
reliable and credible and what else is necessary to investigate, the purpose of
Crawford for preventing the court from discretionarily assessing the reliability of the
out-of-court testimonial statements will not be served in the ROC criminal justice
system.

Hence, whether the out-of-court testimonial statement bears particularized

guarantees of trustworthiness, the second method of deciding the admissibility of
hearsay evidence provided by Roberts, is a proper standard as to determine the
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admissibility of the out-of-court statements in the ROC criminal justice system.

It is

preferred to follow Roberts instead of Crawford while interpreting Subparagraph 3 of
Article 159-4 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
Moreover, Crawford seems to prevent the fact-finder from hearing inadmissible
hearsay.

It is less meaningful to follow Crawford for distinguishing admissible

hearsay from inadmissible hearsay in Taiwan because the fact-finder in Taiwan will
hear both admissible and inadmissible hearsay.

While there is an inquisitorial

hearsay exception focusing merely on the voluntariness of the declarant, 232 the court
is not required to assess the reliability of an out-of-court statement through
cross-examination.

The court is allowed to evaluate the reliability of the hearsay

evidence by any inquisitorial method.

If the trustworthiness and the reliability can

be found, no matter how discretionarily, cross-examination is no longer necessary.
In other words, the right of confrontation in the ROC criminal justice system is not a
constitutional mandate.

The meaning of the right of confrontation is much different

from its counterpart in the United States, as held in Crawford.

As a result, adoption

of the hearsay rule referring to the Federal Rules of Evidence just results in the ROC
trial process to become less inquisitorial since the court only has to follow the

adversarial trial model when Articles 159-2 to 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure

232

See Article 159-1 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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Perhaps this is what the 2003 pro-accusatorial reforms really mean.

5.3.5 The Meaning of Adoption of the Hearsay Rule in the ROC
While the ROC hearsay rule does not follow Crawford to exclude testimonial
hearsay not made under cross-examination from admissible evidence, it is interesting
what this 2003 legislation means in the ROC criminal justice system.

In general,

there were two main weaknesses regarding out-of-court statements in the pre-2003
practice.

First of all, the prosecutor played no role in the fact-finding process.

In

the past, after prosecution, the court was obliged to investigate all the material factual
issues.

The prosecutor had to do nothing during the trial process except read the

indictment at the end of trial.

Sometimes the prosecutor, with little or insufficient

evidence, filed an indictment just because the defendant was considered a highly
likely suspect.

While the prosecutors were absent during the fact-finding process,

the defendant had to argue with the court.

Usually the court went through all related

evidence whether it was presented by the prosecutor.

This trial practice looked like

a battle between the court and the defendant, which inevitably made the role of the
court less neutral.
The second defect resulting from that the fact-finding process depended too
much on out-of-court statements, such as police interrogation.

In the past, the ROC
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Supreme Court admitted almost all evidence relating to proving the truth of the matter
at issue?33
prosecution.

In reality, out-of-court statements played an important role in
Sometimes the public prosecutor did not interrogate a witness who had

made a statement during police interrogation before indictment.

While the court was

only required to read the verbatim transcript made by law-enforcement-officers before
verdict, whether to summon the declaring witness at trial was up to the court's
discretionary power.

The defendant had no legal right to present evidence or to ask

the declaring witness to be present at trial.

Nor did he have the right to be

confronted with the witnesses against him.

This practice would result in serious

injustice especially when the court, without further investigation ex officio,
discretionarily and arbitrarily believed an out-of-court declarant who intended to
frame the defendant by merely making a statement during police interrogation.
Besides, when the law-enforcement-officers might be under pressure of apt to receive
a benefit from settling a serious criminal case, they had a tendency to find a goat.
This police malpractice made their reports less reliable.

Ironically, the defendant

had no equal status to argue with the presenting party of evidence not only because
the prosecutor were always absent at trial but also because doing so would badly

233

See 72 Tai Sun 1332 ( 1983) .
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impress the fact-finder. 234
Although adoption of the hearsay rule does not necessarily result in the ROC
criminal justice system being non-inquisitorial, the less inquisitorial practice after the
2003 legislation emerges as a result.
pre-2003 weaknesses.

The ROC hearsay rule puts an end to these

With the 2003 hearsay rule, the defendant gains a legal status,

a procedural right, to argue the admissibility of the out-of-court statement presented at
trial.

To prevent the defendant from arguing this issue with the court, making its

role less neutral, the prosecutor is required to be present at trial for responding
hearsay objection in order to prove the case. 235

This 2003 legislation requires the

prosecutor to participate in the trial process more actively.

Since Paragraph 1 of

Article 159 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code excludes hearsay information in
general, arguing with the prosecutor about the admissibility of an out-of-court
statement becomes a regular practice at trial.

This post-2003 practice makes it

possible for the court to play a more neutral role than what it did before at trial in that
the prosecutor rather than the court is responsible for answering the defendant's
objection.

Furthermore, the defendant finally gets an equal status to argue with the

opposing party, regardless of a public or a private prosecutor, instead of the

234

235

This happened when the court collected evidence ex officio.

See Paragraph 2 of Article 159-5 and Paragraph 1 of Article 161 of the ROC Criminal Procedure
Code.
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In sum, without this 2003 hearsay rule, it would be difficult for the ROC

criminal justice system to build a pro-accusatorial or a less-inquisitorial trial process
because the prosecutor would have nothing to do.

At least to those issues provided

in Articles 159-2 to 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code, the defendant can
challenge the admissibility of the out-of-court statement, and the prosecutor has to
respond the challenge by advocating the admissibility of the hearsay.
While the pre-2003 trial process depended too much on the verbatim transcripts
made by the law-enforcement-officers, it often neglected the risks deriving from
intentional false accusations by the out-of-court witnesses and immoral
law-enforcement-officers.

In the past, especially when the defendant was framed, an

injustice like that in the Raleigh trial, 236 where the defendant was convicted on ex
parte official inquiry, might happen if the court inclined to put more credibility on the
initial out-of-court statements and ceased from investigating related evidence ex
officio.

Nonetheless, after the 2003 hearsay rule, especially for those out-of-court

statements provided in Articles 159-2 to 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code,
236

As the Court in Crawford noted: "The most notorious instances of civil-law examination occurred
in the great political trials of the 16th and 17th centuries. One such was the 1603 trial of Sir Walter
Raleigh for treason. Lord Cobham, Raleigh's alleged accomplice, had implicated him in an
examination before the Privy Council and in a letter. At Raleigh's trial, these were read to the jury.
Raleigh argued that Cobham had lied to save himself: 'Cobham is absolutely in the King's mercy; to
excuse me cannot avail him; by accusing me he may hope for favour.' Suspecting that Cobham
would recant, Raleigh demanded that the judges call him to appear, arguing that '[t]he Proof of the
Common Law is by witness and jury: let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my accuser before
my face .... ,'and, despite Raleigh's protestations that he was being tried 'by the Spanish Inquisition,'
the jury convicted, and Raleigh was sentenced to death. One of Raleigh's trial judges later lamented
that 'the justice of England has never been so degraded and injured as by the condemnation of Sir
Walter Raleigh."' See 124 S. Ct., at 1360.
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the court can no longer admit an out-of-court statement into evidence without
1,.

providing the defendant an opportunity to question the admissibility of it.

The

prosecutors thus must first prove these out-of-court statements to be reliable by a
preponderance of the evidence.

The defendant then has an opportunity to discredit

those out-of-court statements.

As a result, the 2003 legislation prevented the court

from relying too much on verbatim transcripts like that in the past.
institutional check on the inquisitorial power of the court.

It looks like an

In a sense it provides a

clear guide for dealing with some kinds of hearsay evidence in the ROC criminal
justice system.

5.4 The Scientific Expert Evidence
5.4.1 Introduction
The practice of expert evidence in the ROC criminal justice system is rather
inquisitorial.

As illustrated in Ms. Zhang's fraud case, 237 even the testimony from

an expert of parapsychology was admissible after the public prosecutor inquired into
the possibility of the defendant's extraordinary power.

In this Taipei High Court

case, the defense attorney did not challenge the witness's testimony.

The court

discharged the fraud offense merely because it was possible for the defendant to 'get

237

See 90 Sun E 2963.
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the drug out of nothing,' which would not result in guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nonetheless, neither the public prosecutor nor the court set out the standard or address
why parapsychology was accepted as scientific at trial.

Incredibly, no one in Taiwan

has challenged this inquisitorial practice as to expert evidence.

People seem to

accept the expert's testimony not only because he is not only the authoritative scholar
of this field but also because he is a well-known scientist and professor at the best
University in Taiwan. 238
Unlike this inquisitorial practice of expert evidence, the Federal Rules of
Evidence deal with this expert evidence issue in more detail.
the requirement of admissible expert testimony. 239
areas ofFRE 702 are broad. 240

FRE 702 provides for

In general, the acceptable subject

It allows the skilled witnesses qualified by

"knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education," including physicians, physicists,
bankers, landowners, and architects, to give expert testimony. 241

In a sense FRE 702

is "generous in its definition of an expert" which "opens the door quite wide to the

238

It is unclear whether the court would accept Professor Li's testimony if he was neither a Stanford
graduate nor an engineer professor at NTU.
239

It provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if ( 1)
the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts
of the case."
240

See L. Timothy Perrin, supra note 1138, 1395.

241

See Eric Ilhyung Lee, supra note 1141,613.
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receipt of expert testimony." 242

It is not difficult to be qualified as an expert; for

instance, a trial judge once said, "My rule of thumb test for whether or not a witness is
qualified as an expert is simple.

I hear the witness explain his experience, and if

there is an objection to the qualifications I would explain to the jury that under the
Federal Rules of Evidence an expert is any person who knows more about what he is
talking about than I do. " 243

Although FRE 702 only requires the expert testimony to

be helpful to the trier of fact, 244 Daubert held "Rule 702's 'helpfulness' standard
requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to
admissibility."245

It is unclear if Professor Li will be treated as an expert of the

so-called 'fringe' or 'junk' science.

Even an expert of parapsychology seems to be

allowed to testify at trial under FRE 702 and Kumho, however, opponents of expert
testimony, which they characterize as based on the so-called fringe or junk science
can argue against its admissibility in terms of its topic, the training of the proposed
expert, and the reliability of the expert's methods and application of those methods?46

In other words, an exclusionary ruling might result from the fact that this kind of
expert testimony based on fringe or junk science is not based on sufficient facts or
242

See Irving Younger, supra note 1142, 3.

243

See George C. Pratt, supra note 1133, 143.

244

See Michael C. McCarthy, supra note 1140,355.

245

See 509 U.S., at 592.

246

See Authur Best, supra note 1016, 173-4.

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

476

data, that it is not the product of reliable principles and methods, and that it is not
based on a reliable application of reliable principles to the facts of the case. 247
Through the Ms. Zhang's fraud case, it is not hard to find how an admissible
expert testimony under an inquisitorial approach might become inadmissible under an
accusatorial and adversarial process.

It is difficult to say, however, whether

admitting Professor Li's expert testimony at trial is right.

It is also difficult to

determine if the Taipei High Court's decision absolving Ms. Zhang of the fraud
offense is well-grounded.

While lay persons are not capable of resolving

complicated scientific issues in general, neither professional judges nor lay jurors
should be responsible for finding a "facf' based on evidence beyond their abilities.
As a result, with this understanding, the ROC lawmakers

~e

currently proposing a

legal draft resolving scientific issues by empanelling the court with scientific experts.
It is necessary for them to consider if this new proposed legal institution could work
more efficiently than either the civil-law-based inquisitorial approach or the
common-law-based accusatorial and adversarial procedure.

If the new proposed

legal institution cannot preclude the occurrence of the most significant defects in
either the inquisitorial or the accusatorial and adversarial process, then it is unwise
and unnecessary to adopt a fruitless and inefficient method to resolve scientific issues.

247

Id.
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In addition, if a more efficient and practicable approach could be found, the
lawmakers should also consider if it is more applicable in the ROC criminal justice
1,

system.

Of course, this study does not intend to conduct a thorough analysis
,I

between these legal institutions that resolve scientific issues.

This section just tries

to provide an unconsidered legal institution for the ROC lawmakers. 248

Before

examining the proposed draft of empanelling the court with scientific experts, this
study will explore the major defects of expert evidence in both inquisitorial and
accusatorial systems.

Understanding the defects of expert evidence in each

jurisdiction provides important information for better understanding the need for any
meaningful improvement in the ROC criminal justice system.

5 .4.2 Defects of Expert Evidence in the ROC and the United States Systems
While the expert evidence system is assumed to help the fact-finder reach "a fair
determination of the facts and fair adjudication of the disputed claims, " 249 the ROC
expert evidence system is much different from its counterpart in the United States.
Precisely speaking, there is not a real American styled expert evidence system in
Taiwan.

Articles 197 to 211 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code govern expert

248

It should be noted that this study does not suggest that the common-law-based accusatorial process
is better than the civil-law-based proceeding in deciding the scientific disputes.
249

See Eric Ilhyung Lee, supra note 1141, 620.
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Unlike the Federal Rules of Evidence addressing issues

including qualification of the expert witness and the scope, form, and basis of expert
testimony in the United States,250 the ROC provisions of expert evidence focus on
more procedural matters such as the method of appointment of an expert witness, the
procedure for challenging the appointment of an expert witness, 251 and when a
warrant is necessary during the process.

While Articles 206 and 208 of the ROC

Criminal Procedure Code allow the court to admit the expert's written report into
evidence at trial, they exist as hearsay exceptions to Paragraph 1 of Article 159 of the
ROC Criminal Procedure Code because of their nature as out-of-court statements.

In

a sense admitting an out-of-court scientific evidence in written form is a characteristic
of the civil law inquisitorial tradition.

This non-accusatorial and non-adversarial

tradition of the fact-finding process was initially designed to provide the court a
discretionary power to locate the material truth, especially when the defendant is not

250

In addition to FRE 702, FRE 703 provides: "The facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the "facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order
for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be
disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their
probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect." Moreover, FRE 704 provides: "(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b),
testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact (b) No expert witness testifying with
respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or
inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an
element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of
fact alone."
251

See Eric Ilhyung Lee, supra note 1141, 604.
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capable of doing so.

Nonetheless, when the court is not able to discover the truth ex

officio because of its lack of necessary scientific knowledge, this non-accusatorial
arrangement unavoidably becomes fruitless.

There is a serious problem when the

court knows almost nothing about the scientific dispute but is empowered to resolve
it.
Usually the prosecutor has already resolved the scientific issues by relying on the
expert's opinion before filing an indictment.

While there are very few experts

available in the ROC market, it is not easy for the defendants, especially for the rich
defendants, to find an expert who is capable of challenging the reliability and the
validity of the respective scientific evidence presented by government-hired experts.
According to Article 198 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code, only the court and the
public prosecutor are allowed to appoint experts who have the specialized knowledge
relating to the disputed issue or who are delegated by the government to be
responsible for resolving the claimed disputes.

In a sense the court-appointed expert

witness in Taiwan is regarded either as "an individual with advanced scholarship in a
particular field or discipline or as one holding an occupation requiring a certifiable or
licensed skill."252

He is viewed as either a man ofletters or a specialized

professional assumed to lend special or critical analysis helpful to the disputed

252

Id., at 605.
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Usually the ROC Judicial Yuan suggests that the courts locate experts from

the Academic or Research Institutes.
Yuan are regarded more reliable.

Those experts suggested by the ROC Judicial

When the court considers the disputed issue

warrants an expert's analysis, but the Judicial Yuan does not suggest any reliable
expert in the field, the court may ask the parties to nominate suitable expert witnesses
or find reliable ones ex officio.

The appointed expert has to take an oath before

resolving the claimed dispute under Article 202 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
If the defendant is not satisfied with the expert's opinion, it is up to the court's
discretionary power to determine whether to ask another expert witness to re-examine
the disputed issue. 254

The court has the exclusive power to decide which is more

reliable if there is a conflict of expert opinion. The parties are entitled to
cross-examine the expert witness if the court deems it helpful in finding the truth. 255

In practice, however, neither the prosecutor nor the defense lawyer in Taiwan has
enough scientific knowledge necessary to cross-examine expert when disputed issues

253

Id.

254

This discretionary power is a little similar to that in FRE 706 (a), providing: "The court may on its
own motion or on the motion of any party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should
not be appointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any
expert witnesses of its own selection. An expert witness shall not be appointed by the court unless the
witness consents to act A witness so appointed shall be informed of the witness' duties by the court
in writing, a copy of which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in which the parties shall
have opportunity to participate. A witness so appointed shall advise the parties of the witness'
findings, if any; the witness' deposition may be taken by any party; and the witness may be called to
testify by the court or any party. The witness shall be subject to cross-examination by each party,
including a party calling the witness."
255

See Paragraph 1 of Article 206 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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are complicated.

While the fact-fmder also has very little scientific knowledge

necessary to decide a scientific issue, adoption of any accusatorial process concerning
that issue is merely nominal adversarial and meaningless.

Scientific experts always

criticize the trial process for wasting their time at trial since no meaningful and core
questions will be presented by the parties and even th~ court often knows nothing
about the expert testimony.

Under these circumstances, the court usually prohibits

the parties from cross-examining the expert witness especially when the claimed
dispute is too complicated.

Similar to the German system, the expert witness in

Taiwan plays his role as a consultant to the court256 since his "conclusions and
testimony do not carry an aura ofinfallibility."257

In general, there are two major

defects in the ROC practice of expert evidence: the fact-finder is not capable of
resolving the disputed scientific or technical issue; the parties are not able to
cross-examine the expert witness when complicated issue is presented.

It seems

impossible for the fact-finders to make a fair and non-arbitrary decision if they are
insufficiently knowledgeable and intelligent to understand the disputed issues. 258

In

other words, "if discovering the truth is dependent upon understanding the issues, and

256

This practice derives from Germany; see Samuel R. Gross, supra note II 08, 1209.

257

See Eric Ilhyung Lee, supra note 1141, 610.

258

See Michael A. Fisher, The Legality of Expert Juries in Patent Litigation: Going for the Blue
Ribbon, 2 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. I, •46 (2001) .
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the person charged with the task of discovery cannot achieve this understanding, then
the person's conclusions cannot bear any relationship to the truth, beyond that which
is stumbled upon by sheer luck."

259

As a consequence, the court usually makes a

decision largely on the expert's professional opinions with little understanding of their
real meaning.
The current accusatorial expert evidence system in the United States is also
under criticism in terms of selecting and using expert witnesses. 260

Many s~holars

and researchers wonder if the federal evidentiary system of the United States is
conducive to realizing the objective ofFRE 702, which is assisting the trier of fact in
reaching a fair and objective decision. 261

Some observers even pointedly doubt

whether the Federal Rules of Evidence would undermine "the truth-finding, equal
access, and efficiency goals of adjudication." 262

In a way, expert testimony is

considered to be a disgraceful and weak link in the adversarial fact-finding process. 263
While the common law tradition encourages the parties to present expert testimony
for guiding the fact-finder, 264 the parties try their best to shop for experts who are

259

Id., at "'47.

260

See Tahirin V. Lee, Court-Appointed Experts and Judicial Reluctance: A Proposal to Amend Rule
706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 480,481 ( 1988) .
261

See Eric Ilhyung Lee, supra note 1141, 620.

262

See Tahirin V. Lee, supra note 1457, 484.

263

See Samuel R. Gross, supra note 1108, 1116.

264

See L. Timothy Perrin, supra note 1138, 1393.
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This practice indeed favors the rich

since only they can afford to pay for the best experts. 266

Expert witnesses ~ually

give partisan rather than objective testimonr 67 that they believe will not pass peer
review. 268

They are unrelentingly criticized as "mercenaries, prostitutes or hired

guns, witnesses devoid of principle who sell their opinions to the highest bidder."269
While experts are prone to "shade and overstate the certainty of their opinions, use
unreliable methodologies or rely on unproven theories, serve as conduits of
inadmissible evidence, and occasionally lie to serve their clients,"270 their testimony
is very likely to be misleading and truth-hiding. 271

In addition to these shortcomings

of expert shopping and its high cost,272 the current evidentiary system in the United

265

See Tahirin V. Lee, supra note 1457, 483.

266

See Richard A. Epstein, A New Regime for Expert Witnesses, 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 757, 759 ( 1992) .

267

In practice, ''they may either overtly conform their testimony to the need of the side that hired them
in order to earn a higher fee, or they may unconscionably develop a bias favoring their employers'
position as a result of a natural team-spirit mentality." See L. Timothy Perrin, supra note 113 8, 1415.
268

See Michael C. McCarthy, supra note 1140, 352.

269

See L. Timothy Perrin, supra note 1138, 1393.

270

See Eric Ilhyung Lee, supra note 1141, 622. Despite such harsh criticism, expert witnesses are
merely creatures of the lawyers who vilify them and of the judges who only passively maintain control
over their work and influence. Id., at 623.
271

As noted by Professor John H. Langbein, "At the American trial bar, those of us who serve as
expert witnesses are known as saxophones .... The idea is that the lawyer plays the tune, manipulating
the expert as though the expert were a musical instrument on which the lawyer sounds the desired
notes... I have experienced the subtle pressure to join the team- to shade one's views, to conceal
doubt, to overstate nuances, to downplay weak aspects of the case that one has been hired to bolster.
Nobody likes to disappoint a patron; and beyond this psychological pressure is the financial
inducement. Money changes hands upon the rendering of expertise, but the expert can run his meter
only so long as his patron litigator likes the tune." See John H. Langbein, supra note 1114, 835.
272

The high cost of witness preparation would eventually result in judicial inefficiency.

See L.
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States does not provide any meaningful resolution especially when "expert testimony
fails to cover issues for which the trier of fact expects to rely on expert witnesses." 273
Frankly, "the risk of non-production of expert evidence becomes serious in matters in
which courts are dependent on expert guidance for deciding material facts. " 274
Under the current federal evidential rules, expert witnesses are often led, or
coaxed by lawyers, to give directly opposing testimony on key issues. 275

Sometimes

a blizzard of expert testimony addresses all issues but for those the fact-finder may
deem necessary and relevant to the resolution of the case. 276

This practice results in

the trial process looking like a battle of the experts and indeed provides the fact-finder
little guidance in resolving the issues277 since neither lay jurors nor professional
judges are intimately familiar with the disputed scientific or technical issues.

As a

result, the accusatorial and adversarial approach in resolving scientific or technical
Timothy Perrin, supra note 113 8, 1418.
273

See Eric Ilhyung Lee, supra note 1141, 621.

274

See Tahirin V. Lee, supra note 1457, 485.

275

See Eric Ilhyung Lee, supra note 1141, 621.

276

For an example of such an 'evidentiary void' in the presentation of expert testimony, Professor
Tahirin V. Lee highlights the murder trial of Robert E. Chambers in 1988: "To help the jury determine
the existence of intent to murder the victim, one of the parties' medical experts testified that the blood
vessels in the eyes of the victim had burst, indicating extreme force applied to her neck during
strangulation. After this testimony, the jury asked the judge if an expert could testify as to the length
of the stranglehold that was necessary to burst the blood vessels. The jury considered that fact
relevant to its determination of intent The prosecution and defense then informed the judge that
neither counsel had asked its experts this question during deposition, nor had either counsel asked
experts to look into the matter... The judge simply informed the jury that no expert opinion would be
produced on the matter." See Tahirin V. Lee, supra note 1457, 486. See also Eric Ilhyung Lee, supra
note 1141,621.
277

See Eric Ilhyung Lee, supra note 1141,621.
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disputes unavoidably becomes merely nominal adversary and accusatory.

It is less

meaningful than that in resolving the non-scientific and non-technical disputes.
Reforms toward the use of neutral court-appointed expert witnesses have long
been discussed.2 78
nature.

Interestingly, these proposed reforms look more inquisitorial in

This curious feature might "require major changes in adversarial

procedures." 279

Nonetheless, this does not necessarily resolve the problem of the

fact-finder knowing little about the disputed issue.280

Even if the expert witnesses

are not shopped from the market, it is not easy for the lay fact-finder to assess whether
1

the respective expert testimony is correct.

Moreover, while the parties govern the

accusatorial and adversarial fact-finding process, it is also difficult for the lawyers to
predict and present what the fact-finder deems relevant and necessary to the disputed
issues.

Although there has been some experimentation with expert witness panels

278

In fact, "The most frequently proposed reform is the use of neutral, court-appointed expert
witnesses. In addition, there have been proposals to amend the substantive rules of evidence
concerning the presentation of expert testimony. Some commentators emphasize the need for the
accountability of expert witnesses through, inter alia, peer review. In one state, court rules limit the
number of expert witnesses and the length of their depositions. One commentator's proposed reform
includes 'a call to lawyers to take the higher ground by ending the misuse and abuse of experts."' Id.,
at 623-4.
279

For example, "Professor Samuel Gross is the author of perhaps the single most comprehensive and
concise work on the subject of expert evidence in U.S. courts. He discusses the need for fundamental
reforms in the expert evidence process and the relative merits of different proposals. Professor Gross
acknowledges that some of the proposed measures require major changes in adversarial procedures.
If implemented, these proposals would 'challenge the basic premises of our adversarial method.'
Nevertheless, serious attempts to reform the current system require consideration of all options.
Specifically, Professor Gross' proposals include: (1) using neutral court-appointed experts, either
exclusively or in addition to those retained by the parties; (2) eliminating juries; and (3) presenting
expert testimony primarily by written reports." Id., at 625. See also Samuel R. Gross, supra note
ll08, 1208-20.
280

This is similar to the ROC practice where the fact-finder also knows little about the scientific or
technical issue.

I
i
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and proposals for rule changes, reforms have been slow. 281

Since some observers

even doubt whether the proposed reforms would "do more harm than good," the
evidentiary system in the United States seems reluctant to change. 282

To be true, the

adversarial system "continues on with all its flaws and remains a much criticized part
of the litigation process in the United States." 283

While the expert evidence system

in the United States is also troubled with the problem that the lay fact-finder finds
difficulty in deciding the scientific or technical disputes, it is not a good idea for
Taiwan to adopt a troublesome American expert evidence system.

To resolve this

fact-finding problem, the ROC lawmakers propose to empanel the court composed by
both professional judges and the participating non-professional expert judges.

This

draft is pending now.

5.4.3 The Proposed Draft of the Act of Experimentally Empanelling the Court with
the Participating Non-Professional Expert Judges
In order to avoid problems resulting from lay participation in resolving scientific
or technical issues, the ROC lawmakers draft a new Act, the Draft of the Act of
Experimentally Empanelling the Court with the Participating Non-Professional Expert
281

See Eric Ilhyung Lee, supra note 1141, 624.

282

Id.

283

Id.
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Judges, to empanel the court with both professional judges and the participating
non-professional expert judges who have necessary knowledge for determining the
disputed issues.

According to Article 1 of the Draft, it is proposed to improve the

efficiency and accuracy of the fact-finding process.

The Participating Court

composed of both professional judges and the participating non-professional expert
judges is assumed to be the fact-fmder. 284
are not professional judges.

In general, the participating expert judges

They serve this position for no remuneration. 285

The

Participating Court is not applicable to all civil, criminal, and administrative
disputes-- except what the law allows. 286

Under Paragraph 1 of Article 6 of the Draft,

only public prosecution of some provided offenses, including disputes on medical
I

malpractice, traffic accident, copyrights, trademark, and exchange securities, is

I

. I
;

subject to this fact-finding proceeding.

The ROC Judicial Yuan has to appoint the

participating non-professional expert judges who must have more than three years of
working experience with the respective "scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge. "

287

The Participating Court is composed of either three professional

judges and two non-professional experts, or two professional judges and three

284

See Article 2 of the Draft.

285

See Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Draft.

286

See Paragraph 1 of Article 5, Paragraph 1 of Article 6 and Paragraph 1 of Article 7 of the Draft.

287

See FRE 702.

I
I
I
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non-professional experts. 288

488

Like professional judges, the participating

non-professional expert judges are also allowed to ask questions ex officio at trial. 289
The participating non-professional expert judges have to express their professional
scientific or technical opinions before professional judges during deliberation.Z90
The professional judges are still responsible for making the written judgment for the
majority291 while the dissenting opinion can be submitted in three days. 292

If the

Participating Court is empanelled upon the defendant's application, the defendant is
not allowed to appeal unless provided by law.Z93

In sum, under this Draft, the

participating non-professional expert judges are deemed expert consultants assisting
professional judges in deciding complicated scientific or technical disputes.
There are still problems with this proposed Draft.
comes from lay participation in the fact-finding process.

The most serious problem
For example, while

Paragraph 1 of Article 34 of the Draft requires professional judges to justify the
Participating Court's decision in writing, it goes back to the unresolved problem that
lay judges are not suitable for deciding complicated scientific and technical issues.

288

See Paragraph 1 of Article 20 of the Draft.

289

See Paragraph 2 of Article 25 of the Draft.

290

See Article 31 of the Draft.

291

The judgment should be signed by all members of the panel.

292

See Article 34 of the Draft.

293

See Paragraph I of Article 36 of the Draft.
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Although the participating non-professional expert judges may provide the
professional judges important information about the disputed issues, it is questionable
how the professional lay judges can be responsible for a written professional
judgment since they still do not know the nature of the disputes.

Similarly, if a

written judgment is dependent upon understanding the issues, and the person charged
with the task of justifying the majority opinion in writing cannot attain this
understanding, then the written judgment "cannot bear any relationship to the truth,
beyond that which is stumbled upon by sheer luck."

294

A worse situation will

emerge when the professional judges dissent with the majority expert judges'
decision.295

Moreover, when expert opinions are divided, professional judges will

have difficulty deciding which side is more reliable.

These results are similar to the

current practice when there are more than two expert opinions in conflict.
In a sense the professional judges still have to largely draw upon the expert
judges' opinions to justify their decision in writing.

The fact-finding process

provided in the new Draft will be almost identical to the current practice in Taiwan
where the court is allowed to exercise its inquisitorial power to retain reliable experts
to assist the court in deciding the material truth.

294

295

The only difference between the

See Michael A. Fisher, supra note 1455, *47.

This will happen when the Participating Court is composed oftwo professional judges and three
expert judges.
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current practice and the proposed draft seems to be that the experts gain their
positions as judges.

Nonetheless, the cost will be much higher than the current

practice because the court only has to inquisitorially retain expert opinions but the
proposed draft also asks the court to maintain the system of non-professional expert
judges who will review expert witnesses' testimony at trial.

This change will not

thoroughly save the professional judges from the current unresolved defects: lay
professional judges have to make a written decision reasonably justifying how to
resolve disputed scientific and technical issues.

Although the Draft improves the

fact-finding process in deciding the scientific or technical issues, it does not correct
the traditional defects existing in current practice.

It is unreasonable to expect lay

fact-finders with very little scientific or mathematical background to learn the
disputed subject matter during the course of trial which usually requires years of study
by a highly select set of full-time students.296

This study does not suggest passing

this Draft because it is not reasonable to adopt a new institution with merely little
improvement.

Improving the current expert evidence system should be done by

other methods.

5.4.4 The Recommended Blue Ribbon Expert Jury

296

See Michael A. Fisher, supra note 1455, *52.

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

491

While the major concern in dealing with expert evidence focuses on lay
participation in deciding scientific or technical disputed issues beyond the
professional judges' knowledge, how to prevent it deserves more attention.

To be

sure, as technologies become more and more complex, it is more and more difficult
for lay fact-finders to comprehend the scientific and technical issues in finding the
material truth.

Even though the court can inquisitorially call upon expert witnesses

for facilitating comprehension, there are still many disputed issues far beyond the
training and intelligence of the fact-finder which results in rational fact-finding to be
almost impossible. 297

Only after the fact-finders are sufficiently able to understand

the disputed issues will they not "subject the parties to the arbitrary decisions that
must necessarily result in."298

Thus, it is recommendable, if possible, to equip the

fact-finders with sufficient and necessary knowledge that will enable them to
understand the disputed scientific or technical issues.

While the United States

Supreme Court in Peters v. Kiff required the jurors to be sane and competent during
trial, 299 "Due Process requires at least a minimum level of rationality in the
adjudication process." 300

It seems probable that incompetent lay jurors could result

297

Id., at *1.

298

Id., at * 46.

299

See 407 U.S. 493,501 (1972) .

300

See Michael A. Fisher, supra note 1455, *47.
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in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since they are
insufficiently knowledgeable and intelligent to see what is under dispute.

Only

when the fact-finders are able to comprehend the technology at issue can their
decision-making be any more rational than that of an insane fact-finder. 301
In a sense lay fact-finders are incompetent to determine highly complex issues of
fact or law. 302

Lay jurors are prone to be "overwhelmed, frustrated and confused by

testimony well beyond their comprehension."303

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger of

the United States Supreme Court once "criticized lay jurors for their inability to
understand issues and evidence in technically complex cases. " 304

As a consequence,

the use of 'blue ribbon jury' or 'expert jury' has long been proposed in the United
States "as a way to restore fairness to the process and reduce the arbitrariness of
result." 305

In general, the blue ribbon jury consists of"scientifically sophisticated

members who comprehend technologically complex concepts."306

The blue ribbon

jury may be empanelled to decide disputes involving medical, economic, or scientific

3o1

Id.

302

See Michael Sales & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by
Heuristics, 15 Law & Soc. Rev. 123, 149 (1980) .

303

See Arthur Austin, The Jury System at Risk from Complexity, the New Media, and Deviancy, 73
Denv. U. L. Rev. 51, 54 (1995) .
304

See LeRoy Kondo, Untangling the Tangled Web: Federal Court Reform Through Specialization for
Internet Law and Other High Technology Cases, 2002 UCLA J. L. Tech. 1 ( 2002) .
305

See Michael A. Fisher, supra note 1455, •2.

306

See LeRoy Kondo, supra note 1501.
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Jurors of the blue ribbon jury are selected from "a pool of individuals

who possess the appropriate educational background, professional training, or other
pertinent experience to render informed opinions on complex matters," instead of
being chosen from "a social cross-section reflected in voter registration or drivers'
license lists, tax records, or telephone directories." 308

As suggested, a blue ribbon

expert jury might be "the only realistic way" in deciding highly complicated scientific
and technical disputes. 309
In fact, the use of expert juries as a method of resolving complex factual issues
has had a long history in common law. 310

It can be traced back to the fourteenth

century311 when trade disputes were sometimes heard by a jury ofspecialists. 312

For

instance, because merchants were considered to "have better knowledge of the matters

in difference which were to be tryed[sic] than others could," in 1645 "the King's
Bench used a jury or merchants to try a mercantile issue."313

The practice of

307

See Graham C. Lilly, Article: The Decline of the American Jury, 72 U. Colo. L. Rev. 53, 85( 2001 ).

308

See LeRoy Kondo, supra note 1501.

309

See Michael A. Fisher, supra note 1455, •2.

310

Id., at •11.

311

See Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 Harv. L.
Rev. 40,42 ( 1902) .

312

313

See Michael A. Fisher, supra note 1455, •1s.

Id. Moreover, Lord Mansfield often empanelled a jury of merchants to try mercantile cases. See
J. H. Neuscher, Use of Experts by the Courts, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1109 ( 1941). At least in 1815 a
Massachusetts federal court used a special jury to try a mercantile case. See Peisch y. Dickson. 19 F.
Cas. 123 (Mass., 1815) .
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empanelling special juries in an estate case was also early prevalent in
Massachusetts.

314

A former New York statute even "authorized a trial court to grant

a motion for a special jury in any criminal or civil case which was sufficiently
important, intricate, or widely publicized to warrant such ajury."

315

The United

States Supreme Court also upheld the use of these special juries in Fay v. New
York316 and Alexander v. Louisiana. 317

According to Taylor v. Louisiana, 318

empanelling the blue ribbon jury would not necessarily violate "the requirement that a
jury should represent a fair cross section of the community."319

In addition, the use

of the blue ribbon jury system has held constitutional in the circuits. 320

Arguably,

the United States military courts serve as blue ribbon juries since the military court
members are "best qualified for the duty by reason of age, education, training,

314

See Harvey v. Richards, 11 F. Cas. 746 (Mass., 1815) .

315

This New York statute was repealed in 1978. Besides, "In the mid-1960s, New Jersey employed a
grand jury selection system which favored highly educated jurors. Delaware currently has a statute
authorizing a court to grant a request for a special jury in any 'complex' civil case. Such juries can be
subject to specific requirements of intelligence, education, or occupation. The decision of whether to
grant a special jury request is left to the discretion of the trial judge. In Colorado, for certain water
drainage district cases, a statute mandates the use of special juries of landowners knowledgeable about
farm drainage." See Michael A. Fisher, supra note 1455, •25.
316

It held New York's use of blue ribbon juries for select cases to be constitutional.
296 ( 1947) .

317

See 405 U.S. 625 ( 1972) .

318

See419U.S.522 (1975).

319

See LeRoy Kondo, supra note 1501.

no Id.

See 332 U.S. 261,
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experience, length of service, and judicial temperament" according to 10 U.S.C. 825
(d) (2). 321

Even in criminal cases the state's use of blue ribbon jury would not

necessarily violate both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause since
a "mere showing that a class was not represented in a particular jury is not enough" to
prove discrimination. 322

More importantly, neither the accused's Sixth Amendment

right to an impartial jury nor his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and
equal protection would automatically be violated by the use of a blue ribbonjury. 323
Under Fay, experimental use of blue ribbon juries in resolving complex disputes in
both federal and state levels has increased. 324

The evolution of blue ribbon jury in

the United States may provide the ROC lawmakers a whole new idea about how to
decide highly complex scientific and technical issues. 325
Unlike the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, the ROC
Constitution does not provide the right to trial by jury.
will result from adoption of the blue ribbon jury system.

No violation of Constitution
On the contrary, adoption

321

See United States v. Simoy. 46 M. J. 592, 606 ( 1996). In other words, those experienced military
officers are appropriate members of the special jury. See United States v. Moore, 26M. J. 692
(1988) .
322

See Jackson v. Follette, 332 F. Supp. 872, 876 (S. D. N. Y. 1971) .

323

See United States ex rei. Fein v. Deegan, 298 F. Supp. 359, 366 ( S. D. N. Y. 1967) .

324

This involves "intellectual property, toxic tort, product liability, or other technically complex
arenas." See LeRoy Kondo, supra note 1501.
325

In fact, no one has introduced the blue ribbon jury system in Taiwan. In other words, this legal
system has never been considered by the ROC lawmakers.
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of the blue ribbon jury will result in an important advantage: no defect derives from
the professional judges' inability to understand the disputed scientific or technical
issues.

The fact-finding process will be "stumbled upon by sheer luck."326

As a

result, adoption of this fact-finding institution will correct the current major defect in
the ROC criminal justice system.

While the ROC criminal justice system is

currently trying to selectively incorporate accusatorial and adversarial elements into
its trial system, adopting the blue ribbon expert jury just fits this trend.

The ROC

lawmakers should take this institution into serious consideration as a better solution
for the current expert evidence system.

5.4.5 Legal Education in Taiwan
In addition to the lack of a complete set of evidential rules of expert opinions,
legal education is itself an important factor resulting in fruitless expert evidence
practice in Taiwan.

In general, if judges and lawyers know nothing about the

disputed scientific and technical issues, it is almost impossible for them to make any
meaningful decision.

Moreover, if the ROC legal professionals are not capable of

questioning expert witnesses, any consideration of scientific evidence law will not
remedy the currently existing defects in the expert evidence system.

326

See Michael A. Fisher, supra note 1455, *47.
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To those familiar with legal education in the United States, the Taiwanese system
of legal education may need some explanation. 327

Like most continental legal

systems, law is primarily an undergraduate study in Taiwan. 328

Unlike the J.D.

degree in the United States, the flrst law degree in Taiwan, the LL. B., is usually an
undergraduate degree.329

People usually began their legal education after graduating

from senior high school.

As a result, 'departments of law' within Taiwanese

universities, which are 'schools of law,' primarily provide basic legal education.
Besides, higher law degrees such as 'Master of Laws' and 'Ph. D. in Law' are also
provided by a few law graduate institutes and the departments oflaw. 330

Generally

speaking, undergraduate legal education is aimed at providing basic training for legal
professionals and facilitating the development of state and society. 331

While law

students are generally composed of high school graduates, they hold little information
and knowledge about natural science.
fleld of natural science.

Rarely do law students take classes in any

Since the bar passing rate has long been low, around 3% to

8%, the most important concern for Taiwanese law students is to pass the bar.
327

See NCCU law school, Taiwan's Legal Education System, available at:
hm>://justice.nccu.edu.tw/verE/Emain.html (last visited, Feb 25th, 2005) .
321

See NTU law school, Legal Education in Taiwan, available at:
h!tJ>://www.Iaw.ntu.edu.tw/engljsb/admission/02llb.htm (last visited, Feb lSih, 2005) .

329

Id.

33o

Id.

331

Id.

This
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background probably explains why most legal professionals are not capable of
questioning scientific or technical expert witnesses.
Beginning inl991, legal education started to change.

Soochou University

Department of Law began to offer a new postgraduate program, a master of laws
program, for non-law graduates.
program in the United States.

1bis new master program is very similar to the J.D

While there were very few non-law graduates

attending the LL.B. program, the master level of legal studies attracts many non-law
graduates.

More and more non-law graduates join this master program after

encountering legal problems in their own professional fields.

In reality, many

medical doctors, accountants, architects, and scientists in other fields pursue this
masters degree.

Since the candidates hold degrees other than law, this program is

focusing on "Interdisciplinary Legal Studies."

After Soochou University

Department of Law had successfully trained double-background lawyers,332 other
universities followed its lead.

1bis post-graduate master oflaws program is

designed for adapting jurisprudence to the new pluralistic century by breaking
through the barriers of traditional legal education, responding to social demand, and
attracting people from diverse realms to make contributions to the development of

332

In fact, the market prefers those double-background lawyers.
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legal study. 333
Although the traditionally trained judges and lawyers might not sufficiently
erudite concerning the disputed scientific or technical issues, these
double-background lawyers are. 334

They will conduct meaningful

cross-examinations for assisting the fact-finders in deciding highly disputed scientific
or technical issues.

When the market is full of capable lawyers with

double-backgrounds, the recommended blue ribbon expert jury would be better than
the proposed Draft since the latter still includes lay fact-finders who are generally
incapable of understanding and deciding the disputed issues.

5.5 Other Significant Elements Unfavorable an Accusatorial Trial Process in the ROC
5.5.1 Introduction
The legal systems of the Republic of China on Taiwan and the United States both
reflect their separate histories as imperial colonies. 335

It is interesting, however, why

the colonial historical background did not produce similar criminal justice practices in
both areas.

On the contrary, the ROC criminal justice system before 2003 was

333

See NTU law school, Legal Education in Taiwan: Graduate Institute of Interdisciplinary Legal
Studies, available at: http://www.law.ntu.edu.tw/english/admission/02llm ohd.htm (last visited, Feb
15th, 2005) .
334

Probably because of the economic concern, rarely do those double-background lawyers choose to
become professional judges. As a result, only lawyers are expected to be double-background.

335

See Eric Ilhyung Lee, supra note 1141, 631.

~·
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Although the 2003

legislation adopts some accusatorial elements into the ROC Criminal Procedure Code,
it seems impossible to build a pure accusatorial criminal justice system in Taiwan.
As analyzed supra, even the practices of the exclusionary rule and the hearsay rule
retain their inquisitorial features which are not identical to their counterparts in the
United States.

It is meaningful to find out if other elements in the ROC criminal

justice system result in its inquisitorial practice in nature.

Of course, even though it

is almost impossible to build a pure inquisitorial criminal justice system in Taiwan
without fully abandoning its civil law tradition; it is still possible and desirable to
replace many of the out-of-date and fruitless inquisitorial institutions for more
efficient and proper accusatorial substitutes.
In this section, this study will attempt to locate inquisitorial elements in the ROC
criminal justice system that works against establishing an accusatorial trial process.
Moreover, this study will also discuss which of these might be replaced by
accusatorial elements.

Nonetheless, instead of assessing the possibility of

successfully transplanting a respective accusatorial element in a civil-law-based
jurisdiction, this study only aims to identify which of these inquisitorial elements
within the current ROC Criminal Procedural Code might be modified.

In other

words, this section merely tries to justify why a pure accusatorial criminal justice
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It does not include all necessary viewpoints since

there are still many undiscovered factors. 336

5.5.2 Cultural Legacy
As mentioned supra, Roman law and common law heavily influenced the
criminal justice system in the United States.

Secular political powers, furthermore,

were subject to the sacred power in the medieval era, because the Church also played
an important role in shaping the accusatorial and adversarial criminal procedure. 337

In contrast, situations in China were much different.

In reality, there was no

religious authority governing the imperial power, although Buddhism and Daoism
( Taoism ) had long been the most popular religions throughout Chinese history. 338
Instead of religious domination, Confucianism has greatly formed the thought of
Chinese society, including its ethics, its political theory, 339 and the ways in which

336

Truly, any subsection ofthis section is worthy of a more thorough comparative study.

337

Foe example, the Fourth Lateran Council of the Roman Catholic Church and Pope Innocent III
( 1198-1216) forbade the priests and banned the clergy from participating in the administration of
ordeals without providing appropriate judicial solutions replacing the ordeal. The Pope also
transformed cannon or church law into an inquisitorial system in order to protect the faith from heretics.
See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 12. See also Leonard W. Levy, supra note 321, 212.
With the Court expanding its criminal jurisdiction to difficult or troublesome cases, its power has
grown considerably since it adopted methods more commonly used on the Continent stemming from
the reforms of Pope Innocent III. See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 77. Moreover, despite
assuring the right to a fair proceeding, and that Pope Innocent III directed that the names and
statements of accusing witnesses were to be furnished to an inquisitional defendant, the question of
whether a defendant had the right actually to see the accusing witnesses was not address. See Frank R.
Herrmann, supra note 790, 525.
338

See W. Scott Morton, supra note 60, 29-44.

339

Id., at 33.
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disputes have been resolved in traditional China. 340 Under Confucianism, the
ancient Chinese viewed bringing a lawsuit as the last resort. 341

An old maxim might

properly reflect this traditional perspective: "It is better to die of starvation than to
become a thief; it is better to be vexed to death than to bring a lawsuit."342 This
belief has resulted in "the traditional preference for dispute resolution outside a legal
court structure. "343

As a result, law did not play an important role in Chinese society

since "the emphasis was on prevention and peaceful resolution of disputes."344
There was not an independent judicial branch in the traditional Chinese
government.

Officials in charge of resolving disputes were not modem judges

because they also had to administrate local affairs.
disputes were rather flexible. 345

Procedures employed to resolve

While dispute resolution was often deemed an

opportunity "to teach the disputants the importance of keeping good relationships
with others," officials could elect to not hear the case if they thought it was
meaningless 346 and not necessary in maintaining social harmony. 347

340

See Bobby K. Y. Wong, supra note 61, *1.

341

Id.

In other words,

342

See Jerome A. Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 1201,
1201 ( 1966) .

343

See Robert F. Utter, Dispute Resolution in China, 62 Wash. L. Rev. 383, 384 ( 1987) .

344

See Bobby K. Y. Wong, supra note 61, *1.

34

s See Bobby K. Y. Wong, supra note 61, *2.

346

Id., at *3.
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solving the claimed dispute itself was never the official's main concem. 348

Because

the main purpose of hearing the case was to maintain group harmony and social order,
the officials must know what happened.

In order to find the truth, officials were not

bound by the parties' presentation of evidence.

The inquisitorial approach was

adopted to assist them in revealing the truth; they were allowed to use torture and
tricks to uncover the facts. 349

In general, tricks were not mere manifestation of the

wits of officials; the prevalent praise of discovering the truth significantly influenced
traditional culture,350 which encouraged them to employ more inquisitorial
approaches.

While the traditional dispute-resolving method focused mainly on

group harmony and peaceful social order, it was important to "get the defendant to
repent and see the error of his ways." 351

347

See Robert F. Utter, supra note 1540, 385.

348

See Bobby K. Y. Wong, supra note 61, *2.

349

Moreover, since confession was deemed to

As reported, "Many officials in traditional China took the King Solomon approach. The following
is an example taken from the Han dynasty.
It is a dispute over ownership of some cloth. After
hearing what the disputants (A and B) and other witnesses said, the official could not decide whether A
or B was the true owner. The cloth had been used as an umbrella by both of them and there was, other
than the statements of A and B, no evidence to prove ownership. The official then accused the
disputants of bothering him with this trifling case in which only cloth of very low value was involved.
To solve the problem, he ordered that the cloth should be cut into two equal parts and each man got one.
After A and B left with the cloth, he sent runners to follow them and see what their responses to his
order would be. He was told that A was wholly satisfied with the decision and B complained that it
was wrong. Knowing that, he ordered the runners to bring back A and B. Upon interrogation, A
finally admitted that he was not the owner. As revealed, the fact was that it started to rain when B was
taking the cloth to the market for sale. B used the cloth as an umbrella and allowed A to get shelter
under the cloth. Later, A wanted to take the cloth out of momentary greed." Id., at *4.
3

so Id., at *5.

m See Wikipedia, supra note 65.

l

I
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be the best way for the defendant to repent of his previous wrong doings, "the use of
torture, in order to extract the necessary confession,"352 was adopted as an efficient
and necessary approach in discovering the truth.

Since people had tolerated this

inquisitorial fact-finding and dispute-resolving process for centuries, the idea of due
process was totally unknown in traditional Chinese society. 353

As a result,

Confucianism and its accompanying dispute-resolving philosophy remained dominant
in the ROC criminal justice system.

Not until the last decade of the twentieth

century did the traditional inquisitorial approach in the ROC criminal justice system
change.

In other words, Confucianism might partly explain why the ROC criminal

justice practices during 1945 to 1987 looked so inquisitorial, and as one consequence,
not very human rights friendly.

5.5.3 For the Protection of Public Interests, National Security, and Social Order
In addition to the influence under the traditional philosophy of Confucianism, the
long-term unstable societal and political circumstances of the ROC also provided the
bases for adopting an inquisitorial criminal justice system.

It is generally accepted

that an inquisitorial approach of the fact-finding process is much more efficient than

352

Id.

353

See Bobby K. Y. Wong, supra note 61, •2.
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an accusatorial and adversarial method since the latter provides the parties legal
positions to present and argue the admissibility and credibility of evidence. 354

This

inquisitorial advantage allows the government to suppress any form of illegality
without a lawyer's "undue interference."

Historical events support this assertion.

,,
I
I

For example, when a great wave of crime, causing social unrest had been gathering
momentum in southern England near the end of the seventeenth century,355 in 1692,
the English Parliament established a thief catcher system for the apprehension of a
specified class of felons. 356

Because the trial process then was neither adversarial

nor accusatorial, 357 it is possible that the thief catcher system was initially adopted to
maintain social order by inquisitorially prosecuting and convicting the defendants.

In addition, the quasi-military criminal practice of the Courts ofVice-Admiralty358 m
the 1760s was also used to inquisitorially prosecute cases of smuggling and tax
evasion. 359

354

See Renee Lettow Lerner, supra note 1356, 820.

355

See Gerald Howson, supra note 393, 3.

356

The system focused on highway robbers and offered the very considerable sum of£ 40 for their
capture and conviction. This piece of legislation was followed over the next half century by a series
of similar measures concerning burglars, horse thieves, coiners and a host of others. See Stephan
Landsman, supra note 304, 573.
351

See John H. Langbein, supra note 402, 314.

358

It was a civil-law tribunal established seventy-five years earlier to enforce imperial trade regulation.
See David J. Bodenhamer, supra note 327, 33.

359

See Ellen Hochstedler Steury, supra note 300, 86. Besides, Sir William Pitt once eloquently
asserted: "The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the Crown. It may be
frail --- its roof may shake -- the wind may blow through it -- the storm may enter -- the rain may
enter --- but the King of England cannot enter; all his forces dare not cross the threshold of that ruined

I
I

I

i
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This inquisitorial power for securing national security instead of maintaining
social order or improving public interests has long been exercised by the United
States.

In addition to expanding the substantive scope of criminal prohibition to

achieve preventive law enforcement, the exploitation of administrative procedures has
usually been the most insidious and common approach to avoid the rigors of the
criminal process altogether.

360

It is proven that administrative processes have been

highly effective in chilling activity of which the government disapproves since "they
can be applied without affording their targets the rights of a criminal defendant." 361
In reality, this approach often results in widespread abuse. 362

For instance, the

Enemy Alien Act of 1798, an administrative mechanism for preventive law
enforcement, authorizes the United States President "during a declared war to lock up,
deport, or otherwise restrict the liability of any person over fourteen years of age who
is a citizen of the country with which we are at war." 363

Under this Act, it is not

tenement." In fact, this assertion was under a belief that the decision to issue a warrant was a judicial
instead of an executive act. See Jacob W. Landynski, supra note 430,28.
360

In general, the most effective way to "authorize preventive law enforcement is to redefine liability
broadly so that authorities can sweep up large numbers of people without having to prove that
individuals have engaged in specific harmful conduct." See David Cole, The New McCathyism:
Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 Harv. Civil Rights-Civil Liberties L. Rev. 1, 3, 15
(2003) .
361

Id., at 15.

362

Id.

363

In fact, "Presidents invoked the Enemy Alien Act during the War of 1812, World War I, and World
War ll to regulate the activities of all 'enemy aliens' and to detain and deport some of them. Since the
law requires a formally declared war, it has not been used since World War II." ld.
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mandatory to provide the detainees hearings and lawyers. 364

The government has to

prove nothing but the mere fact of enemy citizenship before any engagement in
preventive detention. 365

In World War II, the government extended the rationale, for

detaining all possible and potential enemy aliens, "to intern some 110,000
persons--70,000 of whom were U.S. citizens--solely for their Japanese descent,
without any individualized hearings or trials." 366

Obviously, the process under the

Enemy Alien Act has been rather inquisitorial.
Immigration laws are often relied upon by the government to detain foreigners
"in times of crisis that do not reach the level of a formally declared war." 367

During

the Palmer Raids of the winter of 1919-1920, the government "arrested between four
thousand and ten thousand individuals, many without any warrant, conducted illegal
searches and seizures in doing so, detained many in overcrowded and unsanitary
conditions, and interrogated them without counsel."368

364

Id.

36s

Id.

While the United States

366

Although the United States government formally apologized for that action and paid reparations to
survivors, the temptation to use administrative processes for preventive detention continues. Id., at
16.
367

For example, "The most infamous example of the use of immigration authority for preventive
detention purposes was the Palmer Raids of the winter of 1919-1920.... The government responded
by mounting a mass nationwide roundup of foreign nationals, not for their role in the bombings, but for
their political associations with the Communist Party, the Communist Labor Party, and the Union of
Russian Workers. The raids focused on foreign nationals because, lacking a peacetime sedition law,
the immigration laws were the only authorization for targeting individuals for their politics." Id.
36s

Id.
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Supreme Court has long held that "deportation is not punishment and that, therefore,
the rights attaching to criminal trials do not automatically extend to deportation
hearings,"369 foreigners actually have no constitutional right to claim an adversarial
and accusatorial deportation proceeding.
After World War II, in 1948 the Justice Department adopted "the Portfolio" for
interning dangerous persons who would have no right to seek judicial review. 370

In

1950, Congress passed Title II of the Internal Security Acf 71 which authorized
"detention without arraignment before a judge, the possibility of bail, or a jury
trial."372

During the Cold War, the Smith Act, incriminating subversive speech and

association not through the criminal process but by loyalty review procedures and
congressional committee hearings, employed an inquisitorial method "to inflict a kind
of guilt by association while denying its targets critical criminal protections, such as
the presumption of innocence and the right to confront the prosecution's evidence."

369

373

As described, "Aliens in deportation proceedings have no constitutional right to a lawyer and have
a statutory right to a lawyer only if they can find and afford one. They have no constitutional right to
a presumption of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt, to a jury trial, or to witness confrontation.
The Supreme Court has insisted that aliens living in the United States have a due process right to a
fundamentally fair hearing, but the contours of that right have not been clearly articulated. The rules
of evidence do not apply. The government asserts the right not only to rely on hearsay but also to
deport, detain, and deny immigration benefits to noncitizens on the basis of secret evidence presented
in camera and ex parte to the judge, so that neither the noncitizen nor his attorney has any right to
confront or rebut it." Id., at 17-8.
370

Id., at 18.

371

Id.

372

See Richard Longaker, Emergency Detention: The Generation Gap 1950-71, 27 W. Pol. Q. 395,
402 ( 1974) .
373

See David Cole, supra note 1557,20.
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As a result, "the use of congressional committees and administrative tribunals for
political control during the Cold War"374 was non-accusatorial and non-adversarial in
nature since the accused would be "indicted and tried and sentenced by congressional
committee or administrative tribunal, with the same men acting as prosecutors, judges,
and jury."37S
Today, in the war on terrorism, the government once again applies administrative
process to seeking preventive justice.376

The United States Congress passed the

Authorization for Use of Military Force authorizing "the President to use 'all
necessary and appropriate force against 'nations, organizations, or persons' associated
with the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks."377

The war on terrorism resulted in

"the indefinite and virtually incommunicado detention of foreign nationals and U.S.
citizens alike as 'enemy combatants. "'378

The government invokes "military

authority" instead of ordinary criminal procedure to detain anyone whom the
President labels an "enemy combatant."379

374

In practice, "the government maintains

Id., at 22.

375

See Alan Barth, The Loyalty of Free Men, 11 (1951) . For more information about the American
inquisition during the Cold War, see Stanley I. Kutler, The American Inquisition( McGraw-Hill, 1982 );
Griffin Fariello, Red Scare: Memories of the American Inquisition (New York Avon Books, 1995) .
376

See David Cole, supra note 1557, 22.

377

See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. 124 S. Ct2633, 2640 (2004) .

378

See David Cole, supra note 1557, 22.

379

Id., at 23.
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that it may detain foreign nationals and U.S. citizens aljke indefinitely, without a
hearing, without access to a lawyer, and without judicial review, simply on the
President's say-so."380

Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court already held

the United States courts should have jurisdiction to hear "habeas corpus challenges to
the legality of their detention at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base" in Rasul v.
Bush. 381

Furthermore, the Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld also recognized the detained

citizen's right to present evidence showing that he was not an enemy combatant. 382
Whether these inquisitorial administrative proceedings adopted in the war on.
terrorism will pass judicial review remains to be observed in the coming future.
With these inquisitorial experiences in both England and the United States, it
seems common for the government to adopt a more effective and efficient
inquisitorial proceeding under unstable societal and political situations.

Ironically,

even the common law countries have adopted some significant inquisitorial
institutions while their ordinary criminal practices are purely accusatorial and
adversarial.

These inquisitorial practices in the common law jurisdictions may

3so

Id.

381

See 124 S Ct. 2686, 2698 ( 2004) .

382

It held: "while the full protections that accompany challenges to detentions in other settings may
prove unworkable and inappropriate in the enemy-combatant setting, the threats to military operations
posed by a basic system of independent review are not so weighty as to trump a citizen's core rights to
challenge meaningfully the Government's case and to be heard by an impartial adjudicator." See 124
S. Ct., at 2650.
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explain the ROC criminal justice had adopted so many extremely inquisitorial
methods for the fact-finding process.

For instance, after the establishment of the

ROC, the ROC regime suffered many unstable societal and political circumstances. 383
Between 1949 and 1987, since the ROC regime did not terminate its war relation with
the PRC, the ROC on Taiwan enforced martial law and was in a state of siege.
According to Article 23 of the ROC Constitution, the ROC Legislative Yuan could
pass any law to prevent infringement upon the freedoms of other persons, to avert an
imminent crisis, to maintain social order or to advance public welfare.

In order to

effectively control the newly retroceded island and prepare the potential war with the
PRC, the ROC government passed many extremely inquisitorial laws authorizing the
military power and the police power to investigate any possible rebellion and treason.
Moreover, any association with the Communist Party was made a serious crime.
The long-term unstable environment caused the ROC government to ignore the need
of human rights protection.

Special criminal procedural laws instead of the ROC

Criminal Procedure Code had dominated the daily criminal justice practice.

Even as

recently as two decades ago, the Statute for Prevention of Gangster of 1985, designed
to incarcerate violent hoodlums, still authorized the police to arbitrarily classify a

383

These include the Domestic Warlord Period from 1917 to 1928, War with Japan and World War II
from 1931 to 1945, the Domestic War between KMT and CCP (the Chines Communist Party) from
1945 to 1949. See W. Scott Morton, supra note 60, 180-99.
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person as a gangster, to force him to appear before the police or arrest him without
warrant, to adopt a secret witness system, and to impose a rehabilitative program upon
him without any participation or surveillance of the prosecutor. 384

In a sense the

Statute was adopted in the name of maintaining social order and improving public
interests.
This study does not try to advocate the constitutionality of any adoption of
inquisitorial laws during unstable societal and political periods.

On the contrary, it

disagrees with these historical events which have seriously infringed upon human
rights protection.

Nevertheless, from a historical viewpoint, it looks unavoidable for

the government to adopt an inquisitorial process when dealing with seriously unstable
societal and political circumstances.

This comparative analysis just intends to

explain why the ROC criminal justice system had undergone so many inquisitorial
institutions under its specific historical background.

384

To some extent, the police play roles as the prosecutors do under this Statute. See the former
Articles 5, 6, 7, 12, and 21 of the Statute for Prevention of Gangster. The former Article 6 of the
Statute for Prevention of Gangster provided: "After a person is listed as a gangster and the
circumstances are serious, the police bureaus may subpoena him to appear without any warning. The
police may arrest the person who was subpoenaed but failed to appear." The former Article 7 of the
Statute for Prevention of Gangster provided: "Within a year after a person is listed as a gangster and
has been given such warning, the police bureaus may subpoena him to appear if he still meets any
condition as prescribed in any section of Article 2." Article 6 and Article 7 of the Statute for
Prevention of Gangsters allowed the police to arrest the person who was subpoenaed but failed to
appear, and for those who are committing the offenses, the police may arrest them without prior
subpoenas. Both of the above articles authorized the police the power to arrest people without prior
notice or warrants. The police then had the full discretion to decide whether to charge an individual
as a hoodlum because the suspect was deprived of the right to cross-examination the witness under the
secret witness system, which offered the police an opportunity to produce fake witness in order to
detain or incarcerate the suspect

513

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

5.5.4 The Unitary Trial
Unlike the Anglo-American system, both guilt and sentence are considered in a
single judicial process in Taiwan. 385

Under this unitary trial structure, usually "the

defendant's denials, if seen as false, would affect his sentence. " 386

It is true the

defendant has only one opportunity to show his remorse in order to reduce or mitigate
the possible

sen~ence.

Nonetheless, while the court must consider all mitigating

circumstances inquisitorially under Paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the ROC Criminal
Procedure Code and Article 57 of the ROC Criminal Law after guilt is found, rarely
have ROC trials seriously ad4ressed the sentence.

The defendant usually presents

any favorable evidence during any stage of the judicial process.

This does not

necessarily mean the defendant confesses guilt.
In a sense the defendant will have no chance to show remorse at trial if he denies
his guilt.

It is unreasonable, however, if the defendant denies guilt first, but is later

remorseful before the same decision maker. 387
guilt, he will never show remorse.

In practice, if the defendant denies

It is meaningless if a defendant is remorseful

without confession before the same decision maker.

While denying guilt is the only

way to be acquitted, the defendant will not confess guilt if he believes he is innocent.
385

See Myron Moskovitz, supra note 11, 1152.

386

Id., at 1153.

387

The ROC courts have to convict and sentence.
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It is also not necessary for the defendant to show remorse if the court fmds him
innocent.

On the contrary, while the bifurcated trial structure provides the defendant

a chance to deny guilt at trial but to repent of his wrong doings at the sentencing
phase, it seems to encourage the defendant to confuse the fact-finder even if he
strongly believes he is guilty.

In addition, if the defendant is truly innocent but is

unjustly convicted, it is unreasonable to expect him to show remorse because he
clearly knows he did nothing wrong.
insincere remorse.

The reduced sentence should not come from

The defendant should not be allowed to show his remorse if he

denies guilt, even the fact-finder is different from the decision maker of the sentence.
As a result, only when the defendant denies guilt will there be a pro-accusatorial trial,

pursuant to newly adopted 2003 legislation.
According to Article 449 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code, if the defendant
confesses guilt before the public prosecutor, the court can sentence him without
entering the trial process.

Usually the court will accept the suggested sentence

offered by the public prosecutor.

If the defendant confesses guilt during the

preliminary preparing process after prosecution, "the Simple Trial Process" applies
under Paragraph 1 of Article 273-1 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
is not bound by hearsay rule. 388

388

The court

The Simple Trial Process is merely about the

See Article 273-2 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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sentence since the defendant has already confessed.
defendant the opportunity to reduce his sentence.

These provisions provide the
Like a usual sentencing process,

the court inquisitorially decides cases under these provisions.
Since the court has to decide both the guilt and the sentence during a single trial
process, it is almost impossible to adopt a pure accusatorial and adversarial trial
process in which the court will inquisitorially decide the sentence.

In reality, the

defendant's personality is an important concern for the court as it determines an
appropriate sentence.389

In order to fully understand the person as much as possible

on trial, the court will explore the defendant's life and his criminal record, as well as
information in the dossier. 390

The unitary trial structure, thus, by its very nature
~·

prevents the ROC trials from being purely accusatorial and adversarial.

5.6 The Legal Assistance Act
Although the 2003 legislation adopts the exclusionary rule and hearsay rule, it is
meaningless for a defendant who lacks the necessary legal knowledge because he
knows nothing properly applying these rules to assure himself a fair trial.

It

becomes important to provide legal assistance for the defendant, especially the

389

See Renee Lettow Lerner, supra note 1356, 823.

39o

Id.
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indigent defendant who cannot afford a competent lawyer.

According to Paragraph

1 of Article 31 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code, providing for mandatory
defending situations, where no attorney has been retained, the presiding judge should
assign a private or public defense attorney to defend the accused at trial if the
minimum punishment is not less than three years, or if a high court takes jurisdiction
over the first instance of criminal cases,391 or if the accused cannot make a statement
at trial because of his mental status.

This rule also applies to other cases if

low-income accused wishes legal representation, or if the presiding judge considers it
necessary.

Nonetheless, this provision does not apply before prosecution.

Unlike

Faretta v. California, ruling that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of the
defendant to proceed "pro se," 392 the defendant has no right to proceed prose under
Paragraph 1 of Article 31 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code. 393
Different from their counterparts in the United States, the ROC public defense
attorneys, or public defenders, are judicial officers who are very well paid.
gain the position by passing the Public Defender Examination.

391

394

They

While the

According to Article 4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code, the high court bas jurisdiction of the
first instance of the following criminal case: (1) A offense against the internal security of the ROC; (2)
An offense against the external security of the ROC; (3) An offense of interference with relations with
other countries.
392

See 422 U.S. 806 (1975) .

393

See Jaw-Perng Wang, supra note 67, 22.

394

ld., at 23.
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Examination is rarely held and less than five persons passes the Examination each
time, currently there are less than fifty public defenders practicing in Taiwan.

It is

unrealistic to expect public defenders to assume the responsibility for assisting all
indigent defendants, especially after 2003. 395

Moreover, while the court only paid

the assigned lawyer (the assigned public defender) between USD 100.00 to 300.00
for each representation, which is much lower than the average attorney fee around
USD 1800 for each case, rarely did privately practicing lawyers voluntarily accept the
court's assignments. Even those accepting the court's offers would often not
provide high quality legal service.
On December 23rd, 2003, the ROC Legislative Yuan passed the Legal Assistance
Act.

According to Paragraph 1 of Article 14 of the Legal Assistance Act, while no

attorney has been retained, the accused at trial can apply for legal assistance without
any review if the minimum punishment is not less than three years, or if a high court
takes jurisdiction over the first instance of criminal cases.

According to Paragraph 2

of Article 14 of the Legal Assistance Act, the accused can also apply for legal
assistance without any review if he cannot make a complete statement at trial because
of his mental status and. the presiding judge considers it necessary.

Beside these

non-reviewable situations, any defendant or victim of a criminal case can apply for

39

s In a sense the 2003 legislation requires higher legal skills of the defense party.
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The district branch of the Legal Assistance Association,

composed of judges, public prosecutors, lawyers, law professors, and other legal
experts, decides all reviewable applications. 397

While the retained lawyer is better

paid by the public association than the past, between USD 600.00 to 2000.00,
depending on the difficulty and complication of the case,398 he will be punished if his
legal assistance is below standard quality. 399

Most importantly, the Legal Assistance

Association has access to a nearly inexhaustible fund totally some USD three-hundred
million dollars.

In fact, the Legal Assistance Act provides the indigent defendant

better, broader, and more effective legal assistance than in that required by Paragraph
1 of Article 31 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

Especially when the indigent

defendant denies guilt and a trial is mandatory, he can expect a fair trial with timely,
necessary, meaningful, and effective legal assistance, which will accusatorially and
adversarially carry out the legislative goal of the exclusionary rule and hearsay rule.
The Legal Assistance Act favors an adversarial and accusatorial adjudicating process.

396

See Paragraph 1 of Article 16 of the Legal Assistance Act

397

See Article 47 of the Legal Assistance Act

398

See Article 28 of the Legal Assistance Act

399

See Article 27 of the Legal Assistance Act
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Chapter Six: Conclusions and Recommendation
6.1 The ROC Criminal Justice System Under the 2003 Legislation
As to the purpose of a continental-based criminal justice system, Professor
Mirjan Damaska once stated "the idea that criminal proceedings could be justifiably
used for purposes other than those of establishing the truth and enforcing the
substantive criminal law is simply not part of the continental legal tradition.'' 1597
Unlike the United States, while finding the truth remains the most important concern
in the ROC criminal justice system, 1598 without any persuasive justification, it is not
easy for the court to exclude reliable and trustworthy evidence even though human
rights protection is also important.

It is still questionable if the people of Taiwan

would accept a pure accusatorial and adversarial criminal justice system which could
result in an OJ Simpson-like case in which the acquitted defendant was arguably
guilty.

Moreover, different from the American Bill of Rights which defines human

rights in more detail, the continental constitutional approach to human rights
protection does not clearly provide what human rights should include.

It is more

difficult to draw upon the ROC Constitution itself to determine what rights are
specifically constitutionally protected.

While persuasive justification to exclude

reliable and trustworthy evidence results largely from obvious constitutional
1597

See Mirjan Damaska, supra note 1381,4.

1598

See Paragraph 2 of Article 163 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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violations, it is more difficult for the court to justify any exclusion of incarcerating
evidence especially when the contents of the constitutional rights in a continental style
constitution are less clear.

Thus, courts in Taiwan have to explain more fully their

exercising the balancing test and why they are excluding evidence, through either the
exclusionary rule or the hearsay rule, than do courts in the United States.

1599

While

courts in Taiwan are required to find the truth, especially under the newly amended
Article 55 of the ROC Criminal Law, it is impossible to adopt an Anglo-American
trial system as the fact-finding process.

Besides, the unitary trial structure and its

accompanying inquisitorial nature of sentencing also distinguish the ROC trial
proceeding from its United States counterpart.

Based upon these differences, any

legal reform in the ROC criminal justice system will not result in a pure accusatorial
and adversarial trial process.

The 2003 reform of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code

thus was properly titled "Pro-Accusatorial" in that merely adopting the exclusionary
rule and the hearsay rule would not totally deprive it of its inquisitorial characteristics.
While the 2003 legislation did not completely change the inquisitorial nature of
the ROC criminal justice system, that legislation has considerable significance in the
ROC criminal justice system.
1599

Although it is unclear whether the previous ROC

In a sense courts in the United States merely have to apply the totality-of-the-circumstances test to
explain whether the governmental activity is illegal. After Crawford. the admissibility of the
testimonial hearsay depends on the accused's opportunity to be cross-examined. These processes of
excluding evidence via the exclusionary rule or the hearsay rule in the United States are more easily
executed than those in the ROC.
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criminal justice system would unavoidably spawn injustices like those of the Hsichih
murder case, 1600 the newly adopted exclusionary rule and the hearsay rule will, to
some extent, prevent the repeating of similar mistakes.

With these new rules, the

defense party gains the legal status to challenge the admissibility of evidence and to
actively participate in the trial process.

Unlike as in the past, the court now has to

decide admissibility through the adversarial process before closing the case.

Even

though the court is still allowed to exercise its inquisitorial power to consider
evidence not presented by the parties, no longer is the admissibility of an out-of-court
statement merely subject to the court's discretionary power.

At least for the·hearsay

evidence presented by the law-enforcement-officers, the court cannot admit it without
explaining why it is more reliable. 1601

Since out-of-court statements of the

law-enforcement-officers are not automatically admissible into evidence at trial, it is
less possible to see the injustice of the Hsichih murder case in the future.

In a sense

the exclusionary rule and the hearsay rule derived from the Anglo-American criminal
justice system are deemed better for protecting the accused's rights at trial than the
traditional ROC inquisition.

As a result, providing the defendant the rights to

challenge the admissibility of the illegally-obtained evidence and the out-of-court

1600

In practice the injustice might also derive from the corruption, laziness, or stupidity of those who
ran the criminal justice system.
1601

See Articles 159-2 to 159-3 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.
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statements is itself the most significant achievement of the 2003 pre-accusatorial
legislation.
This study extensively introduces the related developments of the exclusionary
rule and the hearsay rule in Taiwan as well as their counterparts in the United States.
After examining the rules in both nations, it is apparent that different developments of
the exclusionary rule and the hearsay rule evolved from different legal cultures and
historical experiences.

In a sense the American colonial history has contributed

immensely to the United States' peculiar accusatorial and adversarial judicial system.
The parties are responsible for investigating the facts and producing evidence at
trial. 1602

Participation of citizens via services on juries in the judicial system is

designed to be a meaningful check against governmental arbitrariness on the judiciary.
This practice intentionally furthers the federal system which focuses on decentralized
democracy.

While the colonial history of Taiwan did not result in the serious distrust

of the governmental powers, even the court has not, in every case, been able to
discover the truth more accurately than Anglo-American courts.

No draft really

intends to replace the professional judges of any other persons as the fact-finders
except for the recently proposed Draft of partly empanelling the court with the
participating expert judges. 1603

In all probability, the 2003 legislation merely reflects

1602

See Renee Lettow Lerner, supra note 1356, 797.

1603

Nonetheless, unlike the United States, the Draft does not come from the need to further

523

From Inquisitorial to Accusatorial?

the purpose to correct the defects in the previous ROC criminal justice system by
referring to the accusatorial and adversarial trial system.

The current ROC criminal

procedure still remains its inquisitorial characteristics to some extent.

This study

further concludes with the following viewpoints and suggestions.

6.2 The Suitable Viewpoint of the ROC Exclusionary Rule
In the accusatorial system, like the United States, the criminal justice practice is
much more party-influenced or party-oriented than the hierarchically controlled
continental criminal justice system in Taiwan.

Arguably, "Americans view the state

with suspicion and the law as their shield against official transgressions, who expect
'total justice': compensation for every harm suffered, observance of due process when
their rights are at stake." 1604

Under this viewpoint, the prosecutor is assumed to be

responsible for any violation of constitutional human rights protection conducted by
the police and will lose his case while important evidence is excluded; the victim of
any violation of constitution hence will benefit from the exclusionary rule.

On the

contrary, in a jurisdiction without this accusatorial and adversarial tradition, like
Taiwan, the public prosecutor is not merely regarded as a party. 1605

decentralized democracy.
1604

See Kuk Cho, supra note 1214, 298.

1605

See Renee Lettow Lerner, supra note 1356, 797.

And the victim
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of any violation of the constitution will not automatically benefit from any
misconduct of his "opposing party" through the exclusionary rule.

Thus, the

exclusionary rule does not derive from the idea that the public prosecutor should be
In addition, the exclusionary rule is not

responsible for the police misconduct.

designed to be a mechanism from which the victim is entitled to benefit.

Allowing

illegally-obtained evidence admissibility at trial does not necessarily evade the feeling
of criminal "justice."
While there emerged three main legal problems after promulgating Article 158-4
of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code, this study tries to provide resolutions from both
systematic and comparative viewpoints.

The ROC legal system only allows the

Grand Justice Council (the Constitution Court) to outlaw any effective positive law.
Ordinary courts cannot ignore an enacted provision by interpreting it in a totally
opposmg way.

Since the newly enacted Article 158-4 of the ROC Criminal

Procedure Code and the Taipei High Court's decision, 92 Sun E 1812, held after this
legislation, exclude evidence illegally obtained by law-enforcement-officers only, 1606
the exclusionary rule should not apply to illegal activities made by private persons
and non- law-enforcement-officers.

This suggestion is reasonable not only because

the exclusionary rule is designed to be a remedy for violation of human rights
1606

Although whether the Taiwanese Supreme Court will uphold this new ruling remains to be seen,
this legislative and judicial trend is obviously distinct from the Taiwan High Court's former ruling in
the 1999 adultery case, 88 Sun E 1953.

, I
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protection but also because constitutional human rights are initially created to prevent
illegal invasions from governmental activities.

In addition, in the United States,

Mapp and Leon focus primarily on governmental misconduct.
Even though different constitutional approaches to human rights protection have
resulted in different developments of the exclusionary rule, the same outcome of
excluding, or not, might have derived from different philosophies regarding utilization
of the exclusionary rule.

In determining the reasonableness, as well as recognizing

and creating another exception to the exclusionary rule, the United States approach
might have reached the same result of whether to exclude evidence as the ROC
approach might result in by applying the balance.

Because considerations behind the

discretionary power to exclude evidence are similar in both Taiwan and the United
States, the ROC courts consider the totality-of-the-circumstances test set out in Gates
in deciding the constitutionality of illegal governmental activities.

Applying Gates

in Taiwan will make the country's exclusionary practice less abstract.

As a

consequence, the different outcomes between the exclusionary rules between Taiwan
and the United States would possibly become lesser, and perhaps eventually there
would be no discemable difference.

To some extent, Mapp applies to Taiwan

especially where merely trivial differences between these two approaches of
exercising the discretionary power of the exclusionary rule are found after employing
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It remains a difficult task to decide which

approach is more predictable of outcomes; nonetheless, it is of some scholarly interest
to conclude this comparative study with these suggestions about the exclusionary rule.

6.3 The Proper Evaluation of the ROC Hearsay Rule
To be sure, evidence law governs trial procedure in the accusatorial and
adversarial system.

While it is impossible to admit only in-court statements into

evidence at trial, the hearsay rule provides the parties with a clear guideline as to how
to get the out-of-court statements into evidence.
Sixth Amendment's right of confrontation.

The hearsay rule does ensure the

Nonetheless, under Crawford, the

hearsay rule cannot replace cross-examination in assessing the reliability of
out-of-court statements.

The prosecutor is responsible for any violation of the

constitutional right of confrontation1607 and could lose the case on account of
important evidence being excluded; meanwhile the victim of any violation of the
Constitution Clause will benefit from the exclusionary and hearsay rules.
Although the 2003 hearsay rule refers to the Federal Rules of Evidence, perhaps
the different style of legislating the hearsay rule in the ROC Criminal Procedure Code

1607

For example, Crawford only admits testimonial out-of-court statements under hearsay into
evidence at trial. If the prosecutor or the law-enforcement-officers do not have the out-of-court
declarant to make a statement under cross-examination, and if the declarant does not testify at trial, his
testimonial out-of-court statement will be inadmissible.
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results from the pro-civil-law idea that a public prosecutor is much more than a party.
Without a heavy distrust, derived from the Raleigh trial, in the judicial officials, 1608 as
well as the bifurcated trial structure, the ROC hearsay rule creates a pro-inquisitorial
exception, Article 159-1 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code, based mainly on the
court's discretionary power.

In addition, although Articles 159-2 to 159-4 of the

ROC Criminal Procedure Code provide the defendant the procedural right to
challenge the admissibility of out-of-court statements, they also allow the court to
exercise its discretionary power in assessing the reliability and determining the
admissibility of the out-of-court statements.

Like Roberts suggested,

cross-examination is merely a preferred method, not the only method, to assess the
reliability of out-of-court statements. 1609

Consequently, in Taiwan, admitting

out-of-court testimonial statements, with no cross-examination, into evidence at trial
does not necessarily result in the feeling of criminal "injustice."

1608

As stated in Crawford. "We have no doubt that the courts below were acting in utmost good faith
when they found reliability. The Framers, however, would not have been content to indulge this
assumption. They knew that judges, like other government officers, could not always be trusted to
safeguard the rights of the people; the likes of the dread Lord Jeffi'eys were not yet too distant a
memory. They were loath to leave too much discretion in judicial hands." See 124 S. Ct, at 1373.
1609

The Court held: "The historical evidence leaves little doubt, however, that the Clause was intended
to exclude some hearsay. Moreover, underlying policies support the same conclusion. The Court
has emphasized that the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at
trial, and that 'a primary interest secured by [the provision] is the right of cross-examination.' ... The
Court, however, has recognized that competing interests, if 'closely examined,' may warrant dispensing
with confrontation at trial.. .. This Court, in a series of cases, has sought to accommodate these
competing interests. True to the common-law tradition, the process has been gradual, building on past
decisions, drawing on new experience, and responding to changing conditions. The Court has not
sought to ' map out a theory of the Confrontation Clause that would determine the validity of all ...
hearsay exceptions.' But a general approach to the problem is discernible." See 448 U.S., at 63-5.
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This study concludes that the ROC hearsay rule includes both inquisitorial and
adversarial exceptions.

As the court is still acting as a fact-finder under Articles 55

and 56 of the ROC Criminal Law and Paragraph 2 of Article 163 of the ROC
Criminal Procedure Code, and is required to justify its fact-finding in written, the
accusatorial adjudicatory model and its accompanying rules of evidence should not
completely apply in Taiwan without some degree of harmonization.

For example,

although not all hearsay exceptions in the Federal Rules of Evidence have been
incorporated into Articles 159-2 to 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code,
which stem from common law rules of evidence, Article 159-1 of the ROC Criminal
Procedure Code provides the court the legal authority to admit any out-of-court
statement presented by the parties.

Moreover, Paragraph 2 of Article 163 of the

ROC Criminal Procedure Code allows the court to admit any out-of-court statement
presented by the parties if the court finds the statement has guarantees of
trustworthiness and if the out-of-court statement is inadmissible according to Articles
159-2 to 159-4 ofthe ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

On the contrary, while the

court collects and investigat~s evidence ex officio, no hearsay rule should apply
because then the court is applying its inquisitorial power. In theory, this inquisitorial
power to find the truth should not be subject to any accusatoriallimitation. 1610
1610

It is

In other words, in theory, the court still can employ its inquisitorial power to find the truth ex
officio even when the specific truth-finding approach is not allowed as an accusatorial hearsay
exception.
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worthy to note, that under the accusatorial hearsay rule, the court cannot admit
verbatim transcripts made during police interrogation into evidence if the declarant is
not present at trial because Article 159-2 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code
already excludes it in principle. 1611

This study suggests that, under its inquisitorial

power, the court can admit the out-of-court statements not excluded by Articles 159-2
to 159-3 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

A hearsay exception provided in

FRE 803 or 804 but not in Articles 159-2 to 159-4 of the ROC Criminal Procedure
Code might be admissible under either Article 159-1 or Paragraph 2 of Article 163 of
the ROC Criminal Procedure Code.

Interestingly, it is not clear how the court should

exercise this inquisitorial power to uncover a fact when neither of the parties presents
any information about it.

Nonetheless, at least, while the fact-finder will inevitably

hear all kinds of evidence after indictment, which might provide the court with
necessary information to exercise its inquisitorial power to investigate evidence, the
hearsay practice in Taiwan should be more flexible than its U.S. counterpart.
The hearsay practice in Taiwan is not identical to its counterpart in the United
States.

While the ROC hearsay rule provides the defendant a procedural right to

challenge the admissibility of the out-of-court statements and requires the prosecutor

1611

This is because the ROC legal system only allows the Grand Justice Council to outlaw any
effective positive law, and ordinary courts can not ignore an enacted provision by interpreting it as they
wish.
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to be present at trial to respond to this challenge, establishing the common law
hearsay rule within the ROC criminal justice system is not meaningless.

In fact,

however, it is less meaningful, rather than meaningless, for the ROC criminal justice
system to adopt this common law hearsay rule than for the United States where the
trial structure is bifurcated, and where the parties are responsible for presentation of
evidence, and where the fact-finder is not required to explain in writing why a
particular decision was made.

If the ROC criminal justice system intends to build a

more accusatorial and adversarial trial practice similar, not identical, to its counterpart
in the United States, it might be possible to restrict the court to exercising its
inquisitorial power in evidence investigation so that the parties, in most cases, are
responsible for presentation of evidence.

Nonetheless, it is impossible to prevent the

ROC courts from hearing inadmissible evidence that might influence its
decision-making and provide it sufficient and necessary information to exercise its
inquisitorial power to investigate evidence ex officio.

If the court learns that the

inadmissible hearsay might possibly result in the material truth, it would be difficult
for the court to stop investigating evidence ex officio since it has to justify its decision
in writing which will be scrutinized in appeal.

Of course, it is fair to say the

narrower Paragraph 2 of Article 163 of the ROC Criminal Procedure Code and
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Articles 55 and 56 of the ROC Criminal Law include 1612 what the less inquisitorial
and more accusatorial and adversarial trial process in Taiwan will look like.

This

study is unable to suggest how to restrict the inquisitorial power of the court to
investigate evidence ex officio because that requires further empirical analysis of
judicial decisions under the newly enacted Article 55 of the ROC Criminal Law.

6.4 The Recommended Expert Evidence System: the Blue Ribbon Expert Jury

It is obvious the current ROC expert evidence system is defective.

As shown in

Ms. Zhang's fraud case, whether the respective knowledge is admissible into evidence
at trial is up to the court's arbitrary power.

Ironically, the court usually lacks the

necessary background to determine if expert testimony is helpful in finding the truth.
Judicial decisions are thus unreasonable and unpredictable regarding complex
scientific or technical disputes.

Moreover, while the court has to justify its

fact-finding in written judgments, it has to largely draw upon expert's written
opinions to make those judgments.

This practice often results in the court

abandoning its judicial power to experts.

In order to correct this disadvantage, the

ROC lawmakers are drafting an Act which empanels the court with both professional
and participating non-professional judges.

1612

Nonetheless, this proposed draft does not

Only the newly enacted Article 55 of the ROC Criminal Law will be applicable on July I 51 2006.
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completely resolve the institutional defect in the current ROC expert evidence system.
It is not a good idea to ask professional judges to decide complex scientific or
technical issues because it is difficult for them to master the disputed issue during the
course of trial.

Instead of adopting the proposed draft, this study suggests that the

ROC lawmakers should adopt the "Blue Ribbon Expert Jury" to resolve highly
complex scientific or technical issues.

With this institution, the professional judges

will no longer be responsible for justifying, in writing, their factual investigation and
conclusions, into matters beyond their personal knowledge.

Additionally, a blue

ribbon expert jury will also help the fact-fmding process, concerning complex
scientific or technical issues, become more meaningful.

Of course, it does not

necessarily mean the accusatorial and adversarial process is always better than an
inquisitorial proceeding in any other way.

This study suggests that it is only because

the blue ribbon jury is a more fruitful and reasonable fact-finding institution.

It is

assumed to lack most disadvantages in the current ROC criminal justice system when
courts find themselves facing highly complex scientific or technical issues.

I

ROC Codes
Criminal Law
Article 55: If one act constitutes several unlike offenses or the means employed or the
results of the commission of one offense constitute another unlike offense, only the
most severe of the prescribed punishments shall be imposed.
Article 56: If several successive acts constitute like offenses, such successive acts
may be considered to be one offense, but the punishment prescribed for such offense
may be increased up to one half.

Criminal Procedure
Article 158-4: Unless otherwise provided by law, whether evidence derivative from
violation of procedure rule conducted by government officers should be excluded in a
criminal case depends on the result of balancing human right protection of the
defendant against the public interest.
Paragraph 1 of Article 159: Unless otherwise provided by law, any out-of-court verbal
statement derivative from anyone other than the defendant himself shall be
inadmissible.
Paragraph 1 of Article 159-1: If an out-of-court verbal statement derived from anyone
other than the defendant is made before a judge, it is admissible because of its reliable
vol untariness.
Paragraph 2 of Article 159-1: Without obvious unbelievable circumstances,
out-of-court verbal statements derived from anyone other than the defendant made
before a public prosecutor is also admissible.
Article 159-2: While an out-of-court verbal statement derived from anyone other than
the defendant made before any law-enforcement-officer is inconsistent with the same
declarant's statement at trial, the former inconsistent statement is admissible if the
court finds the previous statement is more reliable and it is necessary to use the
previous statement to prove the truth of the asserted matters.

II

Article 15 9-3 : If the declarant is unavailable to stand trial in that he is dead, has a
mental disorder, loses his memory, is incapable of talking, is living abroad, lost, or
refuses to make a statement without justification, the former out-of-court verbal
statement derived from anyone other than the defendant made before any
law-enforcement-officer is admissible too when the court finds the out-of-court
statement is more reliable and it is necessary to use the out-of-court statement prove
the truth of the asserted matters.
Article159-4: Besides the out-of-court verbal statements, either public records and
reports or business records of regular activity are admissible in evidence unless
obviously unbelievable circumstances exist.

Accordingly, a residual clause

admitting any other document made in reliable circumstance is also adopted.
Paragraph 1 of Article 159-5: Within the scope of inadmissible hearsay, while both
parties accept out-of-court statement in evidence at trial, hearsay is admissible only if
the court finds it proper after considering the given situation where it was made.

Constitution
Article 7: All citizens of the Republic of China, irrespective of sex, religion, race,
class, or party affiliation, shall be equal before the law.
Article 8: Personal freedom shall be guaranteed to the people.

Except in case of

flagrante delicto as provided by law, no person shall be arrested or detained otherwise
than by a judicial or a police organ in accordance with the procedure prescribed by
law.

No person shall be tried or punished otherwise than by a law court in

accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.

Any arrest, detention, trial, or

punishment which is not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law may be
resisted.

When a person is arrested or detained on suspicion of having committed a

crime, the organ making the arrest or detention shall in writing inform the said person,
and his designated relative or friend, of the grounds for his arrest or detention, and
shall, within 24 hours, turn him over to a competent court for trial.

The said person,

or any other person, may petition the competent court that a writ be served within 24
hours on the organ making the arrest for the surrender of the said person for trial.
The court shall not reject the petition mentioned in the preceding paragraph, nor shall
it order the organ concerned to make an investigation and report first. The organ
concerned shall not refuse to execute, or delay in executing, the writ of the court for

III

the surrender of the said person for trial.

When a person is unlawfully arrested or

detained by any organ, he or any other person may petition the court for an
investigation.

The court shall not reject such a petition, and shall, within 24 hours,

investigate the action of the organ concerned and deal with the matter in accordance
with law.
Article 10: The people shall have freedom of residence and of change of residence.
Article 11: The people shall have freedom of speech, teaching, writing and
publication.
Article 12: The people shall have freedom of privacy of correspondence.
Article 13: The people shall have freedom of religious belief.
Article 14: The people shall have freedom of assembly and association.
Article 15: The right of existence, the right to work and the right of property shall be
guaranteed to the people.
Article 16: The people shall have the right of presenting petitions, lodging complaints,
or instituting legal proceedings.
Article 17: The people shall have the right of election, recall, initiative and
referendum.
Article 18: The people shall have the right of taking public examinations and of
holding public offices.
Article 19: The people shall have the duty of paying taxes in accordance with law.
Article 20: The people shall have the duty of performing military service in
accordance with law.
Article 21: The people shall have the right and the duty of receiving citizens'
education.
Article 22: All other freedoms and rights of the people that are not detrimental to

IV

social order or public welfare shall be guaranteed under the Constitution.
Article 23: All the freedoms and rights enumerated in the preceding Articles shall not
be restricted by law except such as may be necessary to prevent infringement upon the
freedoms of other persons, to avert an imminent crisis, to maintain social order or to
advance public welfare.
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